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PRIESTHOOD OF BELIEVERS

by The Rev. Professor G. D. HENDERSON

Writers belonging to various Christian denominations have recently had much to say about the Laity and their privileges and responsibilities within the Church. It is plain that the Church is unthinkable apart from membership, and this membership consists largely of laymen. We are, however, painfully conscious that for the majority connexion with the Church is vague, and it seems natural to speculate whether deeper sympathy might not be roused if membership more clearly carried with it a real share in a life of obvious activity. The Calvinistic Reformers made serious efforts in this direction, with reference both to Worship and to Government, and corresponding strategy is everywhere needed today, for nothing will occupy a prominent place in a man's heart that does not make an appreciable demand upon his attention and supply him with agreeable outlets for his energy. Experience teaches the observant minister that he must offer church-people something definite to do, something that will bring out their capabilities and promote the exercise of their gifts, stir their pride and stimulate loyal sentiments and render fellowship interesting and action rewarding. Being busy about a church is not being religious; but religion will have a better chance with the ordinary person as the Church forces itself to a higher place on the list of his priorities. Both rights and obligations ought to be underlined.

Again, the burden of the Christian ministry is in our time more plainly than ever too heavy. The seriousness and difficulty of the calling have been recognised in every age; but when we observe the scarcity of candidates we may well be led to ask whether the conditions of service have not become almost intolerable. There is a limit to the place of mortification in the Christian life. The cure of souls will always be an exacting task; but it was early in the history of the Church when the Apostles protested that their attention was being distracted from this

primary duty by what they called serving tables. A Swedish parish priest must give much time to what might be classified as civil service work, and elsewhere there have been times when the minister of religion had largely to maintain himself by his labours on the land. In the Scottish ministry conditions have been more favourable; but discouragement has certainly come from the multitude of interruptions to the important functions of study and personal pastoral care. So many of the demands are far from being such as require the kind and amount of intellectual and spiritual discipline to which the candidate for the ministry has hopefully submitted himself. Might not some of the work at present done directly by ministers be undertaken by lay men and women; indeed, recognising the defects of all professionalism, more effectively accomplished by them, if they were given some training and could be assisted to find time for such ministry? The minister should be able and willing to delegate, and congregations should learn to understand and accept this procedure, not leaving quite so much of their religion and so many of the associated activities to be performed by the ordained clergyman and reserved for this official as his right and duty. There are certain offices for which congregations will feel they pay ministers to be responsible; but not only should the laity be taught to see opportunities for Christian witness wherever they go, but more instruction would seem to be required for some of them in public prayer, the basic truths of Christianity, the Church's experience revealed in history and biography, the main principles of their own denomination. In particular it is widely felt that the laity could do more, and should be trained and trusted to do more, of the evangelical work that is so urgently needed in these days of general spiritual ignorance and confusion. Erasmus complained how the common people handed religion over to ecclesiastics 'as if themselves were no part of the Church or that their vow in baptism had lost its obligation'. The sharp distinction often drawn between clergy and laity naturally encouraged such conduct.

A further reason for the new prominence given to this matter of the spiritual witness of the laity may be the better understanding of Christian principles to which the Church has latterly attained. Human love is an outcome from a process of sublimation of animal instinct, and so the personal and self-centred

need of sustenance basic to the idea of property and leading to exploitation individual and national may by sublimation have produced a new consciousness of responsibility, in citizenship, in world affairs, in missionary and social outlook, and in connexion with Church membership. Also, the Churches have been driven by recent experience to much rethinking, and one result has been that they have to some extent freed themselves from growths of irrelevance and triviality, both theological and practical. In any case the conviction that the laity must have a greater share in the work of the Church involves an appreciation of the real Christian spirit, of what it means to be a Christian.

These points have been noted by way of introduction to an examination of the idea of the priesthood of all believers and a statement of certain interpretations that have been given of it and some reflections induced by present spiritual and ecclesiastical conditions.

Biblical evidence for the doctrine is clear. Israel is represented (Exod. 19.6) as 'a kingdom of priests and an holy nation', and this has its New Testament echo in 'a royal priesthood' (1 Pet. 2.9) and 'kings and priests unto God' (Rev. 1.6), while Psalm 110, the Epistle to the Hebrews, verses like Rom. 12.1 and other passages not so patently relevant, have played their part. Both the corporate priesthood which we associate with the view of the Church as the Body of Christ, and the individual priesthood attributable to each person as a member of that Body, are thus brought to notice. The priesthood of the Church as such has been discussed in the light of patristic teaching, by Lightfoot, Bigg, T. M. Lindsay, Charles Gore, the last bringing together important passages from the writings of Leo the Great, Augustine and later Christian authors, which bear witness to this conception of a sacerdotal community. St. Paul's frequent use of the image of the Body of Christ has had decisive influence, this particular metaphor having been given outstanding, possibly undue, prominence, now with reference to unity, now with reference to fellowship.

The emphasis on unity fits in with the thought and practice of our time. Thus the Church is sometimes called a perpetuation of the Incarnation, the body which takes the place of Christ's earthly body and through which He furthers His will

in the world, an idea long familiar to Romanists and more widely accepted since Möhler's advocacy of it (1832), and known not only to those of Catholic tendency but to a certain type of Scots Presbyterian. The fact that Jesus at the Last Supper spoke of the bread as His 'body' has perhaps confused the issue. Sacerdotalism is encouraged, and the Church may thus become an idol substituted for the only Redeemer, though there is a useful reminder that 'once for all' does not refer to something which, because historical, is past and ended, but to something achieved and perpetually effective and dynamical.

Modern psychology recognises that a community may be a real unit as contrasted with a mere aggregate, and there is wide agreement that the Church is to be regarded as a priestly institution. There is evidence of this, for example, in the words of different speakers at the 1899 Conference on *Priesthood and Sacrifice* reported by W. Sanday, while Gordon Rupp in attributing to Luther the idea of Christian solidarity, calls attention to the same conception as implied in the German 'Guilt Declaration' of October 1945. One has also to note the influence of Eph. 4 and of the metaphor of the Bride. Altogether there is clearly something to be gained from thinking of the Church making its communion, its sacrifice, its thanksgiving, its memorial, its worship, in unity. The Church as a whole stands for holiness, glorifying God before the world through obedience to Christ its Head, and through works in which the divine Spirit is applied to world conditions. The Church is priestly in its intercession for all men, as is brought out so early as the Apology of Aristides. The position is well stated by Dean Selwyn in words reminiscent of Schleiermacher: 'The Christian Church is a priesthood, because it bears the same relation to mankind as a whole, as the Jewish priesthood bore to the whole people of Israel.'

It is only as members of the Body that individual Christians may claim priestly character. They are initiated into this by baptism: 'sacerdotium laici', as Jerome called it. Baptism, said Père Charles de Condren (1643) 'nous incorpore au sacerdoce royal'. Members of 'gathered Churches' could agree. Augustine in his allegorical fashion in the *City of God*, finds Scripture for the people constituting a priesthood, presenting their bodies a living sacrifice. Calvin, like Cyprian, made very plain that one cannot be a Christian apart from the fellowship of the

organised Church: only through its instrumentality is one born of God and reared to Christian manhood; as Kolfhaus states the matter: 'Calvin weiss von keinem Christen "an und für sich" . . . er kennt ihn nur als Glied.' The elect are united in Christ, depending on one Head, and so compacted into one body, made one by their common faith.

That each Church member is in some sense a priest is the message of Scripture, for example, the Greek of Rev. 1.6, and was stressed by Tertullian, Origen and Leo the Great as well as by Thomas Aquinas. Early Christians witnessed by martyrdom and by their moral standards. Eastern Orthodoxy as described by Stanley and as represented by Bulgakov (1927) and Alivisatos (1937) has never ceased to recognise the doctrine, holding that the relation of cleric and layman is 'a relation of mutual help and of unity within the *sobornost'*, and naming Confirmation as the layman's sacrament of ordination. To Luther in the early days of his struggle with Rome the idea of the priesthood of believers naturally made a peculiar appeal. He found himself driven after the Leipzic disputation to reject the whole authoritative hierarchical system according to which grace was conveyed only through the sacraments administered by clergy episcopally ordained, a doctrine which laid all the weight upon validity and works as against effectiveness and faith, the power to withhold grace being a particularly offensive feature. He rejected the priesthood of what might be called the Aaronic or hereditary type associated with a religion of external ceremonial, and laid emphasis upon the spiritual nature of priesthood and sacrifice.

Luther taught the universal priesthood of the faithful in his three famous Tractates of 1520 and in his *de Instituendis Ministris* of 1523. All Christians are alike priests. Everything depends upon the Priesthood of Christ which is shared by us in virtue of our communion with Him through faith: Luther notes the analogy of the oneness of husband and wife which gives them all things in common. As fellow-priests with Christ we have access to God and may do all things which we see done and figured in the visible and corporeal office of priesthood. We are worthy to appear before God, to pray for others, and to teach one another. The Church is the Communion of Saints who have an obligation of mutual charity; brotherly service

within the Christian community is involved, not excluding responsibility for discipline. There is a close connexion between the doctrine of justification by faith and that of the universal priesthood. Luther asserts that the common work of a servant, a husbandman, a woman in her kitchen, is more acceptable to God than all the fastings and works of a priest when these are unaccompanied by faith. The doctrine of vocation thus emerges, work for God in one's ordinary calling. Worldly duties are not to be contrasted with and do not interrupt communion with God, for He accepts as 'good work' 'walking, standing, eating, drinking, sleeping', and whatever is necessary to nourish the body and for common use, such activities being only properly understood when regarded as an offering to God.

But he proceeds beyond this into the sphere of more official priestly function. Thus he speaks of the power of absolution as given to every believer to whom a brother makes confession. He goes very far indeed in his assertion that the Christian as such has priestly rights in connexion with teaching, preaching the Word, baptising, consecrating and administering the Eucharist, binding and loosing in case of sin, prayer for others, sacrificing in the sense of 1 Pet. 2.5 and Rom. 12.1, and judgment in doctrinal and spiritual matters. Since all were priests, great power was allowed to Christian political and civil authorities, for example in the matter of calling Church Councils; and since there was now no separate Canon Law, the laity had naturally responsibility for educational and social problems and matters of discipline to an entirely new extent: by-product attitudes which have seriously affected spiritual independence in Germany ever since. The general Biblical view of the universal priesthood was likewise plainly expressed by Melanchthon near the close of his *Loci Communes*, and was strongly asserted by Bucer in more writings than one and in his practical efforts to give laymen a share in the cure of souls.

Calvin does not use the phrase 'priesthood of all believers'. Authorities differ as to the significance of this. Dr Niesel in *Die Theologie Calvins* declares that while the idea of the Church as the Body of Christ is fundamental with Calvin, the thought of the universal priesthood 'keine Rolle bei ihm spielt'. J. M. Ross of the English Presbyterian Church insists on the same point. A. J. Bronkhorst in Holland supports this view, empha-

sising the direct agency of Christ in the matter of ecclesiastical offices (Eph. 4.11) as against the attitude of Dutch Seceders. Bohatec asserts firmly that the general priesthood is taught by Calvin quite as energetically as by Luther, and Wendel in France appears to take this for granted. August Lang probably states the exact position when he maintains that though Calvin gives no formal constitutional expression to the doctrine, he makes more effective use of it than does Luther and this through the place which Election takes in his system. Even here, however, there is difficulty, for both Luther and Calvin in trying to avoid alike the dangers of the Roman view and those of the Anabaptist teaching, remain somewhat vaguely comprehensive as to the relation of Faith to Order, and neither is explicit as to the meaning of the word 'Believer'.

Calvin makes frequent reference to Biblical utterances as to the Body of Christ and the spiritual priesthood of Christians. Already in the first edition of the *Institutio* (1536) he applies Psalms 45 and 89 to Christ, noting His anointing and how of His fulness we have received (John 1.16) and are 'ejus consortes ac participes', so that we are kings with Him (1 Pet. 2), and, as He is priest satisfying the Father on our behalf by His sacrifice, we are priests in Him, and in Him our intercessor and mediator we offer prayers and thanksgivings and ourselves and all that is ours, being anointed according to Isa. 61 and named 'the priests of the Lord'. The Geneva Catechism of 1537 speaks of Christ as King and Priest as did Augustine; but that of 1545 sums up the work of Christ in these words: 'He was anointed by the Father to be a King, Priest and Prophet', words which show Him in the offices through which among men God furthered His will, and which emphasise sovereignty, atonement and the Word. The 1559 edition of the *Institutio* devotes a chapter to discuss Christ's offices of 'prophet, king and priest', and says: 'We, though in ourselves polluted, in him being priests (Rev. 1.6), offer ourselves and our all to God, and freely enter the heavenly sanctuary, so that the sacrifices of prayer and praise which we present are grateful and of sweet odour before him', we being clothed with His holiness. The Heidelberg Catechism (1563), the Scots catechisms of John Craig (1581) and John Davidson (1602), English catechisms such as those of Rogers (1642) and Palmer (1644), and the Westminster

Confession and both Larger and Shorter Catechisms, follow the same line. Calvin's own view may be further illustrated by his statements in the Commentary on 1 Peter: 'Ye are, each of you, consecrated in Christ, that ye may be associates of His kingdom and partakers in His priesthood'; and the Commentary on Philippians: 'God invites us with so much kindness to the honours of priesthood and even puts sacrifices in our hands'; and the Commentary on Romans: 'Being reconciled to God through the one only true sacrifice of Christ, we are all through His grace made priests, in order that we may dedicate ourselves and all we have to the glory of God.'

In the letter to Francis I which prefaced the first edition of the *Institutio*, Calvin speaks of Christ as the Head, and this conception remained steadily in his mind and has remained characteristic with his followers. The Christian is essentially a member of the Body of Christ: 'Apart from the Body of Christ and the company of the faithful no reconciliation with God can be hoped for'; 'What He Himself possesses, He shares with us as being members of His Body'; 'Through faith we grow into one Body with Christ so that He is ours and all that is His He shares with us.' The priesthood of believers is entirely a deduction from our oneness with Christ: 'We are not otherwise made partakers of the Spirit than through Christ, who is the true sanctuary and our only high priest.' There is of course only one Priest, Jesus Christ, who is the reality shadowed forth by the Levitical priesthood which His coming abrogated as the Melchisedec references insist; and He offers the one effectual oblation, is the one mediator and intercessor, in communion with whom we become 'colleagues in the priesthood'. As Thomas Boston in Scotland expressed it: 'The same ointment poured on the high priest's own head runs down to the skirts of his garments and anoints all the members of Christ.' In the words of Richard Sibbes, the English Puritan: 'Every Christian hath his anointing from Christ's anointing.' Robert Leighton in this connexion used the analogy: 'He the light of the world and they through Him the children of light'; and Jonathan Edwards has written: 'The same Spirit that descended on the Head of the Church descends on the members. . . . They are anointed with the same oil.'

The idea of spiritual sacrifices was familiar to Tertullian;

it was only with Cyprian that the sacrificing priesthood came into prominence. Calvin in various commentaries incidentally applies to believers on account of their spiritual priesthood all the characteristics and functions of priests which he found figured or typified in the Old Testament. They are holy as chosen by God (1 Pet. 1.1 and 15), are sprinkled with sacrificial blood by accepting of Christ's sacrifice (Heb. 12.24), are washed with pure water in baptism (Heb. 10.22), are dedicated with laying on of hands (Heb. 6.2) and anointed (1 John 2.20) and they are taught as they are themselves to teach (1 John 2.27). They offer sacrifices, good works, prayers and praises (Rom. 12.1; Eph. 5.2; Phil. 4.18; Heb. 13.15). There is a curious passage in the *Sacramental Directory* of John Willison (1716) where he inquires of Scottish candidates for communion whether they are priests to God, as only such may lawfully eat of the shew-bread; are they set apart to God by voluntary resignation? are they related to the great High Priest and do they pertain to his family? are they consecrated by being washed in the blood of Christ? do they offer spiritual sacrifices of prayer and praise? Knox's *Book of Common Order* also points out that it is as members of the mystical body of Christ that we make our requests to God for all such as are afflicted. John Maclaurin in eighteenth-century Scotland states clearly that Christ's intercession with the oblation on which that is founded is the ground of our confident access to God and 'the sure hold on which the anchor of hope fixes with steadiness entering into that within the veil'. The precise phrase, 'priesthood of believers', would be difficult to find in any Calvinistic standard or any writer before the nineteenth century, but we have such near approaches as when James Durham says: 'The Jews held these two as great dignities, the kingly and priestly offices, and believers are called by Christ to both', and when we read in Robert Leighton: 'This kingly priesthood is the common dignity of all believers.'

The doctrine as fundamentally Biblical naturally appears in such works as those of the Scots Napier of Merchiston on Revelation, or John Brown of Broughton Place on First Peter, or the Dutch Jacobus Alting on Rom. 12. Similarly we find it in the early Separatist Robert Browne, in John Robinson of Leyden, in Jacobus Arminius himself, in Richard Baxter, even in the

Jansenist St. Cyran, and indeed John Owen speaks practically for all when he says: 'We are priests as we are Christians or partakers of a holy unction, whereby we are anointed to the participation of all Christ's glorious offices.' It is discussed by Scots nineteenth-century theologians such as William Cunningham, James Bannerman and the High Church leader William Milligan, and it is stated appreciatively by Anglicans such as Liddon, Gore, Scott Holland, George Moberly and R. C. Moberly. Incidental references occur in Scottish sermons in all periods, even in William Guthrie, the seventeenth-century pietist; in a sermon by George Gillespie before the House of Lords in 1645; in one of Gilbert Burnet's works; in various sermons of Ralph Erskine from the early eighteenth century; in Robert Riccaltoun somewhat later; in Allan Menzies' contribution to *Scotch Sermons* (1880) and in John Caird's most famous sermon where we find the sentence: 'Live for Christ in common things and all your work will become priestly work.'

It must be apparent, however, that the idea is present as a general assumption rather than as a formal principle. With the Orthodox it is theoretically conceded, is involved in the doctrine of the sacraments and the use of the word 'we' in the liturgy, but it is very clearly not of popular significance in Churches which shut out the laity even from direct vision of the essential mysteries. For the Anglo-Catholic it is also technically incontrovertible, but for centuries was not apparently regarded as involving any living issue. By Calvinists it was shirked, possibly because of suspected implications of the word 'priest' and because greater interest and imitation were attracted by the prophet of the Old Testament than by the priest, though the word was patently Biblical and the conception practically implied by a definition of the Church as 'the company of the faithful'. One notices that the idea of the universal priesthood is often not mentioned in discussions and sermons where one might reasonably expect it, as for example in connexion with both Dutch and Scottish ecclesiastical crises. Allusions are generally figurative and associated with poetical eloquence or a mere flux of scriptural phrases, and we must remember that the Old Testament was read in terms of allegory and type, that prophecies were literally accepted, that the Bible was treated as a single document and that Hebrews was assumed to be Pauline.

We must also realise to what an extent in both Holland and Scotland the Covenant metaphor engrossed attention.

It should on the other hand be noted that Calvin was deeply concerned not only about personal justification and sanctification, but about the witness of Church members in face of the world and of their brotherly obligations to all their fellows. Calvin was a practical reformer, and his ethical, social and educational concern was outstanding. His views on Vocation were more developed than those of Luther, and he brought the laity into the ministerial sphere very deliberately by means of the eldership and diaconate. The Calvinistic doctrine of the Christian magistrate is also relevant evidence. And Leighton was writing in the spirit of Calvin when he declared that works of charity are 'spiritual sacrifices and therefore ought by no means to be neglected by Christian priests, that is, by any who are Christians'; priests have the duty of blessing the people, and 'truly it is this spiritual priesthood, the Elect, that procure blessings upon the rest of the world, and particularly on the places where they live'. Renaissance liberty of thought, too, involved obligation as well as right. Nor must we overlook the share in public worship which Calvin gave the people.

Perhaps what proved most frustrating in the development and understanding and application of the idea of the universal priesthood of Christians was its early association with extreme individualism, involving a particular doctrine of the Holy Spirit, certain views as to the right of private judgment, and in many cases strong anti-clerical feeling. Luther's main point was the rejection of sacerdotalism, and his doctrine of the priesthood of all believers was particularly directed against Rome. He was encouraged by the conviction that in the New Testament priestly power is not credited to Church officers but to the general body of believers. The Reformer at first expressed himself with impatient enthusiasm and sweeping vigour; but presently the logic of his attitude was startlingly revealed to himself and his friends, to his opponents and to the mass of the fearful by the prophets of Zwickau and the violence of the peasant rising. Anabaptist eccentricity had obviously no horizon, social or spiritual. Luther's revolt had been precisely that of individual experience against frustrating tradition and authority; but a negative is never enough, and even a revolu-

tion has sooner or later to organise. Liberty without law is impracticable, and Luther panicked into a conservatism that came to involve state control and clerical officialism and an externalism almost as strangulating as that from which he escaped. Ronald Knox would like to think of Luther as an enthusiast *manqué*, a 'lost leader' of Anabaptists; certainly we hear little more of the priesthood of believers, and though the earlier Luther lived on in Pietism, the German layman's spiritual witness has suffered under Erastian influence.

Neither the mysticism nor the inner conflict which meant so much in the case of Luther, proved directive for Calvin. His individualism was that of the humanist, and though personal communion with God through faith in the crucified and risen Christ was fundamental in his system, conviction for him was subject to intellectual standards, revelation filtered by reason, logic, commonsense, the Spirit bound to the Word, and private judgment thus strictly limited. He liked the Anabaptists no better than did Luther and Zwingli. The dangers of subjectivism, especially in Scripture interpretation, were clearly not excluded; but they were mitigated and a remarkable balance was achieved. Thus while the priesthood was definitely rejected with the superstitions of the mass, Calvin was under no temptation to abandon a professional ministry, and indeed constantly declared this to be essential for the maintenance of ordinances and so for the continued existence of that Church apart from which there was no ordinary possibility of salvation. 'During two hundred years before the coming of Christ', wrote Calvin in his Commentary on Hebrews, 'the foulest corruptions prevailed with respect to the priesthood, yet the right of honour, proceeding from the calling of God, still continued in the office itself.' Calvinistic standards were unhesitating and unanimous as to the divine origin and permanent necessity of the Ministry of Word and Sacraments; Eph. 4 was decisive.

The minister was held to be representative of the people: 'the minister represents the whole people and brings it into the presence of God.' The Book of Numbers prescribed that the priests be taken from among men, and the hands of the people laid upon them. This was regarded as implying the priesthood of the religious community. In Calvinistic Churches much is made of the people's right to choose their minister. This, how-

ever, is complemented by emphasis on the supreme importance of the divine call as distinct from appointment by a congregation: 'how great and splendid it is that at the head of the Church men should be placed to represent the person of the Son of God.' It is doubtful whether anyone entirely overlooks either aspect of this matter; but Bishop Kirk in *The Apostolic Ministry*, while admitting 'a deep truth' embedded in the idea of the priesthood of believers when 'considered corporately' seems to make very light of the people's representation. One might compare this situation with the practice regarding 'consent' in the case of the election of a bishop, or to the discipline problem as to whether the 'keys' were given to the Christian community or to the officers of the Church. Bishop Gore found no difficulty in understanding how the ministry could receive its authority from above while 'the man who is to minister is the elect of the people and their representative also'. Calvin took the comprehensive view. Like Luther he reduced the distinction between clergy and laity to one of function. John Knox wrote in 1550: 'In the Lord's Supper the minister and the congregation sat both at one table: no difference between them in pre-eminence . . . but in the papistical mass the priests . . . are placed by themselves at an altar.' Continental Reformed Churches and some English-speaking Presbyterians minimise the separateness of the clergy; there is also the complication of variety in opinion and practice with respect to the Eldership. Scots would all accept the 'priestlike father' of Burns's *Cottar's Saturday Night*, and Willison's statement that 'Every head of a family is a prophet, priest and king in his own house.' At the same time, for Calvin and Knox as for Zwingli and Bullinger and the Second Helvetic Confession, while all are priests, all are not apostles and bishops; there is a distinction between the Christian priesthood and the ecclesiastical ministry, the former being common to all Christians, while the removal of the Roman priesthood in no way obviated the need for ministers. Turretin, the Swiss author of a text-book much favoured in eighteenth-century Scotland, wrote: 'Priesthood and ministry are things very different from one another.' Reverence for the ministry and for ministers has been characteristic of the Scottish Church.

Anglicans would mostly hold that there is a New Testament priesthood to which individuals are set apart, and some would

speak of a sacrificing, though doubtless not of a vicarious, priesthood. Calvinistic tradition maintains that the New Testament knows nothing of any priests but the believers who constitute the Christian community; but on Biblical grounds it steadily insists upon a divinely called as well as a duly qualified, ordained and elected ministry. There are also separatist or 'gathered' Churches which recognise a professional ministry and reserve for these more or less strictly the actual exercise of the ministry of Word and Sacraments. Methodism has both its well-trained ministers and its lay-preachers, and one might also note how its Classes, providing mutual cure of souls, admirably illustrate the principle of universal priesthood within the Christian community.

But in contrast with the various degrees of custom and doctrine which have been mentioned there is the extremely important and widespread Independent doctrine which is decidedly anti-clerical and charismatic and accepts personal experience of conversion as sufficient qualification for exercising in representative fashion the general responsibility of a group of believers. Essentially every man is his own priest; but some are called by God, with or without trial by the community, to lead in prayer and prophesying and administration of sacraments, the use that may be made of any for edification being left to the Holy Spirit. Quakers carried such views to a logical extreme, recognising distinct gifts but no offices, or at least none for which a college training was requisite. They had no difficulty about the ministry of women. Henry Robinson (1645) in England thought that the 'stammering illiterate tongue of some otherwise despised soul' might reveal precious truth and should be free to do so. The French pastor, Jean Claude, maintained an extreme view as to the possibility that an ignorant person might hear God's word more clearly than a Church Council. The French Prophets from the Cevennes gave forth in a state of trance what purported to be divine revelations of the Montanist type. John Milton believed that each man had the 'right to interpret the Scriptures for himself, inasmuch as he has the Spirit for his guide'. Oliver Cromwell claimed to have 'preached with tongue and sword, with head and heart and right hand, and soul and body and breeches-pocket, not without results, one would venture to hope', and he thought that others

ought to have like liberty of utterance. Laymen such as John Selden and Henry Parker of that same Puritan period were vehemently anti-clerical, though there were of course earnest and active laymen who had no such feelings. The ordinary non-conformist attitude may be gathered from Whitley who says: 'Baptists put in practice the priesthood of all believers, and had no paid ministry released from the discipline of ordinary life'; and from Peel who includes amongst the features of Congregationalism 'that policy which makes the members subject to no lord but Christ, and all kings and priests unto God'; and from Nuttall who writes: 'what was fundamental was the personal reception, both individually and communally, of the Spirit; was in the possession of the Spirit's gifts and graces; was in not grieving the Spirit.' Dr Littell of Boston brings out another point when he asserts that the Anabaptists took the priesthood of all believers to mean 'the application of the *concilia perfectionis* to all Christians instead of only a special class'. The sects have ranged from the teaching of Thomas Münzer to that of Hans Denck; but all have this doctrine of the Spirit.

It seems fairly clear that differences of interpretation and valuation of the doctrine of the priesthood of believers, and notably of the 'free access' involved, will remain. The peculiar circumstances of today, however, direct us to one special aspect of it, an aspect well worthy of emphasis and one that justifies renewed interest in the phrase. When we fix our attention upon our Great High Priest, Jesus Christ, it becomes obvious that nothing is more integral to the idea of priesthood than self-sacrificing service; communion with Him in this cannot be too ardently sought for ourselves and all believers, clerical or lay.

LUTHER'S DOCTRINE OF THE MINISTRY[1]

by The Rev. Dr GÖSTA HÖK

1. The Ministry of the Word

'Ipse enim dixit, solum unum necessarium, nempe verbum dei in quo vivit homo' (Luke 10.42). One thing alone is essential, namely, the Word of God by which man lives. These words could be put as a motto to Luther's entire theology. For the Roman Catholic the sacrifice of the Mass is supreme and absolutely essential for salvation. In Luther the Word occupies this place, and he rejects the sacrifice of the Mass. It is not the Eucharist but the Word which stands in the centre of his theology; the Word has been given for man's salvation, and everything is subordinate to it.

It is a logical sequel of Luther's new conception of grace that the Word has thus thrust aside sacrifice and itself become central. As long as grace is mainly thought of as an '*infused, transforming power*' it is quite natural that it should be mediated by the sacraments, among which the Eucharist is foremost, but in Luther grace is understood as *favor dei*, the favour of God, so it is just as natural that it confronts man through God's Word or Gospel. Man receives of God's favour when he hears and believes the promise given in the Word.

What has just been said must be reflected in Luther's doctrine of the ministry. The Roman Catholic ministry is that of the sacrificing priesthood and Roman Catholic priests are ordained to administer the sacraments—in particular to celebrate the Mass, but also to hear confession and impart absolution. The Lutheran ministry, on the other hand, is a ministry of the Word, and the Lutheran minister, therefore, is called to the 'service of the Word'. He is to be a shepherd who feeds his flock with the Word and who protects it from the wolf, and he does both of these things when he dispenses the mysteries of

[1] *Luthers lära om kyrkans ämbete*, translated from *En Bok om Kyrkans Ambete* (ed. Lindroth), Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, Stockholm, 1951, by the Rev. Ross Mackenzie, B.D.

God in preaching, which Luther calls 'shepherding'. The preacher feeds his flock with the Word, and with the Word defends it against false doctrine.

The ministry of preaching, therefore, is the supreme ministry on which all other functions depend and from which they result. 'Anyone entrusted with the ministry of the Word receives the highest ministry in Christianity', says Luther, 'and after receiving it he may baptise, celebrate Mass, and have the cure of souls. If, however, he chooses to confine himself to preaching, he can let others administer baptism and attend to the lower functions, as Christ, Paul, and all the apostles did.' The ministry of preaching thus stands above all other ministries and at the same time includes them. The case is exactly the opposite in Roman Catholicism where, according to Luther, the task of celebrating the Mass is held to be the highest service, while the task of dispensing the mysteries of God through preaching is held to be one of the least, and so is committed to the lowest orders. Roman Catholic theology asserts, as of *jure divino*, a number of ministries of different power and authority which for this reason are graded. According to Luther and his successors the ministry is *jure divino* one: it is a ministry of the Word with the same power and authority for each one who holds it. It is possible, however, to make a distinction *jure humano* between different orders within that ministry so that not all exercise the same power and authority. To make a distinction, therefore, between bishop, priests, and deacons, as has been done in the Church from the days of Ignatius is, says Luther, a helpful, man-made system which ought to be maintained as long as it is found to be suited to its purpose, but it is not ordained by God Himself. It belongs to the *bene esse* but not to the *esse* of the Church. In this matter we are always free to choose by ourselves the Church-order which best serves God's work.

According to the interpretation of the ministry which is found in Roman Catholicism, ordination becomes of fundamental significance, for there the priest receives power to consecrate, and with that the ability to offer sacrifice. Power to consecrate is a *character indelebilis* which the priest receives when he is anointed. Power to administer the sacraments was given by Christ to Peter, by Peter to his successors, and by these in an

unbroken chain to those who now hold the ministry. Unbroken apostolic succession is a condition for possession of this power.

The ministry of the Word, on the other hand, does not function in that way, for it is not received through ordination but through a call to service (*ministerium*), and if ordination does take place it is not integral to the ministry. Anyone who has received true calling holds the ministry independently of ordination. In Luther's view ordination is only a public confirmation of calling, and what is received in calling is not some special gift of grace or power but a commission.

In all true calling the commission is given by God. Following Jerome, Luther distinguishes four different ways of receiving the ministry:

1. Those whose call is received directly from God and without human mediation, as, for example, certain prophets and apostles.
2. Those whose call comes from God, but through human mediation. All who succeeded the apostles in the ministry (assuming that they hold it rightfully) belong to this group.
3. Those called by men but not chosen by God, who, having secured their ministry by favour or partiality, misuse it for their own interests.
4. Those called neither by God nor by men, as, for example, the Enthusiasts who claim to be moved by the Spirit.

Of these four only the first two are called by God, and being truly called they can, therefore, be divided into two groups. The first consists of those who received their calling directly (a calling which is always accompanied by miracles and signs to prove their authenticity), while the second group consists of those who received their calling from God through human mediation. Those who exercise the ministry of preaching in our day, assuming that they do so rightfully, belong to this group.

God's calling through men, says Luther, is consistent with the original illustration afforded by Timothy and Titus who gave the ministry of preaching to trusted men after they had heard the congregation. In one way or another, therefore, the congregation is to express its will either by election or through government as its representative, but how this is done, says

Luther, is of little importance. Anyone who has been so appointed is afterwards to be installed in his office by the bishop or whatever person performs the ordination. It is by these means that the call is confirmed and proclaimed. If necessary the congregation may call without a bishop's assistance or ordination, and if necessary, but only so, a bishop may call on behalf of the congregation without its taking part in the appointment. Even deacons were not called by the apostles before the whole congregation had assembled and taken its part in their appointment. That God calls through men consequently means for Luther that He calls through the congregation.

The power of the congregation to call rests on the fact that all Christians possess the rightful and true ministry of preaching, besides the functions included over and above—baptism, administration of communion, hearing of confession, and so on. Luther refers here to 2 Cor. 3.6. That we were made ministers of a new covenant, not of the letter but of the Spirit, is a word addressed to all Christians. But a minister of the Spirit preaches grace and forgiveness of sins. All Christians, therefore, have been entrusted with the Word. Luther refers also to 1 Pet. 2.9. All Christians have God's Word and are under obligation to see to its propagation.

By this reason all Christians have power to preach, but they will not always put this power of theirs into practice. We have to take into account here the position in which the Christian finds himself placed. If in any given situation he is on his own, a Christian in isolation, then he is to put his calling into practice immediately and administer the Word to those about him. Under these circumstances he is, in a word, fully competent. Stephen, for example, was not called to preach but did so nevertheless (Acts 6.7). So did Philip (Acts 8.5) and Apollos (Acts 18.25, 26). 'In such a position', says Luther, 'a Christian, because of his brotherly love, will look to the need of the poor, lost soul without waiting for an order or letter from prince or bishop. Need breaks all law, and has no law. If no one helps or is bound to help, then love must do so.' But circumstances will be different if there are several Christians gathered in the same place, for in that case no one may preach unless he has been elected and called by the congregation.

There is thus no special equipment or power required for the

ministry of preaching beyond what belongs to all Christians by their baptism and faith. God's calling, however, is always required. In an exceptional case His call is direct, but usually He mediates it through the Christian community which is at hand. The bishop then appoints to the ministry by ordination, thus making public confirmation of the validity of the calling—yet the ministry is held by those who are called, even though there has been no ordination.

The Roman Catholic conception of a *character indelebilis* given at ordination is entirely rejected by Luther. The commission to hold the ministry of preaching can be revoked: it is not lifelong. The anointing of the candidate for ordination with oil is likewise rejected. Outward anointing is an Old Testament custom abandoned in the New Testament where Christ alone is the Anointed, and His anointing is inward and spiritual. By their baptism and faith, however, that is, by their new birth, all Christians partake of this spiritual anointing of Christ, which means that they partake of the Holy Spirit. By baptism they are born to priesthood. Anointing, therefore, does not mark out the ministry of preaching as above other orders. To submit to anointing in ordination is to deny one's spiritual priesthood. The conception of a special spiritual order separated from the laity is rejected entirely. In ordination the place of anointing is taken partly by the laying on of hands and partly by prayer. Laying on of hands is not essential, for it is not received as a command of God, nor employed *jure divino*, but it is a sanctified custom from the days of the apostles to be employed *jure humano*.

The emphasis lies not on the laying on of hands, but on prayer. It is the Lord's Prayer which is used, and the interpretation given is that the first petition, *Hallowed be thy name*, is thought to contain a request for God to send labourers into His harvest. One who is called to the ministry of preaching retains his ministry as long as he performs it truly, that is, as long as he teaches the Gospel to men. Should he cease to preach he is at once deprived of his ministry despite calling and ordination, for these do not work *ex opere operato*. If a congregation gets a minister who truly performs the ministry of preaching, and who is ready truly to preach God's Word, it is a divine gift indeed and an answer to the prayer for labourers in the harvest.

We must now ask if Luther always uses the word 'ministry' with the same meaning. Does he not use it partly in a more restricted and partly in a more extended sense? As we saw above there is certainly, on the one hand, the 'ministry' which for Luther is equivalent to the commission of the Church or congregation to an individual to teach the Gospel or administer the sacraments on behalf of the Church. No layman can hold the ministry if it is defined in these terms. Such a ministry Luther designates *ministerium ecclesiae*, and its holder is *minister ecclesiae* or *servant of the Church* (*Kirchendiener*). On the other hand, the ministry of preaching, besides the other functions included, belongs to all Christians, since they have all been entrusted with the Word. The ministry in that sense cannot be equated with the commission of the Church or congregation to teach the Gospel publicly and administer the sacraments, but in fact is the ministry which is received by baptism and faith, and which is, furthermore, the possession of every Christian though no special commission was ever received. The holder of the ministry in this sense is also a minister, not of the Church but of the new covenant, the ministry of the Spirit (2 Cor. 3.6).

Against Roman Catholicism and its ministry of the sacrificing priest Luther often uses the conception of the ministry in that later and extended sense. When it is a question of repudiating the Enthusiasts, on the other hand, the emphasis comes to be laid on the ministry as a service of the Church, that is, on the ministry in the more restricted sense. But to conceive of this as an altered standpoint in Luther would be totally wrong, for right through his writings the ministry is found in both the extended and restricted senses. Thus it was not Luther's purpose in the early part of his life merely to put the universal priesthood in place of the ministry of the sacrificing priest. The Roman Catholic ministry was to be supplanted by the Church's ministry of preaching. A man can be appointed to this latter ministry only by a congregation where the ministry of preaching is shared by all who have a common priesthood stemming from a common baptism and faith. This is a conception which Luther never abandoned. However much the ministry and its *jure divino* origin is stressed against the Enthusiasts, yet it will never be anything but a commission of God given indirectly through the congregation in which every individual, by his

participation in the universal priesthood, is responsible for the teaching of the Gospel. So it is as wrong to derive the ministry wholly from the universal priesthood and the ministry of preaching which is joined to it as it is to separate the two. The ministry is a divine system independent of and preliminary to the universal priesthood, otherwise direct calling would be impossible. The congregation which elects and calls consists of Christians who share in the universal priesthood and who on this account are responsible for the ministry of the Word—first, in its wider sense (so that all are responsible for the preaching of the Word), and secondly, in its more restricted sense (so that one specific individual is appointed to preach the Word and administer the sacraments within the congregation). In this way the ministry in its restricted sense is connected with the universal priesthood, that is, with the ministry of preaching which is possessed by all believers.

We shall now examine how Luther discusses the universal priesthood and the power of the keys. He rejects the Roman Catholic doctrines of *ordo* and *jurisdictio* since both are incompatible with the conception of the ministry as a ministry of the Word. In Luther there is no special priesthood, for every Christian is a priest. When the Roman Catholic clergy style themselves priests they rob Christians of their universal priesthood. There is no jurisdiction in the Roman Catholic sense either, for only Christ Himself can command. No new directions can be given beyond the contents of Scripture. Judgment of doctrine belongs to the whole congregation which has been given the power of the keys. When the clergy lay claim to this for their own interests, therefore, they steal the keys which belong to all Christians.

2. The Universal Priesthood

According to Luther all men are anointed as priests, *sacerdotes*, by their baptism and faith, that is, they all share in the dignity of Christ the High Priest. To understand Luther correctly it must be remembered that he represents the Old Testament as a *type* (*typos*, *figura*) or foreshadowing of the New. The physical and outward in the Old Testament corresponds in the New to an inward and spiritual category which is the object of faith. Thus, for example, the Egypt out of which the children of Israel

were delivered is physical, obvious, and external, and has its New Testament analogy in sin which is called the spiritual Egypt. No one can entirely understand the gravity of sin and in this matter we must believe and trust the word of Scripture. The rock which gave the people of Israel water during the desert wandering is a visible and outward rock. In the New Testament the analogy is the rock which is Christ, Christ who quenches the believer's thirst—it is neither seen nor experienced but has to be believed. In the Old Testament the Israelites ate bread which came from heaven, visible and obvious bread. In the New Testament Christ is the believer's bread, but in an invisible way—we have to believe and trust the word of Scripture which says that Christ feeds those who believe. It is the same with the brazen serpent which Moses hung on a tree—a visible and obvious serpent. Christians, on the other hand, are bound to believe in the Crucified.

Luther inserts his doctrine of Church and ministry into his typology. In the Old Testament there is thus an outward and visible Kingdom with specific men as kings. In the New Testament on the other hand the Kingdom is inward and spiritual. Christ's Kingdom is not of this world and no one can see that He is king—we must believe and trust. In the Old Testament there is a visible cultus in Jerusalem: Aaron and his successors are high priests. In the New Testament Christ alone is High Priest, but in such a way that no one can see it—it must be believed. When the Old Testament comes to an end, so does the type. The New Testament represents and fulfils the Old Testament type, but not in an outward, visible, and physical way: it does so rather in an inward and spiritual way, as an object of faith.

The kingdom of the Jews and Aaron's high priestly office have both come to an end, and Christ, who was priest after the order of Melchisedec and not of Aaron, has come in their place. There is no longer, therefore, any outward and visible kingdom or priesthood. Here Luther opposes the Roman Catholic doctrine that Christ succeeded Aaron and left his inheritance to Peter and his successors at Rome. There is no such continuity, for in the New Testament Christ alone is King and Priest, and His Kingdom and Priesthood, since they are everlasting, are different in kind from those of the Old Testament, which are

transient and only a foreshadowing. Christ's Kingdom and Priesthood are, furthermore, here in time the objects of faith, that is, they are inward and spiritual. Christ does not hand them over to anyone. He has no deputy.

By their baptism and faith, however, all Christians share in Christ's Kingdom, and are all kings together with Him. According to Luther this means that they are lords over sin, death, and the devil, and as kings, they may abound in confidence of faith and trample the devil underfoot. Both in himself and with regard to his own freedom a Christian is king.

Christians also share in Christ's High Priestly ministry for they are all priests—yet they are not so for their own sake, but for others. Now the priest's task is to appear before God with prayer and sacrifice, and, besides this, to go out from God in order to preach and teach the people. When he goes into the temple toward God the priest sacrifices and prays for the congregation, and when he leaves the temple he preaches to the people and teaches them God's will. Every Christian, therefore, is to sacrifice, pray, and preach, but none of these things belongs to the ministry (i.e. in its restricted sense) as a right. In the Old Testament this was something which belonged to the outward priesthood, that is, to a special order. In the New Testament, on the other hand, it belongs to Christ, and Christians possess it by their baptism and faith, by sharing in what belongs to Christ. They possess this right by faith, in an inward and spiritual way.

Luther holds that the doctrine of the universal priesthood is entirely Biblical, and he takes his basis of discussion in an Old Testament passage, Exod. 19.6, where God says to Israel: *Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests and an holy nation.* This is connected with Deut. 7.6, which is further connected with the New Testament passages where kingdom and priesthood are co-ordinated. In 1 Pet. 2.9 it is said, *Ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people.* In the same way it is twice said in the book of Revelation that Christ made Christians *kings and priests unto God* (1.6, 5.10). Also belonging here are the words in 1 Pet. 2.5, *an holy priesthood*, and the passage where the book of Revelation calls those who share in the first resurrection *priests of God and of Christ* who shall reign with Him a thousand years (20.6).

Luther has the same interpretation of the word 'priest' in all these passages. While there is only one spiritual priest, namely Christ, who 'offered one sacrifice for sins' (Heb. 10.12,14; 1 Pet. 3.18), yet by their baptism and faith all Christians share in this spiritual and priestly merit of Christ, and are on that account to present their bodies day by day 'a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God' (Rom. 12.1). The idea of *conformity* and *communicatio idiomatum* determine the line of thought here. By coming to possess Christ through his baptism and faith, the Christian is built up in Christ the living stone, shares in sonship, is incorporated into the flock and the people of God, is added like a member to the body of Christ and like a branch to the tree, and shares in everything that belongs to Christ. By his baptism and faith the Christian participates in the new birth, and in Christ's righteousness, purity, and holiness: by his baptism and faith he has part also in Christ's merit as King and Priest—he will be king and priest like Christ. But if he loses his faith he is then neither priest nor Christian.

Luther proves in many ways that the word 'priest' refers to all Christians. Those who are addressed in 1 Pet. 2 are termed 'newborn babes': in other words, they are newly created Christians. Nevertheless they are exhorted to become 'a royal priesthood'. In verse 9 again it is said that they are 'a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people'. Such a thing can only be said of all Christians. Were the ministry (in its restricted sense) being referred to, priesthood and people could not be set alongside one another. Luther says that the word 'priest' never occurs in the New Testament with any other specific significance than that of the idea of conformity. Only one is priest, namely Christ, but His people share in His priestly ministry.

From Thomas Aquinas onwards Roman Catholic theology has made a distinction between an inward priesthood which applies to all and an outward which belongs only to the ordained, and, as distinct from Luther, has thus a place for both a special and a universal priesthood, of which the latter, however, is of very little significance. The point is brought up against Luther by Jerome of Emsen, but Luther replies by showing the parallel with the kingdom. No one will assert that Peter spoke of kings except in an inward and spiritual sense, and the same, says

Luther, must be true of priests. The phrase in the Epistle of Peter, therefore, may not be applied to the special ministry. The Old Testament priesthood is outward and visible, a type of what was to come, and something finite. The New Testament priesthood is inward and spiritual, and this conception alone is found in the New Testament period.

If there is a difference between the priest in the Old Testament and the priest in the New, there is also a difference between sacrifice in the Old Testament and sacrifice in the New. The sacrifice of the New Testament is partly Christ's offering of Himself at Golgotha, an eternal sacrifice of atonement, and partly it is the daily offering by all Christians of their bodies (Rom. 12.1), a sacrifice which denotes an offering of praise. There is no other sacrifice in the Church.

Offerings of praise are a sharing in the sacrifice of Christ: they are the smoke and fragrance of Christ's own sacrifice. Christ offers Himself for us and offers us all together with Himself. Once and for all He offers His own body, and daily He offers ours. In this way we share the cross of Christ. Our sacrifice, says Luther, is the sacrifice of the carnal spirit and the strangling of our old Adam which we ourselves must put to death if the world cannot.

3. The Power of the Keys

We have already seen that Luther rejects the Roman Catholic doctrine of a special *ordo* or special priesthood. In exactly the same way he also rejects the Roman Catholic doctrine of *jurisdictio*. The clergy has no special jurisdiction, and the power of the keys which is discharged by the ministry on behalf of the congregation has nothing at all to do with jurisdiction. It is not a legislative power but a power to bind and loose from sin.

Christ's keys—the true keys—are the ministry and the power to grant repentant sinners what He gained and won through His blood, death, and resurrection. The true keys, therefore, are not ineffective for that is just their content: Christ's blood, death, and resurrection. They are in actual fact full of grace, they communicate and bestow grace. When they are used Christ Himself binds and looses. When Christ's disciples bound or loosed, Christ Himself had already done so: He does not have to follow in order to ratify the act since what the disciples

do and what Christ does are not two different things but one and the same. Christ has no other keys than those which He gave to His disciples: 'Ye shall use my keys here on earth and no others', says Christ. 'Peter's mouth is my mouth, his ministry is my ministry, his loosing is my loosing, and his keys are my keys.' God has only one way of forgiving sins and that is through the spoken word which He commanded us men to employ. In the Word of God and there alone shall forgiveness be sought.

When Luther speaks of the keys in this way it is seen that the power to loose becomes primary: but the keys can never be distinguished, and one cannot be used without the other. The object of both is the same, namely, man's salvation. When the Church binds its ultimate aim is to loose. On that account we are to prize both keys without distinction and regard them as of priceless value for our souls. As said earlier, they are both, in other words, full of grace. The power to bind opens the work of the law and convicts of sin, while the power to loose opens the work of the Gospel and gives comfort by promising life and salvation with the forgiveness of sins. One is no less essential for a Christian than the other.

Luther contrasts the Pope's false keys with the true keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, that is, with Christ's keys. The Pope's are related to the genuine as a painted key is to a real one: they are something for the eyes but not for the soul, empty shells with no power.

If Christ's keys are intended for sinners the Pope's are not: on the contrary, they guide and govern only those who think they are righteous and without sin. Devout Christians who obey the laws of the Pope are bound by his laws, while those who do not bother about his legislation are loosed from them, for the Pope interprets the power of the keys as power of legislation or jurisdiction.

Those who make laws insist on men's works. Now the Pope's power of the keys is a legislative power, and so by virtue of his true keys he insists on works, as distinct from Christ who insists on no works whatever. On the contrary, He makes a gift of grace. Luther, therefore, connects the Pope's keys with works and Christ's true keys with faith. Characteristic of Antichrist is the doctrine of works—and in this case we see quite clearly

that the Pope is Antichrist. Luther follows the customary language of Augustine and the Middle Ages in using *Antichrist* as a qualifying designation. Anyone who maintains a doctrine against Christ is called Antichrist.

The Pope's interpretation of the power of the keys as a legislative power has strange consequences as regards loosing. If the power to bind means the making of law the power to loose must surely mean the abrogation of law. Which law is to be abrogated—is it the law of Christ which was given in the Bible? It cannot be, for not the least letter of the law is to be abrogated (Matt. 5.18). Since the Pope is not above Holy Scripture, as he supposes himself to be, he could not have established the canon. Is he then to abrogate laws which he himself gave? It has been so interpreted in Roman Catholic quarters, but that would be an ineffective loosing, for it would mean in fact nothing more than putting an end to binding. And it is unheard of that the Pope should annul his own laws. Why should the Pope have two equally large keys as his emblem if he hardly ever uses the power to loose? Indeed, he uses it only when he gives dispensation in exchange for money. The Pope's main interest is in the power to bind, identified as it is with power of legislation. According to Luther, on the other hand, the power of the keys is centred in the power to loose—the key by which men receive forgiveness of sins.

Luther considers it especially wrong that in Roman Catholic circles the reliability of the power to loose is called in question. By Roman Catholic theory the power to bind is always to be relied on: it cannot fail, it is an infallible key (*Treffschlüssel*). But the power to bind is unreliable: it is a *clavis errans*, a fallible key (*Fehlschlüssel*). In other words, when the Pope excommunicates he is infallible. Here Gregory's words are relevant where he says that excommunication is to be feared even though it is unjust. Yet it is never the case that the Pope grants absolution unconditionally (*conditionalis clavis*). Absolution is valid only on the assumption of true repentance. No one can know whether his repentance is full enough, so no one can know to what extent the power to loose actually does loose. Luther expresses it in this dramatic manner: 'If I repent then God is true, but if I do not repent, then God is a liar.'

In Roman Catholicism the power of the keys has also been

interpreted as if it implied sovereignty and supremacy of knowledge. A distinction has been made between *clavis potestatis* and *clavis scientiae*. The former should then signify that the Pope had power to order and forbid as he wished in heaven and on earth, to appoint and depose emperors, kings, and princes, and even to empty purgatory. His three crowns ought to denote that he is emperor in heaven, on earth, and under the earth, but no such secular power was given by Christ either to Peter or to his successors. Christ Himself had no such power. His kingdom was not of this world (John 18.36), and He says to His disciples, 'The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them, and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors. But ye shall not be so' (Luke 22.25, 26; cf. 1 Pet. 5.3). When the Pope claims secular and external power he confuses spiritual and secular government.

The kingdom of the Old Testament is not continued in the supremacy of the Pope but, on the contrary, is a type or foreshadowing of Christ's own spiritual kingdom in which every Christian has part by his baptism and faith. It is Christ's power over sin, death, and the devil, but it is not external and secular. Among Christians it is seen in fearlessly trampling underfoot in faith death, sin, and hell, but it cannot be mistaken for an external supremacy over kings and peoples.

The power of the keys is as little a power of possessing knowledge as it is an external power of supremacy. The Pharisees had the key of knowledge, yet they themselves would not enter into heaven and they hindered others (Luke 11.52). But the Pharisees have never possessed the keys which Christ entrusted to Peter. The keys of knowledge, therefore, may not be confused with those which Peter has.

Now if the Pope's keys were just like those depicted—profitless, false, and having nothing in common with Christ's keys—there would be no point in discussing his claim that he alone has received the power of the keys from Christ. But the Pope also claims the true keys, that is, the power to bind in sin and loose from sin. Besides the false keys he has appropriated Christ's true keys which he now uses wrongly by using them against God's will. Luther has to show, therefore, that Christ did not give His keys to Peter and his successors personally, but to His Church and congregation. Moreover, he is forced to

declare somehow or other the inefficacy of these real keys when they are wrongly used by the Pope.

The keys of the Kingdom of Heaven have not been given personally to Peter nor to the bishops, but to Christ's congregation. It is the congregation which is to bind and loose, it is the congregation which is to apply law and gospel to the individual, and this only through its ministry of preaching. The true keys, therefore, cannot be separated from the ministry, for these are one and the same. Luther proves his thesis in his exegesis of Matt. 16.18 f, 18.15 ff, and John 20.21 ff. He takes faith as his basis of discussion. The power of the keys is given to faith, and faith confronts us in Peter's confession, 'Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God' (Matt. 16.16). The power of the keys is given in answer to that confession of faith. The question will then be: To whom does the faith just confessed belong—in other words, who *does* believe? Luther puts the matter here in two distinct ways which ultimately resolve into one:

1. All disciples are asked who they say Christ is. They do not answer, however, each for himself, but all at once through Peter. All in a body, therefore, they confess their faith through Peter and all in a body receive the power of the keys in answer to the confession.

2. The power of the keys goes to no specific individual but to the Church and congregation. It does not belong to Peter personally. Immediately after handing over the power of the keys Jesus had to rebuke Peter: 'Get thee behind me, Satan' (Matt. 16.23). Peter's faith could not be depended on, for he could fall. Nor could the faith of the other disciples be depended on. Yet the faith of the Church could never disappear for the gates of hell would not prevail against it (Matt. 16.18). The Church is the believing people, and there will always be someone who believes when others fall into unbelief. The power of the keys, therefore, has not been entrusted to any specific individual but to the Church and congregation. When Peter received the power of the keys he did so on behalf of the Church.

In Luther's first way of expressing the matter, the thought of conformity is fundamental for possession of the power of the keys. Christ is the rock, and Christians become members of

Christ's body and parts of the rock by their faith. Every believer, therefore, is a Peter. The significance of Luther's view is that Christ never yields the power of the keys. The words, 'Thou art Peter . . . ' and so on, are only an assertion of the conformity to Christ with which there comes participation in the power of the keys.

One gets the impression from Luther's second way of expressing the matter that the power of the keys is actually given away, not in that case to an individual, but to the Church with its ministry of preaching—and by the Church is meant the congregation, that is, basically the believing people who are living members of Christ's body. In this connexion Luther rejects the identification of the Church with the prelates or with any bishop, but speaks of the ministry of preaching which belongs to all believers.

In Luther both ways of expressing the matter resolve into one without any tension being felt.

As proof that the power of the keys was left to the congregation and not to an individual Luther refers to the plural form in relevant texts. Thus in Matt. 16 Christ asks the whole body of the disciples who He is, although Peter alone answers the question. When Peter afterwards receives the power of the keys, it is to be understood that he does so on behalf of all the others, and as Peter replied on their behalf, so it is on their behalf that he receives the power.

In Matt. 18.18 Jesus Himself uses the plural form: 'Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.' These words cannot be interpreted as referring to Peter rather than to the other apostles. In John 20.22 f, where Roman Catholic interpretation holds that the power of the keys is not only promised but directly conceded, Jesus also uses the plural form: 'Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained.'

Matt. 16, the only passage where a singular form occurs, must be interpreted, says Luther, by analogy to Matt. 18 and John 20—in other words it can be explained that Peter receives the promise of the keys on behalf of the others (and so he is addressed in the singular), but it cannot be explained why

Jesus uses the plural form if we suppose that the keys were given to Peter personally.

But the keys have not been given to the episcopate either. If they were given to anyone other than the congregation as a whole, the significance of Christ's exhortation to appeal to the congregation cannot be understood (Matt. 18.17). The power of the keys must, therefore, have been given to the body of the disciples as a whole, that is, to the congregation: 'But if he [*sc.* thy brother] will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church (ἐκκλησία)' (Matt. 18.16, 17). All belong to the congregation by their faith and baptism. The bishops are not referred to exclusively.

The idea that Peter has received the promise of the power of the keys personally must also be rejected on internal grounds. If it cannot be assumed that the promise was given to the congregation, the words of Jesus to Peter in the following paragraph become incomprehensible and contradictory, but with that assumption they become once more intelligible. If Peter in his own person received the name of 'rock', then according to the words of Jesus the gates of hell could not after that have prevailed against him. Nevertheless we know that immediately afterwards Peter fell so deeply that Jesus had to say, 'Get thee behind me, Satan.' In his own person, therefore, Peter cannot be a rock. Even less can his successors on the episcopal throne at Rome be called rocks; in fact they have often sinned more deeply, as the Church of Rome itself admits. The rock is Christ Himself (1 Cor. 3.11; 2 Cor. 4.5). By his conformity to Christ each and every one who believes and confesses Christ is also a part of the rock. As long as he believed Peter was a part of the rock, but when he ceased to believe he no longer belonged there. Then he belonged to Satan.

Luther also observes that if the Pope really wants to be Peter's *personal* successor he ought to apply to himself the words which Christ addressed to Peter, 'Get thee behind me, Satan'.

As already pointed out, Luther had also to explain last of all that when the power of the keys is used wrongly it is ineffective. He did so in two different ways:

1. In the early part of his life he defended himself from the

Pope's excommunication by holding fast to a distinction in the spiritual plane drawn from Augustine who had differentiated between an inward and spiritual fellowship of the saints and an outward and physical one. The former consists of the possession of faith, hope, and love, while the latter is a participation in the sacraments (*communio*) and is extended into a participation in every other blessing. Men are excluded by their sin from the inward and spiritual fellowship where God rules alone. The Pope and the bishops can exclude from the outward and physical fellowship by their excommunication which is, however, only a sign.

If wrong use is made of excommunication then a man is excluded from the latter, but not from the former. Spiritual fellowship with the saints depends on God's instilling faith, hope, and love, into a man's heart. As long as these are found the only harm which can be done is outward. Men are not, therefore, to be afraid of an unjust excommunication, and it means nothing if a man dies after being unjustly excommunicated—it is, rather, a merit. The discussion is based on the distinction between *signum* and *virtus*. The *signum*, which men can regulate, is not to be feared as long as the *virtus* is absent. God alone determines the *virtus*.

2. In later life, however, Luther abandoned this manner of defending himself against the Pope's excommunication. In his work on the keys of 1530 we find no trace of such a line of thought, but on the contrary, in opposition to the spiritualism of the Papal Church, he teaches that Peter's keys are God's own, and that God Himself acts when they are administered. A key rightly used, therefore, can never be without effect. When the Church looses it means exactly that God Himself looses, and the same is true of excommunication. The Church's excommunication is equivalent to God's own. But this presupposes that the power of the keys is exercised on Christ's own instruction as it was given in Matt. 18.15-17: 'Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church: but if he neglect to hear the Church,

let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican.' Firstly, sin must be evident, secondly, it must be laid before the brethren, and thirdly, it must be laid before the congregation. If it is not evident and if it has not been shown first to the brethren and afterwards to the congregation, then excommunication is not according to Christ's will. In that case it is arbitrary, and arbitrary excommunication is without the authority of the Word of God and, therefore, without the authority of the keys. The Pope fancies that he has the keys, but he has not. As we can see, this exegesis is wholly in line with the declared intentions of the reformer in his doctrine of the sacraments and in other directions. The power of the keys presupposes obedience to Christ's command and instruction, and does so not only for its efficacy but also for its existence. To speak of a power of the keys without following this instruction is meaningless. God's promises are united to His command and are valid only as long as the command is obeyed.

4. Luther's View of the Ministry in relation to Earlier Theology

We cannot understand Luther's doctrine of the ministry without a survey, however short, of patristic and medieval theology, for his thought is not a new formation, but is found in the earliest Christian Church and in the Church Fathers along with the lines of thought which Luther rejects. The tension between what he accepts and what he rejects has accordingly been found through the centuries, but in Luther it is actualised and these ideas break out from one another. While one line of thought is accepted, another is rejected.

In the quickest survey, therefore, let us examine Luther's attitude to some of the most important stages of tradition.

1. The earliest of the lines of thought to be mentioned is the traditional threefold division of the ministry according to which bishop, presbyter, and deacon, are distinguished from one another and graded. This threefold division developed in Asia Minor and Syria towards the end of the first century, and shortly afterwards pervaded the whole of the Church. It is especially evident in the Epistle of St. Ignatius. The bishop possesses the ministry, while presbyters and deacons are his fellow-workers.

What position does Luther take as regards this traditional, threefold division? Wyclif had rejected it by referring to Jerome who had equated bishop and presbyter on the basis of the eucharistic prayer, and at the same time had made a distinction between them and the deacons. In that case the bishop's position of authority ought to depend on his having been chosen leader of his fellow-bishops. Luther quotes the same passage in Jerome but does not draw the same radical conclusions as Wyclif. The threefold division is not essential, he says, and does not belong to the Church's *esse* since it is not valid *jure divino*. Yet it is not on that account to be rejected. It can be appropriate and suited to its purpose and should be retained, but in such a case it is valid *jure humano*. Luther himself points out how much less he claims than Jerome. Without any doubt he has been influenced here by the criticism which was earlier directed against the Papal Church. The fact that Jerome is quoted indicates this. But besides Jerome, Luther cites many other Church Fathers on the same question. What is decisive, however, is not at all the authority of Jerome or any other of the Church Fathers, but the witness of the New Testament itself. Of conclusive significance here is Tit. 1.5-7, interpreted in such a way as to make bishop and presbyter the same (Jerome's interpretation, adopted by Wyclif and others), and also 1 Pet. 5.1, which is held to prove the same thing.

2. In the third century there arises the idea of the bishop as priest or *sacerdos*. Thus Origen suggests that the holder of the ministry might be called priest and Levite. His conception, however, is allegorical. According to Tertullian the bishop is *sacerdos* or *summus sacerdos*. Cyprian regularly gives the name *sacerdos* to the bishop. In his writings the use of this term is extended, moreover, and is used of more than the bishop. Towards the end of the third century it becomes universally a designation common to both bishop and presbyter, although by a decree at Laodicea it was decided that deacons should not be referred to as *sacerdotes*. The same linguistic usage is found again in Chrysostom and in Peter Lombard. For the Greek Church Chrysostom gives final shape to the doctrine of a special sacrificing priesthood, while Peter Lombard does the same for the Latin Church.

Of the lines of thought which Luther rejects, the doctrine of

a special priesthood is the most important. The ministry is as little a sacrificial ministry as its holder is *sacerdos*. On this point Luther gives up the tradition of the early Church and of Roman Catholicism which had been imposed from the third century onwards.

3. Side by side with the conceptions which have now been referred to, and partly before them, there appears a number of ideas in the earliest period of the Church which are connected with the Biblical doctrine of a universal priesthood. It reappears time after time in the Christian literature of the first century, although not until later can any more developed theology connected with it be spoken of. In Origen, in the writings attributed to Cyril of Jerusalem, and in Augustine, however, to name a few examples, we are confronted—although in its earliest beginnings—with the combination of universal priesthood, typology, and conformity which is characteristic of Luther's thought.

In this theology the Old Testament is a *typos* or *figura* of the New. The anointing of Aaron and Solomon in the Old Testament is a type of the anointing of Christ with the Holy Spirit, but ever since the ending of the Old Testament type, the only one anointed as priest is Christ Himself. Christians, however, are made partakers of the anointing which was given to Christ by their conformity to Him. From this there follows logically the universal priesthood of all Christians. The doctrine of *typos* excludes any continuity between the priesthood of the Old Testament and that of the New. No one in the period of the New Testament inherits the Old Testament priesthood. On the contrary, the conception of conformity gives all Christians, and not merely holders of the ministry, part of the priesthood.

Analogies can be used in two wholly different ways, partly to emphasise similarity, and partly to show difference. Typology is an analogical concept. It is used in the New Testament mostly with emphasis on the similarity of the terms compared —the interest is in the parallelism. A change soon appears here, however, for when early Christianity was confronted with the task of distinguishing itself clearly from Judaism, it was the difference of the terms compared that generally came to be emphasised more than in the New Testament. This is the conception which the anti-gnostic Fathers employ, representing as

they do the dialectic between the old and new ages by the use of typology. This is also the case in the 'mystagogical' catechisms which are named after Cyril of Jerusalem (but which probably were composed by one of his disciples). It occurs besides in Augustine, when typology and universal priesthood are connected. All of these use typology to mark the distinction between the priesthood of the Old Testament and that of the New: it is the distinction which is emphasised, not the similarity. It is just the same when Luther adopts ideas in this connexion. Both the sacrifice and the priesthood of the Old Testament have ended, and in their place a New Testament sacrifice and a New Testament priesthood are spoken of. The sacrifice is Christ's, made once and for all at Golgotha (Heb. 9.14), and the priesthood is Christ's (Heb. 9.11). Christ alone is King and Priest.

The writer of the mystagogical catechisms and Augustine both proceed from Christ's priesthood to the universal priesthood by introducing the idea of conformity. According to the former it is baptism which unites Christians to Christ, while according to Augustine it is *caritas*. The union is to be thought of in one or other of these ways, and Christians are held to be sharers in Christ's Kingdom and Priesthood by their conformity to Him. By His resurrection Christ, who is the head, is in heaven, but Christians, although they are here on earth by themselves, are members of His body, and as such—as branches of the vine, and as living stones in the temple building—they share in everything which belongs to Him. In this case, they share His Kingdom and Priesthood.

Here we have those ideas which Luther uses against the conception of the ministry which is bound to the sacrifice of the Mass. In other words, when he refutes the interpretation of the ministry which originated as a sacerdotal structure in the third century and which was developed in the Roman Catholicism of the Middle Ages, he does so by a doctrine of universal priesthood which is partly earlier than the sacerdotal interpretation, or at all events as early—that is, by the original Biblical doctrine of universal priesthood, united as it now is with typology and the idea of conformity. Here different conceptions which cannot be logically reconciled are played out against one another. Luther combats the doctrine of sacrifice in the Mass as

being incompatible with the grace of God revealed to us through Christ's sacrifice. With this doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass there is united the sacerdotal interpretation of the ministry which comes from the third century. Luther rejects both. He does not put any ideas of his own in their place or offer any reconstruction, but effects a combination of ideas which are as early as the sacramental interpretation of the ministry. He plays out one kind of patristic theology against another.

4. The Roman Catholic doctrine of jurisdiction is of a later date, being introduced in the Middle Ages before the period of Scholasticism and developed by it. In assenting to this doctrine Luther takes his basis of discussion partly in a freshly stated conception of Christ's kingly power, and partly also in his interpretation of the passages in the Bible connected with the power of the keys. Even here he is not original, for his Biblical interpretation was derived in important points from Augustine, who held that Peter is a name for the Church. The fact that Peter is given the keys does not mean, therefore, that he receives them personally. In Augustine the identification of Peter with the Church is one element in his allegorical interpretation of the Bible. Peter receives the keys because he believes and confesses Christ. The Church consists of those who have a faith working through love. It is on that account that Peter and the Church are to be identified. The keys have been given to the living Church, that is, to those who have a faith working through love.

When Luther opposes the jurisdiction of the ministry and especially the Pope's claim for power, Augustine's thought is found to be most useful, but it is inserted in a polemical connexion totally foreign to Augustine. According to Luther the power of the keys was not given to Peter personally, nor to Peter as a representative of the ministry, but to all who have Peter's faith, that is, to the Living Church. If Peter represented anyone when he took them, it was the believing congregation. Here, with the help of Augustine's exegesis, congregation is set over against a falsely interpreted ministry, and in a way wholly unknown in Augustine himself.

Against the doctrine of the kingly power of the priest inherited from the Old Testament, Luther thus sets the thought of type and the related doctrine of Christ's unique power. It is in this

way that he disproves what his opponents said about the jurisdiction of the ministry. The power of the keys which Christ gave to Peter, on the other hand, is held to belong, with the support of Augustine's exegesis, neither to Pope nor bishops but in point of fact to the congregation. Ideas drawn from Augustine are set over against the medieval papal theology.

Were we to judge Luther's representation only by the use he makes of the patristic tradition and by what he rejects in it, we should certainly not reach the heart of the problem. To possess the sanction of the ancient Church for any ideas which are offered may be extremely important, but more important still are the vital Biblical interests which compelled Luther's own rupture with the Papal Church and its traditional theology. He stands here in a definite historical situation. The Biblical understanding of grace for which he makes himself spokesman is incompatible with the traditional sacrifice of the Mass, and on that account he is forced to reject it. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic interpretation of the ministry which Luther also rejects follows partly from the doctrine of sacrifice and partly from the power politics of the Papal Court, and when the reformer breaks with both these doctrines he is forced simultaneously to do away with the traditional doctrine of the ministry. But something else has to be put in its place. Having rejected the Roman Catholic doctrines of *ordo* and *jurisdictio*, therefore, Luther teaches the doctrine of the ministry of the Word.

It is just this doctrine which forms the main theme of the New Testament, continuing as it does what was given with the apostolate, its proclamation of the Gospel and deaconate. It will not be argued that other lines of thought appear from time to time in the New Testament—in this connexion we can think of the inheritance from Judaism—but in importance and significance these can never be equated with concepts which belong to the proclamation of the Gospel and the deaconate. In the first and second centuries the proclamation of the Gospel is virtually in sole control. At this time the ministry signifies a ministry of the Word. When, however, the conception of sacrifice begins to develop, the ideas of *ordo* and *jurisdictio* begin to increase in strength and suppress the interpretation of the ministry which is bound to the proclamation of the Gospel and which

stems from the apostolate. The proclamation of the Gospel and the deaconate, signifying the work of love, no longer stand in the centre. Sacrifice offered by a sacrificing priest becomes central.

Luther sets himself against all this. His purpose was to re-introduce the main theme of the New Testament, and so for this reason he teaches a single ministry of the Church, that is, a ministry of the Word which is a service and a commission, not an authority or office, and which has as its task, not the offering of sacrifice, but the continuation of the apostolic proclamation of the Gospel and the diaconate.

THE FIRST SACRAMENT: BAPTISM[1]

by Professor Heinrich Vogel

WE confess Holy Baptism as the act of grace of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, by which, on the command and promise of His Word, we are sealed in a second birth to eternal life as sons and heirs of His eternal Kingdom and members of His holy Church, in order that by the Holy Spirit, in His Word and faith, we may be daily baptised into His death and raised with Him.

1. The Origin of Baptism

As a sacrament instituted by the risen Christ baptism is based upon the substitutionary baptism in blood of Christ crucified.

When we ask concerning the origin of baptism we have to distinguish between the institution by which it is constituted—the command and promise of the risen Lord—and the underlying basis of this institution. In other words: Since no division is either possible or permissible at this point, the institution must be based upon the One who institutes, upon the mystery of His person and way and work. The institution cannot be understood as an act of commanding and promising in abstraction from the Lord of the sacrament who does command and promise. It is as we understand it in the light of His mystery that we shall see it to be truly meaningful and solidly grounded. And we must not pervert the proper power of the institution, which summons us with the quality of divine omnipotence, by isolating the institution from its basis and understanding it in terms of a human institution with no final validity. The institution is attested on the lips of the risen Christ. In the account in Matthew it is in fact His final word, the testament of the One who is about to leave His disciples to go to the right hand of God. It is uttered with the full authority of the One who has been raised again from the death of the Cross and to whom

[1] From *Gott in Christo* (Lettner Verlag, Berlin), pp. 856-71, translated by the Rev. G. W. Bromiley, D.Litt., Ph.D.

'all power is given in heaven and in earth' (Matt. 28.18). In the fullest sense it is an act of lordship on the part of Him who has won the divine victory in His substitutionary submission, the Son who as the victor over all lords, principalities and powers has been confirmed and recognised by the Father. It seals its accomplishment in the name of the God who, as the Father, in the Son, and by the Spirit, promises us His presence, the 'God with us'. It is what it is only in the action produced by the word of institution, and—we must at once add with reference to the relationship between word and water—in a fulfilment which is in accordance with the institution (John 3.5; Titus 3.5 ff; Acts 8.36).

No human institution as such can underlie or produce what goes to make up its nature and being. As we shall see, it is a question of no more and no less than the new beginning which God makes with the sinner, of the divine sonship and incorporation into the body of Christ. The quality of this *institutio* is determined by the fact that the instituting Lord Himself underwent a baptism which alone made it possible for us to be baptised at all into and in Him, and which is the basis of the reality and truth of our baptism. He is attested to us as the One who went down to the substitutionary baptism for sin (Matt. 3.13 ff). He who had no need of that baptism went to John's baptism of repentance, which is connected with the eschatological secret of the imminent Kingdom of God and its Messiah. In a dreadful inversion which even the Baptist cannot grasp there was accomplished there something which according to human understanding cannot and ought not to be accomplished. The baptism of Jesus in the river Jordan is marked by the mystery of substitution. It is not by chance that it denotes the beginning of His 'calling' and 'ministry', for from the very outset this takes place under the sign of substitution. The Father acknowledges as His Son the One who has taken the place of sinners. It is upon Him that the Holy Spirit descends. It is by Him and in Him that God acts and reveals Himself as the God who is for us and with us.

But the baptism for sin of the sinless One is grounded in the incarnation of the Word. It can be understood therefore only in relation to the baptism of blood in which the ministry of the One who took our place culminates. 'I have a baptism to be

baptised with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished' (Luke 12.50). The baptism of John, to which the Messiah proclaimed by him submitted 'to fulfil all righteousness' (Matt. 3.15), points to the baptism in which He fulfilled and executed the righteousness of God as the Holy One of God slain on the accursed tree of the law which we had not fulfilled. The going down and rising again in John's baptism—as it is indeed fulfilled by the mystery of the One who takes our place—points as such to another going down and rising again in the reality of His death and resurrection from the dead.

It is in the baptism of blood, and the resurrection of the One who went down and was dead and buried in this way, that our baptism is grounded as instituted by Him and administered and blessed by His command and promise. It is because He was baptised in our place that we can be baptised into Him, into His name. We cannot understand our baptism in the light of John's baptism as such. It does not consist in the correspondence of an 'after' (after the resurrection of the crucified) to a 'before' (in the proclamation of the Messiah). We cannot understand it only in the light of John's baptism, as one form of modern baptismal interpretation would have it, but from the very first it is Christ's baptism, standing under the word of the Baptist who points away from himself to the Messiah: 'I indeed baptise you with water unto repentance; but he that cometh after me is mightier than I, whose shoes I am not worthy to bear: he shall baptise you with the Holy Ghost and with fire' (Matt. 3.11; John 1.26-7). The baptism of John—and we are thinking now of the baptism in Jordan to which sinners thronged when they heard the message of the coming Kingdom of God—is only a sign. Nor is it the only one. Circumcision must be regarded as a prophetic type in its relation to the redemption of Israel out of bondage in Egypt and as a sign of membership of the people which God had elected as His own people. Not that we have to anticipate by calling it a sacrament of the old covenant. We must not ignore this type and what took place in Jordan. We must follow the arrow which shows what direction we have to take. But not in such a way that we come back to it, understanding our baptism in Christ only according to the indicatory character of John's baptism. What happens to us in baptism does not merely point

us to the work of Christ as something which we have to seek behind it, but it must be believed and acknowledged as the work of Christ enacted in us in baptism.

When we see the institution in the mystery of the instituting Lord, in the baptism of blood which He suffered as a substitute, in His death and resurrection, and when we understand the baptism of John which He honoured with His presence as pointing to that and in the light of it, the way opens up for answering the question what happens to us when at His command and with His promise we are baptised in His name.

2. The Nature of Baptism

In baptism we are made partakers of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. It is therefore the beginning which at the end God makes with us as His children and members of the body of Christ.

(*a*) *Participation in the death and resurrection of Christ*

'Or are ye ignorant that all we who were baptised into Jesus Christ were baptised into His death? We were buried therefore with Him through baptism into His death: that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life' (Rom. 6.3-4). We found the origin of baptism in the substitutionary baptism of blood of the One who having gone down to that baptism was raised again from death. The death from which He was raised is originally and essentially not His own but ours. It is His death only as He accepted it, as He took it over from us. That is the seriousness with which we have to take the fact that He is what He is for us. Similarly it is our life which He has brought back as the One who is raised to life for us. The Son of God did not need either to be crucified or to be raised again for Himself. It was as the One who became man, was made flesh, that He had to suffer these things and be crucified and raised again on the third day. This 'must' has its basis, as we saw, in the freedom of the divine mercy. The reality of the substitution made in Him is really acknowledged only when we accept that we are the men whose doomed life He bore on the Cross and whose eternal life He brought in. We cannot hear that 'for us' without realising that we are dead and risen again with Him. We do not realise this by understanding ourselves or giving to our

lives a Christian interpretation, but only by acknowledging that which took place in Christ, which is the basis of faith and summons us to this acknowledgment. If we are buried with Him by baptism, and this being buried is the basis of our being raised again, then as a burial baptism is also a birth, and as an end a beginning.

Before we consider what is involved in this end, or rather this beginning, with all its quality that cannot be compared with anything that we call end and beginning, we have to realise that in baptism there happens to us that which in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ took place for us. Baptism is not merely a reflection of that occurrence, as Barth teaches. It does not merely point to it. Its character is not merely cognitive or significatory. On the contrary, in it—that is, in the occurrence of baptism itself—we have to do with what Christ did as what God does to us on whose behalf that which is proclaimed in the cross and resurrection of Christ took place. Baptism is therefore the appropriation of the work of Christ as it took place 'for us' and indeed 'for me'. Baptism is not administered collectively but to me. In so far as it is incorporation into the body of Christ, as we have seen, it is essentially my baptism, the beginning which God makes with me. In a divine appropriation there takes place to me that which has already taken place for me. For that reason I am made a partaker of the mystery of substitution, I am seized and sealed as a man with Jesus Christ, as one who has died and been raised again with Him. This seizing and sealing implies the beginning at the end, or birth in death.

(*b*) *The Beginning at the End*

When we ask 'What is baptism?' the simplest answer is that it is the beginning which God makes with me. That means, of course, the beginning which God makes with me in Jesus Christ. It can only be this because the beginning has already been made in Jesus Christ. But it is the mystery of baptism that what took place then and there is now effective in its application to me. The fact that the beginning has already been made in Jesus Christ does not mean that we do not recognise the reality of the baptismal occurrence as the beginning which God makes with me in this time of mine. When it is appro-

priated by faith, the word of forgiveness involves a real happening here and now, even though the atonement has already taken place then and there. Similarly the beginning which God makes with me involves a real happening based upon that of the cross and resurrection which already includes my death and life. That is what is stated by that sentence from the Epistle to the Romans which we have already adduced and which cannot be amended or explained away, that by baptism we are buried with Christ in death, in order that with Him we may walk in newness of life in the power of His resurrection. For 'as many of you as were baptised into Christ did put on Christ' (Gal. 3.27), and that denotes the being in Christ of those for whom He is what He is.

The beginning which God makes with me in baptism is therefore based upon the 'beginner' by whom He has made this beginning with us. Indeed, this 'beginner of our faith', who is also its 'perfecter' (Heb. 12.2) is the 'beginner' of our existence and being in Him and with Him. He is the One who acts towards us in baptism. He is the subject of the baptismal occurrence—He who has been raised again from death, from our death. It is as the Risen One that in baptism He acts towards us as the 'beginner'. Baptism is in a special sense the sacrament of the resurrection and therefore of the beginning as it has been inaugurated by the Risen Jesus Christ. We cannot therefore separate the mystery of the beginning which God makes with us from the mystery of the 'beginner'. We should make God's beginning one of our beginnings, which always have in themselves their end, if we were not to understand baptism as the act of grace of Jesus Christ, who Himself as the Christ is for us, the beginning of God with us.

The incomparable quality of this beginning is brought into sharpest focus by the fact that it includes in itself an end which in its finality cannot be regarded as analogous to what we call ends. We have said that baptism is a death and burial. In baptism we are taken and sealed as those who are dead and buried with Christ. The man of sin and death is the man who is crucified with Christ. If we are to follow Rom. 6.3-4 baptism is a fulfilling of this burial, and in inseparable unity with it a fulfilling of the resurrection to a life which knows no death, to a beginning which does not of itself produce any new end. It is

therefore the appropriation of redemption from the wrath of God and the forces of corruption.

We have still to speak of what this means in relation to the faith to which we are summoned in inseparable unity with this occurrence, and the obedience which cannot be separated from this membership of Christ. But above all we have to recognise the ontic basis of our faith and obedience, our loving and hoping, the beginning which is given to us in the very end, the life which comes to us in death. In what beginning can we find comfort if not in that which the grace of God, which precedes all our believing, hoping and loving, has made with us in Jesus Christ and makes with us in baptism? We have to let ourselves be cast back upon this beginning, and upon this beginning as one which breaks through our time of sin and death. The starting point is not an experience of conversion and faith as such, but prevenient, basic grace in the beginning which it posits. We do not conceal the fact that this insight has a certain importance for a question which we have still to discuss, that of infant baptism; not as though it necessarily followed from it, but to the extent that infant baptism emphasises in the sharpest possible way the prevenient character of baptismal grace.

All this means that baptism can be given only once. The end of which we spoke is not an end which can be continually succeeded by new beginnings and new ends. The beginning of which we spoke bruised the head of the finite-infinite worm of our time of death which cannot die. This is still concealed in Jesus Christ. It still seems to be denied by the actuality of our present existence. For that reason we have to believe and give thanks for the act of God to us in all its greatness. Because baptism is *the* end and therefore *the* beginning, it is singular by nature, and cannot be repeated. This has to be asserted against all re-baptisers, whose repetition of baptism in the last resort always consists in a misunderstanding of its nature, a failure to appreciate the beginning of grace which God makes with us—that beginning which precedes all our own understanding and action and decisions and attitudes.

(*c*) *The New Birth*

Understood in this way, we find in baptism the basis of the divine sonship proclaimed to us in the Gospel. As this begin-

ning comes to us, and we undergo this birth, we are adopted as children of God the Father, in the Son, and by the Holy Ghost. Baptism is 'the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he poured out upon us richly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour; that, being justified by his grace, we might be made heirs according to the hope of eternal life' (Titus 3.5-7). What we have never to forget is that what takes place here has to be believed, that it not only calls for and aims at faith, but is the basis of faith and demands it. But it is not our faith which is the basis of our divine sonship. It is that birth of which we are neither creator nor lord. We are not the creator and lord of our own faith. That is what is meant when we ground our divine sonship in the birth which comes to us. Even the first and earthly birth which comes to us in the context of sin and death is not really a matter of our own operation or co-operation. And in an infinitely qualitatively different sense that is true of the second birth by which we are not only called but can actually be the children of God. If we shrink before the enormity of a happening which is so deeply concealed from our own reason and understanding, let us be careful what we are doing when we do not ground the divine sonship strictly and properly outside ourselves, but find a premiss of the baptismal occurrence in all its reality and truth in a correlation between the act of God and our thankfulness, between baptism and faith.

This is emphasised particularly in the mystery that we are baptised into and in His name. It is His name as the One who was crucified and risen for us, and in His name the name of the Father who acts towards us and gives Himself to us in the Son and by the Holy Ghost, which is not only the sign by which the baptismal occurrence is sealed but also that which is its basis and fulfilment. We receive the new name, the name of sonship, only in virtue of the name of the Father as it is effective to us in its redemptive and creative power in the name of the Son and by the name of the Holy Ghost. 'I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine' (Isa. 43.1). That is said by Israel's Redeemer, and the 'Fear not' has divine power just because it is not based on a correlation. Israel can and should call on the name of the Lord, but only as the one who by the Lord Himself is called by the new name given him by His grace.

Therefore is it the God whose name, being, nature, word and work are inseparably connected who calls us by this new name when we are baptised into and in His name.

Therefore the mystery of sonship is again revealed and confirmed in the mystery of the name. As those who are baptised in His name we no longer listen to the forces of corruption to which as men of sin and death we had fallen victim in the power of the divine wrath, but to the God who in spite of everything of His mercy allows us to hear Him, the Creator and Redeemer. In baptism we are taken and sealed as God's possession, on the basis of the fact that He, Jesus Christ, who gave Himself to be ours, has gained us as His own. Therefore in the fullest possible sense baptism is the act of lordship of the One by whom the principalities and powers under whose tyranny and terror we were lost have been despoiled. As redemption from the wrath of the God and the forces of corruption it is our appropriation by the Lord to the Lord who has won us as His possession not with 'silver and gold' but with His own 'precious blood' (1 Pet. 1.18-19). In relation to baptism we can accept the answer given by the Heidelberg Catechism to its first question: 'What is thy only confidence in life and death?' Answer: 'That with body and soul, in both life and death, I am not my own, but belong to my faithful Saviour Jesus Christ.'

(*d*) *Incorporation into the Body of Christ*

We come to the same mystery when in conjunction with all that we have thought through so far we consider baptism as incorporation into the body of Christ, the Church. We said that baptism is always administered as my baptism, and we related this to the singularity of the beginning which God makes with me. But we should give a totally false impression if we tried to consider this event which happens to the 'individual' in an individualistic isolation. If it is really the case in baptism that the work of Jesus Christ accomplished for us is appropriated to me, if it is really the case that the Christ who is for us is the One who acts to me, then I cannot understand the being and life to which I am awakened in Him and which I can have in Him in isolation from its origin, as an individual being in itself. For as I exist from God to God in the divine particularity and immediacy of my being as an individual, I am

claimed for the mystery of the 'we' of the Church—which is the mystery of His body: I, who cannot say 'I' before God, without saying 'thou' to my fellow-man and being to him a neighbour. When the Risen One, and in Him God Himself, makes His beginning with me, I become a participant in the being and life which is His being for us. Baptism is incorporation into the body of Jesus Christ and therefore makes us members of His body (Eph. 4.4 ff; Gal. 3. 27-8). That is something which we have to believe.

But before we consider that this incorporation has to be believed, and that only faith can see it for what it is, we have to underline what it means in relation to incorporation into the Church which is His body. We do well to include the other descriptions of the nature of the Church, so that baptism as incorporation into the body of Jesus Christ includes membership of the people of God and the communion of saints. We can understand all this only in relation to the creative and redemptive subject who is active in baptism, the Father who has such compassion for us in the Son and by the Holy Ghost. Originally and essentially we cannot understand it in relation to the Church as such, but only to her Lord as the Saviour and Head of the Church. If baptism can be described as an act of admission—of the lost sinner by God—it is not (originally and essentially) an act of admission on the part of a human society, the 'Church'. There is no question really of admission into a union, a religious society, a fellowship of faith as a sociological construct. Or more exactly: although in a certain sense there may be admission into a sociological grouping—for the Church is visible as well as invisible—the Church as this visibly existent fellowship is not originally and essentially the admitting subject. It is only as the servant, the one who is commissioned by Jesus Christ, the one who is entrusted with the administration of the sacrament, that she can be the subject and carry out the baptismal action. But where, gathered together on the command and with the promise of her Lord, she does act in this way through one of her members as one who is charged to administer the sacrament, where she baptises, she confesses that it is not she who acts, but the Lord.

By the command and promise of her Lord she is summoned to responsibility for the correct administration of the baptismal

action and for the one baptised. It is in this responsibility that she exercises the office of 'god-parent' which takes on concrete form in definite members of the community. But if they are asked by heathen who do not know the mystery of the baptismal action: 'What are you doing?', they must at once reply to those gathered around the baptismal font: 'It is not we but He Himself who here does what He in His omnipotence alone can do and in His mercy will do.' We must not forget this even when we recognise the confessional character of the baptismal occurrence. In its administration baptism is of course a confession of Jesus Christ and of the work of redemption accomplished by Him. Those who make confession of faith in baptism confess the Lord of baptism. But we must not misunderstand this as though our confession were the basic and determinative factor in baptism and baptism were simply an expression of our faith and confession. The inversion which this would involve would overturn the true basis of confession—and faith—and throw us back not on Him, the Lord, and His act of grace to us, but on ourselves.

But this brings us back again to the question which has cropped up at every point, that of the appropriation of baptismal grace by faith, or the relationship between baptism and faith. We must at once recognise the reach of this question which extends to the whole life of the Christian. It is the question of the efficacy and meaning of baptism for the man who receives the divine benefits in faith and can and should live his life with the gratitude of the baptised.

3. The Efficacy of Baptism

The unique and therefore unrepeatable beginning of baptism which is the strength of faith is the basis of the continuity of the Christian life which can and should be lived in a daily renewed appropriation of the grace of baptism until that beginning which is promised with the return of Jesus Christ.

When we derived it from a Christological source, the nature of baptism enabled us to understand the baptismal occurrence from above and the baptismal action in the light of Jesus Christ as the active creative and redemptive subject. Emphasising

the reality of the beginning which the God and Father of Jesus Christ makes with us in baptism, we were forced to oppose all spiritualising misinterpretations of the sacrament. And emphasising the prevenience of the grace operative in it we were forced to oppose all synergistic understandings in relation to the appropriation of this grace. But once and again—even in relation to the creatively active subject and the personal mystery of this occurrence—we have had to point out that faith is required. 'He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved' (Mark 16.16), and this is sharpened in a way that we cannot ignore in the following sentence: 'but he that believeth not shall be damned.' The New Testament narratives of baptism—that of the eunuch (Acts 8) no less than that in the house of Cornelius (Acts 10)—all point to the closest possible connexion between faith and baptism—and in that order.

(*a*) *The connexion between Faith and Baptism*

To take first the question of the order, the decisive insight in this matter is that by its very nature the baptismal occurrence, or action, cannot be understood apart from faith. It cannot be a purely physical-hyperphysical experience that God makes His beginning with me, that I am crucified with Christ and made a partaker of His resurrection life, that redemption from the wrath of God and the forces of corruption applies to me, that with all these things I am accepted as a child of God and heir of His kingdom, incorporated into the body of Jesus Christ as a member of the Church. It is not something which we can fatalistically and passively allow to take place over us. In the word which is conjoined with the water, it is a word-occurrence, an active word, and therefore it has to be preached and heard and believed. If we were to ignore or minimise the connexion between faith and baptism, we should be exchanging the Scylla of spiritualising for the Charybdis of magic, and it would not greatly matter which of the errors were more fatal in its consequences. When we consider the history of the Christian religion and the way in which it is shot through with superstition about baptism we cannot be less careful in avoiding a magical misinterpretation than a purely spiritual.

Certainly the reminder that the act of grace of the One who was crucified and raised for us does not happen to an inanimate

object but to a man, who by his redemption and awakening is summoned to the decision of thankfulness and faith and obedience, must not be misused to make our faith and knowledge, our thankfulness and confession the presupposition of what God does to us. If we try to interpret in this sense the order in the verse: 'He that believeth and is baptised' (and in all the New Testament accounts of missionary baptisms which maintain this order), we fall a prey to quite other spirits than the Holy Spirit whose name we invoke, namely the spirit of a synergistic methodism which refers the question of the beginning which God makes with us to the subjective experience of faith rather than to the sacrament. But where then is the comfort of the sacrament? Where is its power to create assurance? Faith finds its strength in baptism. If—even as a believer—I cannot be assured by the beginning which God makes with me as the One who acts towards me through the sacrament, by what beginning can I be assured? Are not those who seriously address to themselves the question of faith caught up in a process of self-torture, in which—with the uncertainty of it—they are ground to pieces? And can any certainty which they think they can rely on in themselves replace the certainty created by the sacrament?

Not as though we did not recognise that the certainty of faith is the certainty of the word as it is granted to those who hear the word preached. Respecting the particularly concrete form of the divine working in word and sacrament, we believe, and can do nothing else, when we are thrown back upon the action of God which is done to us in baptism, and cannot be replaced by our own unreliable data. And if we have to agree that the account does not really close with our understanding of the matter, we must be careful that we do not try to control the mystery by the short-circuits of our logic, which says: Either baptism first and then faith—and therefore baptism as a magical happening, or faith first and then baptism—which is to minimise baptism and even make it superfluous. In the context of our total understanding of the grace of God encountering us in Christ in and with His self-coming and self-impartation, we accept that faith as a faith which as grounded in Jesus Christ is thrown back upon the beginning which is made with us in baptism by Jesus Christ.

(*b*) *Baptism continually believed*

What we have said is underlined by the further insight in relation to the question of the continual renewal of the connexion between faith and baptism, or better, of the power of baptism for the whole life of the Christian as it proceeds from and is assured by this beginning. We have said that as the beginning baptism is unique and by its very nature cannot be repeated. But faith is not unique in this sense. We cannot understand baptismal faith as an isolated act which is bound and therefore limited to a baptismal occurrence at one time and place. Even if it is understood as an act which is bound to the baptismal occurrence at that time and place, it is an act which is repeated, which is lived out in a daily renewed decision, repentance and thankfulness. This makes it plain that baptism is not dependent on faith as its presupposition, so that faith has not merely to be based upon baptism but continually recalled to it. 'I am baptised into thy name, Father, Son and Holy Ghost' is something which we have constantly to believe and confess. It is something for whose assuring power we have continually to give thanks. It is in faith that there takes place that daily 'repetition' of baptism of which Luther's exposition speaks with its reference to the drowning of the old Adam and the raising up of the new man in repentance. In the same way it makes plain the highly critical power of baptism, the judgment passed by it upon the unbelief and disobedience and ingratitude of the man who despises the gracious act of God, rejects His gift, and lives as though he were not baptised into the name of the Triune God. Here too we cannot compress the truth into our own psychical experience. We must respect the freedom of the judgment and grace of the One who alone knows the secrets of the heart. But when we ourselves hear what is given us in baptism, we cannot believe that baptism is made as though it had never happened by those who despise it, who totally reject and forget it. I cannot annul the fact that I am baptised, and when I rightly understand this I can only add: Thanks be to God.

I can only reaffirm continually this *reditus ad initium*, this return to baptism as to the beginning which the grace of God made with me, casting myself afresh upon the basis which posits the continuity of my Christian life. When we consider our

Christian life—from the phenomenological standpoint—how can we have any certainty that it is a definite whole, a line, a way, and not simply a collection of extremely contradictory and doubtful fragments? The wholeness of it is posited and maintained by the grace of God forgiving our sins and raising us from the dead, and this is the prevenient grace of God as it meets me in the beginning which God makes with me. This 'beginning' is always with us. Its mystery is not restricted to the one time and place. It initiates and determines a history, the new history of God with me, which is based upon the history of Jesus Christ as the One in whom God made our history His history.

(*c*) *The Simultaneity of Baptism and Faith and the Question of Infant Baptism*

But this brings us up against the decisive question in the relationship of baptism and faith, the question of simultaneity. At this point everything depends upon our understanding the mystery of simultaneity in this question of the relationship of baptism and faith in the light of the Lord of baptism. It is He, acting towards us as the One who makes Himself present in the sacrament, who establishes simultaneity. Simultaneity is the making Himself present here and now in my time of death of the One who, Himself eternal, entered our time of death to overcome it. That beginning (which we understand baptism to be) enables us men of this time of death to be participants in His time of life. This is something we have to believe. In relation to the connexion between faith and baptism it is therefore impossible to reduce the mystery of the simultaneity which He creates, of which He is the basis in His grace, to a simple denominator in our concept of time and—consequently—to try to discover or postulate that simultaneity in the relationship between an experience of faith and the baptismal occurrence.

This is most clearly seen in relation to the baptism of adults, where a phenomenological state of 'believing' does not guarantee the simultaneity of baptism and faith. In this respect we cannot take too seriously what Luther says in his basic statement concerning infant baptism in exposition of Matt. 8.1-13. Of the reason of the sinner which 'offers the greatest resistance to the faith and word of God' he says to those who would make

the adult's attaining to reason a prerequisite of baptismal faith: 'But because they hold so firmly to reason, we must take them with their own cleverness. Tell me, why dost thou baptise a man when he attains to reason? Thou repliest: He hears the Word of God and believes. But I ask: How knowest thou that? Thou sayest: He confesses with the mouth. Suppose I say: How if he lies and dissembles? Thou canst not see the heart. Very well, thou dost not baptise on any other ground than that he makes outward profession, and art uncertain of his faith, and must consider that if he has no more inwardly in the heart than thou dost perceive outwardly, his hearing and confessing and believing is of no avail: for it is a mere illusion and no true faith. But who art thou to say that outward hearing and confessing are necessary to baptism; that where they are not present we must not baptise and where they are we must baptise? And all the time thou must confess that this hearing and confessing are uncertain and therefore not enough for him to receive baptism. On what then dost thou baptise? thou canst not stand when thou plungest baptism into such doubt' (*Erlangen Edition*, 11, pp. 66-7). With respect to the faith which Luther ascribes to infants we should misunderstand him if we were to try to fasten upon it a psychological interpretation, which would of course look very strange. 'God's works are secret and strange when and where He wills, again, they are so manifest when and where He wills that it is too high and deep for us to judge them' (ibid.). But he finds the key-passage in his defence of infant baptism in the blessing of the children by Christ as we have it in Mark 10.13 f. 'In short, the baptism and confidence of children is in the saying: Suffer the little children to come unto me and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God. That is His saying, and He did not speak falsely' (ibid. p. 69). It is indeed hard to see how all that is said against the 'magic' of infant baptism and the superstition always bound up with it could not just as well be turned against the blessing of the children by the prophet of Nazareth—which led the disciples to try to prevent it on account of their lack of age. The reminder that 'blessing' is not baptism does not alter the fact that the subject of the blessing and the subject of our baptism is the same Lord and Saviour.

Ultimately we dare to bring infants to baptism not because

of an ancient tradition—which does in fact reach back into New Testament times—but because of the mystery of the promise under which He, the Lord of baptism, places infants by blessing them and indeed granting to them the Kingdom of God. In relation to a question which is constantly arising in practical theology, that of the practice of infant baptism here and now, we must at least respect this authorisation which is based upon the very nature of baptism and which forbids us to neglect or prevent that which is under promise. The question whether baptism ought to be administered in a post-Christian society, where there is no congregation, whether infant baptism is no longer possible on the edge of the 'Constantinian age' of the Church—as it appears to be ending—because there is no longer any mother, any congregation to bring the infant in her arms to Christ, must at least be decided with a respect for the nature of baptism and not its perversion. In the present conflict concerning infant baptism it seems to us that an exegetical and dogmatic and a practical and pastoral problem are so irremediably interwoven that deductions are drawn from the latter (the equivocal state of the national church) which alter the whole nature of baptism. As far as the faith of infants is concerned, can we not confidently leave it to the grace and wisdom of the One who took them in His arms and placed them under His promise? Is not the one necessary thing for the baptised—and we are thinking now of adults—always that they should be called to faith, to that constant return to the beginning (*reditus ad initium*)? Of what avail is it that they did 'consciously believe' if they do not believe here and now that they belong to the One at whose command and under whose promise they are baptised? What is needed, therefore, is not the abolition of infant baptism, but baptismal faith, that is, the continually new faith which rests confidently in the beginning which Jesus Christ has made with me.

In the strict sense it is faith which in, with and under the invisible baptismal occurrence, that action which is so ridiculous to the reason of religious man, enables the divine act of grace to take place. The hiddenness of the divine action makes it impossible for us to equate the beginning of which we are speaking with any of our historical beginnings. That the beginning is characterised by mystery is not merely underlined but trans-

cended and fulfilled by the fact that this beginning aims at a beginning which will reveal in glory the hidden life which we have begun there with Christ in God. In contrast to our understanding of time, the history of God with us is not marked by a correlation of beginning and end. The end in which God ends our finitude is achieved where He begins. The history of God with us is marked by constant new beginnings: creation, atonement, and a final redemption in participation in the glory of our Brother and Saviour and Lord. In the fullest possible sense, therefore, baptism is a happening with an eschatological seal. It seals to hope. It claims the man of sin and death for that future which is not a mode of our time but which in the coming to us of Jesus Christ enables us by inconceivable grace to have a new nature and being in God's time, which is eternity.

A ROMAN CATHOLIC INTERPRETATION OF KARL BARTH[1]

by Professor GIOVANNI MIEGGE

I do not think that I am doing an injustice to anyone in writing that the book that Balthasar has devoted to Karl Barth[2] constitutes the largest, most unprejudiced and most intelligent attempt that has hitherto been made to set forth clearly the thought of the master of Basel, by identifying his deep-lying connexions with modern Protestant theology, and by setting forth with precision his opposition in regard to Catholicism. One should not lose sight of the fact that Father Balthasar writes as a Roman Catholic theologian. One can easily imagine that a Roman Catholic is sensitive, more than we Protestants, to a determinate intellectual atmosphere, a certain family likeness, which is beyond doubt common to all modern Protestant theologians and which distinguishes the lot of them from the tradition of scholastic ontological thought; and it is a situation that we may enjoy when, although in the realm of Protestantism Barthians and Liberals have for a quarter of a century been exchanging fierce blows in a duel which each imagines to be to the death, a sensitive and cultured theologian can come from the other side with a smile of kindly irony and say: 'And yet at root you are all very much alike: you are all moderns.' Balthasar is one of a small group of Roman theologians who have taken upon themselves as their life's mission the study of the theological positions of Protestantism, in order to put the discussion between Catholicism and Protestantism on a serious footing. It is understandable in the present-day situation in the Church, with so many ecumenical tendencies in full course, with the Protestant world offering so many opportunities for discussion, with the resurgent and consuming desire for unity that never loses a chance to show itself, that there should be

[1] Translated by the Rev. John Strugnell from *Protespantesimo*, 1952, 3/4.
[2] *Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie.* See the review on pp. 108 ff.

within the Roman Catholic world people intelligent enough to understand all that could follow from this, and to accept the chance of discussion, with the legitimate desire to take in hand once more, right from its roots, the problem of the break that was occasioned by the Reformation, and to investigate what are the possibilities of a return, improbable and remote though it may be, into unity. There is nothing to which we can take exception in the fact that these studies are undertaken with this confessed purpose: it is instead of the highest importance to observe that they are often conducted with a profound competence, with scientific rigour, with indisputable equanimity, with the desire not to remain tied down in fixed phrases and in prejudices, and that thus they result in a genuine scientific contribution to the questions that they deal with. It is interesting to observe how in the last decades (and, so as far as one can see, as an answer both to the ecumenical movement and to the resurgence of Biblical and dogmatic theology) a new 'Commonwealth of theology', *universitas theologorum*, has been forming itself, where from both the Protestant and the Catholic sides there has been a return to a discussion of the same problems, with a fundamental agreement on method (historico-critical), a noteworthy converging of viewpoints, and the impression of an enrichment of both sides. For example it is certain that the theology of Karl Barth is helping some Catholic theologians to recognise the intrinsic rationalism of Thomism and to try to modify this—this book is a proof of this—just as on the other hand this book offers a considerable contribution to the interpretation, even from a Protestant point of view, of the greatest theologian of the twentieth century.

Generally speaking, presentations of Barth's thought set out from this affirmation: 'Barth is the anti-Schleiermacher.'[1] This assumption is so axiomatic that few have taken the trouble to test it seriously and to ask whether beside opposition there are not affinities between Barth and Schleiermacher that are worth emphasising.[2] This is what Balthasar has done with insistence

[1] Cf. H. Berkhof's article, 'Die Bedeutung Karl Barths für Theologie, Kirche und Welt', written on the occasion of Barth's sixtieth birthday (1946) and published in *Evangelische Theologie*, 1948-9, pp. 254-68.

[2] Cf. the relation between Barth's concept of theology as a practical science in the service of the Church and the thesis of Schleiermacher in his *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums* (1821).

and tenacity, and despite the paradoxical appearance of the results which he believes he has reached, his thesis deserves careful examination.

There is a fact that is obvious for everyone who has read Barth, even if only superficially: that his polemic takes place on two fronts; on one side against neo-Protestantism, and on the other against Catholicism. But the discussion on the two fronts is not in the least symmetrical. Against neo-Protestantism Barth makes a fundamental objection concerning content: namely concerning its resolution of Christianity into anthropology, against which he takes his own 'Copernican revolution' which replaces an anthropocentric theology by a theocentric one. With Catholicism, however, Barth does not always contest the content of its dogmatics. Roman Catholics are thus greatly interested in Barth's doctrinal positions where they find a substantial agreement with many of the views of traditional theology: he sets against them however a formal principle, the doctrine of the *analogia entis*. In other words, in the last analysis he is criticising a form of thought, that of scholastic objectivism with its inherent metaphysical rationalism. And so we easily arrive at the following deduction: if Barth's objections to modern Protestantism concern substance and not mainly form, while the inverse is true with regard to Catholicism, then Barth with his 'Copernican revolution' is to be placed, from a formal point of view, on the plane of modern Protestant thought, and his philosophical style, his form of thought, his *Denkform*, remain those of post-Kantian philosophy; that is to say they remain (if one is willing to accept the word in a broad sense, neglecting its internal antitheses, considering its intimate spiritual affinities rather than the details of gnoseological technique) those of German idealism.

Put in these terms the thesis can seem too simple. We may think that here we are confronted with one of those polemical simplifications in which Catholic theologians willingly indulge: we know how for them, all that is not Thomism is Idealism, i.e. Subjectivism. But Balthasar's analyses are far from being a hasty simplification. He affirms that he has meditated for a good twenty years upon Barth's thought, anxiously following its development, and the presentation of it that he gives is very complex and rich in its hues. Thus

it is worth while giving a résumé of it in its broad outlines.

People do not often realise, or else they forget, that before the second edition of the *Römerbrief* which brought Barth before world opinion, there is a preparatory phase, which is testified to by certain early writings and above all by the first edition of the famous commentary. These writings have an interest that is far from common, because in them certain motives of his mature thought are already present. They reveal an enthusiastic adhesion on the part of the young Barth to modern Protestantism. In a writing of 1909 (*Moderne Theologie und Reichgottesarbeit*), the young Barth praises religious individualism and historical relativism as the never to be gone-back-on discovery of Schleiermacher; in an essay of 1910 (*Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte*) he sets both the Protestant orthodoxy of the Biblical Canon and the Catholic orthodoxy of Dogma in opposition to the line of theological thought indicated by Paul, Goethe, Schleiermacher (one cannot suppress the name of Kant here) and substantially going back to the circles of mystics and pietists from which Schleiermacher emerged. Finally in the writing *Der Glaube an den persönlichen Gott* (1913) Balthasar finds formulated for the first time the principle of *analogia fidei* which ever more reveals itself as the basis of all Barth's theology. The young Barth then wrote: 'One cannot find an analogy of the true content of faith in God in the human personality. An idea of God constructed by the projection of man's self consciousness into the transcendent cannot in fact ever reach God, far less describe Him exhaustively. The idea of God cannot be something projected outside ourselves, but the reflection of a fact produced in us (*in uns hineingeschaffen*). This fact is the life that comes from God (*das Leben aus Gott*) which is given to us by means of our connexion with history (*Zusammenhang mit der Geschichte*).' And this is, in the still uncautiously liberal language of the young Barth, the 'religious experience'.[1] In substance, thinks Balthasar, in these youthful writings one can safely distinguish in a thought that is still in its matter liberal, the essential and basic outlines, of the later and positive thought of Barth: (1) The systematic starting point, which is the immediateness of God, which means at the same time God's non-objectivity; (2) the definition of a point defined as a fact and in

[1] Balthasar, op. cit., p. 226.

this sense as historic fact, in contra-distinction to the aprioristic structures of philosophy; (3) the designation of this point as being produced by God and not attainable by man, in opposition to the structures of anthropology; (4) its definition as the real, in presence of which 'cultural' developments are mere possibility; (5) the attempt to give a Reformed (i.e. Pauline-evangelical) content to idealistic thought-forms; (6) the anti-Catholic polemic; (7) the first opposing of the *analogia fidei* (as an *analogia historiae*) to the *analogia entis*; (8) religious socialism, which leads to a crossing of the frontiers of the Church with the world. Barth at that time is the loving disciple of Herrmann, from whom he received an indelible mark, seen even in the moments when he believes himself to be completely free of it; he is a disciple of Harnack, and of the Ritschlian school, in the importance which he gives to the historic 'fact' of revelation; he is the fellow worker of Martin Rade in the great Liberal Review *Die Christliche Welt*; he is a standard-bearer of the Blumhardts' Christian Socialism; and on the philosophical level, he is a neo-Kantian of the Marburg school, and a disciple of Natorp, who re-discovered, with Hermann Kutter, the religious importance of Plato's thought.

The first edition of the *Römerbrief* betrays all these complex influences. Its theme, which was to receive its fullest and most resonant orchestration in the second edition, is, according to Balthasar,[1] a Platonic-Origenist vision of the fall (from the divine immediateness) and of *apokatastasis*, an enthusiastic eschatology celebrating the irrevocable return from the age of the fall in which the creature remembers its origin, to a new age of total restoration of the ideal original creation of God: a vision that is not pantheistic, but certainly panentheistic, where oppositions are formulated merely in terms of a divine activity, where the creature has no independence of his own, but is merely a negative moment in a Divine dialectic, destined to be taken up again into God through a new state. It is Plato reinterpreted in a Christian sense, as in Origen; it is theological Hegelianism of the right wing. This is obviously a hard characterisation, but the problem of the interpretation of Barth is precisely that of making clear how much remains of these original motives after the double purification wrought by the Kierkegaardian

[1] op. cit., pp. 71 ff.

'crisis', and by the working out of the *Kirchliche Dogmatik*. In the presence of some of the most characteristic doctrines of Barth's later period one must admit that such a problem has a very great interest.

It is in having attempted this analysis that the importance of Balthasar's book lies. One should say at once to prevent malevolent misinterpretations that the author of this book is in no wise trying to resolve Barth's thought into its presumed Platonico-Kantian components. He recognises explicitly that these motives constitute merely the skin,[1] the philosophical armoury of a thought that, with a rare integrity and clarity, knows how to be, and wants to be, exclusively theological, and is constantly occupied in defining its proper bounds in the direction of the philosophical forms which it has donned. With a lack of prejudice rare in a Catholic scholar, Balthasar admits that Christianity is not bound to any philosophy. The Old Testament thinks according to the forms of Babylonian and Persian thought; Paul and John use concepts and schemata that are Hellenistic, Platonic, possibly Philonic; Augustine is Platonic; Schleiermacher is Platonic. If anyone were tempted to accuse Barth of philosophism, he should remember that the same charge was laid against Thomas Aquinas! But it is precisely Thomas Aquinas who presents the same problem as Karl Barth; that of a very acute theological conscience which freely uses a philosophical form, bending it with great freedom to meet the needs of a Christian theology.[2] The problem is not to break up—perhaps with polemical purpose—Barth's theology into some original manifestation of German idealism, but 'to describe the critical use that he makes, in his theology, of the idealistic form of thought'.[3] Barth's originality, according to Balthasar's interpretation, lies in having conceived the ambitious plan of taking up again the vast systematic vision that Schleiermacher had in the *Kurze Darstellung* and in the *Glaubenslehre*, and of bringing it to a good end, as Schleiermacher was unable to do, by rethinking in Schleiermacher's thought-forms, the authentic message of the Reformation. 'Is that not a possible undertaking, nay rather one full of promise, for the very

[1] 'A singular crust of Platonico-Kantian thought', writes Barth of himself (*Credo*, p. 159).
[2] Balthasar, op. cit., p. 228 f.
[3] op. cit., p. 229.

reason that all German idealism, with Kant as its head, comes from the Reformation, bears the stamp of Luther's theological thought, and is, therefore, in its most inward nature secularised theology? Should it not be possible to take over from idealism its form, its style, and the geniality of its comprehensive vision, which we miss in the Reformers themselves, and to refill this vessel with its original content—a genuine theological conception of Revelation?'[1]

What is the style of thought of German idealism in its simplest common expression? What is the formal point at which Barth and Schleiermacher meet? Balthasar believes that he can define it in the following propositions: (1) Everything depends on a point of greatest intensity. It is in setting out from this that we begin to think and it is this that sets the whole of our theological thought in motion: for Schleiermacher this was the religious experience of the feeling of absolute dependence; for Barth it is the fact of being man addressed (*Angesprochenwerden*) by the Word of God. (2) This point is at once a duality and a reduction of this duality. In Schleiermacher the duality is one of intuition and sentiment, i.e. of receptivity and spontaneity; these however are in the last analysis overcome in an ultimate identity in the consciousness of God, primarily in Christ, secondarily in believers. In Barth the duality is the sterner one of revelation and faith, which however becomes a unity *in actu*, in the action of the Holy Spirit who lays hold of man. (3) This point of greatest intensity is essentially above reason, although it is the basis of reason. It is that pure actuality from which every state (*Zustand*) justifies itself, it is that non-objectivity which creates and clarifies all opposition to it; that point which in Kant is called the transcendental non-intuitible apperception, which in Fichte is the original position of the Self, in Schleiermacher the original fact of religious feeling, in Herrmann the personal decision of faith, in Barth faith as the primary act of God's grace in man. (4) Since the reality from which thought proceeds is essentially above thought, thought is necessarily dialectical, whether in the sense that it expresses in the duality of words and concepts the distance at which we find ourselves from that unattainable unity (a static dialectic) or in the sense that it seeks to imitate synthetically, in some way, in the move-

[1] op. cit., p. 212

ment of thought and in the progressive elimination of duality, that unreachable unity. (5) Finally the point from which thought starts is also the point where one must start to explain being and the objective, the point of unity and totality in the most comprehensive sense. For Schleiermacher it is from that point that consists in the unity of subject and object, i.e. from God, that the whole world should be deduced, from which as from the source of piety and mysticism all culture should develop. For Barth it is from that point that consists in the unity of God and Man in Jesus Christ that creation arises, that redemption is accomplished, and that all works of culture should take their start. For both, the Church represents an intermediate and provisional phase of Christ's action in the world (*ein bewusstes Unterwegs der Wirkung Christi*).[1]

If these observations are right, it is clear that Barth's thought, in its form, is essentially modern, post-Kantian, and—this is what Balthasar underlines—formally less distant than the theological polemics of our time would make us think from that of the great Romantics. But with this we have as yet said nothing. The form of a theologian's thought does not determine his theology, at least as long as he remains conscious of his subject and avails himself freely of the philosophical organon with which he thinks. Generally speaking, one can say that the deviation represented by the theology of Romanticism—of which Barth's dialectic remains the indispensable corrective—lay in its systematic character, for thereby theology was reduced to the thought-forms of idealism and so resolved into philosophy. It is to this resolution of content into form that all Barth's theology is opposed. And in his apologia Balthasar does full justice to its vigorous theological self-consciousness.

One should remember first Barth's constant refusal to yield to the temptation of systematic thought. Even in the *Dogmatik* his thought remains prophetic, not speculative, although at the cost of apparent contradictions, as for example in the doctrine of predestination.[2]

The replacing of Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence by the meeting of faith with the Word of God is acutely theological, and the development that it receives in Barth sets itself in conscious opposition to a pure transcendentalism such

[1] op. cit., pp. 212-14. [2] op. cit., pp. 229 ff.

as that of the idealists. The abstractness of Schleiermacher's feeling of absolute dependence and the pure (empty) formalism of the Kantian categorical imperative are both contrasted with the concreteness of the Word of God.[1]

Dialectic cannot be a substitute for God's judgment. It seems to interpret it, in the *Römerbrief*, where 'every true relationship between God and creature is dissolved in an actualistic and eschatological panentheism'.[2] But in the doctrine of creation the concept of evil is no longer dialectical. Evil, non-entity (*das Nichtige*) is not creatureliness, but that to which God in creating said 'No'; i.e. evil depends upon the decision and judgment of God against it. It is the 'No' of a divine dialectic in a certain sense but not of a dialectic of the finite and the infinite, of God and man as such. It is rather a dialectic arising from the absolute realness of the Divine decision: in which the very concept of truth is not philosophically neutral but is convertible into the Divine 'Yes', just as non-truth is convertible into the Divine 'No'. Non-entity is that which, from God's point of view, absolutely 'should not be', which therefore 'is not', but, in so far as it is not, also is. It is that which is unauthentic (*uneigentlich*), the lie (and as such it has personality, substance, vitality, and spontaneity), but can in no sense lay claim to truth.[3] It is the 'impossible possibility' of sin which man in abstract can commit only in so far as he is not man in concrete, determined by Christ, and living, in His community. It is a narrowly theological concept, and Balthasar observes, a new one. 'Barth's theological dialectic starts where Hegel's leaves off, for where the Hegelian dialectic of contraries operates, the Barthian dialectic of good and evil no longer exists.'[4]

The concrete is not (as it is for Hegel) the concept in its historical richness, nor the individual as such, in his spatio-temporal unrepeatableness (as it was in other Romantics, and in part in Kierkegaard himself), but is Jesus Christ, the fulness given in time, the fulness of all that the time of creation includes. In a sense one could say, transcribing Hegel, that the concrete is not our moment of time, nor the variety of single things, but is God, who is in Himself One and Many, of whose vitality, personality and freedom our temporal individuality is a reflex.

[1] op. cit., pp. 235 ff.
[2] op. cit., p. 238.
[3] *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, 3/3, p. 618.
[4] Balthasar, op. cit., p. 224.

But we must go on to say that this model (*Urbild*) of our concreteness and historicity is not concrete and is not to be grasped as concrete except in Christ's historicity, for He is the archetype of our concreteness and historicity, and also of all natural human historicity—which is the presupposition of the Incarnation. Christ therefore is the real basis of creation, in His ability to be incarnate, humbled, crucified, to descend into hell: and to our being in Christ there corresponds an ethics of the imitation of Christ, which is concrete Christian freedom. The freedom of Jesus Christ is a freedom in self-giving, obedience and prayer. The Son is 'God in His gift of Himself'. He is the beginning of all created liberty: a decision of God which makes possible and real man's decision. 'An extremely Augustinian concept', observes Balthasar,[1] which becomes identical with prayer. But Barth does not hesitate to allow man (as subject) freedom of choice. All freedom, in act, is freedom of choice, and this man does not lose even through sin.

Thus there exists a 'nature', a 'being' of man, but the authenticity of these derives directly from a supreme reality which cannot be expressed except in the categories of actuality and event. Being and nature are, at heart, *Ereignis und Geschichte*, event and history. These actualistic concepts in the *Römerbrief* are employed in such a way as to exclude the concepts of being and nature, while in the latter volumes of the *Dogmatik* they evidently include them, and constitute their foundation. In Christ act and event appear in that which has the form of being (*das Seinshafte*) in its continuity, in its solidity (*Dichtigkeit*) and the continuity of the happening (*das Ereignishafte*) in Christ founds that which in creation has the characters of being and nature (*das Seinshafte und Naturhafte der Schöpfung*) as well as the continuity of God's government in creation. The concept of being is thus not denied by Barth but is used to give to the actualistic concepts their sharpness and point. Equally the abstract concepts (*Abstraktionsbegriffe*) in their place illuminate the concrete and that which is most concrete (God in Christ) by describing the place of its manifestation.[2]

In conclusion, therefore, one can affirm that 'even when Barth avails himself of the terminology, and of the thought form of idealism he either preserves the autonomy of theology

[1] op. cit., p. 248. [2] op. cit., pp. 250-1.

or else recovers it'. In this respect the parallel with Thomas Aquinas is singularly interesting, and it recurs often in Balthasar's considerations. Thomas Aquinas, too, was accused in his time, as Barth has been by some of his Catholic critics, of Philosophism. He too knew how to use a refined philosophical technique to express with absolute freedom and autonomy an authentically Christian thought; and Aristotelianism was, by its nature, and by its pagan origins, intrinsically much more alien to the Christian message than German Idealism, a philosophy that was born from a great movement of Christian revival and wholly permeated with theological intuitions and presuppositions. Can we say perhaps that Barth is the Thomas Aquinas of modern Protestantism—he who, arriving after a century and a half of travail, of neo-Protestant attempts and wanderings, has finally pointed out the true way, harvesting the fruits of a magnificent conceptual elaboration and of a philosophy that is eminently concrete and shot through with spirituality, but leading it to recognise its original meaning, and to pay homage to its Lord?

This interpretation of Barth—even if we do not take into account the extremely laudatory character that it must take on in the mouth of a Catholic theologian, who would be hard put to it to find a term of comparison more honourable than Thomas Aquinas—is, we confess, very attractive. It takes into account Barth's powerful originality, far better than does the petty scholasticism of many of his disciples, who so often create the atmosphere and provide the reasons for much of the anti-Barthianism that there is in the world. It would seem very salutary, therefore, to underline the never denied affinities of this master with that lively current of thought and faith which refused to answer the critique of the Enlightenment and of Kant merely by a blind return to orthodoxy, but girded itself up courageously to think out again its evangelical heritage in face of the problems posed by modern philosophy. And in that it succeeded so well that it ended up by imposing its own problems on philosophy. We who are involved in this current of modern protestantism are evidently in a position to see better, and to evaluate more seriously, its internal antitheses, but the bringing of them all back to the common denominator of

'German Idealism', despite all the explanations given, must leave us somewhat perplexed. And yet for this very reason we can be grateful to a critic who comes from a very different world of thought to challenge us to recognise the substantial unity of this line of development. Barth's greatness is certainly not diminished in our eyes if instead of considering him as a pure anti-Schleiermacher, roaming around in an unreal context devoid of contact with history, we can see in him the reformer, and just because of this, the crown of the new theology which Schleiermacher started: he in whom the deepest and truest intentions of Schleiermacher, the pastor and the Christian, find unequivocal and consistent expression. Only in taking such a view of him can we recognise the true structure of Barth's thought.[1]

In saying this we have given to Hans Urs von Balthasar's book the recognition that it deserves for that in it which interests us, but we have not yet said anything about that in it which chiefly interested its author. He does not consider Barth's thought merely as a subject for theological-philosophical theses, but as a living problem for the Church of today, and especially for the inter-confessional relations between Catholicism and Protestantism. The polemic against Catholicism which, like a red thread, runs through all the Barthian theology—right from the first publications of the young Barth, as Balthasar shows—is well known. It is well known that all its Catholic critics consider Barth's theology to be the quintessence of Protestantism, the resumption of the strongest and most authentic positions of the Reformation, the most serious obstacle, in their view, to the prospects of ecumenism. The demonstration, so carefully followed through by Balthasar, of the relation of the theology of Barth to idealism would seem to strengthen such a judgment. But this would be a hasty and superficial judgment: it is certainly not the least merit of Balthasar's interpretation to have reduced it to its true proportions, and to have indicated accurately what, according to his thought, could be a means of transcending polemic.

The way followed in this attempt at reconciliation is complex

[1] See the interesting discussion of Luigi Pareyson on the 'ambiguity' of Hegelianism, which is resolved into the alternatives of Kierkegaard and Feuerbach (*Esistenza e persona*, Torino, 1950, pp. 197 and 1-52).

and subtle. First evidently one must give great weight to the considerations that we have hitherto expounded. The Barthian theology lives in the thought-forms of modern philosophy, but does not use its content. Its content is authentically theological. Now differences at the level of philosophical technique have never a definitive character or an intrinsic dogmatic value. Augustine and Giordano Bruno were both Platonists.[1] Despite the importance given by modern Catholicism to the *philosophia perennis*, one must recognise that the Christian faith can avail itself of different instruments of thought. In the last analysis there does not exist a Catholic form of thought, or *Denkform*, to the exclusion of all others. The Platonism of Augustine and the Scotism of the Franciscan theologians have as much right to citizenship within Catholicism as Thomism.[2]

Barth's polemic sums up, as we know, its criticisms of Catholicism in the doctrine of the *analogia entis*. Now Balthasar seeks to circumscribe the importance of this doctrine, attributing it to Neo-Thomism rather than to the authentic thought of St. Thomas, who retained a certain fertile ambiguity in the matter. It is true that Thomas Aquinas constructs, with his doctrine of being, an ascending way from reason to faith, but its presupposition is always the participation of the infinite being in the creative will of God: the basis of the *analogia entis* is, in the last analysis, an *analogia fidei*, like that which Barth develops with even greater breadth. One must consider as a useless and excessive development of modern Thomism the sharp contraposition of the natural and the supernatural order, which gives to modern Catholic natural theology its accentuated rationalistic colouring. All patristic literature, up to the early Middle Ages, and further in great part St. Thomas himself, think within the *unicus ordo realis supernaturalis*, i.e. within the limits of the *analogia fidei* which includes in itself as one of its moments the *analogia entis*. It was merely in order to express this order that the fathers and scholastics of the early Middle Ages adopted the categories of Greek thought.[3]

In short, Karl Barth's polemic would be without an object if, faced with a Catholicism which, warned by the Barthian critique, and following the guidance of some of its most daring

[1] Balthasar, op. cit., p. 211. [2] op. cit., pp. 264, 278.
[3] op. cit., p. 273.

modern theologians, such as de Lubac, were to succeed in eliminating the rationalistic ferment of its *Spätscholastik*, and were to renew its strength at the living sources of its tradition, the Bible and the Fathers, as another ecumenical spirit, Congar, exhorts it to do.

To a Catholicism that is disposed to receive into its legitimate content the Barthian critique, Balthasar recalls insistently that the whole evolution of the Barthian thought has the sense of a passing from the tense dialecticism and the extreme actualism of the 'Theology of Crisis' to the broad and serene vistas of an *analogia fidei*, particularly spatious in four of the latest volumes of the *Dogmatik*, which are devoted to the doctrine of Creation. And between these two extremes one can say that the concentration on Christology of the first four volumes, that concentration on Christology in which Barth himself, in his *Parergon* of 1938,[1] saw the definitive form of his thought, assumes a mediating function of uncommon fecundity. In Christ man not only finds God but also rediscovers himself, the world, the reality, relative right, and indestructable goodness of the creature. The point of greatest intensity in which Christ reveals Himself to faith as God Incarnate is truly that luminous centre from which all our knowledge of God and the world radiates in which man learns again to believe in the reality and the goodness of human nature, and to go back from it, with a movement of faith and of thankfulness, to the Creator who, by setting His mark upon it, has established a solemn relationship of analogy between Himself and it.

The prospects for a meeting are not as bleak as they might seem. They presuppose, however, a renewal of Catholic thought, which for the moment is represented only by a small advance patrol, which has been put into difficulties by the encumbering bandages of the *Humani generis*. . . . But that does not mean that the above considerations lose any of their value.

[1] *Evangelische Theologie*, 1948-9, p. 272.

ANGLICANISM AND THE MINISTRY

by The Rev. Dr G. W. BROMILEY

'Wherefore the apostles, following the rule, doctrine, and commandment of our Saviour Christ, their master, ordained in his kingdom and congregation two officers: one called, after the Greek word, bishop, in English an overseer: which same was called priest after the Greek, elder in English, because of his age, discretion, and sadness. . . . Another officer they chose, and called him deacon after the Greek, a minister in English, to minister the alms of the people unto the poor and needy.'[1] This is rather a different doctrine of the apostolic succession from that which we normally associate nowadays with Anglican teaching. Its exponent was of course condemned by the traditionalist hierarchy of his day and finally came to a heretic's death. But a generation later the doctrine of Tyndale had become the commonly accepted teaching of the leaders of his Church, and it could be held without any sense of disloyalty to the newly reformed articles and liturgy.

Indeed, at one point in particular Tyndale and his successors were plainly supported by the official formularies, for these obviously exclude all sacerdotalist conceptions of the ministry. This fact is clear enough even from the wording, for in Prayer-Book and articles alike the Latin word for priest is always *presbyter*, never *sacerdos*, which occurs only in the article (32) legalising the marriage of bishops, priests and deacons, *sacerdotium*. But wording apart, it is to the ministry of the word and sacraments that the presbyter is called and ordained, not to the offering up of sacrifices: a point which the Church of Rome sees clearly enough when it censures the ordination on the ground of an insufficiency of intention. The sixteenth century writers all emphasised this aspect of the ministry. Becon, for example, described the function of the presbyter only in terms of an evangelical ministry,[2] and Fulke made it clear that the Anglican priest is a priest only in the sense of elder, not in the tradition-

[1] Tyndale (Parker Society), II, p. 253.

[2] Becon, II, p. 320.

alist sense of one who offers up the sacrifice of the mass.[1] Hooper put the matter in a sentence: 'The office of bishops and priests in the primitive and first church was to be preachers of God's word and ministers of Christ's sacraments; not to sacrifice for dead nor live, not to sing or mass or any such like.'[2] Similar quotations could easily be multiplied, but that is hardly necessary, for where sacerdotalist conceptions have been revived, it has usually been in relation to the universal priesthood of believers, and in any case only as private speculation, without any basis at all in the authorised formularies.

The case is a little different, perhaps, with the doctrine of an apostolic succession, for here there is very little guidance in the symbols, and therefore a wide variety of views may be advanced none of which can claim to be the official Anglican teaching. In point of fact, the articles do not even mention the matter. They refer incidentally to three orders of the ministry (32, 36), and they insist upon an external calling 'by men who have public authority given unto them in the congregation, to call and send ministers into the Lord's vineyard' (23), but without stating that these must be the episcopal successors of the apostles. The preface to the ordinal is hardly more explicit. Certainly, it derives the threefold ministry from the days of the apostles, thus asserting continuity. Certainly, it lays down episcopal ordination as the domestic rule of the Church of England. But as against that, there is no definite doctrine of an episcopal succession, no particular importance seems to be attached to a tactual continuity, there is no conception of a transmitted grace of orders (orders not being a sacrament of the Gospel, article 25), and it is not suggested that bishops as they were found in sixteenth century England were the only possible form of the New Testament episcopal office.

In these circumstances we need not be surprised that many sixteenth century writers had a very different idea of the apostolic succession from that which is advanced by some contemporary Anglicans. To be sure, they did contend for an apostolic derivation of the ministry, and therefore, ultimately, for its dominical institution and authority. We can see that in the passage from Tyndale with which our survey opened. We can see it too in a passage from Coverdale in which he said con-

[1] Fulke, I, p. 461. [2] Hooper, I, p. 480.

cerning the visible Church and its variety that 'the apostles have in all parts ordained as many churches, as they thought necessary, according to the nature of their countries; and gave unto every church their peculiar bishop, to keep the Lord's flock, whom they also called priest or elder, etc.'.[1] Whitgift made the same point when he wished to prove that the bishops are the successors of the apostles in respect of rule: 'And in that the apostles did appoint bishops in churches which they had planted, and gave unto them such authority, it is evident that therein they made them their successors.'[2]

But while the apostolic derivation of the ministry was accepted, the Anglicans of the sixteenth century did not deduce from it a succession in the apostolic ministry which is vested only in episcopally ordained bishops. For one thing, they were conscious always of the difficulty of distinguishing between bishops and elders in the New Testament, a point which requires independent treatment. Because of this difficulty, they saw that the feudal hierarchy of the Middle Ages, however justifiable historically, was not necessarily the only or necessary extension of the apostolically ordained episcopate. Coverdale was perhaps hinting at this when he attributed the number and variety of churches to the different nature of the countries in which they were planted. The apostolic ministry itself was absolute, and the function of elder-bishops permanent. But the form of it at any given time or place was relative to geographical and historical features. The incipient Puritan Hooper was even more radical, for he condemned the medieval hierarchy as a degeneration from the scriptural original: 'They know that the primitive church had no such bishops as be nowadays, as examples testify.'[3] He attributed the decline to the corruptive agency of wealth.[4] Fulke was rather more charitable: quoting Jerome to the effect that the development of the episcopate was due to the demands made by 'factions'.[5] But he too made the same distinction between episcopacy as such, which he equated with the New Testament presbytership, and the various forms which the episcopate might take. The ministry had in fact its absolute and relative aspects as at once a human and a divine-human institution.

[1] Coverdale, II, p. 464. [2] Whitgift, II, p. 356. [3] Hooper, I, p. 396.
[4] loc. cit. [5] Fulke, I, p. 265.

Now even if it was granted with Fulke or Whitgift that the bishops of the sixteenth century could be regarded as successors in the apostolic ministry—and Hooper himself did not dispute the possibility—there were still three important qualifications. First, it was pointed out that the ministers appointed by the apostles did not inherit the apostolate as such. The apostles as such had no successors. They were *sui generis*. Their specific office and authority perished with them. There were, of course, men who succeeded to their ministry of word and sacrament, and to some extent of discipline. But as Rogers pointed out, they did not inherit the miraculous powers of the apostles,[1] and as Jewel also perceived, they did not share their plenary authority, but had only a local and restricted jurisdiction.[2] It is true that in answer to Puritan objections both Whitgift and Rogers did sketch out a line of derivation through Timothy and Titus to metropolitans and archbishops, but they did not attempt to press this as a strict or a doctrinally necessary succession, only as a possible justification for the existing structure.[3] Certainly it did not affect the distinction between the apostle and his successor in the ministry. The absolutist claims of the bishopric of Rome were of course resisted by all the Anglicans, for as Coverdale pointed out, 'the apostles had all like authority'.[3]

Second, no importance seemed to be attached by the majority of Anglicans to a tactual succession in the ministry by means of episcopal ordination. Naturally, as the Puritan revolt gathered impetus, it became necessary to insist more strongly upon this external succession, for episcopal ordination was the Anglican rule, and disaffected extremists could not be allowed to defy it with impunity. That is why Rogers, for example, set much greater store by it than his Edwardian predecessors. But even with the Elizabethans it was always a matter of discipline and not of dogma. And at an earlier date Anglicans like Bradford had insisted that the only true succession is in apostolic doctrine, not in 'the succession of Papal bishops, who do not minister and hold false doctrine'.[4] A statement like this has to be seen in perspective. It was the defiance of a martyr against the newly reconstituted Marian hierarchy. In happier times Brad-

[1] Rogers, p. 238. [2] Jewel, II, p. 908.
[3] Coverdale, II, p. 464. [4] Bradford, I, p. 506.

ford would have found a relative value in maintaining the historic episcopate as did his Elizabethan successors. But when the choice had to be made between a succession in ministry and doctrine and a succession in orders, as sometimes happened abroad, then the former was regarded as by far the more important. Faced with the same choice, the majority of the Elizabethans would not have decided differently.

Third, and in pursuance of the same principle, it was not insisted that ordination must always be by the traditional territorial bishops except as a domestic rule of the Church of England. As was only to be expected the Anglicans were prepared to defend the legitimacy of their own practice, but they recognised that there might be circumstances in which a succession in the apostolic ministry and doctrine would have to be preferred to a succession in historical episcopal orders. That is why Becon could speak of lawful calling in terms of a calling by the magistrate and people, the Church, rather than by bishops.[1] That is why the article spoke vaguely of 'men who have public authority given unto them in the congregation' and not explicitly of bishops. That is why from Cranmer to Cosin and beyond Anglicans could almost unanimously accept the validity of non-episcopal orders abroad, and many of them can quite conscientiously do so today. That is why Rogers, even though he defended the episcopal system, could still speak of ordination in terms of an ordination by pastors and elders and approve the doctrine of the Protestant churches overseas.[2] That is why an act was passed in 1570 making it easy for men in Presbyterian orders to hold benefices in the English Church. In the face of the overwhelming evidence to the same effect, it is idle to imagine that a strict doctrine of the apostolic succession is any true or necessary part of the Anglican heritage.

At the back of all these qualifications there lay, of course, the fundamental recognition that there was no scriptural warrant for a distinction between bishop and presbyter, at any rate in essential ministry. The Anglicans had no doubt at all on this matter. The apostles had ordained both elders and bishops, or more properly they had ordained elders who were also bishops, and any subsequent modification of the relationship between the two was due only to historical circumstances, and had

[1] Becon, II, p. 319. [2] Rogers, p. 238.

therefore only a relative historical justification. In answer to Puritan pressure the later Elizabethans did attempt to find a modified form of strict episcopacy even at a very early date, but they still admitted that it differed from the historically developed episcopacy of later times, and in any case it did not affect the identity in basic ministry.

With regard to the parity in ministry there is an impressive unanimity. The apostles did not ordain only bishops as ministers of the word and sacraments, leaving it to the bishops to appoint elders as their delegates. They themselves ordained both bishops and elders, or elder-bishops, to continue the essential ministry. That is what Tyndale meant when he said that basically there are only the two officers, elders who are also overseers, and deacons.[1] Becon was of the same mind, for in his discussion of the ministry he equated bishop and spiritual minister: 'Their office is one, their authority and power is one. And therefore St. Paul calleth the spiritual minister sometime bishops, sometime elders, sometime pastors, sometime teachers, etc. . . .'[2] Fulke defended the same position, for he asserted that in the scriptures 'the same men are called *episcopi*, which before were called *presbyteri*'. When his opponent Martin argued that the fathers at least had made a distinction, Fulke referred to the testimony of Jerome in favour of an earlier presbyteral government, but he also pointed out that where necessary scripture must be accepted even against the fathers (cf. article 6).[3] That the traditionalists found it hard to dispute an original parity and even identity is proved by the case of Harpsfield, who had to concede that scripture does not 'know any difference between bishops and priests'.[4] To the stock quotation from Jerome Jewel could add patristic citations from Chrysostom, Augustine and Ambrose to the effect that the bishop is the chief priest, and not a separate minister in the strict sense.[5]

An apparent exception to this view is the authoritative statement in the preface to the ordinal which traces back the episcopate to apostolic times. It is to be noted, however, that in the ordination services the bishop is not ordained to any new ministry apart from the exercise of a wider discipline. Further, the wording in the preface is cautiously general.

[1] Tyndale, II, p. 253. [2] Becon, II, p. 319. [3] Fulke, I, pp. 264-5.
[4] Bradford, I, p. 506. [5] Jewel, III, p. 439.

It need not mean more than that in the New Testament there is an evident function of oversight as well as of spiritual ministration, or that the New Testament refers to bishops as well as to elders even if the two were at one time wholly or in part identical. It was in this sense that the later Elizabethans understood the matter when they defended their retention of the episcopate against Puritan objections.

Whitgift may be taken as a representative of the later view. He could accept the fact that there was an identity *quoad ministerium*, but along the lines already suggested by Fulke[1] he claimed that even from apostolic times there had been a difference *quoad ordinem et politiam*.[2] The bishop is an elder, but he has a jurisdiction which is not shared by other elders. Every bishop is therefore an elder, but not every elder a bishop. He thought that even Jerome admitted this, for when he described the bishop as the chief presbyter he allowed that he was a bishop in the sense in which other elders were not.[3] To this presiding elder, Whitgift argued, there belonged by ecclesiastical custom the right of ordination, and although Whitgift could find no scriptural sanction for this exclusive right,[4] he would not concede that it was overthrown by 1 Tim. 5, which he interpreted to mean ordination to the presbyteral office rather than ordination by the presbytery.[5]

On the face of it, Whitgift appears to be advocating almost a traditionalist and absolutist position, but once again there are important qualifications. The first, and the most important, is that Whitgift can really claim only historical and not scriptural justification for his distinction between bishop and presbyter: 'I know these names be confounded in the scriptures, but I speak according to the manner and custom of the church, even since the apostles' time.'[6] But this meant that his distinction was one of ecclesiastical order, according to article 20, not of fundamental doctrine, according to article 6. The Church of England had the right to maintain the distinction as a matter of internal organisation. It had no right to invest it with dogmatic

[1] Cf. Rogers, p. 332, where Fulke is quoted. [2] Whitgift, II, pp. 254-7.
[3] ibid., p. 251. [4] ibid., I, pp. 438-40.
[5] ibid., p. 432. It is to be noted, however, that in the service of ordination of priests all 'the priests present shall lay their hands severally upon the head of every one that receiveth the order of priesthood'. The ordination is by the bishop and presbytery, not by the bishop alone.
[6] ibid., II, p. 251.

significance, or to make it a ground of separation from other churches which might exercise their similar rights in a different direction. Only if the distinction had had scriptural as well as historical backing would it have been justified in adopting such a course.

But further, and hardly less important, even on a historical basis, Whitgift contended for a supremacy only in government and not in essential ministry. In other words, the presbyter is no less, and no more, the successor of the apostles than the bishop in respect of the ministry of word and sacrament, indeed even in respect of the exercise of discipline. It was true that in the process of historical development the bishop had attained a wider authority and been vested with the exclusive right of ordination, but for his office as such it was impossible to find any spiritual pre-eminence, and even the rights which he did enjoy were by the assent of man rather than by the appointment of God. Whitgift used every possible argument to resist the presbyterian pressure of the Puritans, but one argument he did not and could not use: that there is an essential difference between the bishop and the presbyter by divine right. Because he could not use this argument, his condemnation of the Puritans was again only in respect of discipline and not of doctrine. It did not involve the non-recognition of those foreign ministries which had elders but no bishops, for ultimately the elders and bishops were one and the same. The lack of episcopal ordination had significance only as a matter of domestic order, for the exclusive right of the bishop to ordain had no clear basis in the New Testament. When this point is grasped, it will be seen how far is the high Anglicanism of Whitgift from the exclusivist episcopalianism which has now superseded it in some circles.

One final point may be mentioned, and that is that Whitgift had no real answer to Cartwright's criticism, that the lord-bishop of the sixteenth century bore no resemblance to the bishop of even Jerome's day, let alone of apostolic times.[1] He had no answer because the fact was so evidently true. The early bishoprics had been small, and the bishops undistinguished by worldly honours or status. Indeed, there were even many bishops in the one city, as at Ephesus. All that Whitgift could do was to allege continuity in the function and ministry

[1] Whitgift, II, p. 251.

of the bishop, but in doing this he could not deny that that ministry and function might equally well be exercised under different historical forms. In point of fact, he did not shrink from this conclusion. So long as they followed the New Testament pattern other churches might have their presbyter-bishops without any breach of dogmatic fellowship. All that he himself insisted was that with what he considered to be good historical reason the Church of England had taken order in the matter and decided to retain the traditional structure, and that it was incumbent upon all Anglicans to respect that decision.

From this brief survey we may draw certain conclusions which are not without a bearing on modern ecumenical relationships and doctrinal discussion. The most obvious is that in the strict and official sense there is no Anglican doctrine of episcopacy or of the apostolic succession which need form an obstacle to fellowship with other Protestant churches. Individual Anglicans may of course hold such teachings, and it is important that they should be considered and met, but they hold them only as private theologians, not as representatives either of the symbolical Anglican position, or of the general tradition of their church. By symbol and tradition the acceptance of episcopacy has been a matter of domestic discipline, not of doctrine and therefore of external relationship.

Second, the judgment that the *historic* episcopate is indispensable to a united church is open to serious criticism from the traditional Anglican standpoint. Of course, the Lambeth utterance has no authoritative status, but its practical influence is necessarily great, and it surely calls for revision in the light of the Anglican tradition. To make the historic episcopate a test of intercommunion is to give a false significance to something which earlier Anglicans could reckon only as a matter of individual church order, not of Christian doctrine. According to the Anglican formulation the only episcopacy which has dogmatic significance is the absolute episcopacy of the New Testament, which may historically take many and varied forms, as indeed it has already done, either with or without a maintenance of tactual succession in ordination. Of course, in matters of reunion the Church of England has every reason to plead for that form of episcopacy which it retained in the sixteenth century. But to ascribe to the historical form the same importance

as that accorded to scripture, creeds and the two sacraments, as a test of intercommunion, is to confound things which are not like, with unfortunate consequences.

Finally, the relative nature of the historical episcopate means that although Anglicans may wish to keep an episcopal succession in orders they are not bound to the particular form of episcopacy which existed either in sixteenth century England, or in the England of today. In point of fact, Anglican episcopacy has changed greatly since Tudor times in respect both of the powers and privileges of bishops and also of the division and organisation and even the administration of dioceses. If circumstances demand, there is no reason why there should not be further changes to give a bishop or bishops (as true overseers and not as remote overlords) in every city or equivalent rural unit. The retention of episcopacy as such does not necessarily mean the retention of a particular episcopal structure which may be an impediment where schemes of actual reunion are suggested. In short, episcopacy as understood by Anglicans of the sixteenth century need not involve an organisational obstacle to reunion, any more than it does a dogmatic obstacle to inter-communion, with those bodies which have not maintained a historical continuity of orders.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture. Dom Bernard Orchard, General Editor, with a Foreword by the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., Edinburgh. £4 4s.

On a rough calculation, this work contains something like one and three-quarter million words. In its case, if ever, the remark is surely justified that a man can hardly be expected to find time both to review and also to read the books that come before him. The present writer at all events makes no claim to have read even the greater part of this work. But it is still possible to obtain and present an idea of what such a book is like, either by giving a bird's eye view of the whole, or by sampling. The attempt has been made to make use of both methods in the notice which follows, for reasons that are more than merely practical. Most people may be expected to want to know the kind of answer given by such a work to certain general questions, and also to some more particular questions. They will be interested to learn what the work has to say to such questions as these: How is Holy Scripture to be handled? what makes it Holy Scripture and thus different from other books? what is its essential meaning?; but they will also wish to know what actual position the work takes up on this or that specific *crux interpretum.*

One or two preliminary remarks. The book comprises an astonishing diversity of opinions. For one thing, a good deal of attention is paid to writers not belonging to the Roman Church—duly asterisked to make the situation quite clear. Rightly or wrongly, one has the impression that here and elsewhere more attention is in general paid by the Roman Church to writers of other communions than the latter do to what Romans have to say. Further, as will later be pointed out, a careful account is given of the beginning and course of Higher Criticism, and admission is candidly made of the lateness of the Roman Church in entering this field. Again, differences of opinon between Roman exegetes and critics are frankly stated. If anyone looks here for an unequivocal statement, without deviation from a party line laid down, of solutions unanimously adopted and authoritatively declared on most or many of the problems of Biblical study, he will be—agreeably or disagreeably

as the case may be—disappointed. There is on the contrary a great range and diversity of views expressed.

The presence of this diversity is explained by the fact that the work of interpretation in the Roman Church is done by authorities which vary in the degree of authority which they exercise in hierarchical scale. Sometimes the Church defines infallibly the correct interpretation of a text, or condemns a false interpretation. This high degree of authority belongs to the papal pronouncements of a hermeneutic kind. It will probably come as a novelty to many people to learn that 'the number of texts infallibly interpreted by the Church is small. . . . It has been estimated indeed that the total of such texts is under twenty, though there are of course many others indirectly determined'; and they will hear perhaps with surprise both the smallness and the indefiniteness of the number, as also the fact that 'even the infrequent infallible interpretations of a text' do not necessarily exhaust its full meaning. Lower in the scale of authoritative definition come the many other interpretations contained by the decrees of the Councils, Commissions and Congregations, which are said, though not infallible, to 'enjoy high authority'. Moreover there is the unanimous consent of the Fathers which has 'always' been regarded (see the Council of Trent) as a norm of interpretation. In practice, this standard is liberally construed: 'Moral unanimity is sufficient, i.e. if a good number of the Fathers in widely different parts of the Church, or of different ages agree on a point, and no Father contradicts their teaching, and in fact the number of texts determined by the consent of the Fathers is even smaller than that of the texts determined by the decrees of the Church.' Particular attention is paid by the writers to the so-called 'Replies of the Biblical Commission, designed to guide the Catholic along the lines of prudent exegesis'. Submission is enjoined as a duty, and 'this submission involves an internal assent'—an assent, however, which is not that of divine faith, for the pronouncements of the Commission are not infallible, but only 'based on the very high authority entrusted by the Vicar of Christ to the Commission'. The commentators who contribute to the volume exercise a great deal of freedom in the giving and withholding of this assent, and often, as we shall see, a disputed matter is simply left in suspense, or even apparently decided in the commentator's own different way.

The Roman Church holds that Holy Scripture is infallible and inerrant. 'There is one great limitation to be set upon the divine condescension in its allowing the human author his head: it must be without formal error.' Thus in *Divinus Afflatus Spiritus*, Pope Pius XII writes: 'Just as the substantial Word of God became like to men in all things, sin excepted, Hebrews 4.15, so the words of God,

expressed in human language, became in all things like to human speech, error excepted'; and Pope Benedict XV in *Spiritus Paraclitus* declares that the Holy Spirit so operated on the writers of Scripture that 'they conceived correctly, and were minded to write faithfully, and expressed fittingly with unfailing truth, all those things and those only which he bade them write'. Yet behind this apparently imposing and impregnable façade, there exists an inner dubiety in detailed interpretation of what Holy Scripture is thus infallibly and inerrantly saying which is at least disconcerting. It is not at the moment our purpose to investigate the grounds for this ambiguity, but only to record the fact of its existence. When this is recognised, the real difference between what the Romans have to say about Holy Scripture and what is said by those who do not subscribe to their presuppositions or use their terminology is greatly diminished. The affirmation of Biblical infallibility and inerrancy apparently secures for them no greater degree of unanimity when the meaning of the Bible is being interpreted.

This is by no means said in a spirit of veiled triumph, as though there were a kind of malicious satisfaction in a *tu quoque* that shows them to be in no stronger position in Biblical interpretation than those who belong to another form of the Christian faith. On the contrary, the conclusion is to be regretted: not in this way either is an easy solution to interpretative problems to be obtained. It appears that the appeal to inerrancy and infallibility does not exempt us from the labour of trying to reach a common mind in matters of interpretation. But for those who claim for Holy Scripture inerrancy and infallibility, the fact of ambiguity at the level of interpretation clearly constitutes a grave embarrassment—unless of course by inerrancy and infallibility is meant in the last resort no more than what those mean who discard the ideas but still affirm that the Bible is none the less the very Word of God.

Affirmations of Roman Catholicism about the Scriptures

So far it is perhaps not so much the difference as the similarity between the Roman point of view and that of most readers of the *Journal* that is the striking thing. But wide dissimilarity does in fact lie behind the appearances. This becomes evident when the initial and basic affirmations of the Commentary are set out. Three primary affirmations seem to be made which are worth recording here. First, the Church is the owner of the Scriptures; second, Holy Scripture is the statement of the teaching of the Church; and third, the Church is the living voice of Christ and is therefore the legitimate and infallible interpreter of Scripture. Each of these statements demands some notice.

The role of the Church in relation to the Bible is variously characterised, and with much of what is said there is no cause for disagreement. All will be happy to agree that the Church has always and rightly exercised solicitude and care for the Scriptures and for the purity of the Bible text. Further, 'because the Bible ranks among the most precious jewels of her patrimony, the Church is the Bible's jealous guardian and defender'. Nor is there need to quarrel with the statement that the Church is the 'trustee' of Scripture. Putting these characteristics together, what is being said is that the Church both transmits the Scriptures and 'exercises a wise vigilance' over the purity of what is transmitted. But quite another element is introduced when it is stated that the Church is the 'owner' of Scripture and that the Bible is 'the Church's exclusive possession' or 'property'. 'The Church holds [the books of the Bible] as sacred and canonical . . . because, having been written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost they have God for their author and *as such have been handed to the Church herself*. . . . The Church is, by God's donation exclusive owner and Trustee of the Scriptures.' It is a pity that the two terms are thus linked together, for there is an evident and important distinction of meaning between them. It is one of Tertullian's more unfortunate utterances, cutting at the root of the missionary power of the Scriptures, when he argues that 'heretics should not even be allowed to use the Christian Scriptures, because they no longer belong to the society which has the right of possessing these same Scriptures'.

The second statement concerns the nature of the content of the Bible. The view is (quite rightly) dismissed out of hand that the Bible is 'the eclectic product of certain outstanding members of that divine society that has existed in the world ever since God called Abram out of Ur of the Chaldees'. The Bible is not this; rather it is 'the divinely inspired crystallisation of the spirit and teaching of that society at times and places specially chosen by the Spirit of God dwelling within it'. Even if only a description and not a definition is intended here, this is a remarkable enough statement. With growing vigour and unanimity the conviction is on the other side of the fence being stated that, whatever other elements there are besides, the central message of the Bible is God—God's purpose, God's saving deeds, God's grace and judgment, and God still present in word and work. This is maintained, even if towards the circumference of the evidence given by the witnesses the message does not have quite the ringing tones of clarity that distinguishes it nearer the centre. The Bible certainly is the Church's book, if one cares to put the matter in this way; but to make of it a 'crystallised' summary of the 'spirit and teaching of that society' is to extrude

from the connotation of the phrase all reference beyond the Church. Here there appears what is perhaps the most significant and recurrent distinction that exists between the Church reformed and the Church unreformed: both will quite happily affirm that the Bible is both the Church's book and God's book; but the Church reformed holds that the possessive case is used in different senses, the unreformed Church that it is used univocally. No wonder then that the Church is credited by the Romans not only with trusteeship of Holy Scripture, but also with ownership.

The third affirmation follows immediately from what has been said. Holy Scripture is not a merely petrified record, a mere 'dead letter'. There is 'a living teaching authority . . . prior to every single book of Divine Scripture'; and besides, the Scriptures still do become a 'living voice'. One might so far be listening to the testimony of the Reformers, for example of Calvin in the well-known passage in the *Institutes* (1.6.1-2), where he speaks of God's word orally transmitted by the patriarchs, and later committed to public records; to which might be added what is said in the following chapter, that in the Scriptures it is God who is 'the divine Speaker'. But where the Reformers and the Churches of reform hear in Holy Scripture the voice of God, the Roman Church hears the voice of the Church. It is for them not God who takes the Scriptures and makes them the vehicle of His word; it is the Church's voice that is heard. So too the Church's ministry, which for both is the servant of the word, is differently conceived—by the reformed Churches as a ministry of God's word, by the Roman Church as a ministry of the Church speaking. 'The fact is that, while the Apostles looked upon themselves primarily as witnesses of Christ, the living organism "which is the pillar and the ground of truth" functioned as a *voice*, and its ministries were "servants of the word", the term "word" meaning the spoken word.' Or again, in similar vein, it is said of the Church that it 'possesses the living voice of Christ'. Fact and corollary of the fact are stated together in another sentence: 'the Church is superior to the Bible in the sense that she is the living voice of Christ.' We are faced again with the characteristic difference between the Churches of the reformed and of the unreformed tradition: while both unhesitatingly declare the divine origin, nature and destiny of the Church, the first tradition characteristically affirms, and the second denies, that in speaking of deity one is speaking of something beyond the Church by which the Church is continually judged. Putting it more bluntly, the second affirms, if not an identity between deity and Church, at least a close assimilation of the two; this the first cannot but deny, and as ground and reason for the denial appeal to the reiterated evidence of Holy Scripture itself. If this is the core

of the error, it matters very little whether what happens here is the elevation of the Church to the status of the divine, or the diminution of the divine to the level of the human. The Holy Scriptures will not retain their salvific power if when we resort to them we hear nothing but the Church speaking, or if we hear only the Church speaking of things which it has and knows from a source not outside or distinguishable from itself. If this is something like the truth, once again it matters little whether the charge to be made against the Roman Church at this point be formulated as Titanism or as Prometheanism.

That the affirmations just mentioned really reveal something of cardinal importance in the Roman faith may perhaps be shown by the fact that, setting out from another point, it is to a conclusion of the same kind that one is eventually led. Romanism has never really surrendered the fateful bequest of Scholasticism, or subjected to critical review the intellectualism that sees religion only in terms of knowledge, belief in terms of assent, and theological truths in terms of propositions and statements. Thus 'by religion we mean a system of beliefs concerning the divinity and of man's duties in regard thereto. If such a system, whether practical or theoretical, is based merely on what the human race can discover by its own powers, it is called natural religion. If it is based on knowledge communicated by God to man in some way outside the working of ordinary providence, it is called revealed religion.' Here the definition of religion is intellectually conceived: that of natural religion is in terms which regard God as coming at the end of a process of reasoning, as a deduction or conclusion of inferential thinking; that of revealed religion is expressed as the transmission of information about deity.

This is a pity, for even among Roman writers the attempt is sometimes made to open up a way behind the intellectualism of the official teaching of their Church and the scholastic terminology in which it is traditionally couched. For example, in *The Teaching of the Catholic Church*, the essay 'Faith and Revealed Truth' contributed by the Editor, Dr G. D. Smith, makes a nice distinction between the necessary condition and the motive of the Christian's faith: 'The believer accepts a revealed truth not precisely *because he knows* that God has revealed it and *knows* that God is infallible. This knowledge is the necessary condition, but it is not the motive of his faith. He believes because *God* who is infallible has said it.' Here at least some attempt is made to add to the information conveyed in revelation, the apprehended fact of the source or communicator of this information. So too, and even more clearly, it is said earlier in the same essay: 'Religion is the act whereby God speaks to man, making a statement to the truth of which He testifies'; and 'religion implies a

personal intercourse between God and man, wherein God truly speaks—i.e. makes an assertion, which man accepts on God's personal authority'. Even if the content of revelation is still regarded as true propositions, at least credit is given to the religious man for apprehending behind the propositions the person who is their source. Applying this to the Bible and what is there communicated, on the terms used above it is possible to think of God setting His own personal imprimatur on the truths which the Bible is supposed to record, and thus imparting to them such evidential power as to secure assent to them in the believer's heart. The present writer cannot say that no such clearer statement of the case is given in the volume under review; all he can say is that nothing so clear and definite has come to his notice.

But where unmodified intellectualism of the other kind operates, the only valid and real reason for distinguishing between revelation and doctrine, between the act of revealing and what the Church teaches, collapses. They become indistinguishable. There is no longer a distinction to be drawn between the communication by God of Himself and the communication of truths concerning God, and it is inappropriate to try to apply these terms to revelation and doctrine respectively. The path is thus neatly prepared for the identification of God's revelation with the Church's teaching. 'There is, in a sense,' says the Commentary, and with perfect right, 'but one source of revealed truth, viz. divine Tradition.' It is, however, the further step that has to be resisted: the definition of this divine Tradition as 'the body of revealed truth handed down from the Apostles through the ages and *contained in doctrine, teaching and practice of the Catholic Church*' (italics not in the original). In fact, once the Church's doctrine and the Holy Scriptures are put on an equality with one another, the inferiority of the latter becomes evident, though here the utterances of the Commentary are extraordinarily inconclusive. Thus it is said that 'since that time [the death of the last of the Apostles] there has been no new revelation to the Church, though, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, knowledge and understanding of the original revelation has deepened and widened'. A mediating view finds expression when it is said that 'the question is sometimes asked whether all revealed truth may not be found at least obscurely in Scripture. It is impossible, however, to make an absolute affirmation in terms of the above question; but, relatively speaking, so much is contained in the Bible, that it is difficult to assert that certain particular truths of Christian faith and conduct are nowhere found in it'(!). Again a statement a little bolder in tone appears when, speaking of the dogma of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the assertion is made: 'We may say with

confidence that [Holy Scripture] contains in germ most if not all of developed doctrine of the Church concerning her office.' The hesitancy does the contributor credit, but it should blind no one to the fact that the Roman Church claims and exercises the right to add to the sum of saving revelation from outside the Scriptures, i.e. out of herself.

There is thus achieved an easy solution to the tension between revelation and dogma, between the essence of the Gospel and its expression in doctrinal terms. A simple norm of interpretation is attained by the assimilation of revelation and doctrine: 'For seeing that the same God is author of both the Sacred Books and the doctrine commited to the Church, it is clearly impossible that any teaching can by legitimate means be extracted from the former which shall in any respect be at variance with the latter' (*Providentissimus Deus*). The application of this so-called 'analogy of faith' is of profound significance. Not only does it resolve the tension which is usually supposed to exist, and which in fact plays a most fruitful role in theological work. Even more, the solution is virtually capitulation in favour of one of the poles of tension, namely of the doctrine and teaching of the Church. There are obvious practical considerations which need not here be mentioned which will always tend to give the dominant role to this side, rather than to that of Holy Scripture.

Thus once again we are brought to the point where it becomes obvious that the Church is superior to Scripture. It would indeed be understandable and even acceptable (in some sense) that the Church be held to be the interpreter of Holy Writ. But the contention is wholly unacceptable that all interpretation shall be such as does not conflict with the teaching of the same Church. Here the Roman Church is embracing a doctrine which in principle renders it irreformable. The very same issue raises its head which in the early sixteenth century precipitated the disaster of schism, and turned the Reformation from being a movement for reformation of the Church into an occasion of the division of the Church. It is difficult, alas!, to see how Churches reformed in the days of Luther and Calvin and under their influence, and still susceptible to reform, can have very much that is significant to say to a Church which in principle shies away from the spring of reforming power.

Hermeneutical Principles

The contention that the Bible is really the Word of God is one which the Churches of the Reformation hold in common with the Church of Rome. The latter, however, gives to the principle a form which the reformed Churches can by no means accept. The Roman

Church holds that the Scriptures, having God for their author, are infallible and inerrant. To add one more testimony to this effect, *Providentissimus Deus*, confirming the decrees of Florence and Trent, goes on to assert: 'It makes no difference at all that the Holy Ghost should have taken men to be as it were his tools in writing, as if forsooth the men who were inspired, but not the divine author, might let fall some error.' Appeal is regularly made to the principle enunciated by St. Augustine: 'If I come upon anything in Scripture which seems contrary to the truth, I shall not hesitate to consider that it is no more than a faulty reading of the manuscript, or a failure of the translator to hit off what his text declared, or that I have not succeeded in understanding the passage' (Ep. 82.1).

Here it is convenient to advert to a distinction of first class importance. It is the distinction between the literal and the spiritual meaning of Holy Writ. 'The *literal sense* of Scripture is that which arises directly from the text and is intended by the inspired writer. There is also frequently in Scripture another sense which we call the *spiritual sense*. This is a meaning authoritatively revealed by God to man. It is not, however, strictly speaking, the meaning of the words.' The Commentary is acutely aware of the possibility of misuse of this distinction, and Origen is criticised for abusing it. Positively, 'there is no sure road to the elucidation of the spiritual sense of Scripture save through the literal sense'. This is a salutary warning and sound good sense. Between the literal and the spiritual sense, there is defined a third or plenary sense, also spiritual, but differing from the spiritual sense properly speaking in that it 'inheres in the words themselves and not in what is signified by those words'. Though thus derivable from the words themselves, this plenary sense is a sense of which the writer is not conscious. An example is found in Genesis 3.15, where the statement that man would bruise Satan's head is only fulfilled in and by Christ. Of the spiritual sense proper, it is said: 'Almighty God has thus willed that the persons, things and events described should often signify other persons, things and events.' St. Thomas is quoted to justify this principle of type and antitype (*Quaes. Quodlib.* VII.xiv). The legitimacy of taking a spiritual sense out of words which for the writer bore no more than a literal sense is—perhaps a little naïvely—justified by the fact of the 'ambiguity of language'.

It is to be noted that this distinction between literal and spiritual senses is of immediate value in relating the Old and New Testaments. But it is never used to diminish the inerrancy of Scripture. 'Since [the writers] were God's instruments, their meaning was also God's meaning. They could not write down anything not intended by him, The things which he ordered, and those only, they ... expressed

in apt words and with infallible truth.' The principle of infallibility extends to everything written in Scripture. Thus Scripture records Abraham's residence at Hebron. 'It is asserted in Scripture and is therefore infallibly true.' 'The Church, as the champion of the Bible's inerrancy, has a right to condemn any denial of an authentic Biblical statement.' At the same time, the Church regards such a fact mentioned in patriarchial history as secondary and one 'which cannot itself directly be matter for a positive infallible definition'. Thus the distinction between literal and spiritual senses is not used to restrict or diminish in any way the principle of inerrancy, which applies to the whole of Scripture and to all its senses.

Yet the writers of the Commentary are well aware that, for example, science and higher criticism provide grave embarrassments for anyone holding Biblical inerrancy. It is a difficulty which we all feel, but they, because of the doctrine of inerrancy, most of all. For them it is a matter of life or death, that some relief should be found; for others not committed to inerrancy, it is a matter of profound practical importance. How then do they prepare to face the difficulty thus occasioned? The answer is that they meet it by a very wide application of the principle to which St. Augustine gives expression in the quotation already cited: it is to the original documents and texts that inerrancy belongs; any apparent error must then be due to adventitious causes.

Here three distinguishable investigations designed to relieve the embarrassment must be mentioned. First, apparent error may be due to faulty transmission of the original text, whether by typographical error or by erroneous translation. It thus comes about that the writers of the Commentary, and with them the Roman Church, have a vital interest in the work of textual criticism. Whether textual criticism is best conducted under the pressure of a requirement that the original text be freed from apparent inconsistencies with the assured findings of modern knowledge, is questionable. But the outcome is (perhaps rather too conveniently) in the main left in suspense. It is true that a few decades ago this criticism was employed, the Commentary alleges, in an arbitrary manner, and frequently one would have said that they were using it as a means of introducing their own preconceived opinions into the text. 'But today [criticism] has achieved such stability of principles that it has become an excellent instrument for producing a purer and more accurate edition of the Word of God.'

The second device which the Commentators adopt for bringing the statements of the Bible into harmony with what on other grounds can hardly be denied credence, is the use of literary forms. The plea is (quite rightly) repeatedly made that, e.g., history, in the scientific

sense in which it is now written, was a mode of writing unknown to the original writers. Of the first chapters of Genesis, it is said that 'one can neither affirm nor deny that they are history without applying to them the standards of a literary genre which does not fit them'. And again; 'It is impossible to deny or to affirm their historicity as a whole without unduly applying to them the norms of a literary type under which they cannot be classed.' It is therefore not surprising that the Commentary manifests a profound interest in the investigations of the *Formgeschichte* school. 'These [Biblical] forms do not correspond to any of our classical categories and cannot be judged in the light of the Graeco-Latin or modern literary types.' Caution must be the Roman watchword here: 'To declare *a priori* that these narratives [in Genesis and the like] do not contain history in the modern sense of the word might easily be understood to mean that they do not contain history in any sense', and this again is not rightly affirmed. 'In the meantime it is necessary to practise patience which is a part of prudence and the wisdom of life.' So once more the issue is left in suspense, pending further work along these lines. 'Thus a knowledge and careful appreciation of ancient modes of expression and literary forms and styles will provide a solution to many of the objections made against the truth and historical accuracy of Holy Writ.' The hope entertained is shared by those belonging to the reformed Churches; but it is not quite the same hope. The Commentators look to the study of literary forms to justify their adherence to scriptural inerrancy; others rather look to it with the desire that they may more adequately interpret to us the meaning of the Bible.

Third, there should also be mentioned the need for study of the whole background of the Bible. 'It is absolutely necessary for the interpreter to go back in spirit to those remote centuries of the East, and to make proper use of the aids afforded by history, archaeology, ethnology and other sciences.'

When all these devices have been fully utilised, the Commentators are confident that the result will be to justify their belief in the inerrancy of Scripture. This is a bold hope, and it seems a little difficult to recommend it in its entirety. But meantime, the advent of these comparatively new studies does give to those who hold to the inerrancy of the Bible a breathing space, during which they may at least with some degree of assurance hold that their thesis is not disproved.

Criticism

The aim of the Commentary is set out in the preface. It is compiled in the belief that 'Biblical learning must be integrated with

traditional Christianity if it is to bear any spiritual message or fruit for modern society'. It is a fact, and one candidly admitted here, that the Roman Church was late in entering the field of criticism. It might very well have been recalled that even in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a great deal of work was already being expended in the attempt to establish a true text: the Glossators were already busy with at least the problems of what more recently have come to be known as lower or textual criticism. The late start made by the Roman Church, the Commentary avers, had disadvantageous results: 'The critical analysis of the Bible, when it came, was entirely non-Catholic—indeed anti-Catholic—and vastly more irresponsible and destructive than it need have been.' Not till the end of the nineteenth century did Catholic exegetes take seriously the new study, and 'Catholic scholarship in this matter has not yet made up for its late start.' At the same time, frank acknowledgment is made of the immense industry that had already been expended in applying to the Bible the critical methods which had long been practised in the case of profane literature. Within certain limits easily guessed excellent accounts are given of the course of the new study.

As already said, the Roman Church has a special interest in criticism, and a powerful motive for pursuing the study in the hope of obtaining some relief from the embarrassment which the thesis of inerrancy involves. But the thesis itself exercises a restrictive influence upon the free operation of critical methods. Thus the salient error into which Wellhausen is alleged to fall is the uniting of 'two things that should properly have been distinguished: the literary analysis and the historical criticism'. The propriety of the distinction will hardly be allowed by those not committed to the thesis of Biblical inerrancy. In fact, the standpoint of the Commentary is, as might be guessed, to venerate as virtually unassailable the the verdicts of the Fathers and the decrees of the Councils. The onus of their disproof is laid upon the critics. Thus in the section entitled 'The Gospels and Non-Catholic Higher Criticism', the distinction is clearly drawn, not between right and wrong criticism, but between critics favourable and critics 'hostile to the views of tradition'. 'On the whole it must be said that both in its origins and in its later development higher criticism has signally failed in respect for external historical evidence about the composition of the Gospels (for example). Right from the beginning it put its trust in its power of literary analysis rather than the broader approach which includes analysis and historical tradition alike.' The allegation is repeated here that criticism 'owes its beginnings and rise' partly to the desire to deny the possibility of miracles—which is true enough, but only if the 'partly' be deeply underlined.

There is a manifest failure here to do full justice to the significance of criticism. It is not realised that criticism provided a really new approach to the study of the Scriptures. It is because of this novelty and the unfamiliarity of traditional interpretation with anything comparable, that necessarily the traditional exegetical views held by the Fathers of the Church have come under fire. There are only two possibilities open here: either you permit criticism to do its work unrestricted by extraneous considerations, in the full confidence that finally nothing but a fuller and better understanding of the Bible will result, though some of the opinions the Fathers expressed will no longer be tenable; or you surround the opinions of tradition with a sacrosanctity similar to that of the Bible itself, which enables them to be preserved practically inviolate. It is the latter alternative that of course the Commentary and the Roman Church is bound to adopt. Tradition is of two parts, Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church; and of these the more practically important is the latter. Hence *ab initio* the Roman Church can only operate criticism under the severest of restrictions.

'When rigid adherence to any scheme of things is demanded of men, the prospect of scientific advance is apt to be slight'—so the *Expository Times* (August 1953, p. 322) quotes from an article in *The Hibbert Journal* by Dr E. B. Julian. This may be held neatly to explain why the Roman Church was so late in entering the field of criticism. The present Commentary shows that it is conscious at least of movement around it. We must wait to see whether its own engagement upon criticism will at all modify the rigid adherence to Biblical inerrancy which it still maintains. In using criticism at all, it takes a solvent into its system, and if it is allowed to do its work, changes may be expected.

Some Exegetical Illustrations

The method of approach may be illustrated by the first of the Replies of the Biblical Commission given to New Testament problems. 'Having regard to the universal and unwavering agreement of the Church ever since the first centuries, an agreement clearly attested by the express witness of the Fathers, by the titles of the Gospel manuscripts, the most ancient versions of the sacred books and the lists handed on by the holy Fathers, by ecclesiastical writers, by Popes and Councils, and finally by the liturgical use of the Church in the East and in the West, may and should it be affirmed as certain that Matthew, the Apostle of Christ, was in fact the author of the Gospel current under his name? Answer: In the affirmative.' Similarly to the second inquiry: 'Should the verdict of tradition be considered to give adequate support to the statement

that Matthew wrote before the other Evangelists and wrote the first Gospel in the native language then used by the Jews of Palestine for whom the work was intended? Answer: In the affirmative to both parts.'

A third example may be given, which at the same time illustrates both how cautious are some of the judgments of the Commission, and also how diverting an exercise they provide in the use of logical exclusion. 'Notwithstanding the practice which has flourished consistently in the whole Church from the earliest times, of arguing from the fourth Gospel as from a strictly historical document, and in consideration no less of the special character of the same Gospel and the manifest intention of the author to illustrate and vindicate the divinity of Christ from the very acts and discourses of our Lord, may it be said that the facts narrated in the fourth Gospel were invented wholly or in part, as allegories or doctrinal symbols and that the discourses of our Lord are not properly and truly the discourses of our Lord Himself but the theological composition of the writer though placed in the mouth of our Lord? Answer: In the negative.'

As already stated, the Replies of the Biblical Commission have not the infallibility which is the 'personal prerogative of the Holy Father himself'. In fact advantage *seems* to be taken of this lower degree of authority for at least occasional divergence from them. One must perhaps emphasise 'seems', because of the extremely involved and precise nature of the questions to which alone the Commission gives answers. One can only ask whether the following is an example of consonance or of disagreement between contributor and Commission. 'Are the reasons by which certain critics strive to prove that the last twelve verses of the Gospel of Mark were not written by Mark himself but were added by another hand, of such a character as to justify the statement that they are not to be accepted as inspired or canonical? Or do they prove at least that Mark was not the author of the said verses? Answer: In the negative to both parts.' This may be compared with what the commentator on the passage writes: 'The external evidence is, on the whole, strongly in favour of the authenticity of the canonical conclusion. Furthermore, it is highly improbable that the Gospel originally ended at 16.8 with the abrupt final phrase "for they were afraid". At the same time, the variation in the manuscript and patristic testimony, taken in conjunction with the internal evidence of 16.9-20, suggests that the present final section is not the *exact* original reading. ... The lack of continuity and change of style militate against the view that Mark wrote the section as it stands. Some authors favour the opinion that when the original ending was lost the present conclusion was added

by another inspired writer. . . . Possibly the opinion which is least open to objection is that when the original ending was lost, the canonical conclusion was supplied from memory, and by reference to the other Gospels, by a contemporary who had known the original.'

As for the Old Testament, one observes a similar dexterity of address and method. While holding to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, the Commentary regards this as meaning 'the large part and profound influence of Moses as author and legislator'; and the author of the Book of Wisdom is said to have adopted the pseudonym of Solomon under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. One might think that it would with equal readiness have occurred to the commentator to exonerate the Holy Ghost by application of the principle of literary genres!

These meagre examples of the work of the Commentators must suffice for the present purpose. If they are brief to the point of inadequacy, it may be hoped that they will at least whet the appetite of the reader, and encourage him to study for himself the verdicts given to problems in which he is specially interested.

It remains to be said that this monumental work is quite admirably produced—it must really be reckoned as a publishing triumph even for a house with such a distinguished record as that by which it is issued. In addition to the more than 1200 pages of commentary and special articles, there is a generous index of matters, a series of excellent maps, and a further index of names that occur in them.

J. K. S. Reid

Interpretatio mariologica Protoevangelii posttridentina usque ad Definitionem Dogmaticam Immaculatae Conceptionis. Pars prior. By Tiburtius Gallus, S. J., Apud Edizioni di Storia e Litteratura. Roma, 1953.

In this work Fr. Gallus has carried on a stage further his attempt to trace the evolution of mariological exegesis of the so-called *Protoevangelium*, Gen. 3.15: 'I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel.' An earlier work was published in 1949 entitled *Interpretatio mariologica Protoevangelii tempore postpatristico usque ad Concilium Tridentinum.* The present volume is the first part of a further work carrying on the examination to the year 1660. The author is mainly concerned with the history of Roman exegesis, though considerable attention is paid to the work of Lutheran and Reformed scholars such as Melanchthon, Osiander,

Calvin, Beza, Musculus, Gerhard among others, with a fuller discussion on the influential work of Salomon Glass, *Philologia Sacra* (1634).

This is a laborious, but fruitful and even exciting way of finding out the meaning of a text of Holy Scripture. Certainly the industry that lies behind this volume has yielded interesting and valuable results, though these will be very differently appreciated by Roman and Protestant readers. Of 184 scholars whose exegesis is examined 152 are Roman Catholic, and of these, 125 expound Genesis 3.15 mariologically, though the others do not deny an interpretation in this sense. The overall result is stated in these terms: The Blessed Virgin *ratione muneris maternitatis messianicae* is asserted to be *participem operis contritionis capitis serpentini, in quo opere partem principalem et omnino suae rationis habet solus Christus*. The latter, however, does not exclude *partem subordinatam et alterius rationis, quam habet B. Virgo in eodem opere*. And so it becomes apparent that most Roman Catholic scholars can speak of the Virgin Mary in terms of *corredemptio*, although there are many who will not go so far as this. Certainly the language used by Fr. Gallus is very guarded but the essential pattern of the evolution of this interpretation is clear. No doubt the Marian year 1954 will see the proclamation of the dogma *Maria Corredemptrix*, which for the Protestant world could only be the *reductio ad absurdum* of this whole development.

Protestant interest in this volume lies elsewhere—in the historical study of exegetical analysis. The Roman Church has nothing that it can set beside the massive *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, but the reason for that comes out clearly in this volume. It is not lack of industry among Roman scholars, although they were admittedly late in coming into the field of modern Biblical studies. It is due to the fact that for them the interpretation of Holy Scripture is altogether bound up with the historical consciousness of the Church, for it is only in the evolution of that consciousness that the exegesis of a text is found to be unfolded. A theological dictionary of the New Testament would mean for them not only a semantic and hermeneutic study of the theological terms used in the Scriptures but a historical study of the enlarged sense these terms have acquired in the fermented growth of the mind of the Church. Roman Catholic concern in the history of the exegesis of a Biblical passage is not so much to get at the original meaning and revelatory import of the passage, though that is even for them a necessary starting-point, but to read off the authoritative truth from the Church's historical consciousness.

It is becoming increasingly clear, that this historical study of exegetical interpretation is no less important for the Evangelical

Church, but for quite a different reason: in order to prevent us from reading into Holy Scripture the ideas which we unconsciously absorb in our day and generation, and to free Biblical scholarship from the bondage of the traditions of men. What could be more helpful here than a historico-critical study of exegetical interpretation in order that our own exegesis by being compared with that of other generations may be submitted to ruthless questioning and robbed of its alien presuppositions? It is through such an awakening to our own unconscious conceptions that we can let the Bible speak to us objectively and learn to conform our thinking to its message. It is when this does happen that in historico-exegetical work we can engage in fruitful debate with Roman scholarship. Of that Cullmann's *Peter* is an outstanding example.

T. F. Torrance

The Household of God: Lectures on the Nature of the Church. By Lesslie Newbigin. pp. 155. S.C.M. Press, 1953. 12s. 6d. net.

Bishop Lesslie Newbigin is a theologian every one of whose books must be read. *The Reunion of the Church*, published in 1948, was a work of first class importance. This new work by the Bishop, delivered as a course of Kerr Lectures in Glasgow in 1952, and now published, sets forth with perhaps greater clarity a maturer presentation of its author's theology of the Church, the doctrine of which (as the Bishop remarks in the opening sentence of his introductory chapter) 'has come in recent years to occupy a central place in theological discussion'.

As a theologian, and especially as a theologian concerned with this particular theme, Bishop Newbigin has the great advantage of being also a missionary. He is a missionary, not simply in the sense in which (as he rightly points out) the whole Church is, or ought to be, missionary, but in the sense that his work, both as evangelist and as pastor, lies in South India, and therefore wholly outside the boundaries of what used to be Christendom. He writes not as the inheritor of a settled and Christianised culture, but as a pioneer of the Church's advance in a non-Christian land. He writes moreover as a member of the Church of South India, the Church which, inheriting a number of hitherto separate and disparate ecclesiastical traditions, avows explicitly that 'the Church is not what it ought to be', and 'has the idea of development written into its very constitution'. For Bishop Newbigin the Church is therefore 'the pilgrim people of God. It is on the move—hastening to the ends of the earth to beseech all men to be reconciled to God, and hastening to the end of time to meet its Lord who will gather all into one. Therefore the

nature of the Church is never to be finally defined in static terms, but only in terms of that to which it is going.' 'The Church' (as he elsewhere expresses the same thought) 'is only to be understood in a perspective which is at once eschatological and missionary, the perspective of the end of the world and the ends of the earth.' In these sentences may be found crystallised Bishop Newbigin's deepest insight with regard to the Church, an insight which rightly determines and dominates the whole treatment of his theme.

Three chapters of the Bishop's book are devoted to the consideration of three widely-held theories of the Church, all of which contain truth, but no one of which, taken by itself, can interpret without distortion the Church's true nature. The Bishop calls them the 'Protestant', 'Catholic' and 'Pentecostal' theories respectively. In a footnote he rightly points out that the words 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' are both being used in a loose sense to describe 'the two major points of view represented in the present ecumenical conversation', and that 'the word "Catholic" is not here being used as it is in the Creeds'. So, too, it is only 'for want of a better word' that his third 'type of Christian faith and life' is described as 'Pentecostal': and here, too, there is involved an unfamiliar use of a word which has other and different associations.

The Bishop, as an ex-Presbyterian, assigns on Biblical grounds 'a certain natural primacy' to the 'Protestant' interpretation of the Church as being essentially 'the Congregation of the Faithful'; though it would seem that he looks upon 'classical Protestantism' as being more characteristically set forth by means of a Lutheran than by means of a Calvinist type of ecclesiology. The New Testament speaks constantly of the Christian's relation to Christ as being grounded in faith. In relation to Judaism the issue of works *versus* faith is the real issue, and the lessons of the circumcision controversy are to be taken seriously. God has bestowed His grace 'with undistinguishing regard' upon both Gentiles and Jews. It is not upon 'works-righteousness' that henceforward His covenant can be based. '*There is now no possibility for anyone to claim that he belongs to God's people by right.*' The Christian, justified by faith, owes his salvation wholly to grace. It is here, doubtless, that we are to discover the fundamental insight of Protestantism.

Yet when we go further, and ask: 'How is the Lord Jesus Christ, who in the days of His flesh, separated by nineteen centuries from the world of our time, was present to sight and hearing and touch, made present to us today?' the answer traditionally offered by orthodox Protestantism has been: 'In the word and sacraments of the Gospel.' Where the word is being truly preached and proclaimed, and the sacraments are being duly administered, there Christ is

Himself present in His saving power, to evoke faith. This certainly gives us, in Bishop Newbigin's words, 'an intensely dynamic conception of the Church'. Is it the *whole* truth about the Church? Does it not tend to make of the Church 'practically a series of totally disconnected events in which, at each moment and place at which the word and sacraments of the Gospel are set forth, the Church is there and then called into being by God's creative power'? What appears in this typically 'Protestant' theory of the Church to be lacking is the sense of the Church as a continuing historical institution, with its on-going life, an institution in which 'congregations in different places and times' are organically at one, parts of a single continuous whole. Christ truly gave to His disciples His word and sacraments, but He gave them *to His disciples*. What He left behind was a fellowship, entrusted with the task of representing Him to the world. 'As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you.' The true answer to the question 'How is Jesus present to us today?' must include the recognition that He is 'present in His people, His apostolic fellowship'. Without that recognition, all the stress tends to be placed upon orthodoxy of doctrine: and (as a second distortion of the truth) the idea of the Church as a visible unity tends virtually to disappear. 'What Protestantism has done', we read, 'is to weaken very seriously the sense of the unity and continuity of the Church as the one people of God in all ages and all places, continually drawing men out of the narrowness and poverty of their private spiritual experiences and setting them in a great fellowship which, as it has conceived them and brought them to the new birth, will also nourish and sustain them to the end, enfolding them in the arms of a charity as wide as the arms of the Cross.'

So, in the chapter which follows, consideration is given to the 'Catholic' theory of the Church. After summarising the Biblical evidence for the Church and its mission from Christ, the emphasis in both Testaments on the people of God and on the dealing of God with men 'as social wholes and not only as individuals', and the congruity of this with the Biblical view of nature and the conception of man as a 'psycho-somatic unity', the author goes on to consider the central place given in the Gospel story to the sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion, and the Pauline doctrine of the Church as Christ's 'body'.

'Throughout the New Testament admission into the new covenant with all its privileges and responsibilities is by faith and baptism.' And again: 'There can be several "bodies of Christians" in the modern sense of the word "body". But there can be only one body of Christ, and the Christian life is life in that body.'

Church history, Bishop Newbigin points out, underlines these

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Biblical affirmations. The Church cannot live except as a visibly defined body with a continuing structure. Revolts from and repudiations of tradition are apt to be followed by the reassertions, a generation later in Church life, of the very things which had been repudiated. When a break occurs and a new structure is formed on the basis of the teaching of a reformer, the body which results is inevitably shaped by the limitations which mark even the greatest individual minds. In the New Testament faith and order are given together. When situations arise where men have to choose between them, and the priority is given to faith, the result is a new order invariably less free, because less catholic, than the old. When there is formed a new succession of the ministry, does not the body which has lost the older succession suffer at least some degree of consequent impoverishment or distortion? And why in Protestant history has the significance of the sacraments tended so frequently to be whittled away? 'We conclude', writes the Bishop, 'that just as it belongs to the heart of the Biblical doctrine of the Church that our incorporation in Christ is by faith, so it is no less central to this doctrine that our incorporation is by baptism into a visible fellowship which is the body of Christ in Corinth, in Rome, in the world; and that our participation in the life of the body is maintained by our sharing in the one loaf and the one cup in one undivided fellowship.'

The entire logic of the 'Catholic' position implies one holy Church—and yet Christendom is divided; and Churches may, and do, sin. To say that Christians may sin, but that the Church as such cannot sin, is to evade the problem. 'No honest person can deny that the Church as a visible institution has in the course of its history been guilty of pride, greed, sloth and culpable blindness.' So, too, as regards schism. Breaches of unity *ought* (it might be supposed) to be followed by the spiritual sickness and death of such separatist bodies as have lost continuity with the Church of the past through the loss of 'succession'. But this, though in some instances it may happen, by no means invariably occurs. 'No one who is not spiritually blind or worse can fail to acknowledge that God has signally and abundantly blessed the sacraments and ministry of great bodies which can claim no uninterrupted ministerial succession from the Apostles, but who have contributed at least as much as those who have remained within it to the preaching of the Gospel, the conversion of sinners, and the building up of the saints in holiness.' The logic of an *exclusive* 'Catholicism' is in conflict with the facts.

It is not true (the Bishop concludes) that the form of the Church does not matter: it matters a great deal. The unity of the Church, and therefore its continuity, is of its *esse*, and the subordination of order to faith is not in accordance with the teaching of the New

Testament. But to think in those terms is to think in terms of what *ought* to be, not in terms of what *is*. If we are to think in terms of what we *are*, we must simply say that God has concluded all under sin that He may have mercy on all. 'The Catholic is right in insisting that the continuity of the Church is God's will. He is wrong when he suggests that the doing of that will is the condition of our standing in His grace. As for the individual, so also for the Church, there is only one way to be justified, and it is to say, "God be merciful to me a sinner".'

The Bishop proceeds then to consider a third type of Church theory, which he calls 'Pentecostal'. The 'Catholic-Protestant' debate which has characterised the ecumenical movement needs, he suggests, to become three-cornered. 'A body may have all the outward form of a Church, and preach the true doctrine of the Church, and yet be dead: and on the other hand, the living Spirit can and does give His own life to bodies which lack in some measure the fulness of the Church's true order and teaching.' It is the distortion of Protestantism to define the Church simply as that which bears the apostolic witness, the distortion of Catholicism to define the Church simply as the continuation of the apostolate. 'The Apostle', the Bishop writes, 'asked the converts of Apollos one question: "Did ye receive the Holy Spirit when ye believed?" and got a plain answer. His modern successors are more inclined to ask either "Did you believe exactly what we teach?" or "Were the hands that were laid on you our hands?" and—if the answer is satisfactory—to assure the converts that they have received the Holy Spirit even if they don't know it. There is a world of difference between the two attitudes.'

The great Bishop Butler of Durham, according to a well-known anecdote, is alleged once to have described 'the pretence to a special inspiration, and gifts of the Holy Ghost' as 'a horrid thing, a very horrid thing'. Bishop Newbigin is well aware that among the 'innumerable bodies which, claiming exclusive possession of the Holy Spirit, have separated themselves from their fellow-Christians', there are many impracticable folk, characterised alike by a 'blatant self-righteousness' and by the negation of charity. Nevertheless, he believes that these smaller sects of the 'Pentecostal' type, which at present for the most part stand apart from the ecumenical movement, need to be brought into it, to be criticised by it and to criticise it, in charity. The bridging of the gap which at present separates the 'Pentecostal' alike from the 'Catholic' and from the 'Protestant' traditions may well be the next condition, he suggests, of further advance.

For Bishop Newbigin believes that the ecumenical movement in

its present form is in dire peril of becoming content simply to mark time, to be content with the endless discussion of the 'Protestant *versus* Catholic' antithesis without any real sign of advance, to regard friendly relations and limited practical collaborations between the 'Churches' as a sufficient substitute for unity, and to be lacking in penitence. Fundamentally, his position is that the Churches have all sinned, and are all under the judgment of God; and that 'on the basis of what we are, none of us can be said to possess the *esse* of the Church.' The imperfections and the broken unity of the pilgrim Church here upon earth are only a distorted foretaste and partial *arrhabon* of the Church that shall one day be. The *una sancta*—the one holy Church—is to be also both universal and missionary: the four 'notes' of the Church are in the end to be realised. But, in the meantime, while the Church still is *in via*, it is only in 'the perspective of the end of the world, and of the ends of the earth' that it is able truly to be understood.

THE BISHOP OF DERBY

The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible. By B. B. Warfield. The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company. $3.75.

The publication of a book like *The Glass of Vision* by Dr Austin Farrer of Trinity College, Oxford, is an indication that modern scholarship, with the philosopher's critical mind behind it, is becoming very dissatisfied with the ideas about the nature and authority of the Bible with which it has worked for some time. It is becoming clear to many in this field that there is much more to the old doctrine of verbal inspiration than at first appeared, and that no proper doctrine of the nature and authority of Holy Scripture can afford to neglect the profound element of truth which that doctrine, held alike by Romanist and Protestant Scholastic theology, enshrined. It is useful and indeed helpful to have thrust into this discussion once more, by republication, the best work on this subject by one who has been acknowledged a giant in the history of Reformed theology, the late Professor B. B. Warfield. Here we are given an account of inspiration that is eminently sober and scholarly, and which is grounded upon an exposition of the Biblical teaching itself. Thus presented, it is a view which must be reckoned with, and not one to be set aside under an opprobrious label like 'American fundamentalism'—which is only too often done by Liberal reactionaries. He who will sit patiently at the feet of Warfield, particularly in his studies of Biblical words and expressions, will learn a great deal about the Bible, and will unlearn much which he has been accustomed to take for granted. Nevertheless no one

who has learned from Kittel's *Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, and the Biblical studies which that massive dictionary represents, will want to go back to the way in which Dr Warfield expounded Scripture, reading too readily time-conditioned philosophical categories and nuances into NT terms which are actually alien to them. Since Warfield's time Biblical studies have undergone a great change, for scholars have learned to be most critical of their own inevitable philosophical presuppositions in order as far as possible to read and expound the Scriptures in the light of their own perspective. Very little of that is noticeable here, but in spite of that this work abounds in illuminating studies and discussion.

Thus it is pointed out that the term *inspiration* is not really a Biblical term, and its etymological implications are not perfectly accordant with the Biblical conception of the modes of Divine operation in giving the Scriptures. 'The Biblical writers do not conceive the Scriptures as a human product breathed into by the Divine Spirit, and thus heightened in its qualities or endowed with new qualities; but as Divine product produced through the instrumentality of men.' Dr Warfield then goes on to point out that we must understand the long processes of preparation which the Divine providence undertook in order that inspired Scriptures might be written—the preparation of the material which forms the subject-matter of these books, sacred history itself, religious experience, logical elaboration, progressive revelation, the preparation of the men themselves with all their personal qualities and endowments. 'When "inspiration", technically so-called, is superinduced on lines of preparation like these, it takes on quite a different aspect from that which it bears when it is thought of as an isolated action of the Divine Spirit operating out of relation to historical processes.' It can of course be objected that as light which passes through the coloured glass of a cathedral window is light from heaven but stained by the tints of the glass through which it passes, so any word of God which is passed through the mind and soul of a man must come out discoloured by the personality through which it is given, and just to that degree ceases to be the pure Word of God. In the face of such an objection, however, Dr Warfield asks: 'What if this personality has itself been formed by God into precisely the personality it is, for the express purpose of communicating to the word given through it just the colours which it gives it? What if the colours of the stained-glass window have been designed by the architect for the express purpose of giving to the light that floods the cathedral precisely the tone and quality which it receives from them? What if the word of God that comes to His people is framed by God into the word of God it is, precisely by means of the qualities of the men

formed by Him for the purpose, through which it is given? When we think of God the Lord giving by His Spirit a body of authoritative Scriptures to His people, we must remember that He is the God of providence and grace as well as of revelation and inspiration, and that He holds all the lines of preparation as fully under His direction as He does the specific operation which we call technically, in the narrow sense, by the name of inspiration' (p. 155 f).

We may well agree with the questions posed and the answer given here, but when Dr Warfield goes on to elaborate his answer, we cannot but register profound disagreement. It is clear that his whole doctrine of revelation and inspiration is bound up with a philosophical doctrine of predestination, in which Biblical eschatology is ousted for an un-Biblical notion of rational causation. Further, the argument he gives to account for inspiration through the human mind, is parallel to the Romanist doctrine of the immaculate conception to account for the Virgin Birth of Jesus. Both the doctrine of verbal inspiration as here propounded and the doctrine of the immaculate conception are begotten of the same failure to understand the *quanti ponderis sit peccatum*, and the same attempt to drag down the miracle of Holy Scripture and of the Virgin Birth into a series of logically concatenated ideas. There is no question about the fact that a proper doctrine of Scripture must be grounded analogically upon the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, but in the Incarnation with the hypostatic union of God and Man which it involves, and in Holy Scripture with its derived relation between the Word of God and the word of man, we must take seriously the fact that the Word has assumed our fallen humanity, and was made in the likeness of sinful flesh. This is of course an analogy with a difference, indeed with a double difference. (1) In Jesus Christ, there was a perfect union of God and Man, so that though He was made sin for us, He Himself was without sin, and in the resurrection His perfect humanity, the new humanity, was manifested apart from the limitations and conditions of our fallen world—it was the first-fruits of the new creation. But in Holy Scripture, the Word of God is given to us precisely in the conditions and limitations of our fallen humanity, accommodated to our ignorance and weakness, as Calvin always put it, so that even in Scripture the Word of God 'stutters' and 'prattles' to us. In itself the Word of God is perfect, but even in Holy Scripture we see through a glass darkly, not yet face to face, for the perfection of our union with Christ the Word awaits the *Parousia* and the resurrection of the dead. Meantime we have the Word only in conditions of imperfection and limitation, in eschatological suspension. But the miracle is that even now in spite of sin and imperfection and the

limitations of a fallen humanity, in spite of the earthen vessel which mediates to us the Word of Life, we are given to hear the living Voice of the Lord Himself, and to see the Light Eternal, though when we do hear and see face to face, all intermediation of Scripture and Sacrament will pass away before the full unveiling of the divine Glory. (2) In the Incarnation of the Word, there was a unique and unrepeatable relation of God and Man, there was an *incarnation*; but here in the doctrine of Holy Scripture, there is no incarnation, even though it is grounded upon the unique relation of the God-Man. The basic error that lurks in the scholastic idea of verbal inspiration is that it amounts to an incarnation of the Holy Spirit. It is only strictly christological theology which can obviate that heresy, but Dr Warfield's theory of inspiration neglects the christological basis of the doctrine of Scripture, and fails therefore to take the measure both of the mystery of revelation and the depth of sin in the human mind. Consequently, he draws the line of logical continuity just where the Bible itself refuses to draw it and instead makes us suspend judgment in the face of an incomprehensible act of grace whose mode of operation will only be disclosed in the *eschaton*. To suspend judgment is not to be irrational; rather is it the part of reason which behaves obediently in terms of its object, in this instance, an objective Revelation which even in the event of revelation remains a *mysterion*, and will not yield its secret to analytical and logical investigation. We walk by faith and not by sight (εἶδος)—i.e. not by the evidence of reason or by Platonic forms.

There is no space here to discuss as it deserves the whole argument sustained throughout this large volume in many different ways, but let it be said, in spite of the criticisms made, that this is a work of great scholarship and power which has much that is essential to offer us today. It is unfortunate that its republication has been marred by a lengthy introduction contributed from the pen of Cornelius Van Til, in which the weakness of Warfield's position is turned into an enormity. Three comments may be permitted about this introductory essay. (1) It is a clear instance of an un-reformed subordination of Holy Scripture and its interpretation to a rigid tradition. (2) It is an illustration of the subtle way in which the doctrine of justification by faith alone can be overthrown, for here the Bible is 'justified' by Dr Van Til's private philosophical position, i.e. by the works of his mind which belong to what St. Paul called the works of the flesh or the natural man. He has failed signally to carry through a doctrine of substitutionary atonement into his epistemology, so that the latter is grounded still upon a secular philosophy. (3) The proud flaunting of his rationality on almost

every page points to a mind which has not yet learned that the Cross makes foolish the wisdom of this world. We need men today who will engage in fearless and sincere debate, but polemic of this kind with a strange lack of sympathy and an inability to understand the other man's point of view without distorting it beyond all recognition, can do no service to Christian theology.

T. F. Torrance

Karl Barth—Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie. By Hans Urs von Balthasar. Jakob Hegner Verlag. Köln, 1951. 420 pages. D.M. 28.

This serious and thorough study of Karl Barth's work is written by a learned Roman Catholic theologian. He calls it 'a contribution to the (inter-?)confessional dialogue amongst theologians' and there is no doubt that he has carried out this purpose remarkably well. As Balthasar attempts to lay the basis for a real discussion between Roman Catholic and Protestant theology, his book is no prosaic account of everything Barth has ever said; but it is an exciting and lively investigation of Barth's place in this dialogue and, at the same time, a possible Roman Catholic answer to him. Karl Adam, E. Przywara, G. Söhngen and others had taken up the discussion in earlier stages of Barth's thinking, but now all the more recent volumes of the *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, particularly those dealing with the doctrine of Predestination and Creation, are taken into account. The very structure of Balthasar's book is governed by his desire to reopen the debate. First of all, the possibility of such an inter-confessional discussion is investigated with exemplary objectivity. Then, Barth's position with the challenge it involves is made clear and finally, Balthasar sets forth his answer to this challenge.

But is there any point in a Roman Catholic dialogue with Barth in view of his sharp and apparently exclusive rejection of Roman Catholicism? It must not be forgotten, however, that this repudiation is not an easy and inconsiderate one, for Barth himself holds the work of Roman scholastic theology in high esteem. Balthasar, on the other hand, thinks that the discussion has to be taken up because, as he puts it, 'for the first time true Protestantism has found completely consistent expression in Barth' (p. 32). The disagreement about the formal-principle of theological thinking (the question of the *analogia entis*) does not prove to be an obstacle for Balthasar. His book is really dominated by the argument that Barth's criticism and flat rejection of Roman Catholicism is without sufficient foundation, for with much of Barth's teaching here Roman Catholic theology can only find itself in agreement.

The second part of the book is devoted to a very illuminating representation of Barth's development from individualistic Liberalism to idealistic Dialectics and from there to a more and more Biblical and theological thinking as it finds expression in the volumes of the *Kirchliche Dogmatik*. This is described as his way to the *analogia fidei*. One must read the few pages on the 'beauty of Barth's theology', on Barth's *Anliegen* and also on the *prae-destinatio gemina*, in order to appreciate the sincerity and love with which Balthasar's study is undertaken. This does not mean that the author ever hides his own conviction, but rather that he gives us an example how serious criticism ought to proceed.

The main point at issue throughout is the form of theological thought, with which we are chiefly concerned here. Barth's thought-form (*Denkform*) is described as a theo-logical one. It starts from God Himself, from the act of the *concretissimum* in Christ (we remember Barth's insistence on 'activity', 'event', and 'concreteness' in the whole relationship of God to creature). Balthasar illustrates this by reference to the hour-glass: its two glasses (God and creature) meet each other only through the narrow middle part, i.e. both meet in Christ and nowhere else. God's revelation is one-sided, but a counter-movement results from it (i.e. the sand in the bottom part is rising). This counter-movement, this living and responding of the creature to whom God reveals Himself is taken very seriously, but this would not be possible without the light of God's revealing act. Consequently, everything depends (again in terms of the illustration) on the middle part, on Jesus Christ: *Gerade die engste Stelle ist die entscheidende, ist der Akt, die Berührung, das Ereignis, wovon alles, was Natur und Zustand heisst, sich ableitet* (p. 210). Here the old problem of Barth's relation to philosophy comes up. Balthasar does not think that this 'form of thinking' implies an ultimate triumph of a philosophical system over theology. Barth remains independent even in using philosophical terminology. But from the theological angle, Balthasar asks some critical questions which indicate clearly his whole approach: is the Christological approach compelling Barth to build a system which destroys the independence (*Eigenständigkeit*) of the Natural Order and its corresponding philosophy? Is Barth speculating when in his theology Christ takes such precedence that the gravity of sin is apparently eliminated? Is the Church made an absurdity by Barth's *theo-logical* approach?

The last part of the book (with Balthasar's answer to Barth's challenge) is perhaps the most interesting one for the Protestant reader who is acquainted to a fair extent with Karl Barth's teaching. We also see one of Balthasar's main intentions in writing this book, to show his fellow Roman Catholic theologians that the schism in the

Church does not mean the breakdown of all communication. There can be and there must be theological discussion across the frontiers of denominations. Karl Barth does not constitute an exception. Balthasar thinks that a valid basis for discussion with Barth can be found in those very questions which were thought to be insurmountable, such as Nature, Analogy, and the Christocentric structure of all theology. . . . (Balthasar undertakes to show that modern Roman Catholic theologians—e.g. Guardini, Schmaus, Bernhart—think in Christocentric terms as much as Protestants.) Here we come back to the crucial question of the form of theological thought. Balthasar refuses to oppose Barth with a distinctively Roman Catholic 'form of thinking'. Roman Catholic theology 'breaks the frame of every single form of thinking: Revelation, as the supreme *Ratio*, the personal, divine *Logos* Himself, needs every form of *logoi* of truth in the world to represent His inexhaustable fulness' (p. 264). On the other hand the reader is reminded that Roman Catholic pronouncements in the last few centuries are deeply influenced by the impact of heresy which has to be repudiated: Nature and Reason had to be stressed as opposed to the one-sided principle of Scriptural authority, but this is no justification for the idea that Roman-Catholic thinking can be reduced to a single principle.

Balthasar makes this clear in an impressive interpretation of the notion of Nature in Roman Catholic theology. He rejects all speculation about a *natura pura*. Nature can only be understood in terms of Grace, but a formal notion of pure Nature has to be retained as presupposed by the act and by the notion of Grace (p. 311f). Balthasar is convinced that Barth holds almost the same position in view of the fact that Barth concedes to Creation a particular role in being presupposed by God's acts as the external ground for the Covenant of God. Therefore discussion about *analogia entis* appears to be fruitless and out of date: *Das absolute Prius der Gnadenordnung vor der Naturordnung* (*in ordine intentionis*) *und das relative Prius der Schöpfungsordnung vor der Gnadenordnung* (*in ordine executionis*) find agreement from all sides (p. 313). This formal principle, therefore, cannot be regarded any longer as a justifiable term to mark the difference between Protestant and Roman Catholic theology.

But now, the author goes on to say that once the relative priority of Creation inside the wider priority of God and of His Grace is conceded, a 'relative' looking from Adam to Christ, from Reason to the faith of the Covenant must be conceded as well. Here it would appear that Balthasar postulates a correspondence in the noetic field to this relative priority of Creation or Nature. If so, we cannot help but ask Balthasar at this very point: does this not imply that thinking in terms of an irresponsible *analogia entis* which Barth

still insists on rejecting? There is still an important difference between this *analogia entis* inside the whole of the Order of Grace and Barth's *analogia fidei*. It is one of the peculiarities of this *analogia fidei* that it cannot be handled either way round. It is essentially *irreversible*. Since faith is not a neutral knowledge but depends on God's revealing Himself, so *analogia fidei* cannot be turned into a method for knowing God without His Revelation. Balthasar states quite frankly that Roman Catholic theology inevitably uses 'terms of being' (Seins-qualitäten) to describe God's acting in history. But obviously these terms are understood as reversible, in spite of the absolute priority of God. Even when the notion of *analogia entis* is interpreted Christologically (Przywara), the ultimate reversibility of the term on the noetic level appears. When Barth speaks of 'analogy' he always implies the ultimate incomparability of creature with God. So, the term of analogy is only applied in virtue of revelation and by faith. This underlies the irreversibility of analogy in Karl Barth's use of the term and by this it differs from philosophical statements of similar kinds (cp. *Kirchliche Dogmatik* III, 3, p. 119f).

Although Balthasar's argument that Barth's criticism of Roman Catholic thinking is based on a fundamental misunderstanding, may not convince us, we are grateful to Balthasar for presenting and interpreting Roman Catholic theology in terms of this basic question of theological thinking. We hope that the basis for discussion which he has laid (and which is laid on similar lines by certain fellow theologians of his in other countries) will be used widely and that the dialogue which he has initiated will be taken up both by Roman Catholics and Protestants. We are particularly grateful to H. U. von Balthasar for showing us how such a dialogue can be conducted with real sincerity and objectivity. In this way his book will be as helpful for Roman Catholic as for Protestant theologians.

EDUARD WILDBOLZ

Origen: Contra Celsum. Translated with an Introduction and notes by Henry Chadwick. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 572. 60s. net.

How those who have had to study Origen's *Contra Celsum* must envy the good fortune of their successors who will now have the opportunity of doing so with the aid of this most fascinating and felicitous new translation! No doubt the pages are still large and numerous, but there is not a dull one among them. They read so easily, smoothly and intelligently that it seems virtually a new book. Moreover the notes at the foot of each page, unobtrusive though they be, are packed with learning. Where the text is doubtful adequate guidance is offered. In the main Origen is left to speak

for himself, as he does clearly enough owing to the excellence of the translation; but a mass of information is brought together that is in the highest degree helpful for the understanding of the 'actuality' of an argument conducted on the high plane of Hellenistic, Alexandrian, learning. References will be found to the chief passages in the ancient writers from which Origen derived his materials, historical and mythological, scientific and philosophical, and also to modern works where help is available for a fuller understanding of Origen's thought. Complete indices enable us to find our way about, and there is a full Bibliography. The Introduction is brief. In addition to a description of the Manuscripts, Editions and Translations, there is a full discussion of the identity and date of Celsus and the possibility of reconstructing his text, also an exposition of his theology and of Origen's theological and philosophical background. With this we are well prepared for the book itself.

Students of theology will be grateful to have this easy access to the greatest of the Greek Apologies, perhaps the most important Christian writing of the Ante-Nicene Period. But it will also be a boon to those, of whom there are many today, who are interested to watch the merging of the Hellenic and the Judaeo-Christian traditions which are the sources of modern culture. Porphyry, a contemporary of Origen, and in part an admirer, complained that he mingled Hellenic Philosophy with barbarian myths. More recent theologians have reproached him with corrupting the Biblical tradition with his speculative Platonism. The Church itself condemned him as a heretic while learning much from him. However that may be, it is impossible not to find interest in observing how a great and conspicuously honest mind, steeped in the literary and philosophical culture of Greece, could, in Mr Chadwick's words, 'be satisfied that Christianity was not an irrational credulity but a profound philosophy', and how it was thought possible 'to present Christianity to the educated classes as something intellectually respectable'. That was a difficult enterprise when Christians were 'men of yesterday' and their Bible seemed utterly barbaric to a world still enjoying and proud of its intellectual inheritance; still to produce Plotinus and Neoplatonism. How interesting would have been a dialogue between Origen and Plotinus after a lecture by their common master, Ammonius Saccas! In default of this Celsus is no mean champion of the ancient tradition in some if not in the profoundest of its aspects.

Our thanks are due to the translator for making this Christian 'classic' so readily intelligible, and to the Cambridge University Press for producing this handsome work of scholarship in these difficult times.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

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THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THE LATIN FATHERS

by The Rev. Professor JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

For the first two centuries of its existence Christianity was, even in the West, a Greek thing. Domitian might find Christian victims among members of the reigning family, but Tacitus could still regard the Christians of Rome as the off-scourings of the eastern provinces. The language of the Roman Church was Greek throughout the second century A.D., the language of Bible, Creed and Worship. However Roman in feeling Clement might be his letter to the Corinthians was in Greek; and Hermas' Shepherd was meant for home consumption. During the century nearly all the leading Christians from the East appear to have visited Rome bringing their ideas as to a sort of clearing house; and towards the end of it Bishop Victor of Rome, a genuine Roman, had still to struggle with Theodotus the Tanner from Byzantium, and Blastus and Florinus from Asia. Under his successors Zephyrinus and Callistus theological controversy was still carried on in Greek, but their opponent Hippolytus seems to have been the last Greek-speaking Father of the Roman Church. Similarly in Gaul the Christians of Lyons and Vienne were Greek migrants from Asia, and their bishop, 180-200, Irenaeus, was a product of Asia, the authentic voice of Christian Ephesus.

When we remember the rather self-conscious efforts of Cicero, Varro and Lucretius, Vergil and Horace, to naturalise literary and philosophical culture, i.e. Greek culture, in the West by giving it a Latin dress, it is perhaps worthy of passing remark that the equally significant translation of Christianity into Latin took place unnoticed. When was the ancient Roman Creed first said in Latin? No doubt early, for Irenaeus shows that for Christians Babel had been really overcome at Pentecost, and that it was perfectly natural for the Creed, at least, to be professed in all languages. But when was Scripture first translated into Latin? Little notice seems to have been taken of

this surely important step until Jerome proposed to prepare a new translation of the OT from the original Hebrew.

At all events—if we except Minucius Felix who in any case handles only the themes appropriate to monotheism generally and not to Christianity specifically—it was in Tertullian that Christian theology acquired a Latin voice and perhaps a Latin accent. Tertullian was, it appears, as much at home in Greek as in Latin and composed his earliest works in Greek. Most of the controversies in which he took part belonged primarily to the Greek world. Indeed Dr Prestige insists that in his theology he remained more Greek than Latin, at least in the sense that his work is coloured by philosophic rather than by legal ideas. Why, then, did he choose to theologise in Latin? Was he another Cicero who hoped to serve his fellow Latins by making available to them in their own tongue the doctrines of the Greek Fathers? Or rather, perhaps, another Lucretius penetrated by a sense of the importance of the message, determined at all hazards, in spite of all difficulties, to declare and defend it in the speech of his countrymen? Difficulties indeed there were in making plain Latin express the subtleties of Greek. But Tertullian unlike Lucretius or even Augustine two centuries later makes no apology for his daring. If a new word is required he boldly coins one or, occassionally, simply transliterates the Greek word. The works of Irenaeus and Hippolytus were before him and he uses both probably (certainly Irenaeus, cp. *Adv. Valentinianos*), but he is no mere translator. His robust faith finds expression in vigorous Latin, creative not only linguistically but also theologically. He is 'the Master' of Cyprian and all the Latin Fathers, to whom may be traced their characteristic terminology especially in the Doctrines of the Trinity. As regards the Doctrine of the Spirit he is above all the Latin *Geistesmensch* for whom the Spirit is more than a doctrine, is life itself. I make no apology for devoting most of my time to Tertullian.

Tertullian was a convert from heathenism, but unhappily he tells us nothing about his conversion. How interesting *his* Confessions would have been! But that it was a tremendous spiritual experience for him is clear from all his early writings. Two of these, particularly, seem to reflect it directly, *De Poenitentia* and *De Baptismo*. Repentance, he says, is a necessary

prelude to Baptism, without which Baptism avails nothing. 'We are not washed *in order that* we may cease sinning, but *because* we have ceased from sinning, and in heart have been washed already' (*De Baptismo* 6). Repentance leads on to Baptism which is the sign and seal of repentance, even as it seals faith in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It makes clean the heart and prepares it for the Holy Spirit with His celestial blessings, in a word for salvation. What wonders God can perform by simple inexpensive means. There is nothing commoner than water, but by it God has appointed that man may be cleansed not only physically but also spiritually. As the Spirit hovered upon the waters at Creation, so after the invocation of God on the water the Spirit works through water at Baptism. 'Not indeed in the water do we receive the Holy Spirit, but under the influence of the angel (a reference to the pool of Bethesda) we are by the water of Baptism cleansed and prepared for the Holy Spirit.'

By Tertullian's time the ceremonies of Christian initiation had been extended to include not only water-Baptism, but also unction 'whereby our bodies are anointed even as Christ also was "the Anointed One" '. Then follows Imposition of Hands by the chief priest or bishop with invocation of the Spirit 'who willingly descends from the Father on our cleansed and blessed bodies' even as He descended on Christ after His Baptism in the shape of a Dove. It might appear that Tertullian connects the gift of the Spirit, i.e. the principle of the Christian's supernatural life, not with Baptism in the ordinary sense but with the laying on of the bishop's hands, i.e. with Confirmation. But, as Dr Lampe has pointed out, this is not the only doctrine in Tertullian. He can say as definitely that Baptism confers the Spirit, e.g. in *De Baptismo* 10, when he explains that Christian Baptism differs from the Baptism of John precisely in that it not only gives the forgiveness of sins, but also confers the Holy Spirit. This positive benefit could not have been bestowed until after the Ascension when Christ had completed His redeeming work; 'until the efficacy of the font had been established through the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, whereby our death is destroyed and our life restored'.

At whatever point in the initiatory ceremonies the Holy Spirit was received—and Tertullian is manifestly inconsistent

about this unless he uses the word Baptism and even *aqua* and *lavacrum* to include them all—he is in no doubt that in Christian initiation man receives not only a preparatory forgiveness of sins committed up to that point, but also, positively, that Spirit of God which he first received when God breathed into Adam the breath of life and then lost through sin. 'By the introduction into us and the conservation in us of the Holy Spirit we are all the temples of God' (*De Cultu femin.* II.1; cp. 1 Cor. 6.19). But the Spirit may be lost or driven away, as, for example, by the perturbations caused by undue anxiety about worldly possessions or by fears occasioned by external circumstances. 'Where there is no patience the Spirit cannot continue' (*De Patientia* 1). Or the Spirit is disturbed by the passions excited by the spectacles of the amphitheatre (*De Spect.* 15).

As a baptised Christian Tertullian found himself a member of a Spirit-filled community. In a well-known chapter (39) of the *Apology*, on Christian worship, he describes Christians as 'a body (corpus) knit together by a common religious profession, by unity of discipline, and the bond of a common hope'. See how the Christians love one another, even the heathen remark. They are ready to die for one another, and feel themselves as brethren who know God as their common Father, and have drunk in one Spirit of holiness. Among them there are no disputes about property. They are one in mind and soul, and share their earthly goods with each other, practising communism in all things except in wives. All this finds its full expression in the Agape.

This is of course Apologetic, and Tertullian has to admit that failures do occur within the Christian community. In his early period he is prepared to allow a second (but last!) repentance. In *De Poenitentia* (7 ff) he describes with apparent, if deprecating, approval the process of ecclesiastical penance, as we must call it, whereby the Christian who has committed post-baptismal sin may be restored to the community and to assurance of forgiveness and salvation. A very severe and humbling process it is, consisting of public confession, fasting, lying in sackcloth and ashes, rolling before the feet of the presbyters, and kneeling to God's dear ones, beseeching their intercession with God. Naturally enough some were unwilling to undergo such a process. Why should they be, cries Tertullian.

Surely it is worth while to submit to humiliation if thereby forfeited salvation may be restored 'if by temporal mortification eternal punishments may be discharged'—a revealing phrase! But furthermore, there is no reason to be ashamed of such humiliation when it takes place 'among brethren and fellow-servants, where there is common hope, fear, joy, grief, suffering, because there is a common Spirit from a common Lord and Father'. 'When you cast yourself at the brethren's knees you are entreating Christ', for the Church is in a sense Christ Himself, animated by one Spirit that comes from God.

Nevertheless, many were unwilling or unable to see it in this way. This had been a difficulty even in the times of Hermas 50-100 years earlier, who led the Church to find a partial solution. Now the Church was increasing rapidly in numbers. Tertullian, the Apologist, makes a strong point of this increase, but to Tertullian the enthusiast and rigorist it constituted a real problem, for the Church generally seemed driven to relax its discipline. Just at this point Montanism appeared in Carthage as elsewhere with its testimony against compromise, proclaiming that the Church must keep itself unspotted from the world. For a time—some years perhaps—it appears that the rigorists worked within the Church and only after a period of dispute and contention voluntarily withdrew from its fellowship, on disciplinary not on doctrinal grounds, as followers of the Paraclete arrogating to themselves the designation of Pneumatics by contrast to the Psychics who refused to recognise the New Prophecy. This classification, characteristic of Valentinian gnosticism goes back indeed to St. Paul. Here was the parting of the ways, when, in Troeltschian language, the exclusive sect parted company with the relatively inclusive Catholic Church. Tertullian went with the sectarians, thereby remaining simply true to his original Christian convictions.

Some of Tertullian's writings seem to reflect the period of tension before the final separation—say 207-212. If so, they support the view that the controversy was mainly disciplinary. In the two books *Ad Uxorem* he had allowed second marriage to be lawful on the strength of 1 Cor. 7.39, but he clearly regarded it very unfavourably. In *De Exhortatione Castitatis* he declares it to be very like fornication. It is indeed permitted by the Apostle by way of indulgence, but, if good, there is a

better way, and in advising the better way, St. Paul adds, 'I think I have also the Spirit of God', which makes the advice a command. And Tertullian goes on to quote 'the holy prophetess Prisca' as saying: 'Purity is harmonious, and they see visions and hear manifest visions, as salutary as they are secret'. In the somewhat later *De Monogamia* Tertullian's view has hardened. 'We recognise one marriage as we acknowledge one God.' By now the break has occurred. The Catholics are now dubbed Psychics who have not the Spirit and cannot understand the Apostle, who spoke in the Spirit, and the New Prophecy is defended against the charge of inventing burdensome novelties.

Another disciplinary controversy is revealed in *De Virginibus velandis* where 'the followers of the Paraclete', still within the Church, take a stricter view than the general body. An even more serious problem was set about the same time by the soldier who in 211 at a military festival refused to wear a laurel crown, saying that he was a Christian, so bringing punishment on himself and possibly provoking a renewal of persecution of Christians generally. The clergy condemned the soldier as too hasty and rash, too eager for martyrdom—for a mere matter of dress he had brought trouble on the bearers of the Christian name. Nothing in Scripture forbade the donning of a laurel crown. Here was an old problem, as old as the martyrdom of Polycarp, as the Book of Revelation perhaps. Polycarp and the Catholic Church deprecated the action of enthusiasts who voluntarily sought martyrdom and sometimes lost courage to go through with it. Appeal was made to the saying of our Lord (Matt. 10.23): 'When they persecute you in one city, flee to another'. Tertullian deals with the problem in *De Corona Militis*, which may mark his final break with the Church. At any rate he fiercely attacks the clergy. They are lions in time of peace, deer in times of war. The only Scripture text that comes into their head is that just quoted justifying flight in persecution. In fact they have turned their backs on Scripture and rejected the prophecies of the Holy Spirit. There is already a trait of fanaticism discernible in the Apology when Tertullian speaks of the blood of the martyrs as seed. This comes to full expression in his later Montanist tract *De Fuga in Persecutione*, when appeal is made to many passages of Scripture, not all very relevant; but also to 'an utterance of the Spirit'

(attributed to Maximilla?) which 'incites all almost to go and offer themselves in martyrdom, not to flee from it. . . . Seek not to die on bridal beds . . . nor in soft fevers, but to die the martyr's death, that He may be glorified who has suffered for you.'

It was in *De Pudicitia* that Tertullian made his fiercest onslaught on the Catholic discipline in the name of the Paraclete. Callistus, bishop of Rome had communicated to the Church of North Africa his decision, in virtue of the power of the keys given to Peter, to extend the range of ecclesiastical penance to cover all sexual sins. *De Pudicitia* is Tertullian's indignant reply, addressed apparently to the bishop of Carthage who had accepted the lead of Rome, and who is addressed as 'Apostolic Sir', perhaps sarcastically as Callistus is called *Pontifex Maximus*. 'We excommunicate digamists as bringing infamy upon the Paraclete by the irregularity of their discipline. . . . We doom adulterers and fornicators to pour forth tears barren of peace, and to regain from the Church no ampler return than the publication of their disgrace', i.e. they are to continue in life-long penance without hope of absolution and readmission to communion. For such severity he appeals, in particular, to two Scripture passages. (1) Acts 15.28-9, the decision of the Apostolic Council, 'It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us' to condemn fornication. To subvert that decision is to deny that even the Apostle had the Paraclete (worse, but on a par with the denial that the new prophets had the Paraclete). It is to break the agreement, made by the Holy Spirit Himself to release men from obedience to the whole law in return for strict observance of a part of it (*De Pud.* 12). (2) 1 Cor. 5.3-5, when Paul delivers the fornicator to Satan for the destruction of the flesh in order that the spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus. The question is what spirit is referred to here. If it is the man's own spirit, what Paul is saying is that while the man's spirit may be saved it cannot be reunited to his flesh at the Resurrection, but must continue in penal separation; for his flesh had perished 'substantially', when by his sin he had lost the effects of his baptism. But Tertullian rejects this interpretation in favour of a still more arbitrary one. The Spirit referred to is the Spirit which is accounted to exist in the Church (i.e. in all its members) and which must be kept 'saved',

i.e. uncontaminated by association with fornicators, till the day of the Lord (*De Pud.* 13).

Tertullian holds (21) that God, God alone, can remit mortal sins, 'sins against Himself and His Temple'. Such forgiveness is no mere matter of discipline such as bishops may exercise, who preside over their churches ministerially not imperially and who exhibit neither the prophetic nor the Apostolic character—for all their claims. It is a matter of Divine power, which God may indeed exercise but only through those to whom He gives spiritual power, e.g. Apostles and Prophets. Certainly the Church has power to forgive sins—no one holds that more firmly than do the followers of the Paraclete—but the Church which is properly and in principle the Spirit Himself in whom is the Trinity of the one Divinity—Father, Son and Holy Spirit; *Ecclesia Spiritus per spiritalem hominem, non Ecclesia numerus espicoporum.* (He concedes no forgiving power to martyrs—the martyr atones for his own sin alone—unlike the African enthusiasts of the next generation.)

Tertullian accepts the current designation of Montanism as the New Prophecy, but he constantly rebuts the charge that it introduces novelties. Certainly of doctrinal novelty there could be no question; the Paraclete only confirmed his orthodoxy. All his anti-heretical works except *De Praescriptione* belong to his Montanist period, and even on the question of authority he never seriously modifies the teaching of that book. In *De Praescriptione* the supreme doctrinal authority is held to be the Apostles who taught only what they had received from Christ, and only did so after they had received the Holy Spirit, leading them into all truth. They could not therefore be ignorant of anything or teach any error. Their testament is final. His appeal to the Apostles is in practice, of course, an appeal to their writings, to the New Testament, and to the Old Testament which they also used, but he does not oppose the authority of Scripture to the authority of the Church. Far from it. The Church alone, he declares, may interpret its own Scriptures. Heretics may not intermeddle here, and it is useless to argue with them about Scripture interpretation. Such disputations only upset brain and stomach. Faith saves, not skill in the Scriptures, which is a curious art; and the Rule of Faith states that Christ sent as His Vicar the Power of the Holy Spirit to

lead believers, the Apostles primarily, but also their disciples after them, into all truth. The appeal is, thus, to the Apostolic Church, above all to the Church of Rome, founded by three not by two Apostles (for he strangely included the Apostle John) preserving their Creed, Sacraments and complete Bible, and admitting no gainsayers. But though Tertullian follows Irenaeus here, and even challenges the heretics to produce a list of bishops going back to the Apostles or to Apostolic men, he does not attribute to the bishop a *charisma veritatis*, doctrinal infallibility. A bishop may fall from the rule of faith (3). His final authority in fact is neither Scripture nor the Church but the Spirit, who dwelt in the Apostles, and who must dwell also in those who would truly understand and interpret their writings. This Spirit he came to deny that the Catholics or Psychics possessed at all. Even in *De Praescriptione* room is left for the teaching of *De Pudicitia* that there is an *Ecclesia Spiritus* not identical with the *Ecclesia numerus episcoporum*. We might compare Tertullian's doctrine here with Calvin's *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*, for as with Calvin so with Tertullian the Spirit is the Interpreter of Scripture. It is true he quotes the 'Prophets' once or twice, but never places their utterances on a par with the Apostolic Scriptures as authoritative. They support rather than add to, let alone contradict the Scriptures. The Religion of the Spirit is not opposed by Tertullian to the Religion of Authority.

It was in the sphere of Christian Ethics that the new prophecy could be accused of innovation, and the burdensome novelties they were accused of imposing were four. (1) No second marriage; (2) more and more rigorous fasts; (3) no forgiveness for sexual sins, and (4) no flight in persecution. On all these points Tertullian's views hardened, though they cannot be said to have changed fundamentally. What change there was, was due, he claims, to the teaching of the Holy Spirit enabling him to reach a deeper understanding of the Apostolic precepts, and their implications; but he also seems to argue that discipline was inevitably laxer when the Church was in its infancy, and that now the Spirit demands a sterner obedience. Whether the Montanists were innovators or strict conservatives can perhaps never be finally decided. One thing is clear about Tertullian. He was temperamentally a rigorist

and an enthusiast. He believed that the Holy Spirit was still at work in the Church, and he craved for obvious signs, charismata, as in the Apostolic age. The Montanist phenomena testified to this, not always very nicely. In *De Anima* he tells us that in his community, 'which like the Apostles acknowledges spiritual charismata, there is a sister who is favoured with sundry gifts of revelations, which she experiences in the spirit by ecstatic vision amidst the sacred rites of the Lord's Day in the church'. But fortunately she waited till the service was finished before she related her experience and then her report was carefully tested. The particular vision here recorded—of a corporeal soul—does not whet the appetite for more. Perhaps it is worth remarking that this long treatise on psychology has almost nothing to say about the Holy Spirit. But it is unfortunate that his Six Books on Ecstasy are not extant, for they must have thrown considerable light on this aspect of Montanism. The Church was now tending to deprecate ecstasy, at any rate in living 'prophets', to believe that the age of 'signs' was over, and to see the Spirit safely canalised in official channels, and more or less identified with the charity that covers a multitude of sins and therefore the bond of unity. Perhaps indeed this was what St. Paul was pleading for in 1 Cor. 13, and it seems most Christian and congenial to us today. Perhaps in Tertullian's writings we may observe more of the works of the flesh than of the fruits of the Spirit as described in Gal. 5. Nevertheless it is clear that his doctrine of the Spirit will be no abstract theological rationalisation or product of exegetical ingenuity, but a reflection of an intense experience, individual and communal, not to be met with again on a large scale until the days of the English Puritans.

The occasion to deal systematically with the doctrine of the Spirit was given to Tertullian by the propagation in Carthage of the ideas of the Monarchian Praxeas—'a man in other respects of a restless disposition, above all inflated with the pride of confessorship simply and solely because he had had to bear for a short time the inconvenience of imprisonment'. He first brought Monarchian heresy from Asia to Rome, and had such influence with the then bishop of Rome as to induce him to withdraw his recognition of the prophetic gifts of Montanus, Prisca and Maximilla, and his letters of communion with the

Montanist Churches of Asia and Phrygia. Praxeas thus rendered the devil a twofold service in Rome; he banished the Paraclete and crucified the Father. He had indeed been refuted at Rome and had made his peace with the Church of the Psychics, but his errors, particularly his Patripassianism, still had much support among the simple.

Praxeas did not touch the doctrine of the Spirit. His problem had been to reconcile the 'monarchy' of God, i.e. Monotheism with Christian belief in the divinity of the Saviour, and this he did quite simply. The One Lord Almighty Creator had Himself been born of the Virgin Mary, Himself suffered, and was Himself the Jesus Christ of history. This view entirely satisfied the simple, 'always the majority of believers', who suspected of ditheism or tritheism those who distinguish too clearly between Father, Son and Holy Spirit; and were apt to be proud of the slogan, 'We maintain the Monarchy'. There was, of course, no question that from the beginning Christians had professed faith in Father, Son and Holy Spirit, cp. the baptismal Creed and Formula. This was common to Catholic and Montanist alike. 'We as we have always done', writes Tertullian, 'and more especially since we have been better instructed by the Paraclete who leads men into all truth . . . believe there is one sole God, who has also a Son. . . . Who sent from heaven from the Father the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, the Sanctifier of the faith of those who believe in the Father, *and* in the Son, *and* in the Holy Ghost.' But just how were these three related?

Tertullian begins by explaining the word Monarchy. It means simply the Rule of One, and does not exclude the employment by the One Ruler of agents of government, a son, e.g. or other officers. God administers His government through hosts of angels without it ceasing to be a monarchy; much less is His monarchy destroyed when He uses His Son and the Holy Spirit, sharers, unlike the angels, in the Father's substance, pledges of His love, instruments of His mighty power. They have no other source than the Father from whom they 'proceed' and whose bidding they perform and to whom they return. Scripture clearly distinguishes between the Three persons; as when it is said that the Son will pray the Father to give *another* Comforter. Father and Son are *unum* not *unus* (John 10.30).

We do not say that there are two Gods, but, to avoid saying that the Father was born and suffered, which it is not lawful to believe for it has not been so handed down, 'we, especially who are disciples of the Paraclete and not of men, do indeed define that the Father and Son are two; and with the addition of the Holy Spirit there are three, according to the principle of the economy, which makes numeration necessary' (*Adv. Prax.* 13).

Here Tertullian has used a word which, in this special sense, he shares with his contemporary Hippolytus alone, from whom indeed he may have borrowed it. He introduces it at the very beginning of *Adv. Praxean* and repeats it several times usually as a correlative to monarchia. Latins proudly chant the Greek word '*monarchia*' as something they can fully understand, while even Greeks, e.g. Praxeas, refuse to understand *oikonomia*. Sometimes he translates *oikonomia* into the Latin *dispensatio*, and in its first introduction he seems to explain it by a recitation of the Rule of Faith, including the historic facts of the Incarnation, and the sanctification of believers. This might suggest a Trinity manifest in the historic acts of Redemption, after the manner of Sabellius, but that would be no answer to Praxeas; and elsewhere in the treatise it is clear that *oikonomia* has reference to the Divine Nature itself. This is clear particularly in the chapter where he contrasts his doctrine with that of Valentinus. Valentinus taught that the Divine πλήρωμα contained a multitude of Aeons, thirty in fact, each emanation (προβόλη: *prolatio*) proceeding from the one that had preceded it, and all ultimately owing their origin to 'the Father'. But Valentinus puts so great a distinction between (at any rate) the lowest aeon (i.e. Sophia) and the Father, that it cannot know Him and perishes from its desire to know Him. 'With us the Son (who is also known as Sophia) alone knows and reveals the Father.' Nevertheless with this correction, Tertullian can adopt the Valentinian term *probole*, *prolatio*; and he also uses illustrations which certainly occur in Plotinus in an emanational sense: the root, the tree, the fruit, which are three things from one point of view, but are one from another point of view. Similarly with the Sun, the ray of light, and its apex. In like manner the Trinity flowing down from the Father by closely interconnected steps (*gradus*) causes no disturbance to the monarchy and protects the '*status*' of the Economy. Tertullian

is less careful than Origen who rejected outright the Gnostic and Platonic idea of emanation, and worked with the concepts, Begotten-Unbegotten. Tertullian's Economic Trinity may therefore be described, with Dr Prestige, as Organic Monotheism, where unity is conceived of as a kind of πλήρωμα richer and fuller than a mathematical point. The Economy of Redemptive History is grounded in an ontological Economy in which Unity is 'distributed' into a Trinity of *personae*, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, three in degree (gradus) form (forma) fashion (species) but one in substance, status and power, susceptible of being numbered but not divided (2). The treatise ends as it began with the accepted creed as far as the article on the Spirit. 'Meantime (the Son, having performed His redemptive work) has poured out the gift He received from the Father, even the Holy Spirit, being the third Name in the Godhead and the third Degree of the Divine Majesty, the Preacher of the Sole Monarchy of God, but also the Interpreter of the Economy, and, if any one will receive His words in the New Prophecy, the Leader into all truth, as it is found in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, according to the Christian mystery (sacramentum).' Tertullian of course does not say that the doctrine of the Divine Economy was a Montanist revelation. All he means is that his Montanism had simply intensified his orthodoxy. For him the Holy Spirit is more than the inner light, more than the *esprit de corps* of an enthusiastic sect.

In the 200 years that separate Augustine from Tertullian much has taken place in the theological world. Theological terms have acquired a certain precision and the period of experimentation is over. The long protracted Arian controversy had been concerned chiefly with the doctrine of the Son; but the subsidiary Macedonian and Eunomian heresies had raised questions regarding the Holy Spirit and had called forth from Basil the first dogmatic treatise on the subject. The Latins had followed afar off, content with Tertullian's *Una Substantia Tres Personae*. In *De Fide et Symbolo*, an early lecture on the Creed, Augustine remarks that by comparison with the doctrine of the Son the doctrine of the Spirit had received but little attention, and in *De Trin.* he makes a similar remark with

regard to Latin writers. He does not mention Tertullian, or even Ambrose who had written a treatise *De Spiritu Sancto*, mainly an adaptation from the Greeks. He does quote a phrase of Hilary, which, however, he finds requires clarification.

One may feel that in *De Trin.* Augustine treats his subject as a purely intellectual problem, attempting, as Dr Hodgson says, 'to arrive at a deeper understanding' of the data of Scripture (I should prefer to say of the statements of the Catholic Creed) 'in accordance with the canons of rational thought'. But there is a religious interest too, coloured, it may be, by Neoplatonism, appearing conspicuously at the beginning of Book IV, but elsewhere too (cp. XII.13 ff).

Happiness for man consists in *fruitio Dei*, for God is man's *summum bonum*. So long as we sojourn as pilgrims on this earth we are exiled from the unchangeable joy. We must return by despising and turning away from worldly temporal things, and by coming to know and love immutable and eternal things. All this the Platonists have seen clearly enough. 'There are some who think themselves capable of being cleansed by their own virtuousness so as to contemplate God and dwell in Him . . . because they have been able to penetrate with the eye of the mind beyond created things, and to reach the light of immutable truth . . . to understand immutable substance . . . and they deride many Christians for not being able to do this.' (Cf. *Confessions* where he says the Platonists have seen the blessed country but have not been able to arrive at it.) Man's situation 'here', Augustine realises, is much more desperate than the Platonists imagine. We must have help from heaven 'suited to our estate'—unmerited grace—to cleanse our sins, heal our disease and give us the good will. This is what Christianity brings. The Incarnation, Death and Resurrection of Christ both make salvation possible and demonstrate its possibility by revealing that God loves us. These redemptive acts quicken in us faith and hope and *Amor Dei* which is the motive power (pondus) of our return to Him who is our Highest Good. In Christ, as the Apostle says (Col. 2.3) 'are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge'. *Per ipsum tendimus per scientiam* (knowledge of mundane things, including the philosophic virtues and even the earthly life, death and Resurrection of Christ) *ad sapientiam* (knowledge of eternal things and of un-

changeable truth and being) and thereby to *fruitio Dei*. There seems to be no place in this scheme for the Holy Spirit in addition to God and His Word, God Transcendent and God Immanent, Creative, sustaining and illuminating His creatures and by grace redeeming them. Though not averse, as Tertullian was, to philosophic 'seeking', finding it encouraged indeed in the words 'Seek and ye shall find', Augustine makes nothing at all of the text, so dear to Tertullian, which speaks of the mission of the Paraclete to lead into all truth. It rather suggests a question whether the teaching of the Son was not sufficient for salvation! And though he quotes the passage in 1 Cor. 12 which speaks of the manifestation of the Spirit in gifts of wisdom, knowledge, faith, healings, miracle, prophecy, tongues, it seems to have little meaning for him. The external signs at least are no longer expected, and certainly no longer present any problems. Donatists may be classed with Enthusiasts, as by Knox, but not after the manner of the Montanists.

Nevertheless Augustine does take the mission of the Holy Spirit seriously. Canonical Scripture of both Testaments is 'the writing of the Spirit'. He inspired the Prophets, giving them power to foretell the future, as the philosophers could not do, by enabling them to see the eternal and immutable causes of all things (IV.22). He came as a Dove at the Baptism of Jesus, and as tongues of fire at Pentecost—not being incarnate in these things, as the Son was in His human form—but using corporeal visible things to disclose His presence to human senses. The Spirit was bestowed by Christ on His Apostles as His greatest gift, and on the Church. He is transmitted by the 'Church's Rulers'—not indeed that they themselves bestow the Spirit. 'The Church preserves the custom of the Apostles who laid hands on their converts with invocation of God who alone can bestow this gift' (XV.46); who however does not do so at the behest of schismatical bishops, for against the Donatists Augustine claims a monopoly of the Spirit for the Catholic Church.

Moreover the working of the Spirit is to be seen in what we may call individual religious experience (XV.31-2): 'The Holy Spirit makes us to abide in God and God in us . . . influences a man with love to God and his neighbour. He is the supreme gift of God without whom all other gifts profit nothing, not

even faith.' Without the Holy Spirit we cannot love God, for as Paul says (Rom. 5.5) '*Amor Dei* is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is given unto us'. This was indeed a luminous text for Augustine, perhaps the most meaningful, as it is the most frequently quoted, of all texts referring to the Holy Spirit. It was his sheet-anchor against Donatism and Pelagianism. Augustine would warmly agree that 'Every virtue we possess and every victory won and every thought of holiness are His alone'. This deeply-felt personal religious experience must be held to underlie all he says about the Spirit in *De Trinitate*, though it is with the metaphysical implications of the experience that he is mainly concerned.

According to Catholic teaching the One Only True God is a Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, of one and the same substance in indivisible equality. The Father is God, the Son is God, the Spirit is God, yet are there not three Gods but one God: *Una Substantia Tres Personae* as the Latins say, though the Greeks have a different formula μία οὐσία τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις. As literally translated into Latin—*una essentia tres substantiae*—this would be offensive, but it can be explained harmlessly. Much of this terminology is of course not Scriptural, and yet it has had to be employed in order to make clear what Scripture means—to say something in order to avoid silence—or heresy. In any case Scripture is in many ways enigmatic 'In order to exercise us it has caused those things to be sought into which do not lie upon the surface, but are to be scrutinised in the hidden depths', by dint of much arbitrary exegesis, it must be added.

In any case we must begin with the Scriptural revelation, and this has of course to do with God's manifestations in history. We might say that the One Divine substance breaks by refraction into Three Persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, when it enters history and thus comes within human cognisance. But that would be Sabellian heresy. On the other hand explanation might be sought in some form of subordinationism. Scripture itself speaks of the Son and of the Spirit as having been 'sent' by the Father, or in the latter case 'from the Father by the Son', while it never speaks of the Father as 'sent'. (II.20). (But who were the three men who appeared to Abraham at Mamre and who were addressed by him in the singular as 'my Lord'?) Augustine denies that this implies subordination.

The 'sender' is in reality the Triune God. The Son is 'sent' *in forma servi*, but in His eternal form as Son of God He is also 'sender'. Likewise in His temporal manifestations the Spirit is 'sent', but He is '*apud se Deus*, co-eternal with the Father and the Son before He was given to anyone. Nor is He less than they because they give and He is given, for He Himself gives Himself as being God' (xv.36). Augustine again and again rejects all subordinationism, except such as may be said to lurk in the idea that the Father is the source or *principium* from whom both Son and Spirit are derived in their several ways, albeit eternally. Their visible temporal manifestations recorded in Scripture reveal the nature of the invisible eternal Godhead as inherently triune.

God is one eternal invisible immutable substance, not, however, like the Plotinian First Hypostasis, without attributes: only His attributes are not accidents in the technical sense—i.e. separable from His substance. *Est quod habet.* He *is*, in the full Plotinian sense, immutably; but He is Spirit 'eternal, immortal, incorruptible, immutable, living, wise, powerful, beautiful, righteous, good, blessed,' and the adjectives are as substantive as the noun. Nevertheless Scripture speaks also of the Son as begotten of the Father, and of the Spirit as proceeding from the Father; He *has* a Son but *is* not the Son; and, just as the begetting of the Son has no reference to the birth of Jesus of the Virgin, so the Procession of the Spirit has no reference to Pentecost or to any other temporal 'sending' of the Spirit. No doubt 'it is difficult to distinguish generation from procession in that co-eternal and equal, incorporeal and ineffably unchangeable and indivisible Trinity' (xv.48). 'Not until we reach the blissful abode shall we understand, with a mind that does not reason but simply contemplates, why the Holy Spirit is not a Son though He proceeds from the Father' (xv.45). 'Let him who can understand the timeless generation of the Son from the Father understand also the timeless procession of the Holy Spirit from both' (xv.47). Nevertheless we believe, on the authority of Scripture, that there are eternal relations subsisting within the Godhead between Three Persons, known as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each one possessing equally and substantially all the divine attributes, and each one personal as possessing the faculties of memory, understanding and will that constitute personality in the ordinary human sense,

but distinguishable as Unbegotten, Begotten and Proceeding, and thus related by Filiation and Procession. That the Spirit is personal for Augustine in the same sense that the Father and the Son are personal admits of no doubt.

The distinction in relation—Father-Son, is clear enough. It had been thoroughly discussed for a century. But Holy Spirit is not a distinctive name. Father and Son are both Holy and both Spirit. Indeed the Trinity might be called the Holy Spirit, as when Scripture says 'God is a Spirit'. Yet Scripture also speaks of 'the Spirit of God' and 'the Spirit of Christ' so that there is a Holy Spirit, properly so called, who is not the Trinity but is *in* the Trinity, and is the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son. To be sure the Lord said that the Spirit 'proceedeth from the Father', but Augustine remarks that this does not necessarily exclude His procession also from the Son. In *De Trin.* he insists on the *filioque* which was to lead to misunderstanding with the Greeks and to play a part in the subsequent Schism. He is most careful, however, to maintain the idea of the Father as the unitary source. Does not the Son owe all that He has or is to the Father, including the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him? There is one *principium* not two, which was the all-important matter for the Greeks.

But if the Holy Spirit is not a distinctive name, neither does it express the relation of the Spirit to Father and Son. Scripture and reverence both rule out any attempt to press further the analogy of the family; and Augustine searches the Scriptures, both Old Testament and New Testament, for an appropriate designation. And of course he finds one. The word most commonly associated with the Spirit in the Bible is 'gift' (*donum, munus*). To be sure in the New Testament the reference is usually to 'gifts' of the Spirit, special endowments given to individual Christians for the edification of the Church, and differing from individual to individual. But in Acts (2.38, 8.20, 10.45, 11.17) the phrase is used, 'the gift of the Holy Spirit', surely significantly, for the author is interested in the transmission of the Holy Spirit (cp. Luke 11.13: 'If ye being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him?'). Here then is the required term. Relatively to the Father the Holy Spirit is His Gift, and Augustine,

throughout his works, even the earlier ones can refer to the Spirit without explanation as simply 'the Gift'. But of course 'Gift' is relative not only to the giver but also to the receiver, in this case to individual men in history. This raises the question whether the Holy Spirit existed before He was 'given'. Augustine has various suggestions to make. From all eternity God might have purposed in due time to give this 'Gift'. In any case there is a difference between *Donum* and *Donatum*. A thing may be called a gift before it is actually given. At all events the Spirit was *Donabile* before there was anyone to whom He might be given. Curiously, there is no suggestion that He might be the Gift of the Father to the Son, not even by way of repudiation.

A gift of course may be anything at all, for the word in itself has no specific content, and Augustine goes on to give it content by further designating the Holy Spirit as Love (caritas). A special interest attaches to his endeavour in this direction, as it has given rise to some misunderstanding. In v. 12, where it is explained that the name Holy Spirit denotes what the Father and the Son have in common (holiness and spirituality) he says 'The Holy Spirit is a certain *communio* of the Father and the Son'. In Book v.1 he discusses the question why the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, seeing that both are equally wise, and that Wisdom is among the substantial attributes of the Godhead, and therefore common to all Three Persons. He goes on to consider (vi.7) the Holy Spirit, beginning with the assertion that He too is of the same substance and equal in attributes with the Father and the Son. 'But whether He is the unity of the Father and the Son, or the holiness or the love of both, manifestly He is not one of the two' but a third 'through whom both are joined, through whom the Begotten is loved by the Begetter and loves Him that begot Him.' 'The Holy Spirit, whatever He is, is something common to the Father and the Son, but that *communio* itself is consubstantial and co-eternal. If it may fitly be called *amicitia* let it be so called, but it is more aptly called *caritas*.' He concludes: 'Therefore there are not more than three, one who loves Him who is from Himself, and One who loves Him from whom He is, and love (*dilectio*) itself.' Again towards the end of Book viii (viii. 10-14) there is an analysis of Love (*dilectio*) and he con-

cludes: 'There are three things (at various levels of being) He that loves, that which is loved and love.' There is no doubt that Augustine has a certain fondness for this formula. He plays about with it at great length, if rather inconclusively, in Books IX and X, and he returns to it in XV.27. 'The Holy Spirit according to the Holy Scriptures is neither of the Father alone nor of the Son alone, but of both, and so intimates to us a mutual love wherewith the Father and the Son reciprocally love one another' as we also are commanded to love one another.

Nevertheless Augustine does not draw the conclusion, that some have drawn from these passages, that the Holy Spirit is impersonal. Nor can there be any question of distributing the Divine attributes among the Three Persons. Even if the name Wisdom is specially given to the Son, the Word of God, the Father and the Spirit are alike and equally Wisdom—not that there are three 'Wisdoms' but one Divine Wisdom. Similarly with Love. In this case Scripture nowhere says the Holy Spirit is Love, which would of course have settled the question. What it says is, 'God is love' (1 John 4), and the question is, is the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit or the Trinity itself Love? Without doubt Love, like Wisdom, is an attribute of the Godhead and therefore of the Three Persons equally. But a careful study of 1 John 4 can produce the result required. Here it is written not only that 'God is Love', but also that 'Love is of God', thereby excluding the Father who is not said to be *of* God. Moreover it is written 'If we love one another we dwell in God and He in us because He hath given us of His Spirit'. Therefore the Holy Spirit who is God *of* God is the God who is Love.

This is no doubt rather desperate exegesis, but the point of it is made clear when Augustine goes on to link it with what Paul says in 1 Cor. 13. There it is said that the greatest of all the gifts of the Spirit is love. Now the Spirit would not be specially called 'The Gift' unless He were Love. Love, therefore, which is of God and *is* God is the appropriate name for the Holy Spirit by whom, being 'given' to us, the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts. *Amor Dei*, not that by which He loved us but that by which we love Him, God's supreme and indispensable gift, is given to us by and with the Holy Spirit. Here we feel the pulse of Augustine's religious life.

THE MINISTRY OF HEALING

by The Rev. J. S. McEWEN

In most Protestant denominations of the present time there is growing interest in the possibility of healing by spiritual means. Those who speak and write on this subject make it clear that it is no new thing they desire to do: their aim is to recover the lost healing ministry of the Early Church.

Traditional Protestantism has tended to regard gifts of healing as a special endowment, divinely imparted to the first generation of believers in order to aid them in their early struggle with the unbelieving world, but divinely withdrawn at or about the time of the death of the last of the Apostles when the Church was strong enough to stand without the support of signs and wonders.

Modern advocates of spiritual healing very naturally dissent from this traditional view. The power of healing, they assert, was not suddenly withdrawn by divine decree. It persisted well into the post-Apostolic age, and was only gradually lost as the early zeal and faith of the Church cooled. Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian and others are cited as witnesses to the existence of a great, though gradually declining, healing ministry in their own day. And it is freely asserted that what could be done in the Church then, could be repeated now. Nothing stands in the way of a revival of this ministry of healing, save our unbelief. Given a new access of faith, the modern Church could possess the same triumphant mastery over disease as did the Church of the first and second centuries.

The question is one of historical fact. If the Early Church possessed a great ministry of healing, and lost it through unbelief, there is no obvious reason why that ministry should not be restored in full measure to men of faith today: indeed there can be no excuse for failure to revive the lost ministry. If, however, it cannot be shown that the Early Church once possessed and gradually forfeited this ministry, then the modern Church must view with considerable caution and reserve the

efforts of those who are seeking to give it a leading place in the Church today.

It appears to the present writer that modern advocates of spiritual healing have, in general, shown more enthusiasm than critical acumen in their handling of the evidence they have drawn from the writings of the Early Fathers. This article will therefore aim first of all at reaching a sober and critical estimate of that evidence. Thereafter it will seek to draw out the lessons of that evidence for the guidance of those who are interested in spiritual healing today. No attempt will be made to deal with the question of the New Testament miracles. The period under examination will be the immediate post-Apostolic era, from A.D. 100 to 250.

One further point ought to be premised: I shall assume that what the Fathers regarded as demon-possession is what we should call hysteria. I do so without prejudice to the question whether there was or is such a thing as actual demon-possession, and solely because the symptoms described by the Fathers seem to me to be clearly those of a type of hysterical epidemic which has recurred more than once, in different parts of the world, under similar conditions of social and religious disintegration.

We are now ready to hear our first witness—Justin Martyr, of Samaria, Ephesus and Rome, whose approximate dates are from A.D. 100 to 165. He will testify to the belief and practice of the Church in these areas in the two or three generations after the death of the Apostles.

His most pointed reference to healing is this short extract from his *Apology*, Book II, Chap. 6:

> Christ was made man for the sake of believing man and the destruction of demons. Now you can learn this from what is under your own observation. For innumerable demonaics throughout the whole world, and in your own city—many of our Christian men exorcising them in the name of Christ, have healed, and do heal, rendering helpless and driving the possessing devils out of the men, though they could not be cured by all the other exorcists, or by those who used incantations and drugs.

There is no reference here to anything at all except a campaign of exorcism—the casting out of devils; or as we should call it, the treatment of hysterical and neurotic conditions. I cannot find elsewhere in his writings anything to indicate that

the Church, in his day, went much beyond exorcism in its ministry of healing. And unlike Dr Leslie Weatherhead (*Psychology, Religion and Healing*, p. 85) I do not feel that Justin was conscious of any significant difference between the healing ministry of his own day, and that of the First Century Church.

We turn next to Tertullian (Carthage, A.D. 155 to 230)—whose testimony covers the second half of the same century and the opening years of the next.

I take the following extracts from his 'Ad Scapulam', Vol. I:

> Even the advocates of the law courts that try us Christians, are beholden to us. For the clerk of one of them, who was liable to be thrown to the ground by an evil spirit, was set free from his affliction: as was also the relative of another, and the little boy of a third.
>
> And how many men of rank, to say nothing of the common people, have been delivered from devils and healed of diseases! Even Severus, the father of Antonine, sought out the Christian Proclus; and in gratitude for his once having healed him by anointing, kept him in the palace to the day of his death.

The evidence in this extract is rather more difficult to assess. The clerk is stated to have been possessed by an evil spirit, which probably means that he suffered from hysterical attacks. Tertullian does not say what the relative and the little boy suffered from; but his sentence links them so closely with the clerk, that there is a fair presumption that they, too, were cases of devil possession.

His next statement is perplexing: 'many . . . have been delivered from devils and healed of diseases.' Here we have, for the first time, a reference to the healing of disease—apparently as distinct from exorcism. But does Tertullian really mean to make this distinction? He possibly means no more than that exorcism did result in healing. Not only was the devil driven out, but the physical symptoms—(possibly hysterical paralysis?)—were removed.

From his third remark about Proclus and the Emperor Severus, we can draw no conclusions. The nature of the Emperor's ailment is not stated. It may have been physical, or it may have been mental. There was more than a streak of insanity about Severus. He was repeatedly guilty of acts of diabolical and insane cruelty. And his son Antonine—better known as Caracalla—of whom Tertullian gracefully says that

'he was reared on Christian milk'—was a perfect monster of depravity, and as mad as a hatter.

Two other brief passages from Tertullian require notice. Addressing the persecutors of the Christian faith, he exclaims:

> If we Christians were to leave your Empire, and to seek some new home for ourselves, who would deliver you from those secret foes ever busy destroying your souls and ruining your health? Who would save you, I mean, from the attacks of those spirits of evil which, without reward or hire, we exorcise? You would be left free to the possession of unclean spirits. . . . You do not take account of this important protection we offer you. . . . We are necessary to your well-being.

And again a little later in the same book:

> Any loss you suffer from our religion is amply compensated by the protection you have from us. Do you not value those persons who deliver you from demons?

These two passages are important because they show how universal is the belief in malignant spirits. Tertullian can assume it as a universally acknowledged fact that men are surrounded constantly by unseen hosts of demons, ever seeking to enter into them, to the ruin of their bodies and souls.

The passages are also important as showing the extent to which Christians had become the recognised exorcists of the Roman Empire. Even the opponents and persecutors of the Church are quick to turn to their Christian neighbours, when they believe that they have fallen victim to devil-possession.

But are these passages evidence of what we today would call a great healing ministry? They are undoubtedly evidence of some success in dealing with neurotic and hysterical troubles. But they give no shred of evidence that organic disease was successfully treated and healed.

We turn next to Irenaeus (Asia and Lyons, A.D. 120 to 202) whose testimony covers the middle of the second century, overlapping that of Justin and Tertullian, and completing our survey of the century. From Book II of his work *Against Heresies*, I extract the two following passages.

Inveighing against certain heretics, he says:

> They can neither confer sight on the blind, nor hearing on the deaf, nor chase away all sorts of demons—except perhaps those that are sent into others by themselves, if they can even do that much. Nor can they cure the weak, or the lame, or those who are distressed in any part of the body, as has often been done in regard to bodily infirmity. . . .

And so far are they from being able to raise the dead, as the Lord raised them, and the Apostles by means of prayer, and as has been done frequently in the brotherhood on account of some necessity; the entire Church in that particular locality entreating the boon with much fasting and prayer—the spirit of the dead man has returned, and he has been bestowed in answer to the prayers of the saints—so far are they—(i.e. the heretics)—from being able to do this, that they do not even believe that it can possibly be done.

And again:

Those who are in truth His disciples—(i.e. as distinct from the heretics)—do in His name perform miracles according to the gift that each has received of Him. Some certainly and truly drive out devils . . . others lay hands on the sick, and they are made whole. Yea, as I have said, the dead have been raised up, and they remained among us for many years.

This is really exciting. It seems to give cast-iron evidence that in Irenaeus' time the Church exercised a wonderful ministry of healing; that it even raised the dead on many occasions; and that Irenaeus was personally acquainted with persons who had been so raised.

But let us look again at what Irenaeus says. Is there not a curious vagueness in his language at certain very critical points? He is trying to prove, in the passage from which these extracts are taken, that the Catholic Church is the true Church because it possesses the miraculous powers promised by Christ to His disciples—whereas the heretics do not possess these powers. Yet just where he ought to give chapter and verse for these miracles that he adduces, he seems to hedge in a most peculiar way.

Look at this for example: 'They cannot cure weakness, or lameness, or paralysis, as has often been done.'

Notice that he does not say 'as we do'—or 'as is being done in the Catholic Church every day'. Surely a man who was constantly witnessing miracles of healing would inevitably have put that clause in the present tense? But Irenaeus puts it in the past tense—'as has often been done'. And I do not see what that lapse into the past tense can possibly signify, except that the miracles of healing he had in mind were not exactly contemporary—and perhaps were not even recent.

All that we are really warranted in concluding from this passage, is that Irenaeus believes that miracles of healing have, in the past, occurred not infrequently in the Catholic Church. We do not know what grounds Irenaeus had for believing this;

and therefore we do not know what value to place upon his assertion. And from his significant change to the past tense, we are probably right in deducing that he had little or no contemporary evidence to submit.

Then there is the raising of the dead, which Irenaeus recounts with such circumstantial detail, and with the bold assurance that 'it has been done frequently in the brotherhood'.

It sounds very convincing—as no doubt it was meant to do. But is it really convincing? In the one sentence Irenaeus says that the raising of the dead occurred frequently in the Catholic Church. In the very next he says that not only are the heretics unable to raise the dead, but 'they do not even believe that it can possibly be done'.

These two statements are not easily reconcilable. If the raising of the dead occurred frequently in the Catholic Church, as Irenaeus suggests, the heretics could hardly have been left in doubt about the possibility of it! Plainly, the evidence available was inadequate to silence the doubts of contemporary heretics; and, if so, we may be excused if our modern minds remain unconvinced.

But Irenaeus continues in the second extract: 'The dead have been raised up, and they remained among us for many years.' This phrase is often taken to mean that Irenaeus was personally acquainted with persons who had been raised from the dead—and surely (it is said) we could ask for no more convincing evidence than that.

But the phrase need not, and probably does not, mean anything of the sort. In the first place, it obviously implies that none of these persons was now alive. 'They remained among us for many years' implies that they remain no longer when Irenaeus writes.

And that, again, inevitably implies that these miraculous resurrections—which Irenaeus previously suggested were of frequent occurrence—in fact all took place many years before he wrote. Between the miracles, and the date of Irenaeus's writing, you have to find room for a fairly lengthy second span of life for these resurrected persons, and an unspecified period of decease after that.

Further, it is not even certain from this passage that Irenaeus had been personally acquainted with any of these persons of

whom he speaks. They may all have been dead before he was born.

No doubt he says 'They remained among us for many years.' But consider the context of the quotation. Irenaeus is here emphasising the difference between the heretics and the Catholic Church. When he says 'them' he means the heretics; and when he says 'us' he means the Catholic Church. And therefore, when he writes 'They remained among us for many years', we have no warrant for assuming that he means anything more than that they remained among the brotherhood of the Catholic Church. We cannot legitimately deduce from his language that he was personally acquainted with them, nor even that they survived into his lifetime.

Once again, therefore, we find Irenaeus looking back into the past—indeed a long way into the past—for his evidence of miraculous gifts and powers in the Church.

Why? Can there be any reason save that the Church was not exercising these powers in a conspicuous degree when he wrote his book, about the year 180—and had not been doing so for a very considerable time? No doubt he believed that the Church had freely exercised these powers in the past—but his belief is not evidence. It is a common delusion of the Christian mind that the Church in the past possessed all the virtues that the Church in the present manifestly lacks. Secular man justifies his civilisation by dreaming of its ideal future. Christian man justifies his Church by dreaming of its ideal past. And there is probably a good deal of fantasy in both ideals. There is next to nothing to be gleaned from Irenaeus.

Our last witness is Origen of Alexandria, A.D. 185 to 253. I do not propose to take his evidence in detail.

He brings us well into the third Christian century, and the pious backward look is even more pronounced in Origen than in Irenaeus—though he does assure us that there are still what he calls 'traces of the Holy Spirit' in the Church; and that 'the name of Jesus can still remove distractions from the minds of men . . . '. He mentions 'the cure of disease' two or three times as a thing that still occurs. But his immense, absorbing interest is in the expulsion of demons by exorcism in the name of Christ.

So powerful is the name of Christ—he tells us—that it drives

out demons even when uttered by the most immoral and unbelieving men. But to get the best results, you should study the devil you are dealing with. Some devils prefer to be addresssed in Hebrew. Others will pay no attention unless you exorcise them in the Persian tongue. While others again will obey only if you speak to them in Egyptian.

Thus Origen; and though it might be interesting to examine his views on exorcism, I think it will be agreed that this is not the sort of thing we were looking for. Here, in the first half of the third century, we are confronted with fantastic superstition: and by the fourth century we are well into the era of miraculous cures wrought by holy relics of saints and martyrs.

We now have before us most of the evidence relating to the healing ministry of the Early Church, from A.D. 100 to 250. It remains only to reach our verdict upon it.

And what is our verdict to be? I can see only one honest conclusion to be drawn from the data we have examined—namely, that if one subtracts the exorcism of demons, there is very little evidence left of a great healing ministry in the sub-Apostolic Church. Assuming—without prejudice—the commonly accepted belief that there was a wonderful healing ministry within the lifetime of the Apostles, I think that the evidence would compel the conclusion that it practically died out with them, and left little except exorcism behind.

I am not for one moment suggesting that there were no cures of organic disease in the Early Church. I think that there were: but I see no reason to believe that they occurred much more frequently than they have done in any other age of the Church's history—and indeed still do. On this point I find myself in complete disagreement with most modern advocates of the ministry of healing, who look back with wistful admiration to something which, in my judgment, never existed.

I think it necessary also to call attention to the fact that we have a good deal of evidence, from this very period, of the Church's powerlessness to heal genuine organic disease. We have accounts, from Dionysius of Alexandria and others, of the conduct of Christians during epidemics of plague and pestilence. Dionysius tells us that the Christians of Alexandria —in striking contrast to the pagans—exhibited the greatest

heroism in nursing the victims of the plague, and that very many of them caught the contagion and died along with those they nursed. Other writers make the same point. It is the magnificent self-sacrifice of the Christians that shines out. But I do not think that it is ever suggested that they miraculously cured plague-victims—or did anything for them save what could be accomplished by patient nursing and the limited medical skill of the times. This negative instance is significant: for in it we know that the Church was confronted by genuine organic disease. And that is something we do not know when we hear of cures of blindness or paralysis—which may as readily have been hysterical symptoms as genuine organic diseases.

I must now give briefly my views on the great prevalence of exorcism in the Early Church—why it assumed such overwhelming importance, and what therapeutic value, if any, it had.

In the first place, as Harnack and others have pointed out, conditions in the Graeco-Roman world immediately before the coming of Christ, and for a century or two afterwards, made for a great deal of nervous instability. For one thing, the old religions had collapsed. Men had pretty well lost all faith in them, and were living in a spiritual vacuum. Again, the merging of all the little states and kingdoms into the one gigantic and impersonal Roman Empire destroyed the old, snug, comforting sense of belonging to a community, and produced a sort of social vacuum. Men thus felt themselves to be flung upon their own resources, without the prop of religious faith, or the stay of community. They felt naked, defenceless, profoundly lonely —and, of course, frightened.

The inevitable result was neurosis—a great wave of neurosis —that swept over the civilised world. Dr William Brown, the noted psychologist, quotes examples drawn from Greek and Roman sources, indicating the prevalence of neurotic disorders, including hysterical blindness and paralysis; and mentions statuettes dug up in temples dedicated to Asclepius, the god of healing, which depict human limbs in typical states of hysterical contraction. It was indeed an age ridden with neurosis.

In the second place, there was an extraordinary spread, and intensification, of belief in demons at just the same time. The

old gods of Greece and Rome were dead; and into their room —empty, swept and garnished—crept innumerable hosts of malignant devils. From sources in Persia and Egypt, the belief in devils spread across the already neurotic civilised world. To quote Harnack—'The whole world and the circumambient atmosphere were filled with devils. Every phase and form of life was ruled by them. They sat upon thrones, they hovered around cradles. The earth was literally a hell.'

When such a belief spread through an already nervously unstable society, there could be but one result. Neurotic people, already subject to hysterical maladies, and believing themselves surrounded by hosts of invisible demons intent on entering into them and working them harm, began to produce the accepted symptoms of devil possession. They took fits—frothed and foamed—howled and threw themselves about—went into trances, and produced all the other accepted antics. Full-fledged demon-possession became about as common as influenza is today: and, in addition all nervous disorders and many physical ailments were naturally ascribed to the operation of devils.

Under the circumstances, the physicians most sought after were the exorcists. For if the ailment was the work of a devil, the obvious thing to do was to get the devil driven out. The Egyptians built up a great reputation as exorcists. Strangely enough, the Jews of the Dispersion came a close second to them —we all know the story of the seven sons of Sceva the Jew in the Book of Acts. And in course of time, the mantle of the Jewish exorcists fell upon the new Christian Church.

The Christians had immense success as exorcists. Their burning faith in the power of Jesus over all evil things carried far more conviction to the hearts and minds of their patients than the blasé incantations of professional exorcists—most of whom were probably well aware of their own quackery. Christians rapidly became the outstanding exorcists of the Graeco-Roman world. Even those who persecuted them were quick to call in the nearest Christian if a case of devil-possession occurred in the family.

Without doubt, then, the Early Christian Church had immense and widely acknowledged success in exorcism. But can that be regarded as a genuine ministry of healing? The question

is a perplexing one. Perhaps we can approach the answer by way of the following analogy.

A favourite cure for toothache in the Highlands used to be to rub a nail on the offending molar. The pain was thus transferred to the nail which was then driven into the arch of a bridge spanning a flowing stream. And the running water carried the pain away!

Thousands of people have been relieved of toothache by that simple method—because they firmly believed they would be. But the fact that the toothache did depart, does not for one moment warrant us in believing that any curative power—mental, spiritual or material—was at work. In fact, no healing did take place. All that happened was that the symptom of pain was inhibited by strong suggestion. The offending tooth went on decaying, and there was in due course further, and perhaps graver, trouble than toothache. Nothing had been healed.

In precisely the same way, the fact that devils were cast out shrieking at the mere utterance of the name of Christ, or even that hysterical paralysis or blindness was removed, is in itself no evidence whatever of any spiritual power being at work, or of any healing—divine or otherwise—being imparted. It may well be that all that has happened is that one symptom or expression of deep-seated neurosis has been inhibited by powerful suggestion. But the neurosis itself may be untouched: and like the decaying tooth, it may later produce even more unpleasant symptoms. There is indeed some evidence to the effect that the exorcisms of the early Church were often not permanent—and that the same person sometimes had to be exorcised repeatedly. That is just what we should expect: for the suppression of a symptom by suggestion—however hallowed the means by which the suggestion is applied—is in no sense a cure.

I do not wish to suggest that all the exorcism of the Early Church was of this type—the mere suppression of hysterical symptoms by strong suggestion. But the writings of Irenaeus and Origen show that a very great deal of it was merely this and nothing more. And not only is this sort of thing not divine healing; it simply is not healing at all in any sense of the word.

There is, however, some evidence that Christian exorcism

did sometimes go deeper, and produced real and permanent healing. This seems to have occurred more often in the earlier part of the period under consideration, and I would connect it with the fact that the earlier forms of exorcism appear to have been more lengthy, consisting of the recitation of a short account of the life of Christ, with special emphasis on His crucifixion. They were not mere commands uttered in the powerful name of Christ, like the later exorcisms: they were genuine declarations of the core of the Gospel message, commended to the mind, heart, and will of the neurotic sufferer, by the earnest and loving Christian brother who was treating him.

The result must often have been genuine conversion. Indeed we are told of such conversion. And provided the neurosis was not too complex and deep seated, conversion would lead to genuine healing of the warped personality—and of course to the relief of all the distressing physical and mental symptoms of the psychological disease. Behind all neurosis lies some sin, or some fear, or some burden of conscience: behind all hysteria lies the characteristic self-absorption—the awful self-centredness of the hysterical patient. And the Gospel is the supreme answer to these things. Where the Gospel of Christ can be brought into effective contact with these things, it destroys them, heals the twisted spirit—and from within, outward, it removes the physical symptoms of the spiritual malady.

This is genuine spiritual healing. It is not a mere tinkering with symptoms by means of suggestion. It is very God, by the power of His redeeming word, making the sufferer a new creature.

The tragedy of the Early Church was that it did not develop this genuine healing ministry, but was tempted away into the much more spectacular field of popular exorcism. We cannot blame the Early Christians overmuch for this. They sincerely believed that by these exorcisms they were scoring resounding victories over the Kingdom of Evil. It must have given them an intoxicating sense of power over Satan's legions, when they watched what they took to be a devil go shrieking out of some poor neurotic. Alas—that the devil is not so easily driven out of the human heart as they fondly fancied!

Modern advocates of spiritual healing join with the Early Church in lamenting the decline and eventual disappearance

of its healing ministry. They blame it on the dimming of the Church's first glow of faith and love and consecration.

I cannot join them, either in their lamentations, or in the reasons they adduce.

It seems to me abundantly clear that what the Early Church chiefly lamented was the decline of its spectacular success in exorcism. I do not regret that decline, for I have given my reasons for believing that it was a thoroughly misguided adventure, and not—for the most part—a ministry of healing at all. Nor do I believe that the decline had any connexion with a dimming of the Church's first love and zeal: I believe that the decline occurred partly because the whole business of exorcism fell into well-deserved discredit—and partly because there was a marked decline in the numbers of suitable patients. The wave of neurosis, hysteria, and demon-possession which had almost turned the civilised world into a Bedlam slowly subsided. There simply were fewer people who showed any reaction to exorcism.

Why? Chiefly because men everywhere were beginning to find a new faith—the Christian faith.

The wave of neurosis had arisen because the civilised world had lost faith in the old religions. It began to subside as society was gradually permeated by the new Christian faith.

So we have the strange paradox that it was the very success of the Church in its genuine healing ministry, that destroyed its spectacular success in the campaign of exorcism, by which it was so bedazzled, and of which it was so proud. The Church really did drive the devils out of the distracted hearts of men. But it did so, not by the hands of its exorcists, but by the preaching of the Gospel. It was the Gospel that did the healing. And as its influence spread, there were fewer and fewer demonaics. The ranks of the hysterically blind and deaf and paralysed thinned out, and what was left was the hard core of real organic disease. The day was over when people by the dozen would rise up and walk, or receive their sight, at a mere command uttered in the name of Christ. That is the explanation of the decline of the spectacular 'ministry of healing' in the Early Church.

If I have been anywhere near the truth in this analysis of the

ministry of healing in the Early Church, there appear to me to be two important lessons that we may deduce from it for our guidance in any healing ministry that we may seek to develop in the Church today.

The first is that the indiscriminate application of healing methods, such as the laying on of hands, or anointing with oil, is a reprehensible practice likely to be productive in some cases of a great deal of harm.

If the patient is highly suggestible, or is rendered so by the methods employed, it will be readily possible to remove pain or to alleviate other distressing conditions. But what if these obvious troubles are but the warning symptoms of some dangerous organic or psychological disease? If they are, then by alleviating the symptoms the would-be healing merely gives the real disease a better opportunity to strengthen its grip on the patient—possibly with fatal results.

Herein lies one of the chief dangers of so-called healing campaigns, with their emotionalism, their powerful suggestion, and their complete absence of careful diagnosis. Spectacular immediate results can be obtained by these hit-or-miss methods; but the results are seldom permanent, and the long-term consequences can, in certain cases, be tragic.

It is imperative that treatment should never be attempted without competent medical diagnosis. The healer must understand the patient and the disease before he lays on his hands otherwise what he does is on a par with the exorcisms of the Early Church, and is as little worthy to be called by the name of healing.

The second lesson to be deduced from the experience of the Early Church is that it is the Gospel above all else that heals. As the Sacrament without the Word is nothing, so laying on of hands, or anointing with oil, or even prayer for healing, are nothing without the Word.

That the Gospel heals is manifestly true in the case of certain diseases of nervous origin. The Word of the Cross brings relief to the burdened conscience, and liberation from the harmful passions and emotions that underlie so many forms of nervous disease. The message of the love of God replaces despair by hope and anxiety by confident faith. Genuine conversion is an effective remedy in many cases of neurotic illness. There

are doctors who dogmatically deny this; but many ministers can tell of cases in their own pastoral experience where people who were neurotic invalids have received a new lease of health by coming to a new knowledge of the love of God through Jesus Christ. That experience brings about such a revolution and reintegration of personality that the neurotic condition vanishes and even physical ailments resulting from it are removed.

Two limiting factors, however, require to be kept in mind.

The first is that in many cases results will not be obtained unless the Gospel message is patiently and painstakingly applied to the particular needs of the sufferer. Here, I think, is the point of worst failure in our Scottish Church. There is no other branch of the Church that excels us in the public proclamation of the Gospel; but we are far behind certain other branches of the Church in the application of the Gospel message to the particular needs of the individual. In the Confessional, for example, the Roman Catholic gets the Gospel of his Church directly applied to his own private needs. How many Protestants get a similar opportunity? And, let it be added, how many would avail themselves of it if they got it? Yet the public proclamation of the Gospel is not enough for the healing of the souls of men: for the spiritually and psychologically sick are often curiously deaf to that aspect of the Gospel message that speaks directly to their need. They shy away from the word that touches them on the raw spot, and even if they do hear it, many of them need help in working out its application to the tangled skein of their inward problems.

If, therefore, we wish to develop the healing ministry in our Church, we must study methods of bringing the healing Gospel to bear directly on the needs and problems of the individual. We must work out improved methods of pastoral care, and we must improve and increase our own capacity to give it. The picture recurs insistently to the mind, of the earliest and best type of Christian exorcist sitting beside his patient, and earnestly and lovingly applying the Gospel message to the sufferer's individual needs. We do that to some extent, of course; but if we are to exercise a healing ministry we shall have to do a great deal more of it.

The second limiting factor must be carefully noted. It is this —that severe neurotic illness, and insanity, are not amenable

to this method of spiritual healing, because the patient no longer has insight into the nature and cause of his malady and is therefore incapable of applying the Gospel message to it.

If the cause of neurotic illness is buried deep in the subconscious, skilled psychological treatment, which few ministers are qualified to give, will be necessary to uncover the real trouble. When that has been done, the counsel and help of a minister may be of great value. But it is idle to expect healing so long as the exciting cause of the ailment remains unknown and unaltered.

As for insanity, if there be the slightest suspicion of it, not a moment should be lost in getting skilled medical attention for the patient. Religious appeal and argument do not benefit the clouded and unbalanced mind. The sweetest spiritual consolations serve only to drive the melancholiac to deeper and more dangerous despair. I do not mean to suggest that all the insane are beyond spiritual help, but that it is imperative that they should first receive skilled medical attention. The time for spiritual help will come later. Even mental specialists who are most favourable to religion prefer that spiritual treatment should not begin until medical and psychological treatment have been completed.

We must now address ourselves to the extremely perplexing question of the spiritual healing of genuine organic disease.

We are at once confronted with two great difficulties: (*a*) to find a satisfactory definition of 'genuine organic disease', and (*b*) to evaluate the immense mass of evidence that is eagerly put before us by healers and their grateful patients.

Let us begin with the second problem. I have gone through scores of testimonies, in books and in the magazines and periodicals that carry reports on spiritual healing, and I am left with the strong conviction that most of the evidence is worth little or nothing. Looked at in the mass, it is tremendously impressive, but when individual cases are singled out and critically examined, the results are disappointing. Even after one has weeded out the testimonies of unbalanced cranks and notoriety-hunters, one is still confronted with this fact—that there is generally no means of deciding whether the patient really had the disease he thought he had. Many are obvious cases of conversion-hysteria, not of genuine organic disease at

all; and many more possibly belong to the same category. Medical verdicts are frequently quoted; but on reading them one realises that doctors often tell their patients only what they think they will understand, and that patients often succeed in misunderstanding even that.

In evaluating the evidence for the spiritual healing of organic disease, the only safe rule is to accept only those testimonies in which there is unimpeachable medical authority for the diagnosis. When this rule is strictly followed, as it must be by an honest investigator, the testimony reduces itself to very slender dimensions. But there do remain a small number of cases in which medically verified organic disease has cleared up after methods of spiritual healing have been employed.

The second problem is to define 'genuine organic disease'. We rule out, of course, the conversion hysterias—hysterical blindness, paralysis and so on—all those cases in which there are bodily symptoms without discoverable disease or injury of the bodily tissues. We have dealt with such cases already.

We are left with two types of organic disease, although the boundary line between them is rather blurred.

The first is the psycho-somatic type, in which the bodily disease is believed to be correlated with some form of nervous illness. A typical example is the alleged correlation of peptic ulcer with chronic anxiety; but there are other suspected correlations, such as fibrositis with nervous tension, angina pectoris with a particular type of emotionally suppressed temperament, angio-neurotic oedema, and so on.

At the other end of the scale lie the diseases that seem to be purely organic, such as cancer and tuberculosis, and the damage resulting from infantile paralysis and rheumatic fever. But we must of course bear in mind that diseases which at present are thought to be purely organic may yet be shown to have a correlation with mental and emotional illness, and therefore to belong to the psycho-somatic group.

It is now fairly widely recognised that drugs and the knife are not our only weapons against the psycho-somatic diseases. They can and should be attacked from the spiritual angle also. Fears, anxieties, tensions that contribute to the disease must be dealt with if real and lasting healing is to be obtained. Here we may reasonably expect that spiritual healing can play a very

important part: and there are well attested cases in which conversion, or the deepening of the spiritual life of an already converted person, has been followed by the clearing up of psycho-somatic disease which had previously defied medical treatment.

It is much more difficult to assess the value of spiritual healing in cases of purely organic disease. We know that a cheerful and hopeful mental outlook promotes healing, and sometimes tips the balance between life and death. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a revitalisation of spiritual life will have a revitalising effect on the whole organism, and will reinforce the healing processes of the body. There are, in fact, two or three well attested cases of cancer and tuberculosis completely clearing up after such a spiritual renewal. It would be irresponsible to claim more than this. We must not allow our judgment to be influenced by the many alleged cures which, however, lack sound medical attestation. A salutary corrective to over-optimism is found in J. G. McKenzie's statement that he has never seen a case of purely organic disease healed by spiritual methods, though he has eagerly watched for any such evidence during years of psycho-analytic practice.

The matter is, indeed, full of perplexities. Those few cases in which spiritual renewal has been followed by healing of purely organic disease are undoubtedly far outnumbered by cases in which spiritual renewal produces no apparent physical benefit. And, on the other hand, astonishing spontaneous healing of desperate diseases does occasionally occur where the most charitable observer can see no sign of spiritual renewal. I am inclined to think that these cases of spontaneous healing may even outnumber those that could be attributed to the influence of religious factors.

Why these things should be, we simply do not know. The degree of faith and devotion in the sufferer is evidently not the decisive factor, as Origen noted long ago. That God gives or withholds healing for His own inscrutable reasons is not a solution that will commend itself to those who think that spiritual healing is an art, with laws that man may learn—not just a desperate appeal for miraculous intervention when all other expedients have failed. Perhaps the apparent capricious-

ness of the results is in large part due to our vast ignorance of the correlations between spiritual and organic disease.

At present then—whatever our hopes for the future may be—spiritual healing of genuine organic disease is undeniably a hit-or-miss affair, with many more misses than hits. But there is always the chance of a hit, and surely that chance ought to be taken? Since the primary aim of the treatment must be spiritual renewal, with bodily healing as only a secondary and subordinate aim, there should be—in properly selected cases—no risk of a devastating blow to faith if the secondary aim is not attained; for the patient will have received what he honestly values most of all—deepened communion with God.

But it is obvious that careful selection of cases is essential. If the patient's real attitude is that he will submit to anything, even to spiritual renewal if that is necessary in order to get bodily healing, then he will not get spiritual renewal nor bodily healing, and will probably end up by losing what little religious faith he had into the bargain.

Once again, therefore, we are confronted with the fact that indiscriminate attempts at spiritual healing are to be condemned. Unless the prospective patient can be brought to desire God even more than he desires health the result of the treatment is not likely to be satisfactory.

I have excluded from this survey all consideration of intercessory prayer as a means of healing—no doubt rather a large omission; but those who wish to pursue the subject will find an interesting treatment of it in Dr Leslie Weatherhead's book *Psychology, Religion, and Healing*. Healing by intercessory prayer exhibits the same apparent capriciousness that we have just noted in the other more direct method of healing. It therefore holds the same perils for those of little faith if their cherished hopes are disappointed, as doubtless in many cases they will be. Yet this point deserves to be noted—that in the case of intercessory prayer, the threat is not so much to the faith of the patient, who may not even know that he is being prayed for; it is rather the faith of those who pray for him that is put in peril. Intercession therefore suggests itself as the best line of attack when the patient's own faith is weak, but there can be found men of mature faith to pray for him.

Finally, I wish to record my conviction that the best hope

for the development of the ministry of healing in the Church lies in the closest possible co-operation with the medical profession. I can see no future for a ministry of spiritual healing that tries to pursue an independent course. That would be a repetition, *mutatis mutandis*, of the error of orthodox medicine which so long ignored the spiritual factor in the causation and cure of disease.

Man is an embodied soul. When we speak of 'body' and 'soul' as separate entities, we must remember that we are speaking about abstractions. Man as we know him is one body-soul organism; and there cannot be two independent ministries of healing to that one organism. There can only be two aspects of the one ministry, intimately dependent on one another, assisting one another, learning from one another. God's will is to make men whole; but how can we obey His will to make men whole if we insist on keeping one aspect of the ministry of healing in sterile isolation from the other, and thereby cripple both of them? We shall not be offering a genuine ministry of healing to suffering humanity until the healers of the 'body' and the healers of the 'soul' have learned how to work together.

We sometimes deplore the materialism of medicine, and criticise the distrustful attitude of doctors towards the clergy. We should do well to realise that it was the Church in bygone days that practically drove medicine out into the wilderness of materialism: and that medical science developed in defiance of one religious ban and anathema after another. It is barely a century since Simpson was being attacked from Scottish pulpits for administering chloroform to women in childbirth and that is but one episode in a long story that is little to the Church's credit. The doctor's traditional distrust of the clergy is not at all surprising.

If today the olive branch is being somewhat grudgingly and tentatively held out toward us by the medical profession, because they are forced to recognise that man cannot be made whole without healing of the spirit, we ought to accept it with due humility—realising that God's will is not fully done until the body, which is the temple of His Holy Spirit, is also cleansed from defilement and disease.

THE OLD TESTAMENT AND SOME THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT-FORMS[1]

by The Rev. Professor NORMAN W. PORTEOUS

It is exactly twenty years since I attended my first meeting of the Society for Old Testament Study here in King's College Hostel. The late Professor A. C. Welch was in the Presidential chair and I remember very clearly that at one of the sittings a very distinguished-looking man was seated at the end of the table on the President's right. There was something commanding in his appearance that at once arrested my attention and I was anxious to know who he was. Later I was introduced to him and learned his name, a name still held in honour, Claude Montefiore. It may very well have been the last occasion on which he attended a meeting of this Society. At least I never saw him again and I am glad to think that I became a member in time to clasp hands with one of the great scholars of the generation that was passing away, a man whose eirenic spirit must have done much to make possible the happy fellowship that means so much to us all, Roman Catholic and Protestant, Jew and Christian alike. It is because of that spirit of tolerance and mutual respect which is so characteristic of this Society that I feel myself able to use some freedom on this occasion in speaking to you.

I have taken it for granted that, when you did me the honour of choosing me as your President, you probably had it in mind that, when the time came, I should speak about the subject which, partly of my own preference, but partly too owing to the promptings of some whose judgment I respect, has occupied a good deal of my thought during these past years, namely the theological aspect of the Old Testament. But, if I am to speak on such a subject, it is unavoidable that I should touch, to some slight extent at least, on controversial issues

[1] This Paper is substantially the same as the Presidential Address read before the Society for Old Testament Study at the Winter Meeting which opened on 5th January 1954 at King's College Hostel, London.

which we normally keep clear of. If I venture to do so towards the end of this paper, it is because I know that I may avail myself of this liberty of speech among friends. In this Society, in which for many years past men of different communions and different faiths have been bound together by very real ties of brotherhood, there is no need for us to apologise to each other if once in a while matters are touched upon which have to do with our ultimate reasons for being interested in the Old Testament.

The problem I should like to discuss with you is one which refuses to leave me at peace. Actually, though I have been thinking about it for a long time, it is only comparatively recently that I have been able to get it into anything like proper focus. Sometimes, I must confess, I find myself wondering whether I would not be wiser to turn my attention to something more concrete from the study of which it would be easier to eliminate the personal equation. But I always come back to the reflection that there is a real difficulty somewhere in the direction in which ever and again I find my eyes turning. This teasing problem seems to me to be concerned with the precise definition of Old Testament Theology. I have felt for long that there is something not altogether satisfactory about Gabler's epoch-making distinction between Biblical and Dogmatic Theology and have spent a good deal of my time prowling round it with a critical eye! That Gabler's distinction is not quite satisfactory is shown by the curious variety of the ways in which the task of Old Testament Theology is defined by recent writers. In spite, however, of this bewildering confusion of voices, one may detect a growing conviction that there is something important requiring to be done if the right way to do it could only be found. We shall have to wait till the man of insight speaks the illuminating and releasing word. Meantime I hope it will not be a waste of your time if we try once more to clear our minds about a problem which, I feel sure, is more than a shadow.

We are almost all engaged, who are members of the Society for Old Testament Study, along with our innumerable colleagues everywhere, in what may be called the Quest of the Historical Israel. It is our duty and our pleasure to seek to enter into the, in part at least, strange but always fascinating

world of the Old Testament, to make ourselves as much at home in it as we can, and by word of mouth as teachers or by pen to help others to see and appreciate what we have found there. There are various interrelated lines of research which we can follow, the archaeological, the anthropological, the historical, the literary, the linguistic, the semantic, the religious, and along every one of these notable progress has been made in recent years. In particular semantic study has led us far beyond the discussion of the meaning of individual words to a deepening understanding of the Hebrew world of thought and action, both in its secular and, above all, in its religious aspects. Behind the complex of key-words which constitutes the heart of Israel's religious vocabulary we are learning to penetrate to, and so picture for ourselves, what Ludwig Köhler has recently called 'Der Hebräische Mensch', making these words the title of one of the most delightful of his books. It is no doubt true that, as Dr Köhler says, we can never hope to know the Hebrew man completely. A fitful light picks out this or that aspect of his being for us, but there is much that we can only see dimly or that eludes our inspection altogether, and we have to content ourselves with a fragmentary picture. There are always, however, additions that can be made, an outline here and there which can be filled out, a feature which can be traced more accurately, small touches of colour which can be applied.

I have heard it argued—and there is a very profound truth in the contention, even though for the majority of us it is a counsel of perfection!—that one essential part of our job if we are teachers is so to know the Hebrew language that it comes to convey its meaning to us, and that we can even think in it and use it, without the intervention of our own native language. That is to say, our task is to learn to put ourselves more and more completely in the position of the ancient Hebrews, to see with their eyes and hear with their ears, to think their thoughts, and so, if not to share their experience exactly as it was lived by them, at least to spy upon it and try to identify ourselves with it imaginatively. It is an arguable view that a description of this Hebrew world, carried out through the systematic exposition of the available texts contained in the Old Testament, full use, moreover, being made of all the aids to comprehension

which are now available, a description, that is, of the aspects of religious belief and practice in this Hebrew world, would be entitled to the name of Old Testament Theology.

It has been a matter of keen debate in recent years whether there is any real justification for such a systematic study of the material which the Old Testament offers, containing the record, as it does, of such an extraordinary variety of religious belief and practice. Would it not be more realistic to continue to try and improve upon previous attempts to write Israel's *Religionsgeschichte*, working out the chronological sequence of the material in the Old Testament by improved methods of source and tradition analysis?

Quite apart, however, from the diminished confidence which many today feel in the trustworthiness of the analysis, there has been a growing consensus of opinion in favour of the view that, underlying all the variety and change characteristic of Old Testament religion, there is a fundemental unity. Dr Rowley has put us once more in his debt by a brilliant discussion of this very subject. If there are differences—as who would venture to deny?—between the respective outlooks of prophet, priest and sage, if we can trace everywhere in the Old Testament change, development, retrogression, reform, reaction, dissolution, consolidation, the attaining of equilibrium and again its loss, it remains true that in this many-coloured world of the Old Testament there is even more unity than there is variety. Dr Köhler[1] has put his finger on one reason for this unity, namely the innate conservatism of the Hebrew people which gave them that astonishing power of remaining true to type which is characteristic of their descendants to this very day, an enduring attitude of mind which has made it possible for books composed of fragments from widely separated periods to convey a remarkable impression of unity until subjected to the microscope of critical investigation. Incidentally, it is a good sign that much more attention is now being paid to the writings of the Old Testament viewed as literary wholes than has sometimes been the case in the past. D. B. Macdonald writes in his vigorous way[2]: 'Original documents lie behind our Book of Genesis but for the meaning of

[1] *Der Hebräische Mensch*, p. 125.
[2] *The Hebrew Literary Genius*, p. 3.

that book as a mirror of the ideas of the Hebrews they may be disregarded. Rather, we have to ask, what did the artist mean who created our Book of Genesis, as we have it?' Perhaps that is going a little too far, but the reaction implied by these words is an indication of something that is very important.

It may very well be the case that the systematic way of presenting the religious material in the Old Testament, such as we have it in the works of Köhler, Eichrodt, Procksch and Vriezen, to mention only some of the more notable writers, has gained in favour as a result of the decline in confidence on the part of the literary and historical critics. I am reminded of the closing words of Dr North's essay on Pentateuchal Criticism in *The Old Testament and Modern Study*. After pointing out how uncertain datings of sources are now felt to be, he concludes[1]: 'Yet the present position is not without its compensations. During the period we have had under review the contrast between the Theology of the Old Testament and the History of Israel's Religion has been so sharp and stubborn that the task of writing a Theology has seemed well-nigh impossible. But if we must now, perforce, be less dogmatic about the History than we used to be we may perhaps essay to write the Theology with fewer misgivings.'

It is probably true that the change-over in interest from the dating of sources to what has come to be known as form-criticism, which is so characteristic of the period through which we are passing, has created an atmosphere more congenial to the study of totalities of thought and attitude. I say totalities in the plural, because a form-critic like von Rad has in effect been giving us in his books the respective religious outlooks of the Yahivist, of the Deuteronomist, of the Priestly Writer, of the Chronicler—I use the singular in each case without prejudice—not the religious outlook of the Old Testament as a whole. We can see clearly, however, that this newer method of approach is concentrating attention on the thought-content of the different parts of the Old Testament regarded as integrated wholes rather than on the development of ideas and practices, laws and institutions, from one source to another. But, more than that—and what I am about to say is very characteristic not only of von Rad's work but of that of others who are working

[1] op. cit., p. 82.

along similar lines—the emphasis is coming to be laid increasingly on the institutions and rituals in which the ideas take concrete form. That is to say, we are pointed back everywhere into the actual religious life of the Hebrew community which is mirrored for us in the Old Testament, the *Rechtsgemeinde* as Köhler calls it, and to the men themselves who constitute it in all the distinctiveness and particularity of their daily existence. *Der Hebräische Mensch* in all the complexities of his life in the community and the outlook on the world which goes with it—that seems to be one of the main centres of interest in Old Testament study today. It is perhaps the most important aspect of what I have called the Quest of the Historical Israel.

What we are most concerned to know, in the last resort, is what the Hebrew man has to tell us about the ultimate concerns of life. Jew and Gentile, we find ourselves with this Old Testament in our hands and, while it speaks to us about many things and with many voices, there is no doubt at all as to what is the dominant theme. We are challenged by that theme on every page. The Hebrew man lives in relationship and the complex of relationships in which he finds himself includes, so he believes, the supreme relationship to the God who imposes His will on man as His creature and on the Hebrew man in particular as belonging to His chosen people. Here in the Old Testament is witness of the most emphatic and unmistakable kind to what the Hebrew writers are convinced is a transcendent Reality affecting every part of life. There is no end to the work that can be done in analysing and presenting this witness and, even more, in pressing back into the mysterious regions of the human spirit where the experiences are lived and the forms of expression and religious symbols take their rise.

Dilthey, the German philosopher, who attempted a Critique of the Historical Reason and has much that is suggestive to say about the *Geisteswissenschaften*, has warned us to rely, in our effort to understand the nature of man, not so much on introspection, with all the possibilities of self-deception and distortion which are attendant upon such an operation, as on the various objectifications of mind, on the sundry expressions which man has given to what is in him, in word and gesture, in law and institution, in art and literature, in cult and creed and ethical

behaviour. There is no doubt at all that we can use the Old Testament, which contains a whole world of expression, in this way to the widening and deepening of our understanding of man as a religious being. One thing that we cannot fail to notice is that the Hebrew man, at his most characteristic, took God more seriously than himself, so seriously indeed that the reality of God as a Person dominates the Old Testament from the first page to the last. As we study the Hebrew man we find that the centre round which his life habitually circles is not himself but God. And yet we must not generalise, because the Old Testament can also show us examples of the man who does not take God into account at all.

All this, as I have already said, is capable of description and elaboration and the picture which emerges reveals a high degree of underlying unity. Is this elaborated picture what we ought to mean when we speak of a Theology of the Old Testament? Is it the task of the Old Testament Theologian to determine as accurately as he can and set forth with whatever degree of system he can contrive what the Hebrews in Old Testament times believed about God and about themselves in relation to God, and what were the ways in which they gave concrete expression to what they believed? There is no doubt at all about the importance of performing such a task. It represents an indispensable step towards the right appropriation of the Old Testament. Yet what the accomplishment of this task would provide us with is, strictly speaking, a religious Phenomenology of the Old Testament rather than a Theology. I am convinced that the careless use of the word 'theology' in this connexion has been responsible for a great deal of argument at cross-purposes and confusion of thought. It should go without saying that nothing derogatory is intended by my suggestion of the word 'phenomenology'. It is a jargon word, I admit, and, on the whole, I dislike jargon and try to avoid it. Jargon, however, has its uses on occasion. Phenomenology is the term that applies to the type of research and proof suitable to what have been called the human sciences, and it demands all the imaginative and sympathetic insight which Eichrodt has desiderated as a necessary part of the equipment of the historian. Systematic treatment of the religious-historical material furnished by the Old Testament, however, worked out, though it

be, imaginatively and with sympathy, does not constitute theology.

In what follows I should like very tentatively and hesitantly to offer you a further instalment of my thinking on this vexed problem of the proper theological handling of the Old Testament. I propose to ask you to go, so to speak, a short walk with me. Perhaps afterwards you will say that it has been a ramble! In other words, what I have to say will take the form of a progressive movement of thought in which a number of theological terms will come up for discussion. Most of them will be very familiar to you from current debate. That they have grouped themselves in my mind in an interesting interrelationship and, as thus grouped, reveal a certain coherence, has given me the courage to invite you to accompany me for a little on my meanderings.

In a fairly recent number of *Evangelische Theologie* (1952 Heft 1/2), which, incidentally, contains the programmatic articles of the group of German scholars who are planning a new Biblical Commentary, Martin Noth offers a highly interesting and suggestive contribution on what he calls the *Vergegenwärtigung* of the Old Testament in preaching. I am not sure that we possess an English word which reproduces the precise nuance of the German here. 'Representation' comes nearest to what is wanted, though it does not quite convey what the word, as Noth employs it, suggests, namely, that something belonging to the past or the future which has the form of history, or, it may be, of *Urgeschichte*, is being represented as relevant in the present. The word which has come to be somewhat familiar among ourselves to express this relevance of the historical is the word 'contemporaneous', which, I believe, owes its special theological connotation to the influence of Kierkegaard.

Now, this business of making relevant or contemporaneous something that belongs to history is a theological as well as a homiletical concern. Indeed it seems to me that precisely this concern is an indispensable characteristic of theology properly so called. What Noth suggests in the above-mentioned essay is that within the Old Testament itself we can recognise how the Hebrews sought to make their historical past relevant to the needs of the present. He draws attention to what is familiar to us all, namely the evidence that in Israel two of the three great

annual agricultural festivals were given an historical reference by the linking of Mazzoth with Pesach which commemorated the Exodus and by the association of Sukkoth with the memory of how the Israelites in their wanderings bivouacked in the wilderness. The autumn festival, moreover, seems to have been used for covenant renewal, when God's mighty acts in history on behalf of His people would be recounted, while such historical recital is also associated with as simple a cultic act as the offering of firstfruits (Deut. 26). Noth further maintains that in the so-called Coronation Psalms we see the cultic linking together of *Urzeit* and *Endzeit* in their significance for the present moment. From all this he draws the conclusion that all that we are entitled to do by way of making the Old Testament relevant to the needs of the present is to 'represent' in all its variety the Old Testament record of the acts of God. God did thus and thus and thus according to the testimony of the Old Testament witnesses. We are not justified, he says, in offering the Old Testament characters as ethical examples or as heroes of faith. Their religious experiences have no relevance for today. The historical situations in which the ancient Hebrews found themselves and in which they had to make their decisions and to act were unique like all historical situations. In consequence their response to the challenge of these situations can in no way be repeated by man today.

Now, one criticism which may be passed on Noth's contention is that he does not make it clear whether what we are to proclaim is the *Heilsgeschichte* of the Old Testament or the scientific history which modern scholarship offers, though I fancy he must mean the *Heilsgeschichte*. But further—a more serious point—the mere proclamation of the acts of God apart from a genuine response on the part of those making the proclamation can in no satisfactory sense make the past contemporaneous. The renewal of the covenant of which Noth speaks must have involved much more than the proclamation of what God had done, of primary importance though such proclamation was. Israel's cultic proclamation of the acts of God is just as time-conditioned as her response to God's gracious activity in law and institution and conduct. If the one can be made relevant to the present, so can the other.

The problem which Noth has raised and to which he has

given an interesting though, in my judgment, partial solution, is, of course, the problem of communication which concerns the Biblical theologian every bit as much as it concerns the preacher. That problem has only recently made a fresh impact on this country through the circumstance that the theological public has become aware of the controversy about 'demythologising' which has been raging in Germany since the early years of the War round the issues raised by the Marburg New Testament scholar Rudolph Bultmann. Now, this would scarcely be the place or time, even though I had the competence to do so, to raise and discuss the whole matter that is under discussion. It must, however, be pointed out that in this controversy the relevance to modern man of the whole phenomenology of both the Old and New Testaments is raised. In Bultmann's opinion to speak of God at all as involved in history necessitates the use of anthropological language and that means the use of myth. Myth is what results when God is brought into connexion with the world of man and nature.[1]

Bultmann, in fact, regards the problem of relevance as being an even more acute one than Noth has implied. The former would not, I imagine, feel that Noth's suggested solution of the problem of communication goes anything like far enough. For us to recount the acts of God in the history of His ancient people would be to involve ourselves in an outworn mythology. The point where, in my judgment, Bultmann has something valuable to say to us is where he insists that, if the Scriptures are to be made theologically relevant to us, then we ourselves must be personally involved. But that that means dispensing with history and so-called myth I take leave to doubt.

Before we move on, after what, I am aware, has been no more than a cursory glance at a discussion which is likely to become more intense, there is just one further observation I wish to make while we are on this question of myth. It will point us to our next halting-place. 'Myth' is one of those words which is ill-defined in meaning and so can be used in a number of ways without our being always fully aware of the fact that we have moved from one usage to another. It would be a real

[1] Bultmann's way of stating and (to some extent) of solving the problem presented by the mythological language of the Bible is reminiscent of what we find in *The Guide to the Perplexed* of Maimonides, the Jewish philosopher of the twelfth century.

theological gain if we could find a different word from myth to describe the essential content, let us say, of the primeval stories in the Book of Genesis, a word that would connect them more closely with history than with the myths associated with nature religions. Whoever wrote these stories down—and, with all respect to Pfeiffer, he must surely have been a Hebrew and not an Edomite!—wrote with a full knowledge of what God had done for Israel in the clear light of history and he is seeking to convey in story form what historical existence before God involves. He is not trying to satisfy man's curiosity about his origins, though some of the material he employs may belong to some such primitive attempts. He is telling man something about the conditions of his existence, about man's responsibility and tragic destiny and the hope which overarches it.

Actually the Old Testament is much less interested in history as a process than in history as the sphere of meeting or encounter between God and man. This is why we have to wait till the Greeks were ready to take up the task before we get a beginning to the writing of something like scientific history, though the Hebrews made a much profounder contribution than the Greeks did to what has come rightly or wrongly to be known as the philosophy of history. 'Encounter' is another of those terms which has acquired in modern times a theological currency and I take it up at this point, because it helps to link the phenomenological and the theological treatment of the Biblical material. That the word is used so much today in theological circles is due, I take it, to the influence of the thought of Martin Buber and to his insistence that personality exists in relationship. Though, of course, the word 'personality' corresponds to nothing in the Biblical vocabulary, we can scarcely avoid using it. If we do so, however, we must exhibit a due caution.

At this point I would like to make a slight digression, without being, I trust, altogether irrelevant. We are all aware that in the Old Testament the concept of personality which is implied by the language used has certain primitive features to which we have learned to allude in the phrase 'corporate personality'. Thought oscillates in a curious way between the group and the individual within the group, passing from one to the other and back again almost imperceptibly. At the same

time we must not lose sight of the fact that the Old Testament contains a perfect gallery of word pictures of sharply defined individuals (the emphasis being laid on action rather than on attribute), pictures which remind me, in another medium, of the clearly individualised portraiture of the Moghul period in India, or, to come nearer home, of the great Flemish period in Europe. Moreover in the Old Testament there is one 'portrait' of a quite extraordinary individuality, the individual characterisation of the Almighty Himself.

Now, it is quite true to say that the dividing line between personalities is less clear to the Hebrews than it is to us, and that the influence of personality over things is conceived somewhat differently among the Hebrews from the way in which we conceive it. I must confess to being a little uneasy, however, when I find the human personality, say that of the prophet or the king, however vaguely the limits of that personality may have been conceived by the Hebrews, being spoken of as being, on the Hebrew view, an extension of the personality of Yahweh. That seems to me to involve a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, the introduction of a relationship of cause and effect into what is a relationship of a fundamentally different kind. I hesitate, therefore, to admit that this is a legitimate way of describing the Hebrew view of what is meant to be a prophet speaking in the name of Yahweh. The classic passage for illustrating what takes place when a prophet does so speak is Jer. 20.7 ff, in which for once we are allowed to see behind the scenes. Jeremiah, you remember, is very bold and accuses the Lord of overpowering him, even of deceiving him, and then goes on to tell what happened to him when he decided not to speak any longer in Yahweh's name. He finds himself compelled to speak. Mowinckel, however, argues somewhere[1] with reference to this passage that the compulsion is of the nature, not of a physical, but of a moral necessity. The prophet is compelled to choose Yahweh's will. Or, if that is going too far, it may be said that the prophet finds himself speaking in Yahweh's name, though without becoming other than himself. The relationship of encounter is not replaced in Hebrew thought by any kind of identification. It is no doubt difficult to describe the compulsion of one person by another in other than terms

[1] *Die Erkenntnis Gottes bei den Alttestamentlichen Profeten*, pp. 22 ff.

which seem to imply the relationship of cause and effect. It should not, however, be forgotten that the prophets reveal themselves in many of their oracles as very definite personalities. This would be hard to explain on the view that the prophet when prophesying was believed to be an extension of the personality of Yahweh.

The prophet is no doubt a special case, but, whatever relationship the Hebrews may have believed to exist between the divine will and the will of the prophet in the moment of prophesying, there can be no question that the summary of the duty of man in Mic. 6.8—to do justly, to love *ḥesedh* and to walk humbly with God, implies for the highest Hebrew thought a fellowship or communion of persons, human person with human person and human person with divine Person. To return for a moment to what Noth has suggested, it seems to me that, if we are to appreciate the significance of the acts of God on behalf of Israel, we must recognise that the series is not complete without that act of God within Israel's life which created a response, however imperfect and partial that response may have been. The Old Testament laws are, generally speaking, not Utopian. What is enjoined—especially in these injunctions which go beyond the letter of the law—has corresponding to it something which is already stirring in the lives of men and women and finding appropriate expression. The presence of ideals in a people implies already a certain reach forward so that they may become a reality. A phenomenological study of the Old Testament brings to light the fascinating spectacle of a new form of community coming into existence and engaged in a life and death struggle with forces of reaction and misrule that seek to choke and destroy it.

This whole phenomenon of the emergence of a new pattern of life in Israel requires to be kept in the centre of our thought when we are trying to understand what the Hebrew meant by knowledge of God, or rather what the profoundest Hebrew thinkers meant. According to the Old Testament there are many media through which man comes to know God. The heavens declare His glory and we read how He communicated His will by messenger, by vision, by dream and so forth. There are the special ways in which God reveals His will to the prophet, but, of intense interest as the psychological questions

which arise here are, we must not limit our attention to those whose task it was to communicate knowledge of God to their fellows. Rather must we notice that, while to the prophet a special knowledge may be given of what Yahweh is about to do, the purpose of the prophetic activity is that men in general should know God.

In a recent essay, in the same number of *Evangelische Theologie* to which reference has already been made, Hans Wolff has tried to make out that knowledge of God in the usage of Hosea has been wrongly understood by other interpreters as meaning the practical loving response on man's part to the will of God or active piety, whereas, he says, it actually has something of a technical connotation and belongs to the sphere of reference of the cult rather than of the marriage relationship. The priests are the culprits specially singled out. Wolff links up with the view put forward by Noth alluded to earlier—we are getting back near our starting-point!—the view, namely, that the important thing in the cult was to recall to the worshippers the facts of the *Heilsgeschichte*, and understands the knowledge which the priest is accused of rejecting (Hos. 4.6) as knowledge of the acts of Yahweh. This is not so clear, however, as Wolff seems to think, because the same verse goes on to say that, because the priests have forgotten the *torah* of God, God will forget their children. The emphasis is on the *torah* and this is made clearer still by what follows; the people and the priests are involved in a common condemnation for the iniquity of their life. Wolff cites in support of his view Hos. 13.4: 'I am the Lord your God from the land of Egypt: you know no God but me, and beside me there is no saviour.' Here, however, it should be noticed that there is unmistakable recollection of the Decalogue in which *Heilsgeschichte* and *Torah* are linked together. By doing His will Israel reveals possession of knowledge of the God who has delivered her. Wolff, of course, notes how *da'ath 'elohim* is linked with *çedhaḳa*, *'emeth* and *ḥesedh*. My quarrel with him is merely that by wrongly interpreting *da'ath 'elohim* as he does he would lend support to Noth who is trying to separate the proclamation of the acts of God from the community response, whereas I feel that we must take them together.

It is quite true that, when the prophet speaks (Hos. 2,19-20)

of the time of Israel's restoration, he seems to lay all the emphasis on God's gracious activity—'I will betroth you to me for ever; I will betroth you to me in righteousness and in justice, in steadfast love and in mercy. I will betroth you to me in faithfulness; and you shall know the Lord.' It is to be all of grace. Yet the closing words must surely mean that Israel will know God by reflecting back the qualities which Yahweh has shown in His dealings with her. Knowledge of God will consist in this reciprocity and mutual loyality. Moreover, when we compare Hosea with his best interpreter Jeremiah, it is clear that Hosea must have meant more, when he spoke about knowledge of God, than the knowledge of God's acts. See Jer. 4.22 and, even more explicitly, 22.15-16, the prophet's accusation of Jehoiakin: 'Do you think you are a king because you compete in cedar? Did not your father eat and drink and do justice and righteousness? Then it was well with him. He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. Is not this to *know* me? says the Lord.'

My suggestion is that, when we are looking for evidence that might have a bearing on the problem of revelation in the Old Testament, the most important facts are not the statements that God spoke to the Patriarchs or to Moses or to the prophets or to this or that man but the fact that in the midst of the historically conditioned life of the Hebrew people men believed that the will of God was made known to them and sealed their belief in action, in concrete response. That so often we are told of men's failure to make this response must not blind us to the fact that an Israel after the Spirit did come into existence, as the very circumstance that there were men to denounce Israel's sins and, indeed, that there is an Old Testament at all makes abundantly clear.

We have reached the point in our discussion where the circle of thought, such as it has been, is virtually complete and we are finally faced by the problem of the transition from phenomenology to theology. The Old Testament tells us how the Hebrew came to realise knowledge of God in cult and institution and in common life. We learn from it the kind of God that Israel believed in and the way in which it was felt that such a God should be worshipped and served. Study of the Old Testament can admit us to this Hebrew world of religious

thought and belief and practice and we can, as it were, walk about in it, making our observations and solving our historical problems. Yet we may still remain investigators, spectators, shut out from that more intimate knowledge and understanding of what we see which can only come through participation. It is my own personal conviction that a theology of the Old Testament, properly so called, is possible only through some kind of participation, so that we come to take the God of the Old Testament quite seriously as God. A Theology of the Old Testament can only be written from the standpoint of one who does not, when writing his theology, bracket off the fact that for him the Old Testament is sacred scripture and that he belongs to a religious community for which the Old Testament is sacred scripture. It is through participation that understanding and discrimination come. In a Biblical theology there is bound to be an axiological element; the judgment of value cannot be excluded.

For the Christian—may I be allowed to say this?—believing, as he does, that the Old Testament and the New Testament correspond to each other as promise to fulfilment, the Old Testament will appear, considered theologically, not other than it actually is, but with the emphasis laid in a particular way because of the known sequel. Even in his theological presentation of the material of the New Testament the Biblical theologian will be influenced inevitably and rightly by the pressures of the religious life in which he himself is involved. How much more then, as he passes back into the older scripture, will he be compelled to pass judgments and recognise significances which to a non-participating manner of study would be excluded. For the whole Bible is a book of life and will not disclose its meaning to the cold eye of intellectual scrutiny alone, even if we miss out the pejorative adjective and add: 'lit up by sympathetic interest.'

In consistency, of course, I ought to speak of Biblical Theology rather than of Old Testament Theology and I am willing to accept the consequences of that. Yet I wish the Old Testament to speak to me with its own voice, knowing that whatever historical limitations I may think I detect in that witness, its function is, not to provide me with infallible oracles, but to bring me into the presence of that living God who can and will

speak a living word and, it may be, admonish or warn or instruct me by the response of the men of old. It is as a result of such an encounter and in face of the written witness that a Biblical Theology can be written. That way seems to open the door to extreme subjectivism. The individual judgments of the theologian, however, are controlled and corrected by the religious community to which he belongs and within which he has those experiences which light up for him the ancient scriptures given him to interpret. The ultimate authority is God Himself and not the community and, if His living guidance is expected and trusted, a Biblical Theology can become what it ought to be, a critique of the life which the religious community today which cherishes the Scriptures is seeking to live.

Perhaps I have gone too far by thus attempting to represent Biblical Theology as a normative discipline. If you prefer to say 'Theology' where I would prefer to say 'Phenomenology', so be it. Yet I cannot get away from the fact that the subject-matter of the Bible is something which can indeed be subjected to intellectual scrutiny but which cannot be known, as the Bible itself understands knowledge, except by man in his totality. It is true, of course, that the theologian inevitably withdraws a hands breadth from living contact with the object of his thought, that a certain abstraction is unavoidable, but, if he makes too many moves from the starting-point of his abstraction without checking up by his experience, he is apt to go astray. To me nothing is entitled to the name of theology which is not continuously under the control of living religious faith and experience, that faith and experience for their part seeking the correction which a vital Biblical Theology can supply.

THE PAULINE DOCTRINE OF THE SECOND ADAM[1]

by The Rev. Professor MATTHEW BLACK

In his recent important book, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, Professor W. D. Davies, discussing St. Paul's doctrine of the Second Adam, writes: 'Probably . . . this conception played a far more important part in his thought than the scanty references to the Second Adam in 1 Corinthians and Romans would lead us to suppose.'[2] A similar importance has been attached to the idea by Dr A. J. Rawlinson in his *New Testament Doctrine of the Christ*; it has provided Paul with some of his most characteristic Christology. It has also been claimed more than once that the Second Adam is St. Paul's substitute for the Gospel Son of Man, while both have been traced to a widely spread myth of the *Urmensch*, or primeval Man, the origins of which are obscure, but which was revived in the Gnostic Anthropos.

It is not surprising that the Christian story of the New Creation should include a Second Adam. It is true that, when St. Paul speaks of a 'new creation' (or 'a new creature', Gal. 6.15; 2 Cor. 5.17), he is probably thinking less of cosmology than of conversion, but the renewal of creation is a prominent idea in the Epistles. Indeed, Isa. 65.17-25, with its prophetic vision of a new heaven and a new earth, has had a profound influence on New Testament thought generally; there is an essential unity, as C. F. Burney pointed out, in the teaching of St. Luke, St. Paul and St. John in this respect: ' . . . all go back in thought to the appearance of Jesus Christ on earth as a new Creation, to be compared and contrasted with the first creation of the world and mankind.'[3]

[1] A paper read before the Manchester University Theological Society on 8th March 1951.

[2] p. 53.

[3] *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel*, pp. 43 ff. It is difficult to see why Burney omitted St. Matthew, for it is the first evangelist who gives us the name for the 'renewal' of creation (19.38, *palingenesia*, the 'second Genesis'); cf. Philo, *V. Mos.* 2.12, *de aetern. mundi* 15.

It is in the course of dealing with the Resurrection that St. Paul introduces the expressions 'the second man' and 'the last Adam' (1 Cor. 15.45-7). In the Resurrection there will be a spiritual, not a natural, body, glorious and immortal like the heavenly bodies, sun, moon and stars (40-4). In support of this doctrine a two-line couplet in antithetic parallelism is cited, of which the first line only is identifiable (from Gen. 2.7),[1] where the first man, Adam, the 'natural man', is contrasted with his spiritual antitype, the last Adam, described as 'an immortalising spirit' (45). The first man is fashioned of earth and clay: the 'second man is from heaven' (47). St. Paul nowhere uses the expression 'a heavenly man' of Christ, but he speaks of 'the heavenly One' (48, *ὁ ἐπουράνιος*). Mortality is the form or likeness of the first Adam (the argument concludes); Adam's descendants are involved in Adam's fate (48). But we shall likewise participate in the destiny of 'the heavenly One'; we shall bear His likeness by ourselves becoming immortal or heavenly beings (49, *ἐπουράνιοι*).

St. Paul is clearly thinking of the Risen Christ, but a verse in parenthesis following his 'quotation' (46) suggests that he may have in mind some current conception. Was he familiar with the 'two Adams' in Philo? An *οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος*, also called *ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος*, the 'Ideal Man' in the Platonic sense, was created first, then the earthly Adam; to this corresponds, as in Paul, but again in the reverse order, the spiritual and the natural.[2] If the Apostle was familiar with Philonic or pre-Philonic teaching,[3] he is reinterpreting it in terms of his own mystical experience of the Risen Christ. Or rather, he is making restrained and cautious use of current *theologoumena* to give expression to his own Christology.

Philo's 'heavenly Man' is a bloodless Idea; in St. Paul 'the

[1] The whole may be a quotation, as Burney suggested (loc. cit.), from some lost book of Testimonies. It may even derive from an unknown apocalyptic Scripture. It is difficult to believe that it is just Gen. 2.7 with St. Paul's own midrashic comment (as Rawlinson makes out), since it is the whole 'quotation' (and particularly the second line) which is the Scriptural basis of the argument.

[2] *Leg. Alleg.*, 1.31, *de opific.* 69; see further the discussion in R. Reitzenstein, *Das iranische Erlösungsmysterium*, pp. 104 ff.

[3] Philo's *Quaestiones in Gen. 9*, generally overlooked in this connexion, points unmistakably to the existence of rabbinic speculations before Philo about the 'alter(homo) qui secundum imaginem', who is 'intelligibilis et invisibilis' and of the class of 'species incorporales'. The glorification, if not the apotheosis, of the first Adam can be traced as early as Eccles. 49.16.

heavenly One' is a historical individual, Jesus Christ, raised to divine status by His Resurrection (cf. Rom. 1.1). In the *Quaestiones*, however, we come at one point very close to the Pauline idea of a Second Adam who is both *οὐράνιος* and a historical personage. Philo is discussing (Q. 56) how God came to utter the same words of blessing at Gen. 9.1 over Noah as He had on the sixth day of Creation over the first Adam (Philo's 'heavenly Man'). The answer given is that Noah, as the prototype of the Second Creation of mankind (*principium secundae quasi facturae hominum*) was held by God in equal honour with the heavenly Adam. As the latter was fashioned after the image of God, Noah was similarly fashioned after the image of the Image (the divine Adam), and deemed worthy of sovereignty over the new world as the heavenly Man had been over the first Creation.[1]

The idea of the Second Adam is prominent in the Resurrection discussion at 1 Cor. 15. Thus vv. 21f: 'For since by man came death', etc., later developed at Rom. 5.21. Both at 1 Cor. 15 and Rom. 5 St. Paul shows evident restraint in his use of the expressions 'the second man' or 'the last Adam': when not employing his usual terms 'Lord' or 'Christ' (now a proper name), he speaks simply of 'the one man' (or 'one man') or of 'the one man Jesus Christ'. Man is involved in Adam's sin and its consequences, but participates by sheer grace in the renewal of his being in 'the one man Jesus Christ'. The Apostle preferred to express his thoughts about Christ in terms which pointed upwards to the transcendent Lord rather than earthwards and backwards, in 'the second man' or 'the last Adam'. Moreover, the conception of the two Adams is not developed in either passage; it is simply being enlisted in the

[1] Students of the *Clementines* and of the curious beliefs of Ebionites and Nazarenes will recognise in this conception a forerunner in Judaism of 'Christological modalism'; Christ had been incarnate in Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus. Cf. H. J. Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums*, pp. 102 ff.

It would take me beyond the limits of my subject to trace the Philonic conception further, but in view of its close connexion with the Gnostic Anthropos and the identification of the latter with the Logos, it should be noted that Philo's heavenly Man is also identified with the Logos and described as the *primum principium* and *praemetitor* (or *prima mensura*) (almost certainly the origin of the mysterious Metatron of 3 Enoch and the Talmud), (Q. 4), while the Logos itself, described in turn as *ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος*, is declared to be 'the oldest of the angels, a kind of archangel', under whose direction the Israelite is to cultivate the spiritual life (*de confus. ling.* 146); in Q. 62, quoted in Greek by Eusebius in the *Praep. Evang. VII, xiii*, the Logos is a *secundus deus* or *δεύτερος θεός* (cf. John 1.1).

service of Pauline teaching about redemption and resurrection. Nevertheless it is a central idea, and, while the typology is strictly Adam-Christ, not Adam-Second Adam, the Second Adam doctrine provided St. Paul with the scaffolding, if not the basic structure, for his redemption and resurrection Christology.

At 1 Cor. 15.21 St. Paul passes to the general theme of eschatology, preparatory to his discussion of the Resurrection body. The eschatological scheme, envisaging a reign of Christ from His Resurrection to the final consummation or End, is one which, as C. H. Dodd has pointed out, reappears in St. Matthew's exposition of the Parable of the Tares[1]; it may have been a rabbinical elaboration of primitive Christian eschatology. But in all essentials it is the primitive Church's doctrine of the Parousia (23), a 'Son of Man' eschatology.

The Apostle is still thinking of Christ as the Second Adam; that is clear from verse 26, where Christ abolishes at the parousia the last enemy, Death, the legacy of the first Adam. Did he have the Synoptic Son of Man in mind, and is the Second Adam his substitute for it? Verse 25 removes any doubts on the first point: the closing words of the quotation from Ps. 8.6 speak of 'all things' being put 'in subjection' beneath Christ's feet, including death. It is not unlikely that these verses (which earlier contain the phrase 'son of man') came from a Book of Testimonies, and were first applied to Jesus as 'Son of Man'; the author of Hebrews quotes them in full of Jesus (2.5).

St. Paul cannot have been unfamiliar with the older apocalyptic title, but he never uses it. Nor does he employ his own terminology 'the second man' or 'the last Adam'. The first probably failed to commend itself on purely linguistic grounds. The idea of the Second Adam is in Paul's mind, but he prefers other titles for Christ. The one he uses in this context (in addition to the proper name 'Christ'), namely 'the Son' (28; cf. 24, which prepares the way for it), is, in fact, sufficiently close in the Hebrew mind to *Barnash* to express all that was implied in it.[2] Indeed, the two expressions *ὁ υἱός* and *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* are probably just as closely connected in origin as

[1] 'Matthew and Paul', in *Expository Times*, Vol. LVIII, 11 (August 1947).
[2] Cf. Rawlinson, op. cit., p. 127.

'the Son of Man' and 'the second man'.[1] What St. Paul gives us is not a substitution of one idea for another or one expression for another, but a synthesis of ideas associated with both conceptions, subsumed in his Christology of Christ, the Son.

These are not the only passages in the Epistles where the doctrine of the Second Adam provided the basic structure of Pauline thought about Christ. Thus Dr Rawlinson has traced the idea of Christ as 'the image and the glory' of God to this doctrine of the Second Adam. He does so on the basis of that curious passage in 1 Cor. 11.7 on the subject of women's dress; 'a man' (*ἀνηρ*) is 'the image and glory of God' (an allusion to Gen. 2.21), and so (Rawlinson argues) Christ must also be 'the image and glory of God', since He is the Second Adam.[2] A much more conclusive passage theologically is 2 Cor. 6.4. 'It is God', writes St. Paul, 'who said, Light shall shine out of darkness, who has shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.' Whatever we read into this text (St. Paul is recalling, some say, his conversion), there is little doubt that rabbinical speculations about the first Adam inspired it. Among other divine gifts and attributes which, according to the rabbis, Adam lost at his Fall, were (including his immortality) the celestial light at Creation by which he had been able to survey the whole world at a glance, and which was withdrawn from him to be restored in the Messianic Age, and, secondly, his 'glory', explained as a reflection of the divine Glory and which, before the Fall, and brightened Adam's face.[3] It is possible that St. Paul is also recalling Hab. 2.4 (the earth filled with the glory of the Lord 'as the waters cover the sea'). But rabbinical doctrine about the first Adam is clearly in his mind: the lost light of a lost world has shone again in the new world, to reveal the restored glory of God in the face of the Second Adam, Jesus Christ.

When in the previous verse (2. Cor 6.3) St. Paul speaks of 'the glory of Christ who is the image of God', he is thinking,

[1] Cf. E. Nestle, *Expository Times*, Vol. XI, p. 238 (on Ps. 80.15, 18), and J. Bowman, ibid., Vol. LIX, p. 294. For the common origin of 'Son of Man' and 'the second man', see further below.

[2] op. cit., p. 132.

[3] See *Beresh. rabb.* 12, and cf. L. Ginsberg, *Legends of the Jews*, Vol. I, p. 86, Vol. V, p. 105; H. St. J. Thackeray, *The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, p. 43; and Sanday and Headlam, *Romans* (I.C.C.), p. 85.

not only of the restored δόξα of the Second Adam, but also of the divine image or likeness according to which the first Adam was fashioned. Christ, the Second Adam, is also the 'image of God', or 'the image of the unseen God' (Col. 1.15), or, as the writer to the Hebrews expresses it, in more elevated language, 'the brightness of his glory' and 'the express image of his person'.

Moreover, as Christ, the Second Adam, is 'the image and glory of God', so too Christians are to reflect the image of the Lord, an idea expressed a few verses earlier at 3.18, and further elaborated at Rom. 8.29; they are to pass through a gradual process of assimilation to the mind and character of Christ, till they finally absorb the splendour of His Person. A similar idea appears at Phil. 2, where it has been suggested more than once that the idea of Christ as the Second Adam is in the author's mind. 'Have this mind in you', St. Paul urges 'which was also in Christ Jesus, who, being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself. . . .'[1] At Rom. 6.3 and 12.2, where he is also speaking of the 'transforming' of the mind, St. Paul may again be thinking of conformity to the divine image in Christ.

The idea meets us again in three closely related passages, Col. 3.10, Eph. 2.15, and 4.22. ('To put on the new man' is found earlier at Rom. 6.6.) The Colossians are said to have 'put on the new man' (at Rom. 13.14 and Gal. 3.27, Paul speaks of 'putting on' (again ἐνδύομαι) Christ): '. . . ye have put off the old man with his doings and have put on the new man, which is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him.' If there is any doubt about the identity of the 'creator' of the 'new man' at Col. 3.10, it is dispelled in the light of Eph. 2.15; it is not God but Christ who 'creates' (κτίζω) 'new men' like Himself. The new man after the image of Christ, the Second Adam, is described in the immediately following verses of Col. 3.12-17, where we can trace the main lineaments of the Gospel Portrait: 'Put on therefore as God's elect, holy and beloved, a heart of compassion, kindness,

[1] Cf. Rawlinson, op. cit., p. 134: 'Of Adam that was true which St. Paul (without mentioning Adam) points out was not true of Christ, namely that he counted equality with God as a prize at which to snatch.'

humility, meekness, long-suffering; forbearing one another and forgiving one another, if any man have a complaint against any; even as the Lord forgave you, so also do ye: and above all these things, put on love, which is the bond of perfection. And let the peace of Christ rule in your hearts to the which also ye were called in one body. . . . '

A fresh aspect of Second Adam Christology is introduced in the last phrase, as Dr W. D. Davies has recently recognised, namely, the conception of the Body of Christ.[1] In all these three passages the unity of mankind in Christ is being stressed; thus, Col. 3.11 continues '(Put on the new man which is being renewed in the image of him that created him) where there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bondman, freeman: but Christ is all and in all'. At Eph. 2.13 ff, it is the unity of Jew and Gentile which is being stressed; Eph. 4.25 goes on to remind the readers similarly of their membership one with another. St. Paul must have been familiar with traditional rabbinical doctrine of the unity of mankind in Adam as the basis of the duties of love, equality and peace. Thus *M. Sanhedrin* 4.5 reads: ' . . . a single man was created for the sake of peace among mankind that none should say to his fellow: my father was greater than thy father.' Moreover, that doctrine 'implied that the very constitution of the physical body of Adam and the method of its formation was symbolic of the real oneness of mankind. In that one body of Adam east and west, north and south were brought together,[2] male and female. . . . '[3] So that when St. Paul thinks of the Body of Christ, what C. H. Dodd has called 'the new corporate personality created in Christ' or 'the mystical unity of redeemed mankind in Christ', he naturally expresses himself in terms of contemporary rabbinical Adam doctrine. 'To gather together in one all things in Christ' (Eph. 1.10) means 'the reconstitution of the essential oneness of mankind in Christ in a spiritual community, as it was in Adam in the physical sense'.

A closer study of the Epistles may bring to light fresh illustrations or other aspects of the Second Adam doctrine of St. Paul. Thus Rawlinson believes that it was St. Paul's Christology of 'the image and the glory' which formed the bridge to

[1] op. cit., pp. 54 ff. [2] Cf. 2 Enoch, 30.13. [3] Davies, loc. cit.

the Wisdom Christology of Colossians.[1] An alternative account of the latter, however, brings me back to the problem of Paul's sources; the Wisdom conception is alleged to come from the same source ultimately as the Johannine Logos and the whole Anthropos (Son of Man and Second Adam) doctrine, namely, in a kind of pre-Christian Gnosticism.

According to Reitzenstein, Bousset and others, and more recently Rudolf Bultmann, behind the New Testament there lies a pre-Christian Gnostic conception of a Heavenly Man, in some forms an apotheosis of the *Urmensch*, occasionally called εἰκων or Image or υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, υἱὸς θεοῦ, δεύτερος θεός (as in Philo), but most widely known as the Logos.[2] The Figure, so far as it can be regarded as 'pre-Christian', proves, on closer examination, to be largely a scholar's reconstruction from sources some as late as Islamic times, others even later. But it would be a mistake to conclude that the Gnostic 'Redeemer' existed only in the imagination of scholars. The ubiquity of the conception in the middle and further East from the second century A.D. onwards in so many forms is difficult to explain as due entirely to Christian influence. It appears in the Gnostic Poimandres as well as in the Philonic Logos-Anthropos, in the Enoch Son of Man and the later Gaonic Metatron, not to mention the Mandaean Saviour, at times patently inspired or deeply influenced by Christianity, but in many features quite independent of it. The fundamental problem, however, remains the same as when Edwyn Bevan discussed it: there is no unequivocal evidence pointing to the existence of such a conception in Pre-Christian sources, particularly within Judaism.[3]

A piece of evidence of some interest to which attention has not hitherto been drawn is to be found in an important manual on the history of religions composed by an Islamic author of the ninth century, Isa al-Warrak. The book itself is lost but it provided the material for the work of a certain Shahristani (*ob.* A.D. 1153), who, in a discussion of Jewish sects, mentions,

[1] In Wisdom 7.25, which was undoubtedly known to St. Paul, the divine Wisdom is described as 'a clear effluence' of God's Glory and also as an 'image' of His goodness. Cf. Rawlinson, op. cit., p. 133.

[2] For a full discussion consult Bultmann's recent *Das Evangelium Johannes*, pp. 8 ff. Cf. further, J. M. Creed, 'The Heavenly Man' (in *J.T.S.*, Vol. XXVI, pp. 113 ff).

[3] *Hellenism and Christianity*, p. 95.

after the Pharisees and Sadducees, a sect called the Maghariya or Cave people; the name is explained by Shahristani as having been given to the sect because its books had been found in a cave (*maghar*).[1] In a recent important article on the new Hebrew scrolls, Professor Paul Kahle, who identifies the sect with the Essenes, suggests that the now famous 'Cave library' found on the Dead Sea originally belonged to them.[2]

Shahristani tells us that the heretic Arius (*ob.* A.D. 336) had been influenced in his teaching about God and the Messiah by this sect which he alleges flourished some four hundred years before Arius. The central and peculiar tenet of the Maghariya was their belief in a divine-human Mediator, described as a 'god' or 'angel' but having the appearance of Adam. The description goes into fantastic detail, but it appears that the name of this being (or one name) was 'the Elect One', and he is said to have been the Angel who created the world; the adherents of the sect are called 'the elect ones'. In this doctrine of a Creator-Angel, S. Poznanski, in a learned article, detected the influence of the Philonic Logos; the latter can also be described as an Angel and was, as is well known, also the Demiurge.[3]

If the identification with the Essenes is sound, then we have to do with a secret Essene cult of a divine Mediator closely related to the Philonic Logos. If the sect, however, flourished (as Shahristani maintains) *c.* 150 B.C., it cannot have derived its central doctrine from Philo. The title 'the Elect One' and the name 'the elect ones' points in a quite different direction; as is well known, the first is the favourite title for the Son of Man or Messiah in 1 Enoch 37-71, and the latter the name for his 'chosen' people. Moreover, the Son of Man is introduced at 1 Enoch 46.1 ff as an angel-like being, pre-existent before

[1] *Kitab al-Milal wan Nihal*, ed. W. Cureton, London, 1846, Vol. I, p. 169; translated by T. Haarbrucker, Halle, 1850, Vol. I, pp. 256 ff. For Abu Isa Muhammed b. Harun al Warrak, see Brockelmann, Supplement, Vol. I, p. 341 and Massignon, Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 1218.

[2] 'The Age of the Scrolls', in *Vetus Testamentum*, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 44 ff.

[3] 'Philon dans l'ancienne litterature judeo-arabe, in *Rev. des Études Juives*, Vols. XLIX-L (1904-5), pp. 10-31. The connexion with Philo is confirmed by a reference of Shahristani to a certain Benjamin of Nihawend, an influential Persian Karaite Jew of the ninth century who taught Philo's doctrine of the Logos and his allegorical interpretation of Scripture. Another Karaite of the tenth century, al-Kirkisani tells us that the most important books found in the cave of the Maghariya were those of 'the Alexandrian', i.e. Philo; cf. Kahle, op. cit., p. 44.

Creation (48.2 ff).[1] In the beliefs of the Maghariya as reported by Shahristani we have something very like a synthesis of the Enoch Son of Man with Philonic or pre-Philonic Logos ideas.

The Son of Man and the Hellenistic Anthropos may well represent two parallel developments of the same divine Figure within pre-Christian Judaism. Both lines of development may have had more in common than is usually supposed: the eschatological functions of the Son of Man may have tended to obscure his character as 'the Man' *par excellence*, the Man after the divine image.[2] At the same time, the fact that the Philonic Anthropos is a mere idea does not mean that in Hellenistic circles, as well as in Palestinian, he may not have been invested with eschatological functions or Messianic dignity; in the Sybillines the Messiah is 'the Man from Heaven' (Book V, 414 ff), and in 3 Enoch, Metatron, identified with the Primal Man as well as with Enoch himself, is the divine assessor or judge.

The conclusions of this discussion may be summed up as follows: (*a*) The terms 'the second man' or 'the last Adam' occur once only in St. Paul (1 Cor. 15.45 ff), and the Apostle shows marked restraint in his use of such language of Christ in other contexts where the conception of the Second Adam underlies his thought. The idea, however, has provided him with the scaffolding for his most characteristic doctrines of redemption and resurrection. (*b*) The Second Adam doctrine and the 'Son of Man' eschatology have been brought together in Pauline eschatology. But again 'human' terminology is avoided; St. Paul speaks of 'the (divine) Son' (*ὁ υἱός* or *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*) rather than of 'the Son of Man' or 'the Second Man'. (*c*) The Second Adam doctrine lies behind Pauline Christology of the 'image and the glory', and the conception of the Church as the Body of Christ. (*d*) The ultimate sources of some of Paul's ideas may have been in current *theologoumena* in Judaism about a divine-human Mediator.

[1] Cf. Martin Werner, *Die Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas* (Bern-Leipzig, 1941), pp. 313 ff.

[2] That this is one clue to the Synoptic Son of Man is the thesis of J. Jeremias's *Jesus als Weltvollender* (Gütersloh, 1930); see also his article on *Adam* in Kittel's *Th. W.* Several features of 1 Enoch take on a fresh significance in this light, e.g. the trees of knowledge and life in the Messianic kingdom. If the book was even substantially in its present form in the first century, then the Similitudes supply the one figure absent from the Second Genesis eschatology of the earlier part, viz. the new Adam.

THE 'PARABLE' (*MĀŠĀL*) IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

by The Rev. Professor A. S. HERBERT

The word with which we are concerned is variously translated in the E.VV. as 'Parable' (e.g. Ezek. 17.2), 'Proverb' (e.g. Ezek. 12.22, 23), 'By-word' (e.g. Ps. 44.15; so Ezek. 14.8 should be more appropriately translated). The last two groups are obviously related and it would be reasonable to suppose that 'By-word' would be a particularised meaning of 'Proverb', i.e. the use of a person (individual or group) in a proverbial way, as an example of disaster. The relation of this kind of meaning to that of 'Parable' is not so obvious, except in so far as there is a common idea of likeness. But this is less obvious when some of the instances of *Māšāl*—'Parable' are noted. Thus the term is used for Taunt song: Isa. 14.4; Hab. 2.6; Mic. 2.4; its use in the Balaam story seems at first to mean little more than an oracle and its use in Job 27.1, 29.1 appears to mean 'Theme'.

The verb is similarly used. The Oxford Lexicon distinguishes the primitive verb (used in Niph, Hiph, Hithp)—'to be like'; and the denominative (Qal and once Pi) 'to speak a proverb or parable'. This denominative verb occurs in Ezekiel and only once otherwise, viz. in Num. 21.27 (JE) in reference to a floating oracle (E.VV. translate 'they that speak in proverbs' —*môšelīm*). The use of the derivatives '*mōšel*' (Job 41.25) and '*mešōl*' (Job 17.6) 'likeness' and 'by-word' respectively continue the meanings already noted. Thus from the root, meaning 'to be like' we have a variety of derived meanings: Popular saying, Proverb, Teaching, Satirical poem, Likeness, Oracular speech, Theme. In passing we may note the existence of apparently another root *m-š-l* 'rule': have dominion, reign (Qal and Hiph), used from the earliest (e.g. Gen. 3.16) to the latest (e.g. Dan. 11.43) periods of OT Scriptures. There is no certain connexion between these two words. *m-š-l* 'to be like', etc., occurs in other Semitic languages in the sense of likeness (Akk. Syriac, Arab,

Ethiopic) and particularly in the sense of a concrete representation of someone. The root *m-š-l* 'rule', does not so occur except in Phoenician. The evidence suggests, therefore, either that we have two independent roots, or that *m-š-l* 'rule' may be derived from *m-š-l* 'be like', because of the use of *m-š-l* for actions, words or objects in magic and so to dominate human activities. There is no clear evidence of such a connexion between the two roots known to me, and for the purpose of this discussion, the root 'to rule' may be ignored.

But the use of the noun and verb in such a variety of ways must raise the question 'Have we done justice to this Hebrew word?' It is possible to see, somewhat dimly, an underlying unity between a popular saying, proverb, and parable in the basic meaning of likeness. Popular sayings frequently arise from some apparent likeness between a particular instance of human behaviour and human conduct in general. Such sayings are often abbreviated similes or metaphors. From this to a proverb is not a large step. A parable clearly depends for its effectiveness on some perceptible likeness between the incident or object described and the situation in which men find themselves, some aspect of human behaviour and some aspect of the Divine ways with men, to which their attention is being directed. The application of this word to what is apparently a Taunt song is not so obvious. Such a usage would naturally arise if *māšāl* meant originally 'an acted spell' (cf. A. R. Johnson, *The Culture Prophet in Ancient Israel*, p. 37 and n. 4; and A. H. Godbey, *A.J.S.L.*, 39, 1922-3) and Akkadian usage encourages this derivation. Then *māšāl* 'by-word' would connect with *māšāl* 'taunt song', and so, possibly, would the words of Balaam in Num. 23 and 24. Are we to suppose that the use of the word for 'sentences of ethical wisdom' (B.D.B., 605*a*) is a weakened (a very much weakened!) form of a 'by-word' or 'spell'? With even less ease can we fit the usage of *māšāl* in Num. 21.27-30; Ps. 49.5, 78.2; Job 13.12, 27.1, 29.1; Eccles. 12.9, where it appears to mean an 'oracle' and 'didactic material'.

Such considerations lead to a re-examination of the use of the word *m-š-l* bearing in mind its basic meaning 'resemble'. This meaning will quite naturally be appropriate for the use of the word in Akkadian magic when we recall that likeness can often be thought of as partial identity. This, after all, is the

basis of all sympathetic magic (and homeopathic medicine) and medieval alchemy. Examples of likeness—partial identity—are numerous in the OT, both in the cultus and in prophetic action. We may recall the shooting of the arrow eastward by Joash while Elisha touches his hands. This was not merely a vivid description of what Joash should do, but a real beginning of those events which should lead to victory over the Syrians in war. The historical victory was but the consummation of the process initiated by the prophetic action. We might ask: 'How can there be any connexion between the action of Elisha and Joash and the successful campaign against the Syrians, other than a psychological one?' Such a question, it is quite obvious, would have had no meaning. The campaign and its success were already present in the symbolic act indicated by the prophet. This is not in fact described as '*māšāl*', but its likeness to the *māšāl* in Ezek. 24.3-5 (the cauldron of stew well-boiled) is obvious. With this in mind we may turn to an examination of the use of the *māšāl* in the OT.

It may be convenient to begin with types of *māšāl* which are obviously old and well-established in the life and language of Israel. These are the types usually described as proverbial sayings, brief, terse sentences of popular sagacity.

1. (*a*) 1 *Sam.* 10.12

'Therefore it became a *māšāl*' (LXX, παραβολή). Is Saul also among the prophets! (where the appropriate English punctuation at the end of the saying would clearly be an exclamation mark, rather than a question mark). The saying occurs, though not called *māšāl*, after a somewhat similar story of King Saul's behaviour in 1 Sam. 19.24. Clearly the saying did not originate in both these situations. We may feel that the second occasion, after Saul was a public figure in Israelite life, was a more appropriate occasion for the origin of the saying. That, however, does not affect the significance of the stories for explicating the word *māšāl*. In both Saul is found 'prophesying', 10.10, 19.23, *wayyithnabbē'* (a form which certainly in the earlier literature is most clearly connected with the ecstatic and somewhat discreditable kinds of prophecy). Now prophesying was treated with respect in Israel, as something potentially dangerous, but it by no means necessarily reflected credit on the

person prophesying. And clearly in these stories which appear to explain the origin of the saying, Saul is 'out of place', a king has no business prophesying. We may recall the scorn of Michal against David when he behaved without kingly decorum before the people in the presence of the Ark 2 Sam. 6.20. Clearly the saying reported in 1 Sam. 10.12, 19.24, is *not* just an example of popular wisdom. It is a scornful phrase. It would be used of someone who was behaving in a manner not proper to his reputation or honour. He would, by this saying, be made to see that his behaviour was similar to that of Saul's, would recognise the judgment of his fellows upon him and, it might be supposed, would accept that judgment upon himself.

(*b*) 1 Sam. 24.14 (E.V.13) LXX *παραβολή*

> As the *māšāl* of the ancients says (or the *māšāl* of the Easterners)
> From the wicked goes forth wickedness
> But my hand shall not be against thee.

The previous verse reads:

> May Yahweh judge between me and thee
> And may Yahweh 'avenge' me of thee
> But my hand shall not be against thee.

The verse containing the *māšāl* is rejected by most commentators (e.g. Smith, *I.C.C.*, p. 218, Cent. Bible Kennedy, but not Camb. Bi. Skinner) on the grounds that 'it intimates that the wickedness of Saul would be his own destruction', and so contrasts with what is otherwise shown by David in this incident —deep respect for the Lord's anointed and a fine magnanimity. In support of the view that the whole verse is a marginal comment by a later reader is the fact that both verses end with the same phrase 'but my hand shall not be against thee'. But this ignores the common meaning of *rāšā'*, 'one who is in the wrong', which is precisely the point of the previous verse. The judgment implied against Saul in this story, is not against his moral character—however much that might be a proper inference—but in the fact that as between these two, Saul and David, Saul is in the wrong and David is in the right and so v. 18 (17); (cf. also the parallel in 26, also the Pharaoh Exod. 9.27). The verse is then parallel to the previous, not only in the phrase 'but my hand shall not be against thee', but in its whole meaning. David is content to leave Yahweh to set him in the right

as against Saul, though he might well have been justified in vindicating himself. But Saul is not just an enemy seeking David's life 'without cause'. He is Yahweh's anointed and his blood ought not to be shed by man. That is not to say that all his actions are therefore in the right, but, in our English proverb, 'two wrongs do not make a right'. So 'may Yahweh judge, and do right by me' is the response of David to this dilemma. There seems, therefore, no very good reason for deleting the verse; it is of a piece with what precedes. The only objection to it could be on the ground that is it an anticlimax. David has invoked the judgment of Yahweh. Is it, after that, appropriate to seek further justification from a proverb? But this argument is double-edged. For it is even more difficult to imagine a later commentator doing the same. Piety alone would surely have prevented such bathos. Now, the narration is presenting two 'wrong' actions: the one that David was tempted to commit, which he expressly condemns: the other, that Saul was in fact committing, viz. lying in wait for David's life to take it, v. 12 (11). And this conduct of Saul, David stops short of explicitly condemning, although it is condemned in every turn of the story and the dialogue. What he does is to bring everything to a point and direct that point to Saul with the word 'From those in the wrong, wrong proceeds'. It is left for Saul and for all who are involved in this situation to accept the inescapable conviction. The saying by itself is trite—as most proverbs are. As applied to a particular situation it is a most vigorous and brilliant use of a well-known saying, and it takes its place with other Biblical parables. It involves a judgment.

Ezek. 12.22, 23; LXX (3 times)

'Son of man. What is this *māšāl* of yours (plur.) concerning (or against) the land of Israel saying (or namely)

The days grow long, and every vision perishes.'

This *māšāl*, the prophet is told, is forbidden by God, and is to be replaced by (or LXX reversed)

'The days are at hand and the word of every vision.'

Māšāl is usually understood here as 'Proverb', although neither of these sayings is proverbial in form. It might be argued that the *māšāl* forbidden by God was *current* in Israel, but that does not make it a proverb. (One often hears the saying, 'The

Church has failed' and it appears that that has been said for centuries. But no one would describe that as a proverb.) It is, however, described as a *māšāl* and so far we have found no justification for giving that word the precise meaning 'Proverb'. Now as a current saying it might well be expressing a variety of feelings, from despondency to mockery. The passage suggests, however, that it was addressed to the prophet and, therefore, by implication, to God whose spokesman the prophet was. At once we can see every reason for describing this as a *māšāl*. It is the application of a current saying to a particular situation and person, implying a judgment or even condemnation of that person, all the more cogent for not being explicitly made. The plain facts of the situation make it inescapable. For if the prophet's vision has not been fulfilled (i.e. it perishes) two possibilities arise (1) it was not from Yahweh and therefore Ezekiel is a false prophet, (2) it was from Yahweh, but He is impotent. So the application of this saying to the prophet compels him to make a judgment on himself, or so the mockers intend. In fact, that judgment is reversed by a Divine word. It is not he, but they who are under judgment in this matter. The vision has not 'perished: the *māšāl* is reversed by another 'word of the Lord' to the prophet which will demonstrate the working of God. The description of the saying as *māšāl* is to be taken seriously. It is a tersely expressed description which is intended by a rebellious people to make the prophet condemn himself as a false prophet.

Ezek. 18.2, 3:

What mean ye, ye who repeat (*mōšelim*) this *māšāl* concerning the land of Israel (LXX: among the children of Israel) saying (i.e. namely) 'the fathers used to eat sour grapes and the children's teeth are blunted'. (cf. Jer. 31.29, though not described as *māšāl*.)

This has all the *sound* of a popular proverb, but not the *sense*! For the function of a popular proverb is to apply some recognised fact of everyday experience to a particular situation in order to illuminate. But there is nothing whatever in everyday experience to justify the statement that when parents eat unripe fruit, their children have bad teeth, or suffer any other physical discomfort. One may doubt whether even a strong sense of corporate personality would create the conditions for such a phenomenon! If this were a popular proverb to illumi-

nate a particular situation, viz. the 'transmission of guilt for which high authority could be invoked' (Exod. 34.7; Num. 14.18; JE) (*I.C.C.*, p. 197), it would be the illumination of the known by the unknown. Is it not rather taking the recognised teaching of Exod. 34.7 and Num. 14.18; Exod. 20.5 (the sins of the fathers shall be visited upon the children) and expressing it in such a form as to expose it to ridicule and condemnation? It is manifestly evidence of an immoral and unjust government of the world. But that accounts for the manner in which the prophet deals with the situation. For his rebuttal is a stern and vigorous rebuttal of an attitude of mind which would evade responsibility, condone moral laxity, and encourage cynicism. It is not the words of one who would bring comfort to the despondent. Here, then, we have, not a popular proverb, but a word which suggests condemnation of the religion of which the prophet is the exponent. It is similar to other 'parables'.

2. *B.D.B. By-word*

The use of the word *māšāl* in Ps. 44.15 (14) 'Thou makest us (Israel) a *māšāl* among the peoples', cf. Jer. 24.9; Job 17.6; Ps. 69.12 (11); Deut. 27.37; 1 Kings 9.7 = 2 Chron. 7.20; Ezek. 14.8. The word is used with words or phrases which make it evident that scorn, reproach, mockery is associated with the word. Usually it is Israel that is to become a *māšāl*, but in three instances it is an individual, Job 17.6; Ps. 69.12; Ezek. 14.8. Of these, the former two refer to a situation in which the element of incongruency is most striking. God has made the righteous Job an object of abhorrence to his fellows. That is, of course, one of the themes of the book, but it is stated in unambiguous terms in this passage. It is true that four out of the six words in this verse have been questioned in the *form* in which they appear in M.T. and that the word under discussion is one of them. But, as the versions show, the basic meaning has not been altered. The LXX reads:

> Thou had made me a by-word (*θρύλημα*) among the people.
> I have been proved to be an object of laughter for them.

and this compares with M.T. emended:

> Thou has made me a masal of the people.
> A portent (*mōpēth* for *tōpheth*) before them I am become.

Now, in spite of the difficulties of the passage, the main thought is clear. Job the righteous is suffering a fate that belongs appropriately to the unrighteous. But this brings the moral order of the universe under judgment. He himself is the striking instance that will, now that it is clearly seen, bring the God of conventional orthodoxy under judgment. It is the appeal from God to God that we find elsewhere in Job. *māšāl* is here a genuine parable, Job himself in his suffering has become the parable; in recognising the truth about him—and it is so clear that it cannot be missed—men can recognise the truth about much else in the world, cf. Job 27.1 and 29.1. The former of these is most striking. The opening words of the speech of Job referred to as *māšāl* (*προοίμιον* [*sic*]), read:

> As God liveth who taketh away my judgment
> Yea Shaddai who maketh bitter my soul.

That is to say, Job introduces a solemn statement with the familiar words of the oath, and then charges God with exactly that form of conduct most vigorously condemned by the prophets. The force of the phrase could not be exceeded. If God, whose great characteristic it is that He upholds justice and, as Isaiah had said, 'will swiftly punish the violent, who take away the righteousness of the righteous', if He should take away Job's *just* cause, this is ultimate despair. Whether the verse be original to the Book of Job, or due to a later scribe, the appropriateness of the word *māšāl* is evident. The terms of the solemn oath are used, but in such a way as to compel attention to the monstrous injustice of Job's case, to make a moral judgment inescapable (against the conventional belief in God). It is probable that the use of *māšāl* in 29.1, is similar if 29 and 30 are taken together. Job describes his conduct and only one result is possible—honour and veneration from men and a manifest blessing from God—but instead derision and contumely from men and a curse! Thus Job sets up his own condition as a clear, unmistakable case, which, in terms of orthodox teaching, makes the moral government of the world manifestly unjust. This means that either God Himself is brought under judgment, or conventional orthodoxy. The use of *māšāl* here, whether by the poet or by a later commentator, is singularly appropriate. Job's own condition is the supreme and the

extreme case which, therefore, has sufficient similarity to the many others which might be explained away. It sheds a new light on the others and compels attention and a moral judgment. And if at first sight it seems to be judging God, in fact it is offering judgment upon those who are ready with over-simplified explanations of God's dealings with men.

Similar to this usage in Job is Ps. 69.12 (11) where the humble man of God (individual or nation) is dishonoured before wicked men. The more zealous he is for the way of God, the more he suffers. His very attitude of patient resignation and mourning is misunderstood. They that sit in the gateway of the city discuss him to his disadvantage. Drunkards make him the subject of mocking song. His whole way of life, apparently his loyalty to the Divine cause, the Torah, is brought into discredit: 'I became a *māšāl* for them.' That is, he furnishes a clear instance by which men may condemn him and all like him, and, therefore, the cause for which he stands. The translation proverb (R.V.) is inappropriate.

So also in the other instances referred to above, especially when it refers to Israel becoming a *māšāl* among the nations. For Israel is God's people, destined for honour; and if she meets with disaster, it can only be through persistent unworthiness of the Divine calling. Israel then becomes a demonstrative case, an unmistakable instance, which will then lead the peoples to judge their own life. Israel itself becomes, if not in loyalty, then in disloyalty, *the parable*, the means by which the nations recognise themselves under judgment. 'If God has dealt so with Israel, His people, will He not also deal with us in like manner?'

3. *Prophetic Figurative Discourse, B.D.B.*

We may now turn to the group of passages listed in B.D.B. as 'prophetic figurative discourse'. So to describe them is to admit no possibility of associating the use of *māšāl* in these passages with the etymology of the word, or with other occurrences of the word in the OT. They are characterised by the use of the verb *nāsā'*—lift up, take up, or more probably 'solemnly utter' (cf. the noun *massa'* and the use of *nāsā'* with *'ālāh*, 1 Kings 8.31 and *dābār*, Amos 5.1). The term is used consistently as a description of Balaam's utterances, Num. 23.7, 18, 24.3, 15, 20, 21, 23; LXX.

The phrase occurs also in Mic. 2.4; Hab. 2.6; Isa. 14.4.

It is to these instances that Godbey directs particular attention as being the product of an acted spell, the verbal expression of a piece of sympathetic magic. We may suppose the prophet to have enacted a symbolic act and then given the verbal expression to it. Eissfeldt describes them simply as Taunt songs: Hermaniuk dismisses altogether the thought of comparison and translates as revelatory discourse or oracle, expressly denying any association with *παραβολή*. That they are oracles is obvious enough—most prophetic speeches are! Again, they may well be formally described as Taunt songs, but so may also many oracles not described as *māšāl*. They may well have been accompanied by some piece of acted symbolism, and the suggestion of Godbey's is attractive, but there is no evidence for it.

A comparison of these passages discloses certain features in common. In each case we have a violent reversal of fortune described. It is described in such terms that it is shown to be the direct opposite of what men were expecting or felt they had a right to expect. A human assessment of the situation must be replaced by the divine assessment. Thus Balak had every right to expect his prophet Balaam to curse Israel and bless the army of Moab. In fact, Israel is blessed and Moab cursed. All the words of blessing and cursing are what Balak wanted, but they are applied to the wrong people. Further, when Balaam turns to Amalek and Kain, the same feature is apparent, the more obviously perhaps because of the brevity of the *māšāl*.

Num. 24.20: the first of the nations is Amalek,
But his ending shall be destruction.

and so in v. 21: 'Enduring and unassailable is Kain.
But destruction and captivity await him.'

The closing oracle is obscure and may have been added. But the same feature obviously characterises the *māšāl*, viz., a total reversal of fortune and one contrary to all expectation.

The *māšāl* in Mic. 2.4 has obviously suffered in the course of transmission, but its general meaning is quite clear. The people of God, whose land was received by divine allotting, who expected to live in the land secure, each on the field apportioned to him, will see a new allotting and apportioning for an alien people and Israel will be taken from the land of promise.

Hab. 2.6 f might be summed up, 'The spoiler is spoiled, the robber robbed, and the usurer will pay usury.'

No less clear is Isa. 14.4, with its brilliantly painted picture of Babylon the strong, self-confident and oppressive, reduced to utter impotence and futility, while the sighs of the oppressed change to irrepressible songs of joy.

> How hath the Tyrant ceased,—ceased is insolence, . . .
> How art thou fallen from Heaven O Day Star son of the morning.

These *mešālīm* compare with the passages in Job 27 and 29-30, which also are described as *mešālīm*, construed with the same verb, *nāsā'*, and also present a picture which is a reversal of what was to be expected. At first sight, the element of comparison seems to be quite absent from these *mešālīm*; yet is not that precisely what we find in, e.g. the parables of the unjust judge and importunate widow in Luke 17.1-6 and of the Pharisee and tax-gatherer in Luke 18.9-14? Is it not an effective way of saying, 'This is what the situation is really like. You will recognise it if and when, you take seriously Yahweh's sovereignty. Therefore, repent of your wrong actions, mistrust and fear, or arrogance, and accept His judgment in the earth.'

With these we should probably also associate Num. 21.27-30, which is certainly not a proverb or collection of proverbs (so R.V.) but, in spite of some obscurity, manifestly a Taunt song and again indicating a reversal of fortune. Apparently, Kemosh God of Moab, instead of performing his proper work of maintaining the welfare of his 'sons and daughters' has made them fugitives and captives. Again, Ps. 49.5 describes in the following verses, a reversal of human expectation, (*māšāl* here parallel with *ḥīdāh*), while Ps. 78.2 (also parallel with *ḥīdāh*) reads:

> I would open my mouth with a *māšāl*
> I would utter riddles from of old.

Apparently the whole Psalm is being thus described. It is, in fact, a recital of those historical events which demonstrate (or ought to demonstrate) for the people of God His judgments and His *ḥesed* and includes a number of reversals of human judgment.

4. *B.D.B. Similitude or Parable*

In Ezekiel the noun is used on three occasions when the

translation 'Parable' is by most scholars, not in dispute, viz. 17.2, 21.5 (E.VV. 20.49), 24.3; the LXX translates by παραβολή in each instance. No less consistently do the commentators treat these parables as allegories. (Though Godbey treats them as magical spells: *A.J.S.L.*, xxxix.) Now the words parable and allegory are quite easily distinguishable in meaning. Had there been any possibilities of confusion, we should expect to find *māšāl* translated indiscriminately, παραβολή and ἀλληγορία. In fact, although other translations are given for *māšāl*, ἀλληγορία does not appear. Now, while the LXX translation is not determinative, it should be treated with respect. We should inquire then whether these are in fact allegories.

The first, 17.2-10 is followed by an explanation in vv. 12-21, 22-4, which has many of the features of an allegorical interpretation. But we observe (1) that the explanation is very much simpler and more effective than the 'allegory'. (2) There are several features in the 'allegory' that have no counterpart in the explanation, and vice versa. (3) It is difficult to see why the prophet should present his message in 12-21 in the obscure and highly improbable form of 2-10, and (4) 22-4 appear to be another and quite different interpretation of part of the parable (cf. Cooke, Bertholet, Hölscher, Irwin).

It is, of course, possible to dismiss altogether the explanation(s) as due to a subsequent commentator, but it should be noted that course is usually adopted because of the impossibility of equating the events of the 'allegory' with the events of the so-called explanation(s). But the force of such an objection is removed if we regard vv. 1-10 as parabolic and not allegorical; and the account in vv. 11-21 as a description of the historical situation to which this parable was directed, and not an elucidation of each figure in an allegory. Then, parable and history 'come to a point' with the phrase 'shall it (he) prosper?' But this leads to a further examination of the parable, which, as it stands, offers a most improbable picture or series of events. First, we have the crest of a cedar tree which is then left out of account and then we have a vine upon whose strange behaviour attention is fixed (5) 6-10. The double application suggests the possibility that there were originally two parables, each involving a great vulture and horticultural activity. (1) The parable of the cedar slip set in a new plantation. (2) The

parable of a vine planted in a fertile seed bed. We may then summarise the parables in the light of the applications:

(1) There came a great vulture, took a sprig from a cedar and set it in a far away land. It grew there, and dwarfed all other trees and shrubs and became a refuge for all the birds of heaven (vv. 3 and 4 helped by vv. 22-4).

That is how God will overrule the doings of men in our day. The Exile is *not* the end. It is the beginning of a new life in which the Divine purpose for Israel and the nations of the world will be realised.

(2) There came a great vulture and planted a vine in a fertile plot, so that it grew strongly and healthily (vv. 5, 6, 8). But, strange to say, when another vulture appeared it tried to leave its fertile plot and strained towards the new vulture as though asking to be transplanted. What would happen to such an unnatural vine? It would wither and die. So shall it be with Judah seeking Egyptian aid.

Ezekiel 21.1-5 (*E.V.* 20.45-9)

The prophet is instructed to say to the forest of the Negeb that Yahweh will kindle a fire which shall sweep irresistibly through the forest and scrub and it will be obvious to all that it is Yahweh's own doing. Now the point of the parable is not to describe the devastation wrought by Nebuchadrezzar's army in figurative language. The Judeans knew the horror and terror well enough at first hand. But the point is in the last sentence, 'All flesh shall see that I, Yahweh, have kindled it, it shall not be quenched.' That is to say, the invasion is more than a political event. It is Divine action. There were prophets, like Hananiah, who buoyed up the morale of the people with false hope. But 'it shall not be quenched'. It is a vigorous and moving appeal to the people to recognise political events as the consequence of the sin of Yahweh's peoples against the Divine Majesty.

The only comment made by his hearers was, 'Is he not a speaker of parables?' Surely, one of the most remarkable instances of avoiding unwelcome reality by uttering a platitudinous truth!

In Ezek. 24.3 the prophet is commanded to utter a parable against or concerning 'the rebellious house'. The parable

follows in the verses 3-14. The text of this passage has obviously suffered in the process of transmission as the versions indicate, although, fortunately, only in details which do not affect the movement of the verses. But there does appear to be some confusion in the words of the parable, for we have in fact two pictures which do not really stand together, resembling a double exposure on one negative in a camera. Once again, the difficulties can be removed by eliminating all that is inconsistent with the first picture, that of the *boiling cauldron*; but to do so raises other difficulties. How did the words about a rusty cauldron come into the text? Presumably, whoever put them there had good reasons for doing so, it is hard to believe that a scribe or commentator deliberately added words which have nothing to do with the parable, offer no explanation and obscure the meaning. But those difficulties do not arise if we have here two parables, verbally linked by the common features of a cauldron and a fire. For such a confusion we have a parallel in Matt. 22.2-14 (cf. Luke 14.16-24). The Parables of the Wedding Feast and the Wedding Garment (Indeed Manson's *Teaching of Jesus*, pp. 83-6 finds three parables in this passage and so Harnack *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, p. 83). We may tentatively offer the reconstruction as follows (cf. Cooke, *I.C.C.*, pp. 266-9):

vv. 3-5, 6*c*:

Set on, set on the pot.
And pour in water too.
Lay pieces (of meat) therein
Fill up with loins and shoulder
Take of the choicest sheep
And pile the logs beneath it
Boil, boil and seethe
Its bones within it . . .
One-by-one take out the pieces
Casting no lot thereon.

The application is obviously to Jerusalem or to the people of Judah. Just so has the wrath of God brought this people to a full end. There will be nothing left (cf. v. 14):

vv. 6, *a*, *b*, 9*c*. 11:

Therefore thus hath Yahweh said
Woe to the city of bloodshed
The pot whose rust is in it.
Whose rust is not departed
Yea, I will make the pile great

And I will stand it on the coals
That the brass become red-hot,
And be melted while its rust be consumed.

Application: Jerusalem is so permeated with iniquity that she must be destroyed and re-made.

Māšāl in the Book of Proverbs

The meaning given to the word 'is a sentence of ethical wisdom' (B.D.B., *māšāl*, 6).

The word *māšāl* appears as a title to the final collection in 1.1, which apparently refers back to the statement in 1 Kings 5.12 (E.VV., 4.32) from which we can derive no information as to its meaning. Its application to the Book of Proverbs has always been recognised as inappropriate: 'In the first place the book states that Solomon is not the author of all the sections. In the second place, it does not in the least fit several important parts.' (Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 645.) It is reasonable to suggest that the title is taken from 10.1, where it originally belonged and was placed here when 1.2-9 were added as a prefix to the earlier collection. That is to say that the title is not meant to be descriptive of the contents of the whole book any more than the title 'Holy Bible' is meant to include the Preface and Chapter Headings in most editions of the Authorised Translation. The use of the word in 1.1 cannot be used to explain its meaning. The word appears, however, in 1.6 in conjunction with *melīṣāh* as though they are associated terms and both demanding understanding and insight. Remarkably enough, this word appears elsewhere only in Hab. 2.6 also associated with *māšāl*. In post-Biblical Hebrew it is also used with *māšāl*, apparently in the sense of a metaphor: and we may compare the use of the Hiph. participle in Gen. 42.23; Job 33.23; Isa. 43.27 and 2 Chron. 32.31: interpreter, ambassador, intermediary. Clearly, in 1.6 *māšāl* does not mean 'Proverb', but a saying, long or short, which claims attention and requires the understanding of such as are loyal to the Torah. The use of the word in 26.7, 9, is at least consistent with this. The first couplet is not quite clear, but, apparently:

26.7: Hanging down (helpless) are the legs of the lame
And a *māšāl* in the mouth of fools.
9: A thorn goes up in the hand of the drunkard
And a *māšal* in the mouth of fools.

The meaning of the second is clear enough. A drunkard may do himself serious injury by grasping a thorn branch in mistake for a staff to give himself steadiness. Similarly, a man whose legs are weakened by disease may, in trying to stand, do himself a serious injury. So is a *māšāl* in the mouth of fools. But it describes precisely the situation noted by Ezekiel when his contemporaries excused themselves from judgment and hindered themselves and their contemporaries from moral and spiritual regeneration by uttering the parable:

'The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are blunted.'

We are left then with 10.1 and 25.1, both titles of collections described as *mešālīm*. The difficulty in determining from the context the precise meaning of the word here is obvious enough. We cannot determine how much of what follows in the present collection was originally designated by the title. It may be worthy of note that the majority of the verses in Chaps. 10-15 are antithetic in character. The intention is, apparently, to summarise the particular universe of discourse so that a man may compare his situation with the particular saying and judge rightly his manner or condition of life; 25-29 may, perhaps, be subdivided into (*a*) 25-28, which contains some of the wittiest comments on life in the OT (e.g. As one that taketh a dog by the ears is he that vexeth (or mixeth) himself with strife not his own); cf. also the words on the sluggard, 26.14-16, while, (*b*) 28, 29 is mainly antithetical in character. Such sections might well be called parables as setting forth clearly the issues of life in a striking and concrete manner, so that a man of average common sense might assess the manner of his life.

The *māšāl* of the OT, if the conclusions of this study be acceptable, is a powerful rhetorical or literary device. Its origin *may* be in a spoken or active spell followed by the words 'so shall it be!' cf. Godbey, *A.J.S.L.*, 39, 1922-23, pp. 89-108. That is suggested both by the Akkadian and Arabic usage of nouns formed from the root. Nevertheless, the evidence for such a background in the OT is tenuous, and certainly difficult to establish for what appears to be the earlier usages of the word in 1 Sam. 10.12, 24.14, for the Deuteronomic usages and those in Job (the instances where the E.VV. translate by 'by-word') and not at all for the examples appearing in the Book of Pro-

verbs. A case for such a background may be argued for two occurrences in Ezekiel, 'the Forest Fire' and 'the Boiling Cauldron', the occurrences in the Balaam story and, possibly, as a description of the oracles in Isa. 14, 2.4; Hab. 2.6. The possibility of such an origin cannot be ruled out, and it would offer an attractive link between *māšal* to be like and *māšal* have (magical) dominion over. But whether or not that be the origin of the word, it is used with a remarkable consistency in the OT and there appears to be no need to distinguish such diverse meanings as Taunt song, Popular Proverb, Teaching, Oracular speech, Apocalyptic utterance (so Eissfeldt, *Der Maschal im Alten Testament*, Giessen, 1913); nor symbol, prophetic revelation, allegory, proverb, typical case and 'rarely with an element of comparison' (so Hermaniuk, *La Parabole Evangelique*). It is always a Parable expressed in a brief pithy sentence, a vivid and striking speech, a rapidly drawn picture. Not only is it verbal: even a person, individual or corporate, e.g. Job or Israel may be a Parable. It has a clearly recognisable purpose: that of quickening an apprehension of the real as distinct from the wished for, or complacently accepted; of compelling the hearer or reader to form a judgment on himself, his situation or his conduct. It is a recognised and accepted rhetorical or literary genre, as witness the use of a *māšāl* by the contemporaries of Ezekiel. But as used by the prophets it is especially intended to awaken men to the supreme reality of God's present judgment with the intent that they may be saved. This usage persists in 4 Ezra and Enoch, and comes to its finest expression in the Parables of Jesus.

BOOK REVIEWS

God is Light. By E. P. Dickie. Hodder & Stoughton. 17s. 6d.

The avowed aim of Professor Dickie's book is to expound a theology of revelation and response which will do justice to the best in the old liberalism, and also to the best in the more fashionable theology of transcendence. Certainly there have been too many superficial caricatures of liberalism since orthodoxy became trumps, and it is good to be reminded of the gains which liberalism secured, as well as of its weaker points.

In his first chapter Dr Dickie gives sixteen points that were characteristic of liberalism at its best, and these are indeed the positions which his own book is concerned to defend. If there is one conviction underlying them all, it is this, that God's world is essentially one, that creation is built on redemption lines, and that God's revelation to all His human creatures, both inside and outside the Christian Faith, is of the same essential structure. The author is aware of the danger which threatened liberal theologians, and to which some of them fell victims; that with such a system it is not easy to do justice to the Biblical view of sin, and the transcendence and finality of Christ; the category of evolution was apt in liberalism to take the place of the category of revelation. There can be no doubt of Dr Dickie's own desire to do justice to these most essential concerns of Christian doctrine, while avoiding the too sheer dualism of Kierkegaard, which he believes to have been a bad influence on both Barth and Brunner.

The rationalism of the eighteenth century attempted to explain special revelation in terms which it thought fitted to describe general revelation; the tendency of some of our mediating Scottish theologians of today is to describe general revelation in terms which are in the first case fitted to describe the special revelation. This procedure is surely more fitting to the spirit of the Christian faith, though perhaps not without danger to belief in the finality of Christ.

Dr Dickie believes that God is revealed both in Christ and also in nature and conscience; that there may be a true encounter with God, not only for the Christian who meets Him in Christ, but also for other men who meet or have met God (possibly in the pre-existent Word) in nature-mysticism, in beauty, in conscience, in

the search for truth. Such an encounter he holds is always an act of divine grace, of saving significance if the man is obedient. If not, then it is an occasion of judgment. As the Testimony of the Holy Spirit is borne within man's heart when he believes in Christ, so there is a similar work (the same work?) of God's spirit and grace available for all men confronted in any way by God's demand and offer of help. By these means Dr Dickie wishes to narrow the gap between nature and supernature, between growth and givenness, between revelation and response, between God and man. If anything is certain, it is that God can speak through conscience. Kierkegaard so widened the gap between God and man that he was forced to talk of God almost entirely in negative terms, and could think of such monstrosities as the teleological suspension of the ethical, as when he claimed that God demanded from Abraham in faith an obedience that was contrary to conscience.

Here Dr Dickie makes the good point that we must not think of reason and conscience as merely human and invariable faculties—as if reason were a kind of unchanging litmus paper which was able at once to detect the truth or falsity of a claimant to revelation. If it is to be adequate to its object, reason must change to suit the object. Conscience, like reason, may be enlightened and transfigured, called upward by the Spirit of God to new power and adequacy. Where man is humble and repentant, his reason and conscience become more truly rational. And we must not say that the response is wholly human, while the revelation alone is divine. So the attempt to confirm and identify revelation by various rational tests is by no means always an arrogant act, as Karl Barth believes it to be, and as it certainly was in the hands of the eighteenth century rationalists.

A good deal of the book deals with this theme of the confirmation of revelation by human conscience and reason, and with the kindred question: 'What are the conditions of receiving and recognising true revelation?' Some of the conditions are enumerated; repentance, humility, love for others, desire for communion with God, sharing in the worship of the Church, readiness to act on light already shown, readiness to be guided by the insight of Christian friends and by the wise tradition of the Church. But in the last resort there is no final external test by which we can be made sure of God's revelation or guidance.

There is much wisdom in all this, but one question must be raised. Is not Dr Dickie once or twice in danger of the same error that he finds in Berdyaev, the error of confusing between the divine and the human, the testimony of the Spirit and the enlightened reason? In one place he says: 'The reason which identifies revelation then becomes identified with revelation' (p. 133). The words 'becomes

identified' are ambiguous, but if they mean what they appear to, how can the reason bow before revelation, as Dr Dickie rightly says it does, on the previous page? Here for the moment God within us seems to have been fused with us, and we have been merged with the revealing God above us. The necessary transcendence of revelation has not been preserved.

On the question of verification, the Barthians are attacked. 'Revelation, it is said, is infallible, but when we seek to know confidently how revelation can be recognised, the answer is confusion. The Barthian is notoriously open to this difficulty' (p. 209). A quotation is given from Brunner in which the words occur: 'What is capable of proof is by definition immanent in thought, just as revelation transcends thought, and is incapable of proof.' This position Dr Dickie rejects: 'The awkwardness of this statement is that it presents another religious immediacy. It seems that here we have to choose. Either we open the door to complete irrationalism, or we open the door to verification' (p. 210).

There is here a misunderstanding of Brunner. In this one matter, his position is, I think, exactly the same as Dr Dickie's. He agrees that not every experience claiming to be revelation is to be taken at its face-value. There are various tests, mostly of a negative kind, coherence with the rest of revelation, the teaching of the Bible and so on. All that Brunner is contending for in the passage quoted has been said concisely and admirably by Dr Dickie himself on p. 22: 'There is one kind of evidence which comes from reason and is expounded in the logical syllogism, and there is another kind that comes by personal encounter. It is the second that is present in religions certainty. God is not reached by inference from any given reality.'

The test of any liberal theology—or of any theology—is, as Dr Dickie would agree, its power to do justice to the finality of Christ. Here there can be no doubt of his own general intention. He suggests that those theologies which deny, with Calvin and Brunner, the saving power of general revelation—are forced to deny that outside the Christian faith men can be saved. The present writer would agree with Dr Dickie in repudiating the view of the Westminster Confession that only believing Christians can be saved. The scriptural proofs adduced by the Confession are weak, and the view is repellent to those who believe in the love of God, since many men have never had the chance to believe in Christ. There remains the statement in Acts 4.12, where it is said that Christ's is the only name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved. Dr Dickie's reaction here seems uncertain. He says on p. 14 that we agree with Paul and Luther that 'without Jesus man is altogether

lost', and yet suggests that Peter's vision of the vessel let down from heaven may have been a caution against dismissing all Gentile faiths as idolatry or foolishness. Now this is obviously not (as Dr Dickie agrees) what the passage means—it means that God is going to make a free offer of salvation through Christ to the Gentiles. But what could the citing of this verse in this context by Dr Dickie mean except that it was narrowminded of Peter to believe that salvation comes through Christ alone?

Surely we may believe with Peter, that salvation comes through Christ alone, and yet that some who never heard of Him, or were unable to believe, may be saved; for as Professor Hodgson has written—all who in the end are saved, will be saved by Him alone. It is through the objective fact of Christ's incarnation and atonement that God has made it possible for Himself to treat all men, as He does, so far better than they deserve, for all have sinned and come short of His glory. Thus it is because of His act in Christ that He is able to be so gracious to men who have only known Him in His general revelation, whether before Christ's life and death, or after it. This view could be held along with the kind of liberalism that Dr Dickie advocates, which is therefore not necessarily condemned to an inadequate doctrine of Christ's work as Saviour.

There are many other interesting—and some very debatable—points scattered through this book. Perhaps the best thing in it is the excellent answer to Dr Farrer's criticism in his Bampton Lectures of the notion of the believer's personal encounter with God. This could not have been more cogently put.

The structure of the book is a little difficult to detect. Not infrequently it is hard to see the line and march of the argument; occasionally the frequent cross-headings of the paragraphs do not seem to be altogether relevant to the matter contained in the paragraphs, and one reader at least felt that some of the authors criticized should have been either more fully, or less fully dealt with.

Yet the book has its own logic, and there are a number of those happy and vivid illustrations and flashes of wit which Professor Dickie's readers and friends have learned to expect from him.

DAVID CAIRNS

Communion with God in the New Testament. By A. RAYMOND GEORGE. pp. xx+274. Epworth Press, 1953. 25s.

THIS is a most significant and important book. It contains a detailed study of certain New Testament texts, notably the actual prayers of our Lord and of certain New Testament words, notably κοινωνία. It also shows deep inside awareness of the oneness of all truly

Christian and New Testament devotion, however differently interpreted in the various New Testament books.

Heiler's distinction between mystical and prophetic prayer needed such elaboration and critical appreciation with reference to the New Testament evidence. For the root causes of the divisions of Christendom are often concealed by theological rationalisation and revealed in devotional practice. The fact that Mr Raymond George comes down heavily on the prophetic side and disallows the word, mysticism, as a suitable description of any truly Biblical piety, should not deter those who have sat at the feet of von Hügel from studying his work. For the mysticism he disallows is the mysticism of union and absorption and not the mysticism of fellowship and communion. In rightly disallowing the claim of the former to represent the Biblical tradition he perhaps unnecessarily censors any use of the term, mysticism, to describe the latter.

Verbally Mr George has defended his use of terms with great care. But the issues are deeper than questions of verbal terminology and Mr George shows himself well aware of them. I hope that his disallowing of the word, mysticism, and his attempt to prove the central significance of '*κοινωνία*', as opposed particularly to 'vision', for any proper evaluation of Biblical devotion will not tend to a hardening of the Protestant arteries at the very point at which they need the revitalising influence of the living blood-stream of Catholicism.

It is true that Mr George's criticism of Dr Kirk's famous Bampton Lectures on *The Vision of God* restores a Biblical perspective, which the later history of Catholic devotion has tended to distort. It is also true that Catholic ontology badly needs correcting by Biblical eschatology. It is even more true that notions of our present individual and corporate privileges in the life of the body of Christ need keeping in their proper place by remembering how all strands of New Testament theology, however realised their eschatology, look forward to a future bliss far transcending any present experience or indeed any present possibilities of experience. St. Paul's expectation that to be 'with Christ' will be something 'far better' than to be 'in Christ' badly needs stressing today and Mr George has done invaluable service in relating this burning eschatological doctrinal issue to its devotional and ethical implications.

Nevertheless the Biblical spadework, on which Mr George has spent his energies in this book, is only the first step towards the further work on which there is a hint that he may possibly be now engaged. *Communion with God in the New Testament* needs relating to (*a*) the tradition of Catholic mysticism, which is as alive today as it was in the Middle Ages and the Early Church, and also to (*b*) the

tradition of Evangelical piety, which should neither be dismissed by Catholics as an unaccountable overflow of the uncovenanted mercies of God nor idolised by Protestants as the sole legitimate heir to the authentic New Testament tradition.

We need today a synthesis of Dr Kirk's *The Vision of God* and Dr Newton Flew's *The Idea of Perfection*. The strength of Dr Kirk's work lies not only in its beautiful prose, which transforms arid wastes and deserts of theological abstraction and historical fact into green pastures of sheer delight, but also in its comprehensive grasp from within of the richness of the mystical tradition, as it flows from the Alexandrian fathers to the counter-Reformation and beyond. Dr Flew lacks Dr Kirk's beauty of diction and inside awareness of the Catholic tradition, but supplements him splendidly by stressing the Evangelical and post-Reformation tradition of devotion which is quite foreign to Dr Kirk.

It is the bringing together of the traditions represented by Dr Kirk and Dr Flew which is the crying need of our time. Can Mr George help us here? His detailed linguistic study of the Greek word, κοινωνία, shows that he knows the grammar. Can he now give us the composition which will help us not to dismiss Dom Cuthbert Butler's *Western Mysticism* as unbiblical, but rightly to evaluate it and relate it to those Biblical roots, by loyalty to which and by natural growth from which all distinctively Christian devotional and ethical practice must ultimately be judged? With gratitude for this book we look forward to its sequel. J. E. Fison

Concise Bible Commentary. By W. K. Lowther Clarke. pp. 996. London, S.P.C.K. 30s.

Dr Lowther Clarke's amazing versatility and breadth of theological culture have found expression, apart from the many monographs which he has written on New Testament and Patristic subjects, in numerous special studies contributed to composite works such as Dr Gore's *New Commentary on Holy Scripture* and Foakes-Jackson's and Lake's *Beginnings of Christianity*, Vol. II. To the former of these he contributed articles on the Gentile Background of Early Christianity and on New Testament Chronology, and to the latter an important dissertation on the Use of the Septuagint in the Acts of the Apostles. Readers of *Liturgy and Life* also will remember the very suggestive and fascinating pages which he wrote in the prefatory chapter to that work. Now, as the mature product of forty years of Biblical study, Dr Clarke gives us this *Concise Commentary* on the whole of the Old Testament, the Apocrypha and the New Testament, judging that among books of this sort there is room for

the expression of a single mind. We consider that he is right in this judgment. The *Concise Commentary* is a very remarkable achievement both as regards the range of the author's scholarship and as regards the unity and integration of his thought. Over the entire field of the work he has been able to keep abreast of the most recent critical investigation. He has read off the results with clarity of discernment and presented them with an objectivity and dispassionateness of judgment which cannot fail to command confidence and respect.

It is indeed a daring undertaking to drive a one-horse sleigh over so long a road, and Dr Clarke, in commenting on the various books of Scripture, is not able to linger long at any points of call. But he has an eye for essentials, and by wise arrangement and economy of space he has contrived to find room in his equipage for an impressive load of highly informed general studies, extending to more than a third part of the book. These deal with such topics as the history of Israel and the surrounding nations, Hebrew religion, Hebrew institutions and laws, the life and teaching of Jesus, the beginnings of the Church, the life and letters of St. Paul, life in the Gentile churches, miracles in Holy Scripture, New Testament doctrine, and the sacraments. Here for many readers will lie the most valuable and educative part of the whole Commentary, particularly perhaps for the theological student who has not yet many books, but who will find himself suitably introduced to most of the real critical and historical problems with which he has to reckon both in the Old Testament and in the New. If one were to single out the two most instructive chapters in this section, one could hardly fail to select those on 'Hebrew Religion' and 'Doctrine in the New Testament'. These chapters are marvels of order and compression, and they are vitally related to the critical and historical questions which thought has to face at the present day. But everywhere the author has something of a helpful and constructive kind to offer to the reader, and he conveys it in lucid and often in memorable terms.

In a brief notice of so voluminous a work it is not possible to adduce many instances of Dr Clarke's interpretative judgments. But from the chapter on the Sacraments of the New Testament, where the writer is faced by questions demanding a more than usual amount of subjective treatment the following examples may be cited. To the question whether sacraments under their ordinary definition as outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual grace were alien to the Jewish mind, Dr Clarke answers that it was indeed so, for 'the Jewish mind was non-dualistic, and did not think in terms of the contrast between material and spiritual.' The voice at the Baptism of Jesus is interpreted as signifying that God's choice has fallen on Jesus alone: 'For the present He is the only member of the

new community. The Baptism of John has been transformed—not by the act of Jesus, but by God's intervention.' Also, 'the real origin of the Christian rite is the Baptism of Jesus, who in His person underwent the discipline in consonance with the principle of the Incarnation, and worked out its implications in the Cross, Burial, and Resurrection.' *À propos* of present theological interest in clearing up the relation of Confirmation to Baptism Dr Clarke holds that the tendency in Christian history has always been towards differentiation and elaboration; hence we can understand two sacraments being made out of one original sacrament of initiation, not two originally separate sacraments being turned into one. Baptism and Confirmation were primordially one, or Acts with its insistence on the Laying on of Hands at baptism must be rejected as unhistorical. The conclusion of Dr Clarke with regard to the Last Supper is that it was not a Passover observance; it was 'a solemn meal on the lines of the *Kiddush*, but not the actual *Kiddush* either of Sabbath or Passover'.

With regard to Ordination and the Ministry, which fall to be discussed in the same chapter, Dr Clarke has nothing new to say, but on the subject of Marriage in the teaching of Jesus he is led to conclude that the saying in Luke 16.18 gives the original text of the Saviour's word. 'Mark and Matthew will give us the versions current in local Churches, where the saying was adapted to contemporary needs.' Obviously the declaration of Jesus must be considered prior to the question-and-answer form of the pronouncement-story in Mark and Matthew. Dr Clarke also considers that *porneia* in the text of the Apostolic Decrees in Acts 15.20, 29—he does not enter into the textual problem here—meant 'marriage within the prohibited degrees', an interpretation which is attractive and probable in itself, and which is certainly in consonance with the Noachian character of the other regulations. Dr Clarke thinks he sees in this interpretation also a possible explanation of the exceptive-clauses which are found in St. Matthew's version of the teaching of Jesus on Divorce as compared with the unglossed version given by St. Mark and St. Luke.

It is to be added that Dr Clarke has enriched his valuable work by appending a glossary of Bible Words which should be most useful to the student and general reader. WILLIAM MANSON

Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament. By RONALD S. WALLACE. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh. 18s.

IT almost appears that we could begin to talk of a revival of Calvin studies, comparable to the revival of Luther studies which has been

seen in Germany and Scandinavia in recent decades and has now reached to England. At all events, we have had in recent years a notable series of books which are inspired by a common endeavour to penetrate the smokescreen of 'Calvinism' and recover the authentic thought of Calvin himself— such books as *Calvin's Doctrine of Man* by T. F. Torrance and the two independent studies of *Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God* by T. H. L. Parker and E. A. Dowey. Mr Wallace's book forms a solid and valuable addition to this list. It brings together and arranges in an orderly pattern a selection of the most important statements of Calvin bearing on the doctrine of the Word and the sacraments. They are drawn from the whole vast corpus of Calvin's writings, treatises, commentaries, letters, etc., and the labour involved in collecting and arranging them so skilfully must have been prodigious. Mr Wallace's part is much like that of a good chairman, who introduces the principal speaker and at the same time unobtrusively keeps him under control. It must be confessed that the speaker in question is none the worse for being handled in this way; for despite his repeated protestations that he was a lover of brevity, the truth is that Calvin was extremely prolix. Mr Wallace's *catena* binds up Calvin's thought and accelerates its movement.

The book sets forth Calvin's doctrine of the Word and the sacraments (why the title has sacrament in the singular is not clear to me) within the framework of his conception of the revelation of God. According to Calvin, the possibility of a direct revelation of God is excluded because of 'the infinite qualitative difference between God and man'. God adapts Himself to our capacity by revealing Himself indirectly through signs and symbols, so that in every revelation there is a paradoxical combination of unveiling and veiling. The Word and the sacraments correspond to the flesh of Christ, as the lowly forms in which God accommodates Himself to our limited capacity.

Calvin's insistence on the divine accommodation prompts the question how in fact he knows what God is 'in Himself'. If God in His naked majesty is invisible to the human eye and inapprehensible by the human mind, if He is revealed in Christ alone—and Christ is for Calvin the mediator of all divine revelation—how can we get beyond the representation to the reality? Calvin's answer is that while the divine glory is concealed in the flesh of Christ, it is really present there and sometimes shines through, as in the transfiguration and especially the resurrection. Similarly, it is only by the Spirit that the Word can be for us the vehicle of divine revelation. Hence it is clear that Calvin's view of Scripture cannot be identified with that which now goes by the name of fundamentalism, despite

apparent resemblances between them. Mr Wallace goes into this question very clearly and candidly, and he shows that while Calvin did at times express himself in terms which have a fundamentalist sound, in practice he recognised those qualities in Scripture which reflect the humanity of its authors. The necessity of the witness of the Holy Spirit, on which Calvin laid so great stress, precludes any attempt to establish a rational ground for the authority of Scripture.

The most remarkable feature of Calvin's interpretation of Scripture is the contemporaneity of his approach. No doubt it is true that he took insufficient account of the historical character of Scripture and of the historical distance which separates it from us. The historical sense was relatively undeveloped in his time. Yet, Calvin's approach to Scripture is not unhistorical; it is eschatological, as appears from the vigour which he shows in the 'christological' interpretation of the Old Testament, while at the same time striving to do justice to the novelty of the New.

Mr Wallace has collected a great deal of material to illustrate Calvin's doctrine of the sacraments. Calvin's concern was to maintain the distinction between the sign and the thing signified, and at the same time, the unique, spiritual, sacramental connexion between them. Occasional inconsistencies, or shifts of emphasis, are due to the fact that his sacramental doctrine involved him in a war on two fronts. The desire to avoid the error of the Roman doctrine, which confounds the sign with the reality, leads him at times to a negative emphasis which virtually reduces the sacrament to the level of a preacher's illustration; when Calvin, following the disastrous Augustinian precedent, labours to find a definition of the sacrament in terms of the Word and forgets that it belongs to a category of its own, when he speaks of the sacraments as mere appendages to the Word, having no efficacy apart from the Word, one is left wondering why, when we have all that we need in the Word, the sacraments were instituted at all. But when Calvin is warring on the other front against the Zwinglian doctrine of the sacraments as mere signs, his emphasis is more positive; now the sacraments are instruments through which God acts, and in which the reality is given along with the sign; now eating is more than believing and there is a real transaction between Christ and the believer. It is when he is operating on this front that the great strength of Calvin's doctrine of the sacraments appears; it lies in his clear grasp of the uniqueness of the sacramental union and his refusal to seek an interpretation of it in terms of some general sacramental principle (would only that he had followed this rule more consistently). As Mr Wallace well puts it, Calvin sees a parallelism between the human action and the divine in the sacra-

ments, which has its archetype in the hypostatic union and is therefore insusceptible of rational explanation. Calvin's doctrine of the sacraments is in the last analysis a doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

There is, however, a weakness which the material collected by Mr Wallace to illustrate Calvin's doctrine of the Last Supper helps us to see. Calvin's doctrine led him inevitably into complications and inconsistencies because he started out from a fundamental antithesis between the *direction* of the historical work of Christ and that of the Lord's Supper. It escaped Calvin as also to some extent Luther, that the traditional conception of the work of Christ as a sacrifice offered to propitiate the Father, belongs together with the Catholic doctrine of merit and is really incompatible with the basic Reformation discovery of the sufficiency of grace. A revealing chapter in the *Institutes* (II, 17) shows that in fact Calvin's faith was in grace alone (*sola gratia*); it could only feel secure if it were grounded in an act of merit. The consequence of Calvin's retention of this unreformed vestige of Catholicism is that the work of Christ points in one direction, and the Lord's Supper in another, and the attempt to trace an analogical relation between them produces a criss-cross pattern which becomes increasingly complex and confusing. The application to the Lord's Supper of the idea of the Eucharistic sacrifice in any sense save that of simple thanksgiving (which to the recipient of grace is no sacrifice) is irreconcilable with the institution, in which we are commanded not to offer (this was an invention of the second century), but to *take*.

A specially gratifying feature of Mr Wallace's book is the place it gives to Calvin's doctrine of our union with Christ. It may surprise those who know only the Calvin of popular caricature to learn that there was a mystical strain in his thought; yet the frequency with which Calvin reverts to it and the unaccustomed warmth of the language in which he expounds it show that the conception of our mystical union with Christ (the phrase is his) lay near to the inmost citadel of his faith.

GEORGE S. HENDRY

Peter: Disciple—Apostle—Martyr. By OSCAR CULLMANN. S.C.M. 18s.

PROFESSOR FLOYD V. FILSON has now translated for us Oscar Cullmann's important study of Saint Peter.[1] Not only have the recent excavations in St. Peter's Basilica aroused fresh interest in the long disputed question as to Peter's connexion with Rome, but also the Papal claim to inherit his apostolic office and to have the power of St. Peter's Keys is one which is of perennial interest to all branches of the Church.

[1] A review of the German edition appeared in this *Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 2.

Let it be said at once that this book is a model of eirenic scholarship. The controversy over Papal rights has so often degenerated into mutual vilification that it must be a source of satisfaction to Catholics and Protestants alike to note with what fairness and objectivity Professor Cullmann handles this disturbing question. For it is a disturbing question that cannot be roughly brushed aside by an outraged and militant Protestantism which would challenge any statement made from the Vatican if only on principle. The fact remains that the Church of Rome with the power and authority, the wisdom and experience of so many centuries behind it finds itself in a stronger position today after the upheavals of this turbulent half-century, while few Protestant Churches could say the same of themselves. Papal authority is, therefore, not a matter for dismissing with a shrug of the shoulders, but one for careful consideration by all who recognise the remarkable power that the See of St. Peter holds, not only over members of the Roman Communion in all parts of the World but its attraction for many who find divided Protestantism woolly, drab and ineffective. The great merit of Cullmann's book is that it goes so far in recognising the basis on which Papal claims are made. If we as Protestants have been tempted to challenge the primacy of Peter and to put in his place the more congenial figure of Paul, let us be taught by Cullmann to be more respectful of Scripture and tradition.

The book concerns itself, firstly, with an examination of the historical evidence for the place of Peter among the Disciples and in the early Church, and for his connexion with Rome, and, secondly, with a discussion of Papal claims, based on the Vatican's interpretation of Matt. 16.17-19. Cullmann has no difficulty in establishing on the evidence of the Gospels that Peter occupied a particularly representative position, and that the rest of the New Testament bears witness to the fact that after the Death of Jesus he became leader of the Church in Jerusalem. This position he forsook in favour of James when he was delegated by the Church to take charge of the Jewish Christian Mission. His primacy in Cullmann's view came as a consequence of a direct commission from the Risen Lord. We are also obliged to treat him as one of the founders of Christian Theology in that he appears to have been earlier than Paul in grasping the significance of the Death of Jesus (pp. 65-9).

On the question of Peter's connexion with Rome the New Testament provides no concrete evidence. It does, however, attest his martyrdom. Patristic sources add Rome as a probable place of his execution during the Neronian persecution. Liturgical sources contribute little and the recent archaeological excavation under the high altar at St. Peter's cannot be regarded as indicating any-

thing more than that the execution took place in the Vatican area.

Cullmann devotes himself then to the theological question of the meaning of the Dominical utterance in Matt. 16.17, etc.: 'You are Rock, and upon this Rock I will build my Church. . . .' After careful examination he concludes that the saying is genuine, but that it probably belongs properly to the Passion narrative and had its origin in the context of Jesus' intention to build a new People of God upon this Rocklike foundation member. In other words, Cullmann offers us no bolthole from Papal claims on the favourite Protestant grounds that the Matthew saying is an interpolation, since Jesus could not have spoken of building a 'Church' in the modern sense. Nothing, however, is more certain than that Jesus did intend to found an *ekklesia*, which is what the passage means. Further, the other conventional Protestant argument, following the Reformers, that in the Matthew passage 'Rock' meant not Peter but Peter's faith in the true Rock, Christ, is shown to be equally unsound.

Why then, does Cullmann not lead us back to make our submission to the Vatican in dust and ashes? Firstly, because the foundation of the Church was on the unrepeatable apostolate of Peter based on his direct commission from Christ, and his place as first eye-witness to the fact of the Resurrection. To suggest that this apostolic function can be handed on to successors by any kind of 'Apostolic Succession' is to confuse chronological succession with continuation of the apostolic office. The apostolic office of Peter on which the Church was founded was part of the once-for-all divine event in time. All Christian Churches are Catholic and Apostolic and founded upon Peter, if they are guided by the Apostolic Scripture in continuing the building of Christ's Church. Bishops (including the Bishop of Rome) are, like presbyters, useful as guarantors, watchmen, shepherds and interpreters of this unique gift.

Secondly, and with specific reference to Papal claims, if any particular Church were to be entitled to claim today that it had inherited through its connexion with Peter a special position among the rest, it ought to be the Church of Jerusalem, since it was only in that city that Peter was undisputed leader. Not only was Rome of little importance in the New Testament period, but also there is no indication that Peter led the whole Church from there. The claim of Antioch to have Peter as its Bishop is older and better attested than that of Rome.

The fact that, from the beginning of the second century onwards, Rome assumed a leading and increasingly important role in the Church is not disputed, what is denied is that that has anything to do with the Apostolic Age, or that the primacy promised to Peter

in Matt. 16.17, a primacy which was actually exercised by him for a short time in Jerusalem, can possibly be transferred to the Bishops of Rome, Antioch, Corinth or Ephesus, Alexandria or Constantinople, Wittenberg, Canterbury or Geneva, Stockholm or Amsterdam have as much or as little right as Rome to regard themselves as the centre of the Church today or in time to come.

We must all be grateful for this stimulating, lucid and convincing treatment of a crucial issue. WILLIAM NEIL

Christianity in an Age of Science. By C. A. COULSON, F.R.S. O.U.P., 1953. 5s.

PROFESSOR COULSON has come to the fore as the outstanding prophet (or lay evangelist) from the scientific field in this generation. The publication of his Riddell Lectures is a welcome opportunity to face what he has to say in cool contemplation, undistracted by his brilliance as an advocate. The problem, analysed in his first lecture, is about the status, if any, which can be granted to religion in an age of science; and he proposes to establish 'a status freely granted, and even partly proposed, by science' (p. 5). He demolishes the false clues which lead to territorial separation, and goes on to analyse with rare skill the subtle and intimate 'Man-Nature-God' relationship within which science arises as a 'search for meaning and satisfaction', and thus as 'an essentially religious activity' (cf. p. 33). In his second lecture he speaks of man's encounter with Nature as one moment in his whole encounter with reality, where the 'models' by which experiences are related together in a satisfying and orderly scheme will differ from those appropriate in other moments without, however, producing conflict. He has an 'analogy of the mountain', which in fact dominates his whole story, and though he is aware of how it breaks down eventually, it seems to me that it has lured him far in the direction of a 'holist' and heretical Christianity before he decides to drop it. In the third lecture he traces the 'common quality or coherence in the idea and person of God' pertaining to the scientist and the Christian, to substantiate his thesis that science and religion are basically one. Some of his points here are less substantial than one would like. I am sure he is prepared to meet carping criticism from a theologian, and I could think up quite a lot. But I would not use it to detract from the stature of this short, brilliantly written and intensely stimulating book, which ought to be widely read and pondered. There is greatness in the author's scientific vision, humanity and religion, which must enrich every reader.

W. A. WHITEHOUSE

Holy Communion and Holy Spirit. By J. E. L. Oulton. pp. 203. S.P.C.K., 1951. 15s.

In this persuasive book Dr Oulton seeks to redress a tendency to treat the Eucharist in isolation from the life of the Church as a whole. In its true context the Eucharist reflects that experience of the Holy Spirit which is characteristic of *all* the Church's life.

A beginning is made with a consideration of the relationship between 'the fellowship of the upper room' and the institution of the sacrament, because the institution within the framework of an already existing fellowship of loyalty and devotion is a pointer to the place of the Eucharist within the Church, The events of the Last Supper, as recorded in the New Testament, did not constitute a new relationship between Jesus and the disciples. Consequently a valid doctrine of the sacrament sees no difference in kind between the grace received through it and the 'indwellingness' of the Spirit at other times; the mystical and the sacramental, so far from being opposites, are different aspects of what is fundamentally the same experience. 'Indeed we are true to the teaching of the New Testament and to that of Christian mystics when we affirm that the presence within us of Christ is the very thing which stirs the soul to "seek" him as he "comes" in the Sacrament' (p. 184). *Tu ne me chercherais pas, si tu ne m'avais trouvé.*

Dr Oulton then goes on to develop his thesis by a painstaking study of Acts, the Pauline epistles, the Johannine writings, and Hebrews, as all testifying in various ways to the close relationship in the life of the Early Church between spiritual and eucharistic experience.

He opposes McNeile's sharp differentiation of the Spirit in Acts as an impersonal *afflatus* coming upon men from the Pauline conception of the Spirit as an abiding presence which is the equivalent of Christ Himself, and cites in support such passages as Acts 6.3 and 11.24 which describe respectively the Seven and Barnabas as 'full of (Holy) Spirit'. The absence of the definite article would seem to raise questions here; but leaving aside exegesis of individual passages, it is perfectly clear that the Church in Acts is a Spirit-filled community gathering for 'the breaking of bread' in expression of that joy and unity in daily life which were the gift of the Spirit at Pentecost.

To Paul, again, it is the Holy Spirit who maintains the unity of the Church, and dwells in the individual member from the moment of baptism. This indwelling presence is mystical, but not in a non-sacramental sense. If it is asked how Paul relates the Eucharist to this presence, the answer is the same as in the case of the institution of the sacrament and in that of Church life in Acts: the Eucharist presupposes the Spirit-governed fellowship. 'Thus, though 1 Cor.

11.17-34 contains no direct reference to the Holy Spirit, St. Paul's censure of the lack of fellowship and the lack of self-discernment is a sufficient indication, especially when his teaching in other passages is remembered, that neglect to use the gift of the Holy Spirit, both corporately and individually, was at the root of the abuses which had arisen in connexion with the Sacrament' (p. 58).

Almost all of what Dr Oulton has to say about Johannine teaching concerns the discourse in John 6. He makes no reference to the allusion to the sacraments in 19.34 and he declines to follow Bede, Westcott and others in finding in the dependent passage 1 John 5.6-8 any clear sacramental content, although this would further have illustrated his thesis. He judges the absence of any New Testament parallel to the use of the word 'blood' for the Eucharist to be a fatal objection to taking the passage in this way. But the centrality of this word in the tradition of the institution and in the Johannine eucharistic discourse is surely reason enough.

There is sharp divergence of view regarding possible eucharistic references in Hebrews. Dr Oulton gives careful attention to the most important of the passages, Heb. 13.9-16 (pp. 110 ff). Dissenting alike from Westcott, who interpreted 13.10 of the Eucharist, and from Moffatt, who saw no such reference, Dr Oulton puts forward a view of his own. 'The meaning of *v.* 10 is that Christians have an altar whereof they have no right to eat whose worship is sensuous and earth-bound' (p. 113). The altar is not specified, but 'is in the sphere of invisible realities, whether it be Jesus Himself or Jesus conceived of as high priest and victim'. Whichever view is adopted, there is no doubt that Hebrews, in comparison with Pauline and Johannine writings, is deficient in its teaching on sacramental grace and on the Holy Spirit alike.

In an important chapter on the implications of the New Testament evidence Dr Oulton makes some wise and balanced observations on the divergence between Eastern and Western practice in consecration, and on the *epiclesis*. The omission, in more primitive liturgies such as the Ethiopic and Nestorian, of the petition that the Holy Spirit may descend upon the congregation (as well as upon the elements), is in accord with Dr Oulton's argument that the New Testament gives to the doctrine of the indwellingness of the Spirit in the Church and its members priority over the presence of Christ imparted in the Eucharist. He quotes from a post-communion hymn the words

> Jesu, gentlest Saviour,
> Thou art in us now,

and asks, 'What would St. Paul or St. John have made of that "now"?' (p. 131). Against this, however, must be placed the *marana*

tha of the Early Church which, while eschatological, expresses also the experience of the presence of the Risen Christ at the Eucharist which, though not different in kind from his continual abiding presence, was felt to be especially real because it was a foretaste of the joys of the Messianic banquet in the Kingdom of God.

Among the implications of the argument of this book is the relation between baptism and the eucharist, to which Dr Oulton devotes a whole chapter. He naturally finds himself more in agreement with Hooker that the grace received in the latter continues the new life begun in baptism and does not impart something new, than with O. C. Quick, for whom the grace received in baptism 'is but the initial impulse of the divine power to start him upon his heavenward way', which is maintained by participation in the Eucharist. Dr Oulton brings plain common sense and the facts of experience to bear on a topic which only too easily can become a subject for academic ecclesiastical debate divorced from reality.

Not the least of the merits of this book is its eirenical, dispassionate spirit. The case it presents will, in its main features, command wide assent. There are, however, questions of some importance to which the reviewer would give different answers. For example, a much more radical interpretation of the Last Supper is permissible than what is offered in the second chapter. Exponents (such as Billerbeck, Dalman, and Jeremias) of the view that the meal was a Passover are not mentioned, and the difficulties attaching to the Johannine dating are not faced.

A. J. B. Higgins

The Life and Person of Jesus Christ. By H. E. W. Turner. pp. 62. S.P.C.K. 1s. 9d.

This pamphlet is one of a series for Christian discussion groups, and each short chapter is provided with a bibliography and questions for discussion. The first two sections deal with the sources for our knowledge of Jesus and include an outline of the results of literary and form criticism. There follow a simple account of the life of Jesus, and two sections on His teaching about the Kingdom and about love for God and man. The remaining sections describe what Jesus knew Himself to be, what the early Christians thought of Him, and what He means today.

The author's aim is to describe the main conclusions of present-day critical study because he 'is convinced that they make it possible for the modern Christian as for his first century predecessor to cry "My Lord and my God" '. Detailed criticism would therefore be

beside the mark, but some general comments may be offered. (1) The treatment would have been much helped by a section on the political and religious background. Without such information, it is not at all easy to understand the Gospel conflict stories. (2) There is little sense of purpose and movement in the life of Jesus as it is here described. (3) The important tendency in modern study to base exegesis on careful examination of Old Testament patterns is little represented. Few people seem able to follow the subtler exponents of this method; but the Old Testament is often the simplest and most helpful clue to the ordinary reader of the Gospels. (4) By and large, the book lists and questions are a good deal too difficult, even for university students.

All the same, any group that gets to grips with this booklet will learn a very great deal and Professor Turner will deserve their gratitude. KENNETH GRAYSTON

New Testament Studies. By C. H. DODD. Manchester University Press. 16s.

THERE are eight essays in this book, all have been printed before but not all have been hitherto readily accessible—indeed the essay on Eternal Life is now printed in this country for the first time. This, the Ingersoll Lecture for 1949-50, offers a fuller treatment than the study of this same subject in the author's *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*. Dodd maintains that the 'life of the ages' has come upon those who believe in Jesus Christ and its quality is therefore now open to examination. He concludes that at no moment is the life of men inherently imperishable, but at every moment it is indestructible so far as it consists in a personal relation with God.

The other Ingersoll Lecture, 'The Communion of Saints', argues that immortality is not for the individual as such but the individual in his relations with his neighbour. Membership of the Church means participation in a society capable of perfection, and only in this society can men be perfected. Dodd deals with the problem of the undeveloped soul, citing the Old Testament heroes of Hebrews 11 as examples of those who 'in the timeless order beyond our earth' may yet fulfil their destiny by drawing upon the treasury of life to which more enlightened children of God have contributed. One may feel that in this interpretation such emphasis is placed upon the community that there is danger of losing sight of the fact that it is God who perfects, and this may be part of the reason why, as Dodd observes, the subject of this essay plays little part in much Protestant theology.

One other essay, Natural Law, falls within the scope of Biblical theology. Of the other essays two are on 'The Mind of Paul' and three are concerned with the pre-literary tradition behind the Gospels.

The belief expressed in the preface that, although the discussion in two or three cases has moved on since the time of writing, the considerations adduced are still not altogether irrelevant is justified by the essay, 'The Framework of the Gospel Narrative', printed in 1932. In 1952 H. E. D. Sparks wrote that Rawlinson's *St. Mark* is, 'probably the best commentary on the English text of any Biblical book available', and it is the view found there of the unreliability of the Markan framework which this essay contests.

The value of this book for students is enhanced by the full indices (Nominum, Rerum, Locorum).

There is an error on p. 37—*αὐτῶν τὴν ὑπόκρισιν* is not from Matthew's account of the Tribute Money but is found in Mark's.

V. Parker

The Evolution of the Christian Year. By A. Allan McArthur. pp. 192. S.C.M. Press, 1953. 15s.

This is an important and erudite work. The title is misleading, for the book is concerned chiefly with the origins and early evolution of the principal festivals of the Christian Year, except for a glance at Scottish usage from the Reformation to the present day; and the whole elaborate medieval development is left untouched. But the period with which it deals—the first five centuries—was the basically formative period of the Christian Year's development; and Dr McArthur musters and handles his complicated material with signal skill, judgment, and patience.

His method is to start from a firm base at as early a point as possible, then by working forwards and backwards to search out the origins and principles of each feast or season, so disclosing its nature and purpose. Thereafter he examines the development or confusion which later emerged. Even where it is not possible to agree fully with Dr McArthur, or where the problem eludes final solution, we recognise gratefully his clear and patient unravelling of tangled evidence by no means coherent in sequence or locality, and his task made specially difficult by the conflicting computations of time current during these centuries, and the varying meanings of such terms as the Christian Pasch.

Dr McArthur begins with the Christian week and an exposition of Sunday, 'the first day of the week', 'the Lord's Day', or 'the Lord's Day of the Lord', as the basis of the Christian Year. It is, he

declares, 'the foundation of the entire structure', and he arrays the evidence in telling fashion. The resurrection of our Lord almost immediately fixed Sunday as the primary Christian day of worship. This we all know, but seldom has the evidence been so plainly and convincingly stated; and in the history of the Church, not least in our own communion, this basic fact has often been so obscured as almost to be disregarded. It is unfair, however, to arraign the Puritans too severely 'for the application of the Jewish term Sabbath to the Christian Sunday', for in fact the early Reformers and Puritans preferred the historic and central designation 'the Lord's Day', and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries many who were not Puritans used the term 'Sabbath' for Sunday. Moreover, the seeds of this confusion were sown very early, as Dr McArthur shows; and in medieval times also the decisive importance of the resurrection was often obscured by the excessive and divisive emphasis placed upon our Lord's suffering and death.

He also traces in an illuminating way the Jewish computation of time and its influence upon Christian practice, and the meaning of such terms as 'station' in the Christian vocabulary. He examines too, with searching insight, the question of weekly as against daily (and yearly) communion, showing that weekly communion on the Lord's Day was the early norm: 'It was on the Lord's Day, the Day of Jesus the Victor, Jesus the King, and on the morning of that day, that the central common worship of the Church took place.' He shows how, through various influences (perhaps not least, though he hardly mentions this, through the constant use of the Lord's Prayer—'Give us this day our *daily* bread') this emphasis was clouded by a growing practice among the devout of more frequent celebrations, and concludes with the observation that 'the validity of daily celebrations may be questioned'. Here, indeed, is food for thought.

A criticism Dr McArthur makes at this point of the *anamnesis* in the Consecration Prayer of the *Book of Common Order 1940* falls to be considered. He objects to what he describes as that prayer's 'concentration on the passion alone', and contrasts it with the *Apostolic Tradition*. The *Book of Common Order* reads 'having in remembrance the work and passion of our Saviour Christ, and pleading His eternal sacrifice . . . ', and Hippolytus writes 'having in memory therefore His death and resurrection . . . '. But the contrast is merely verbal. In the paragraph immediately preceding the clause to which Dr McArthur objects, august thanksgiving has been made not only for our Lord's passion but also for His resurrection and heavenly ministry. There is no room whatever for misunderstanding; and the intention is made doubly secure by the use of the word 'eternal' in the phrase 'pleading His eternal sacrifice'. Here is no concentration

on the passion alone 'offered once for all', but a concentration on its eternal reality possible only of a living Risen Lord who continually makes intercession for us. Dr McArthur has surely missed this point entirely. The fact of the resurrection dominates the whole prayer in the *Book of Common Order*, and the stress upon the resurrection is quite as strong as in Hippolytus's formula; the difference is that in the *Book of Common Order* the eschatological reality is more profoundly expressed. It is indeed true, as Dr McArthur says, that 'it is in the light of the resurrection that the Church sees our Lord's death'. Take away, or obscure that light, and all is darkness.

To follow Dr McArthur in detail through his exposition of the early evolution of Christmas and Epiphany, Good Friday and Easter, Ascension and Pentecost, is not possible here. At each point he exposes and analyses the evidence with the utmost care, and arrives at the conclusion that these festivals were all originally unitive. This view, if it be valid as I have long believed it to be, increases our understanding of the wholeness of the Christian Faith in contrast to a tendency among some towards its segmentation. Dr McArthur does not claim absolute finality for all his conclusions, but his investigation is as thorough and painstaking as his modesty is obvious He has rendered a cardinal service to all who love the Christian Year, and his fascinating study demands the attention not only of scholars but of general readers.

For example, his exposition of the Last Supper and our Lord's death in relation to the primitive Pasch, involving an understanding of the conflicting chronology of the Synoptic and Johannine accounts is perhaps the most suggestive treatment which has yet appeared in English. I do not find myself in complete agreement with it, but examining the problem from a liturgical as well as exegetical and theological point of view, he succeeds in throwing light on every knotty point, and especially upon the Johannine narrative. Most English scholars who have written on this subject have obviously been more at home in the field of New Testament than liturgical studies, and they have consequently failed to discern the relation of the New Testament to the worshipping Church. Their approach has been exegetical and theological, and their treatment therefore sadly incomplete, for these things cannot be understood in a theological vacuum. This dissociation from the worshipping life of the Church has been a tragic weakness in much theological and New Testament teaching, particularly from the Reformation to the present day. It has been related to ethics but not to worship, and has not been seen in the perspective of the Church's historic practice at prayer, which in its turn has suffered much confusion.

When we turn, however, to Dr McArthur's concluding suggestions

for a revisal of the Christian Year within the Church of Scotland we must survey them with caution. Not that, on the whole, they are not moderate, reasonable, and illuminating; but more study is still desirable. This study, I am convinced, should be done ecumenically, rather than from within an individual Church; and revision, if it is ultimately held to be desirable (as on some points it should be), would be more fruitful and sure if it arose out of some ecumenical agreement. To begin a unilateral revision and experiment would produce an unfortunate confusion. But even without radical revision of the Christian Year as we know and practise it, this book can do much to enlarge and deepen our understanding of it. We may hope, therefore, that it will be widely read and pondered, and receive the welcome it eminently deserves.

The style of writing is, on the whole, simple and lucid, with an absence of technical terms used for their own sake, and the evidence is given in English translation. More care, however, might usefully have been given to paragraphing; and had such too frequently recurring expressions as 'in connexion with', 'in that case', 'with regard to' been rigorously excluded, the writing would have gained greatly in force and clarity, for these odious compound prepositions invariable dull the sharp edge of any sentence where they occur.

WILLIAM D. MAXWELL

Leiturgia. Handbuch der evangelischen Gottesdienst. Herausgegeben von KARL FERDINAND MÜLLER und WALTER BLANKENBURG. Johannes Stauda-Verlag, Kassel.

Die Neuordnung des Gottesdienstes in Theologie und Kirche. By KARL FERDINAND MÜLLER. Sonderdruck aus *Theologie und Liturgie.* Johannes Stauda-Verlag, Kassel.

THE first of these important works is to appear in 18 parts, each of about 80 pages, to be published at approximately two-month intervals, and each costing DM 3.80. Binding cases for the ultimate three volumes will be supplied at DM 3.50 each. The prospectus awakens keen anticipation. The subject of volume one is the history, doctrine and forms of Evangelical Worship. The first section outlines the history of Christian worship from New Testament times to the present day. This is followed by an essay on the doctrine of worship. Further sections will deal with the liturgical aspects of church architecture and the Ecclesiastical Year. The Eucharistic Service will be discussed in detail. Volume two will deal with Baptism, Confirmation, Ordination and the other occasional services, and will appear after volume three, which will be devoted to church music—the psalms and hymns of the Eucharist and the

Daily Office, Gregorian and polyphonic music, congregational and choral singing and training, organ and other instrumental music.

All this forms an exciting programme. So far only the first two parts have come to hand, and it may be said at once that if the later parts reach the standard of these two, this work will be of the utmost value to all liturgists, even outside the Lutheran Church.

The historical outline which is by Rudolf Stählin covers the ground admirably. A brief introduction emphasises that the basic principle which binds the different liturgies together, and the critical principle by which all liturgical development must be directed and judged, are one and the same, namely, the words of our Lord: 'This do in remembrance of me.' Among the difficulties in the consideration of the history of worship are these, that so many factors have shared in the formation of the liturgy, that the modern man uses categories of thought very different from those of the Fathers of the Church, and that sources for the first formative years are scarce. The introduction gives also a brief survey of the progress of scientific study of the history of worship, and provides a list of the most important text-books. At this point attention may be drawn to the excellent bibliographies which stand at the head of each section. Most of the references are to German books, but some translations are mentioned, and also some of the more important works in other languages. This bibliographical feature will be most valuable to students.

The history itself is compressed into 80 pages, and one cannot expect to find very detailed treatment of some of the interesting problems. The Eastern Liturgies receive only six pages, the views of Zwingli and of Calvin one page each, and the Anglican Liturgy and the Tridentine reform of the Roman Liturgy two pages each. Emphasis is naturally given to the developments in Germany both in the Middle Ages and after the Lutheran Reformation. This in a general history would seem a little out of proportion, and the brief treatment of, say, Calvinistic worship suggests an undervaluation of the importance for worship of this reformer and his work. But after all this is a text-book on Lutheran worship, and what is said is clear and illuminating.

The second part offers the commencement of Peter Brunner's contribution on the doctrine of worship, which will occupy over 200 pages. He begins with a particularly inclusive and up-to-date bibliography covering the whole literature of his subject. The first section contains an interesting and valuable discussion on the use in the Early Church of words such as *latreia*, *threskeia*, *leiturgia*, *ekklesia*, *synagoge*, *synaxis*, and of the words by which they were translated in later times. The second section (which has since

appeared), discusses the threefold dimension of worship from the point of view of dogmatics, anthropology and cosmology. The largest portion of this section deals with the place of worship within God's universal *Heilsoekonomie*. The ideas of worship as expressed in the Scriptures, among heathen peoples, and in the Church, are carefully examined and are related to the whole purpose of God.

At a time when the dogmatic approach to the meaning of worship is being widely adopted, this contribution must prove helpful and directive. It will appear from what has been said that *Leiturgia* will be a valuable addition to liturgical works, and it is to be hoped that it may be possible to translate at least some parts of the work for the use of English readers who at present have little to guide them on Lutheran worship.

The dogmatic approach is further exemplified in Karl Ferdinand Müller's contribution to *Theologie und Liturgie* which is available separately. The discussion arises from the progress of the Liturgical Renewal in Germany which has both theological and liturgical consequences. Part I deals first with the writings of Karl Barth and Wilhelm Stählin, contrasting in a very interesting manner their fundamental ideas. To the former Word and Sacrament are *Zeichen der Verkündigung*, to the latter, *Erscheinungsformen des Mysterium*. This contrast, however, cannot be drawn too sharply for the *Zeichen der Verkündigung* are signs, not merely cognitive but effective, of the mystery of union with Christ. Other writers are also discussed. The second part considers the development of the Liturgical Revival and its influence in the recent *Ordnungen*. The volume closes with a useful bibliography in two parts, first, a list of *Ordnungen* and Hymn-books, mostly issued in the last thirty years, and second, a list of recent books on the doctrine of worship. The whole subject is treated on a very high level, and any who would direct their attention to the theology of worship must take this work into account.

JOHN A. LAMB

Vetus Latina. By P. DR BONIFATIUS FISCHER. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel. Nach Petrus Sabatier neu gesammelt und herausgegeben von der Erzabtei Beuron. I. Verzeichnis der Sigel. II. Genesis. Verlag Herder Freiburg, 1949, 1951.

A. JÜLICHER, speaking of Sabatier's text, urged that 'the patristic quotations should not be cited from Sabatier, but direct from the MSS. or the best editions' (*T.L.Z.*, 1908, p. 328). He did not live to see this. The posthumous edition of his NT Old Latin does not supply patristic witnesses, and his work on the OT was interrupted by his loss of sight before it was far enough advanced to form even

the basis of an edition. I therefore most warmly welcome Dom Bonifatius Fischer's Beuron edition. It is based on the huge collection of quotations made by the late J. Denk, thoroughly checked and supplemented by Fischer.

The first part gives lists of the MSS. and Fathers employed, the second carries the text to Gen. 9.14. Within the framework of Rahlfs' LXX text and the new Vulgate text of St. Jerome's Abbey, Rome, there is an edition of the remnants of the pre-Vulgate text. Where the evidence is uniform we read one text, called L(atin); elsewhere there are several texts, according to the development to be observed in the sources, both African and European. A critical apparatus relates the Latin variants to the Greek, including the more recent translations. A second apparatus, filling more than half of the space, is devoted to the quotations and allusions on which the reconstruction is based. Indefatigable industry is combined with sober judgment, and the editor's approach could not be more modest. The Introduction is as brief as possible in order that the edition should not be delayed by attempting at the same time to solve all the critical problems. He frankly calls his lists provisional and does not hesitate to supplement them when necessary. The arrangement itself is submitted only as a tentative solution and suggestions are invited.

Dom R. Weber, an authority on the Vulgate, has argued that Fischer's scale is too ambitious. As a specialist on the LXX I regret that Rahlfs' text, however superior to his predecessors', is treated as final even in places where the O.L. itself supports the most obvious emendations. I give three examples:

(i) The 'sons of God', Gen. 6.2, 4, presents a dogmatic difficulty which the early translators met by substituting *ἄγγελοι θεοῦ* (cf. *Philo's Bible*, pp. 20 f). As J. E. Grabe saw, the Greek Fathers generally support this reading. The later school read *υἱοὶ θεοῦ*, in agreement with the Hebrew. Rahlfs prefers the secondary *υἱοί*, presumably because in v. 4 *ἄγγελοι* is supported only by 72 (m) and Philo *immut.* § 1. Latin patristic evidence is markedly in favour of *ἄγγελοι*. St. Augustine and St. Jerome struggled against it in support of Aquila's and Symmachus' *υἱοί*.

(ii) In Gen. 3.24, the story of the expulsion from paradise, the LXX, instead of *God placed . . . the Cherubim*, reads *placed him* (Adam) *. . . and posted* (*καὶ ἔταξεν*) *the Cherubim*. There are variants to this awkward text, but the O.L. reflects it unanimously. Holmes saw that *ἔταξεν* was a marginal variant to *κατῴκισεν*. Philo did not know it. In *cher* § 1 Cohn following § 11, rightly deleted *καὶ ἔταξε* as a lemma alteration. The Armen. qu. I 57 attests *κατοικίζει τὰ χερουβὶμ καὶ τὴν φλογίνην ῥομφαίαν*. And even pap. 911, when rightly supple-

mented, against its editor Sanders, agrees with the Philonic text which corresponds to the Hebrew. This certainly is the genuine text which was lost in the Latin until Jerome reverted to the Hebrew.

(iii) For Gen. 4.25 more is required than the note that, in conformity to the Hebrew, *dicens* is omitted in Jerome's *quaest. Hebr. in libro Geneseos* and λέγουσα in 'Phil-codd-omn½Clem'. Except for Wendland's mistaken conjecture in *post. Cain.* § 124 (cf. *Philo's Bible*, pp. 90 ff), it is not found in the Greek or Armenian Philo. Moreover, pap. 911 reads εἶπεν δέ. The Samaritan has וַיִּקְרָא instead of וַתִּקְרָא so that there must have been two interpretations of long standing as to whom to attribute the exclamation. Fischer himself quotes Beda Ven. *unde apte apud LXX translatores nato eo dixisse fertur pater sive mater eius: suscitavit.* There is still more to be gleaned from Fischer's collected quotations. So Anon²: *deinde genuit Adam loco Abel . . . et vocavit nomen eius Seth.* This interpretation emerges as soon as we remove the passage indicated by dots which, as Lagarde has seen, belongs to the birth of Cain (Gen. 4.1), *de quo ait mater: conparavi hominem per Deum.* To add to the oddities of patristic comment, Ambrosiaster has about Cain: *sicut dicit Adam de Cain: procreavi . . . Deum;* and Isid. Sevill.: *pater eius ait: Cain, id est: possedi . . . Deum.* Julianus of Eclanum makes both share: *Eva vocavit nomen eius Cain; sed quid inquit, dicit Adam. Audiamus: possedi . . . Deum.* Whence this vaccilation? Early texts, mainly J, attribute the naming of children to the mother, late texts (P) to the father, and the two often appear side by side. Hence the assimilations which deserve a chapter of its own. Similarly assimilation to parallel passages, frequently in neighbouring verses, often yields the explanation of variants. They are carefully marked in Rahlfs' Genesis edition of 1926, but have to some extent been overlooked by Fischer. In 3⁸ the notes on the omission of τοῦ θεοῦ and κυρίου must be transposed. In some passages Fischer follows Brooke and M'Lean in attributing readings to the Armenian and 'Philo', instead of Arm. and Phil-arm. Whether these quotations are peculiar to the Armenian or taken from Philo's Greek, is difficult to tell. Nor should the texts edited by Aucher be styled '*fragments*', as is done by the Cambridge editors and Fischer. A few passing remarks about the MSS. of the LXX (p. 22) are rash; they will no doubt be corrected later.

One point should be made. If Fischer would correct the impression that his LXX and Vulgate texts are final, his O.L. texts would stand out much more clearly as early and frequent decisive witnesses to the Greek from which they derive.

PETER KATZ

The Years of Fulfilment. By Norman Maclean, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton. 20s.

It is getting on to twenty years since Norman Maclean retired, and so he is not so well known a figure to many in the Church today, but no one who knew him well could ever forget him or cease to be grateful for his distinctive personality, his shy charm, and his occasionally mordant wit. He stood for many years in the front rank of the preachers and churchmen of Scotland, and he was easily the best Christian journalist of his time. It is not surprising that leading newspapers recognised his gifts and used them to the full for a quarter of a century. He was probably the best ministerial journalist for a full century. His articles 'In our Parish' were a superb example, and he takes us into his confidence as to the manner in which *The Scotsman* sought him out as 'one who can write on grave subjects', and he recognises the vast power of the press exercised from 'the pulpit on the Bridges' and elsewhere.

All Dr Maclean's friends were hoping that he would live to complete his memoirs, especially as the first two volumes had brought readers up just to the beginning of that period when he became and remained a public figure. He tells us at the close of this book of his own eagerness to see the task finished, and we are much indebted to his daughter for arranging the material and adding the short final chapter. His ministeries in Colinton, Park Church, Glasgow, and St. Cuthbert's, Edinburgh, are dealt with, and also several outstanding occasions after his retirement. Behind it all there is a vivid picture of a changing Scotland; and it is not possible to read this book, and especially such pages as 82-6, without feeling how much some things have improved even in the last fifty years. There is a discerning selection of representative incidents, and leading characteristics of movements and men. The human touch is never lost, the interest in persons is unflagging, and notably those somewhat quaint in character or pawky in speech. He is not altogether friendly to lawyers, as one of the earlier volumes revealed, and he can put the heritors in their place, and even the leaders of Presbyteries. His sermon on the Gadarene swine was apparently very telling, and his description of the women of Colinton discussing the proposed new church at a tea-party is inimitable. It is all done with an apparently effortless felicity of style, with beautifully constructed sentences, ingenious phrases and vivid analogies.

It may be questioned if Dr Maclean quite understood men like Chalmers or Rainy, and his judgments on the Disruption and on the Union of 1900 with its subsequent events are less than reliable. This third volume confirms the impression made by its two predecessors that Dr Maclean never wholly got over the deep animosities

created by the ecclesiastical strife, that he was too familiar with in his boyhood and early ministry, and he shows a curious sympathy for the minority that did not enter the Union of 1900 for whom he was apparently asked to write.

The story of the negotiations that led to the Union of 1929, in which he took a leading part, is given ample space here. It is a little surprising that he ascribes so much influence to Dr William Mair as a pioneer of the Union movement. When he is dealing with tendencies which did not command his sympathy, he is apt to dismiss them too readily as 'idealists in a hurry'—a conception which he overworks. What he has to say on the question of larger reunion in the light of the famous Kikuyu controversy is fascinating, and his judgments of the Iona Community are surprisingly sympathetic, while he regards the decision of the General Assembly on the Govan case as one of their resounding blunders. The book contains one prophecy of a personal kind which many would like to see fulfilled. He is optimistic enough to believe that love and conciliation will prevail in our world, and to those who have been Moderators, or may yet be, he holds out the consolation that they will 'retain throughout their remaining years something of the perfume which seems to cling to an empty rose-bowl'!

GEORGE S. GUNN

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RECENT BIBLICAL STUDIES AND THEIR DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS

by The Rev. T. S. GARRETT

The survey of recent trends in Old Testament Scholarship, entitled *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, has indicated the changes of approach which have taken place in the present generation. The consensus of opinion amongst the acknowledged authorities who have contributed to this volume seems to be that, while the older methods of study have by no means been driven from the field and the opinions of scholars who ignore them should be treated with caution, the new approach, associated in particular with the names of Swedish scholars, which seeks to trace the growth of Hebrew literature through the oral tradition of cultic circles has, in spite of doubts and opposition, now gained a place as an approved method of study beside the methods evolved in a previous generation. The result has been a profound change in the pattern of the Old Testament which critical scholarship presents to us. It is not without significance that a similar method began to be applied at an earlier date to the analysis of the oral tradition behind the New Testament. There too, this method has gained its place as one of the approved methods of study, though by no means the only one. There too our concept of the way in which the Gospels, in particular, came to be compiled has undergone a transformation.

Before we consider the implications of these changes for our view of the Bible and the nature of the revelation which it contains, we must survey briefly the new Biblical pattern which is emerging. The change might be depicted in the Old Testament diagrammatically, the old pattern being indicated by a series of dots, larger ones of different colours representing the major events of Biblical history, the great personalities who responded to those events, and the major documents which have been traced by the source critics in the books of the Bible. Beside the larger dots would be smaller ones denoting the

numerous anonymous or spurious pericopai and redactional additions which have been woven together with the older literary strata. There would be connecting lines between one dot and another in some places; but the general impression given by the diagram would be one of fragmentation and miscellaneous variety to which the final editors of the Biblical books had only succeeded in giving a superficial unity, though this might not necessarily prevent our perceiving a unity of theme in the Bible as a whole.

In the diagram of the new pattern the dots would remain; but the smaller ones would be grouped around the larger ones in circles, and these circles, in turn, would, for the most part, be linked to one another to form a chain, perhaps not a very regular, or always continuous, one; but nevertheless exhibiting a similarity of shape in each of its links throughout its length.

To turn from diagram to direct description, in all the different strata of Biblical literature there seems to have been activity within a group or community forming a vital part in the process of literary development. Individual law givers and inspired judges only appear from behind a screen of legal tradition and codification, some of the codes which can be distinguished having found their form as a result of legal practice at the primitive level, others owing their present structure and content to revision resulting from prophetic inspiration and, in the case of the ceremonial law, to the prophetically inspired reform of the priestly tradition. In each case more ancient tradition and precedent has doubtless been transformed in accordance with contemporary needs and insights.

Again, the facts of Israel's history appear to have reached their final presentation, firstly through the medium of an oral tradition of countless story-tellers, with cultic connexions, who have added a religious interpretation in the telling, as well as a number of legendary accretions of edifying intent. Secondly this oral tradition has at many points been given a radically new interpretation and emphasis by teachers, some, no doubt, in the process of reducing it to writing, the interpretation being in accordance with the dogmas of the time at which they wrote. Sometimes, as in the case of the founding of the monarchy in 1 Samuel, two stories, one at the stage of the primitive tradition and the other transformed by later dogma, stand side by side

in irreconcilable contrast in the final literary construction.

In the resultant 'sacred history' real history has undoubtedly been obscured at many points, but by no means necessarily obliterated. The modern with his standards of historical accuracy may regret that the ancient had so little of what he would call historical sense. But in this process of transforming real history into sacred history one clear, positive value may be detected. The historical events deemed to be revelations of God are made to live again for subsequent generations and to bear a revelatory character again in the context of the faith and life of those generations by this very process of reinterpretation.

So too with the prophets. The new methods of study suggest that they, both in their life histories and prophetic utterances have been refracted to us, for the most part, through the schools of their disciples which also have cultic connexions. Again we modern students of the Bible are concerned to separate the primary and genuine utterances of the prophets from the secondary and, as we should say, spurious and to attach more importance to the former. To be sure, if all were proved to be secondary, as some more radical exponents of the new methods have suggested, we might have to revise our opinion of the prophetic literature. Even then it might not lose its religious value, as the instances of the purely legendary books of Daniel and Jonah show, though the value of these books is, at least in part, derived from the fact that the legends contained in them bore a living prophetic message to the people of the time in which they were written.

We may, however, prefer to accept the more cautious view that the prophetic books contain in the majority of cases some genuine utterances of the prophets whose names they bear, either written down by the prophets themselves or accurately transmitted by their disciples; but also that a considerable portion of these books is made up of passages which, no doubt, contain genuine echoes of the master's teaching, enwrapped, however, in secondary homiletic emanating from the school of disciples. If this be right, may we not again discern, as in the case of the historical books, a positive value in this ancient habit of mixing together primary utterance and secondary comment without distinction? Here also it would seem that

this procedure was intended to make the prophet himself and his teaching live again in the community of his disciples and to speak a prophetic message relevant to a subsequent generation.

In this connexion we need to consider the meaning of the word 'cultic' which has been associated with these groups of interpreters, both of the history and of the prophets. If it is right to call these groups 'cultic', it can only mean that the Biblical literature was composed in the *milieu* of the worshipping community of Israel. But in defining Israelite cultus we must not attach more weight than is justified to notions of it gained from the comparison of it with that of the surrounding nations. Israel's cultus may well have contained enacted myths, such as that of the divine enthronement; but undoubtedly its distinctive character which separated it from that of other nations and which has been of most formative influence in the development of Christian worship is the concept of 'memorial', or calling to remembrance, particularly of the events believed to be the saving acts of God in history and of the utterances of the prophets or other great personalities in response to those events.

This dominating element in Israelite worship, instanced supremely in the Passover, must be regarded, if the pattern of Biblical literature which we have outlined be correct, as precisely also the intention of the historical and prophetic writings. The historical events live again in the worshipping community, even though their original tenor be partly concealed. The prophets are living voices in the circles of their disciples, and the very expansion of their utterances in secondary homiletic, while it may partially blur the picture of the prophets themselves, makes their teaching relevant to later times and new situations. Just as the calling to remembrance of the sin of the widow of Zarephath meant for her punishment by the slaying of her son, so too to call to remembrance the historical events or prophetic teaching of the past meant for the Israelite to bring them into dynamic relation with the present.

If this interpretation of the significance of the secondary material in the Bible be accepted, it may be that the now widely current view of the nature of Biblical revelation should be modified in certain respects. The revelation is commonly regarded as consisting, not in propositions or dogmas, but in a series of significant historical events and the moral and

religious response to those events. This position remains true as far as it goes; but we must note that the interpretation of the past event and the prophetic response to it acquires in the worshipping community a dogmatic or propositional character, and these dogmas or propositions become a doctrinal tradition which is applied again and again to the contemporary situation.

It must, however, also be observed that the dogmas or propositions are never found in separation from the original historical-prophetic complex of revelation from which they arose, but are always found in close connexion with the recalling of the event and of the prophetic response to it. There is, in other words, no systematic theology in the Old Testament written in separation from the sacred history. This is the significance of the weaving together of primary events and prophetic utterance with secondary homiletic. The event takes place, the prophetic response is made; but the two together become the bearer of revelation from generation to generation by being called to remembrance and reapplied in a fresh context. Indeed, we may say that the revelation of the past only continues as revelation when it is thus reinterpreted and reapplied as revelation for the present. And the revelatory character of the Bible in part consists in the fact that the Biblical literature is made up of recurring cycles of this process.

In line with this view it may be argued that there should be a change of emphasis in our consideration of the nature of prophetic inspiration. The Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit has always declared that He 'spake by the prophets'; but it has been common to distinguish between the individual and occasional character of the Spirit's working in the Old Testament and the continuity and corporateness of his presence in the Church. But in the view of Biblical revelation outlined above it will be seen that there are remarkable similarities between the pattern of the Spirit's working in the New and Old Testaments. There was a real, though limited, *koinonia* of the Spirit in the Church of Israel through which the Spirit 'glorified' the living God by taking the events of history which had been the vehicles of His judgment and salvation in the past and the teaching of the prophets and law givers in relation to those events and 'showing them unto' the Church. Moreover, while it is undoubtedly legitimate to isolate the individual

prophet and inquire into the psychological state in which he uttered his prophecies, the discussion of the nature of inspiration must not end there. Our final view must be governed, not only by consideration of the prophet-in-himself, but also of the prophet-in-relation-to-the worshipping community which interpreted him. Biblical inspiration is not individual, but corporate, in both the Testaments.

This parallelism between the working of the Holy Spirit under the Old Covenant and the New is further enhanced when we consider the central nexus of Biblical revelation, the Incarnation itself. Like his forerunners the law givers and prophets and the events of the sacred history which foreshadowed the salvation wrought by Him, Jesus stands as a distinct historical figure into whose life and teaching it is possible to make historical research; but it is also true that, like His predecessors, He is known to us only as mediated through the common tradition of the 'cultic circle' of His disciples. As Dr Oscar Cullmann has pointed out (in '"*KYRIOS*" as Designation for the Oral Tradition concerning Jesus', *Scottish Journal of Theology*, June 1950), ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου means for St. Paul 'through the apostolic tradition' behind which the Lord Jesus stands. The calling to remembrance of Jesus as living Lord in the Eucharist and the calling to remembrance of His teaching and actions in the apostolic tradition, as those of the *Kyrios* who speaks to the Church in the present, is a direct continuation of the pattern which we have observed in the Old Testament. The climax of the process is reached in the Fourth Gospel where the synoptic tradition undergoes a radical transformation in order that the Jesus of Palestine may stand in living relation to the Hellenistic Church of the end of the first or the beginning of the second century and the members of that Church may be made to stand where the disciples and the Jews stood three-quarters of a century before (see Hoskyns, *The Fourth Gospel*, Introduction).

Nor does the pattern stop with Jesus: in the Pastoral Epistles and, perhaps, Ephesians we have examples of the same process at work, namely, a Paulinist circle taking the deposit of Pauline teaching, reinterpreting and applying it to the conditions of the second century. And if, while giving value to the evidence of Petrine teaching in 1 Peter brought forward by Dr E. G.

Selwyn, a second century date for this epistle be still preferred, we have here an example of the combined deposit of Petrine and Pauline teaching being treated in the same way. The very pseudonymity of these epistles is part of the 'memorial' technique. And, indeed, we may go on to say that the pattern is extended indefinitely throughout the history of the Church, whenever a text is expanded and applied to the present condition of the listening congregation, or whenever a dramatist presents Moses or Elijah or our Lord Himself in modern dress and speaking the language of the twentieth century, the only difference being that our modern critical attitude prevents our printing the ancient and the modern side by side without a line being drawn between text and commentary.

This overriding symmetry of the Biblical pattern surely cannot be ignored. We have made deductions as to its implications for our understanding of the nature of the Word of God in the Bible as a whole. A similar conclusion must be suggested with regard to the supreme declaration in the Word made Flesh.

It is illuminating to note that modern Christologies tend to divide themselves into two never quite reconcilable groups similar to the ancient Alexandrian and Antiocene schools of Christology. Are we justified in applying to this fact the principle that, when two divergent answers to a question constantly arise over a number of years, the probability is that, either the wrong question is being asked, or the question is being framed in the wrong way? It may be that the Incarnation is a mystery and a paradox and that we can never hope to get more than a partial presentation of it from one side or the other in human language. But it is also possible that the cleavage would be lessened by considering the doctrine of Christ in the light of the movement we have observed in Biblical revelation as a whole. It is undoubtedly legitimate for us to study Jesus-in-Himself and ask who He was and in what manner He is God-Man. To this question we may give answer, in neo-Alexandrian fashion, that he was Absolute Actuality entering the temporal order (L. S. Thornton), or the divine Word undergoing the experience of an individual human life (L. Hodgson); or, in neo-Antiocene fashion, we may seek to state the nature of His divinity in terms of full and perfect indwelling of divine grace

(D. M. Baillie), or full and perfect inspiration (W. R. Matthews)—to instance only a few of the recent answers that have been made. But we must also recognise that this inquiry is defective if made alone. Our final estimate of Christ must bring together the two questions, 'Who was He-in-Himself?' and 'Who was He-in-relation-to-His-Church?' This is not to be sceptical, with some neo-orthodox writers, of any possibility of knowing the Jesus of history or to say that only the dogma of the God-Man matters. Rather, the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith must be seen, as they appear in the Bible, to be a single continuum in the experience of the Church.

The Pauline doctrine of the Body of Christ (for a penetrating exposition of which we are indebted to J. A. T. Robinson's *The Body*) is a signal demonstration of this truth. For St. Paul the phrase 'the Body of Christ' is used indiscriminately of His human Body which was crucified, His eucharistic Body and His Body, the Church, the three concepts being linked together inseparably and the language denoting them displaying 'studied ambiguity'. In making this identification in faith of these three which in logic are separate, Paul has given a doctrinal expression to the climax of revelation which is fully in accord with revelation's whole movement. We, if we are to do justice to that movement, as it extends, not only throughout the Bible, but into the life and worship of the Church as well, must likewise bring together in synthesis the Word made Flesh and the Word of the Church's faith.

GOD AND NEGATION

An Exposition of Barth's *Kirchliche Dogmatik* III/3, §50: 'Gott und das Nichtige'

by The Rev. GERAINT VAUGHAN JONES

I

Section 49 of the *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, 'God the Father as Lord of His Creation', begins with this summary:

> God fulfils His fatherly overlordship over his creature through sustaining, accompanying, and directing the course of its life. He does this by manifesting in creation His loving-kindness which operates mightily in it through Jesus Christ so that the splendour of His Son may be made known.

The long section of 260 pages is the development of this theme, concluding with the treatment of the place of the Christian under the world-sovereignty of God the Father. Experience, however, shows that the divine sovereignty is apparently limited; hence, Barth says at the beginning of §50:

> There is found by the ordering of God a menace to the world-process and an actual corruption of it through the inimical principle of Negation (*das Nichtige*) which is opposed to the will of the creator and therefore to the essential goodness of His creation.

This hostile principle Barth calls *das Nichtige*, which, because of its frustrating opposition to the divine will, is more than the merely negative. It is a problem for theology in that it is evidence of a 'foreign body' within God's providential scheme, to which it is opposed at every point. It is not *Nichts*, the absence of something, nor is it an *Etwas*, a something whose contours can be clearly delineated, yet it compels us to think again about the implications of divine sovereignty and of the belief that all is created 'by Him, through Him, and for Him'. Indeed, the concept of *das Nichtige* can only be described in paradoxical and ambiguous terms, and because we have to reckon with it we cannot speak simply of God's direct relationship to His creation in terms of straight vertical lines (*geraden Strichen von oben nach unten*), for this negational element originates

neither in the Creator nor in the creature. Hence the problem of *das Nichtige* in the light of the affirmations of Christian theology is that of avoiding the dilemma arising from a misunderstanding of the self-limitation of God and the easy pessimism of underestimating the extent of His power. For one thing is immediately apparent:

> The existence, the presence, and the activity of *das Nichtige* . . . are, objectively considered, a rupture in the relationship of creator and creature. It is not merely the line of demarcation (*Grenze*) which belongs to both sides of this relationship, but is in opposition to it and is therefore incompatible with the goodness of both creator and creature, not deriving from it but only to be conceived of as a form of disruption hostile to both sides.

And in so far as it is a creative activity theology itself must admit that it, too, is in the grip of the negational of the anti-creation, from which it neither can nor may escape.

In dealing with the problem of this anti-creative element, however (Barth continues, pp. 334-42), we should be careful not to misunderstand it, for confusion is easy enough. Creation, and that which occurs within creation, has its shadow-side (*Schattenseite*), as for example in the Biblical creation-story; but this is actually *part* of creation, whereas *das Nichtige* is not, for it is not a factor in creation nor an aspect of it with some place in the total picture; nor is it anything *in* creation, for creation is the antithesis to it; nor is it true to say that creation as such is bound to have its shadow-side and therefore, through being inevitably the victim of corruption, to be a kind of participator in anti-creation. Barth refers back to KD III/1, §49, where he deals more fully with this point and says that the 'shadow-side is not "nothing" but a "something" on the edge of nothing'. He maintains that this shadow-side is really 'something', and that 'the consummation of all things in Jesus Christ, who is the Lord of all that God has made', will reveal that both the light-side and the shadow-side of creation, both the 'right' and the 'left', will be found to have been glorious. The paradox is that both the positive and the negative aspects alike belong to a 'good' creation.

Barth, in a short *excursus*, refers by way of example to Mozart, who, though he died in misery, poverty, and solitude, and was buried in an unidentified grave, nevertheless in his music testified to the essential beauty and harmony of creation. Mozart, he says, 'makes audible' the fact that creation in its totality praises its master and in this achieves perfection.

Further, the very fact of this confusion of the negative with the negational, the *Schattenseite* with the *Nichtige*, is in itself a triumph of the latter, not only because it is a libel against creation, but because it is a kind of disguise under which the *Nichtige* masquerades, an alibi which conceals its insidiousness. Unless this is understood, it is so easy to 'demythologise' the *Nichtige* that it is rendered harmless through being identified with the shadow-side of creation.

Barth now proceeds to deal at length (pp. 343-402) with the problem of the apprehension of *das Nichtige*, this 'element' which is not merely the obverse of creation but its disruptive antagonist. It is in the first place known through Jesus Christ, in whom not only the shadow-side of creation is exposed, but also the existence of the negational in combat with the totality of creation. Jesus was the victim not only of the 'negative' aspect of creation but of this nihilistically disruptive element itself.

> Whence do we know (Barth asks) that the *Nichtige* exists, and exists, moreover, to such a real extent, in a preponderance and radicality, which have no legitimate place in our picture of the world, that we have no right to proceed as if it were merely one structural factor in creation among others? This follows directly, clearly, and with certainty from the source of all Christian knowledge—namely the knowledge of Jesus Christ. For what becomes evident is this: that the Incarnation of the Word of God in Jesus Christ merely as a revelation of the goodness of the divine creation in its double aspect would not have been necessary.

The Incarnation meant not only that the divine Word became flesh, but that through this very becoming-flesh was subject to all the other annihilating factors which Jesus in His own person was destined to overcome. It is precisely this point, the life of Jesus, which is the decisive moment in which we perceive and apprehend the *Nichtige*. The only sure answer to the question concerning the *Nichtige* is this:

> The *Nichtige* is that 'reality' because of which (and in opposition to which) God Himself became a creature in His own creation: the 'reality' to which He became subject in Jesus Christ and which He desired to overcome. . . . It was precisely the *Nichtige* that brought Jesus Christ to the Cross and over which He was victorious on the Cross.

So emphatic is Barth on this point that he believes it would be wrong to substitute for Jesus as the ground of our knowledge of the *Nichtige* any subjective ground such as the human

consciousness or the sense of sin, for the latter should be regarded as only formally decisive. Besides, sin is part of the shadow-side of creation, not the absolutely negational; it is a 'concrete form' of the *Nichtige* because the latter emerges through it actively into human life, though it is not exhausted in it. In the *Nichtige* we have to do not with certain disagreeable experiences which (because creation has its shadow-side) are inseparable from the existence of the creature, but with the endurance of evil as an absolute and unqualified effrontery (*schlechthinnige Ungehörigkeit*) and a menace to the created order. Far from being identifiable with sin, it is prior to it. Nor is it a moral category alone, for it is much more than something taking the form of wickedness and death: it is also physical, 'the all-embracing negation of the creation and of its very nature'. As such it is a power operating by its own dynamic of harmfulness and annihilation. Evil and death, not sin, are its forms, and these are to be distinguished from sin because they are directed first and foremost against the creature and only indirectly against the Creator, whereas the reverse is true of sin, which aims primarily at God and secondarily at the creature. The *Nichtige* attacks both God and man directly. It is because of the total character of this attack that it appears at the centre of the Gospel, for in attacking Jesus it attacks both Creator and creature. 'Thus it was the word made flesh, God Himself, who faced the *Nichtige* as His enemy and opponent, and He did this in order to rout it.'

In the long *excursus* with which this section closes Barth surveys the contributions of theology and modern existential philosophy to the discussion of the *Nichtige*, beginning with Julius Müller, going back to Leibnitz, and devoting much space to Schleiermacher, whose conception of sin and evil in relation to the being and conduct of God he finds, as might be expected (for Barth never allows an opportunity for confuting Schleiermacher to pass), unacceptable. In Barth's view it is too subjective in its emphasis on consciousness (*Bewusstsein*). More interesting is his account of Heidegger and Sartre on this point. Indeed, Barth displays considerable enthusiasm in his exposition of Sartre's thought. The dominant notion in Heidegger (Barth refers in particular to his *What is Metaphysics?*) is that of the *Nichts*, which is the ground of both affirmation and negation. One wonders what exactly Heidegger means by *Nichts*, and if his relating it to being (*Sein*) is not merely abstract philosophical quibbling, though Barth points out that at one definite point, namely *Angst*, Heidegger's 'Nothing' emerges in less abstract form. Sartre is certainly more intelligible than Heidegger,

for he actually deals with man in his predicament and as confronted by actual choices and decisions. Where the two differ, Barth suggests, is that whereas Heidegger is still faced with the problem of negation, Sartre has put it behind. He begins with it, so to speak, and from it advances to his humanist philosophy. What Sartre says is addressed to man in his concrete situation, and it is unencumbered by preconditions and pre-assumptions, for man begins at and from nothing, not with anything already 'given'. (Incidentally, it might be pointed out that Sartre distinguishes between *rien* and *le néant* as Barth does between *Nichts* and *das Nichtige*.) There is no need here to go deeply into Barth's account of Sartre, as the latter's *Existentialism and Humanism*, on which it draws, is easily accessible. He is right in pointing out that Sartre's atheism and his rejection of all aprioristic presuppositions are forms neither of materialism nor of pessimism but the expression of his confidence in man and in the importance of freedom and decision. In any case, Barth indicates quite rightly that the existential 'nothing' is not to be identified with the *Nichtige* which is the subject of discussion, for the concept of God has no place either in Heidegger or Sartre, whereas for himself *das Nichtige* is conceived essentially as in opposition to God. Hence whatever may be their conception of it, or of what might correspond to it, Sartre and Heidegger cannot reach the dimension on which it becomes a problem for Christian thinking. Indeed, it is his very humanism, his substitution of man for God, which prevents Sartre from appreciating the utterly nihilistic character of Barth's *Nichtige*.

The last section of Barth's treatment of the *Nichtige* is concerned with the question of its reality. It is necessary that this should be dealt with, though in the foregoing *excursus* Barth writes:

> The *Nichtige* has appeared on the scene. It is no merely mental fiction (*Gedankengespinst*), a mere subject for discussion. It is not merely the result of our denials, and it cannot be dismissed by mere assertion. *It is here.* It rushes in upon us overwhelmingly in the very fact of our existence, and we exist because we are projected by it into the world like a cannonball. We must confront it steadily, for it *is* there to see.

What, then, actually, is this Negation, this anti-creation, this anti-God? What do we mean by asking, 'Is' it?, for we can say that only God or His creation really 'is', whereas this active Negation belongs to neither. It cannot, therefore, 'be' in this sense, for 'being' is not one of its predicates. Nevertheless:

> The *Nichtige*—Negation—is not 'nothing': for such a statement, apart from the perverseness of its content, would in any case be a contradiction. It *is* Negation. It possesses precisely such character and existence as are appropriate to its nature and must be predicated of it simply because it is what it is before God, and which we have no right, therefore, to dispute without misunderstanding God Himself.

This combative malevolent negation, then, has existence. Secondly, it is not to be identified simply with what God is not, or with what the creature is not. Thirdly, it is not an object of knowledge natural to the creature, for there is no accessible contact between it and the creature. Fourthly, there is nevertheless an ontological context which makes it real, namely God's own free choice as Creator, as sovereign over His creation, as King of the bond between Himself and man who is the end of creation and that which gives it meaning. Because of God's sovereignty, because God is Lord over both 'left' and 'right', the *Nichtige* is not there by chance, nor is it a sort of second God, and it is not self-created. Therefore it must somehow be from God, and it is because it is the object of God's No!, of his wrath and condemnation, that it is so problematical. It is 'what God does *not* desire. It exists only because it is what God does not will.' Fifthly, it follows that the *Nichtige* is Evil. All being which is foreign to grace, opposed to it, lacking it, is the essence of the *Nichtige*. It is the abnormal, the shapeless which cannot be measured. It obeys no law, for it can only transgress; in fact, it is purely and simply *evil*, and because of its elusiveness and its absolute negativeness cannot be the subject of any dialectical system. Sixthly, the decisive conflict with the *Nichtige*, its rout and final elimination, are effected in Jesus Christ by the power of the Creator. The instrument of this is God's free grace, for He

> knows the *Nichtige*. He knows what He as Creator has chosen and willed. He knows chaos and its frightfulness. He knows its overwhelming power over the creature. He knows how the creature is inescapably imperilled. But He is Lord over that which imperils. Over the creature it has no power of its own.

The Cross is the proof of this.

Finally, Barth concludes, the decisive factor is that the *Nichtige* has no stability (*Bestand*) or substance, which is the possession of God alone. How can it have substance, if God has not created it? It has being, form, and position on God's 'left' hand as the object of His *opus alienum*, which confers upon it the 'truth of the lie, the power of powerlessness, the meaning of meaninglessness' and 'permits it to exist, but only as something which has no measurable existence'. And if Jesus Christ is the victor, the final word is that the *Nichtige*, this devastating,

negational element, has no substantial existence. Jesus has defeated and routed it. It has only apparent power, despite its actually visible existence in the form of menace, corruption, perversion, disruption and destruction. Jesus has once and for all overcome its power, not only in and for His own person, but for the whole creation, even if it is still awaiting its final deliverance. The realm of the *Nichtige* has been destroyed.

Because, however, it can ultimately exist only by God's permission, in the last resort it must serve His purposes. God has seen to it 'that even the *Nichtige* belongs to those things of which it is said that, for those who love Him, all things work together for good'.

II

The question which one is first of all inclined to ask is: Is Barth writing about something actual, or is he toying with what he himself describes as a *Gedankengespinst*?: a question suggested by his paradoxical method of writing and by the difficulty of providing an exact rendering of his terminology. Indeed, the term, *das Nichtige*, does not lend itself easily to exact translation, for its usual meaning ('perishable', 'futile', 'worthless') is not that which Barth gives it. Nor does he mean the merely negative, for this can hardly be said to exercise such universal malevolence and arrogance, such an all-pervasive capacity for perversion and destruction as does *das Nichtige*. Nor is the word 'negation' an adequate indication of what he means by it, and the term 'anti-creation' would be rather too precise. He has, however, made this much clear: that it is not sin, or suffering, or the purely negative aspect of creation. Barth does not identify it with the demonic hierarchies of Ephesians vi, though in an *excursus* in §51, 2 he refers to them. Towards the end of KD III/3, however, he says:

> The *Nichtige* is falsehood. As such it exists and has something resembling substance and personality, vitality and spontaneity, form, power, and direction. As falsehood it founds and organises its kingdom. And the demons are its agents, its lying instruments with their thousand forms and aspects. Its kingdom exists in actuality like the Kingdom of God with its angels. And this aping of the Kingdom of God is the crown of its existence.

Here Barth personalises or 'mythologises' the *Nichtige* in such a way as to suggest that it is identical with the satanic or

Mephistophelian, and though in the final section of the volume ('God's Messengers and their Opponents') he is dealing with a manifestly mythological angelology and demonology, he has protested earlier against 'demythologising'. When he says that the origin and sphere of the devil and his demons is the *Nichtige* he seems to indicate that they have an actual personal existence, not that they are symbols. Although he does not quote Goethe in this connexion Mephistopheles' famous lines express accurately what Barth has in mind:

> I am the spirit who continually denies . . .
> and that with justice, for everything that exists
> deserves to perish.
> So, therefore, all that you call sin,
> destruction, in short, Evil,
> is my own element.
>
> *Faust*, Pt. I, ll.1338-45

There could hardly be a better description of what I believe Barth means by the term *das Nichtige* if this can be thought of as totally depersonalised.

Berdyaev discusses the question raised by Barth from the standpoint of existentialism. It is through confronting man positively with the implicates of existence that the negativeness of evil receives its positive 'existence', though this should not be predicated of it as it is of other modes of being. 'It can be asserted with good grounds that evil has no positive existence and that it can allure by what it filches from good.' One should not, however, talk about what has 'no positive existence'; one cannot call it an 'it', for an 'it' is that which has existence. Yet evil 'not only exists but prevails in the world'. What may be called non-being may have an existential significance. Nonentity has great existential significance, although it would be untrue to say that it exists. The devil, too, is an 'existential reality' but has no objective reality in the world of things (*The Divine and the Human*, p. 86 f. See also *Freedom and the Spirit*, p. 159 and *passim*, and *The Destiny of Man*, p. 41, where Berdyaev again regards evil as non-being with a positive significance). In *The Brothers Karamazov* Dostoievsky asks fundamental questions about the objectivity of evil, e.g. whether there can be redemption from an evil so radical and dynamic that it is insufficient to explain it in terms either of human freedom or of

original sin. It has an independent force of its own. 'Does the spirit of God move above that force?' Alyosha asks, speaking of the Karamazov inheritance. Dmitri's profound observations on the good-evil ambiguity of beauty illustrate further the mysterious character of the *Nichtige* in assuming the guise of its opposite. 'Beauty is a terrible and awful thing. It is terrible because it has not been fathomed and never can be fathomed. . . . The awful thing is that beauty is mysterious as well as terrible. God and the devil are fighting there and the battle-field is the heart of man.'

This radical negational, then, is more than the merely negative: it is an active principle of evil. Is it another form of Kant's 'radical evil'? Has it some affinity with the concept of the 'demonic' as Paul Tillich conceives it, with this 'form-destroying irruption from the creative depths of things'?[1] It would appear to have more in common with this than with the *Ungrund* of Boehme, the primal Nothingness of which Berdyaev writes, out of which good and evil emerge as well as the freedom of God. Nor would it appear to have any similarity to the 'unfathomable' of S. L. Frank, which is closer to *Ungrund*. It is, too, as incapable of precise analysis as was the demonic according to Goethe's description of it to Eckermann: 'It cannot be analysed by the understanding and the intelligence',[2] which is doubtless how Barth would characterise the *Nichtige* as possessing no *Bestand*. Yet like the demonic (Tillich) it is the expression of the form-destroying, and attacks the spiritual centre of personality, though it does not share the duality of having potentiality for both creativeness and destruction.

While it may be easy to dismiss much of what Barth has written as playing with ideas, he has stated in this section of the *Kirchliche Dogmatik* a problem which should not be brushed aside; for there are moments in experience (and this is not due to the fanciful exercise of the imagination) when one is acutely aware of some malevolent principle (or element, or whatever other name might be given to it) which emerges with terrifying force. Possibly Barth had this in mind in saying that the *Nichtige* is not only 'moral' but 'physical' in its scope. There are aspects of the sinister, for example, which one cannot

[1] *Das Dämonische: ein Beitrag zur Sinndeutung der Geschichte*, p. 12.
[2] *Gespräche*, 2.3.1831.

escape: the mere physical appearance of great blocks of decaying slum tenements, neglect, the sordid, the twisted and the tortuous, the squalid, the demonic character of certain political movements which are directed against the spiritual centre of man, forms of organised evil, the strange psychological problems of masochism and sadism. One cannot read, for example, Kraft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis* without feeling that there is something infinitely sinister and menacing at work in the depths of personality. No one who has seen films influenced by the mood of moral nihilism created by the German occupation of France, such as *Panique* and *Les Enfants du Paradis*, in which the helpless individual is confronted by malignant, destructive, and irrational individuals or masses, or the Mexican film *Los Olvidados*, can do so without experiencing horror at the expression which the Satanic, the really *Nichtige*, is given through the medium of serious artistic entertainment. There is something 'there' which one cannot wish away or dismiss by describing it as an illusion of the morbid imagination. It is too devastating and too pervasive and permanent.

The difficulty, as Barth realises, is in describing precisely this 'element' which attacks personality and undermines even physical creation. As he himself asks, what, precisely, 'is' it? Has 'it' being? The ugly is not merely the obverse or the reverse of the beautiful: it is an active, horrifying element which affects and spoils personality. It is not created; a street, or a garden, for example, 'goes' like that until, through decay, what was once attractive assumes the form of physical hideousness which exercises a kind of morbid fascination. It is a pity that Barth did not examine the problem from the standpoint of psychology, or in the light of more definite human experiences, rather than in more abstract terms. Yet though his thought is often obscure he has confronted his readers with a phase of experience which is too radical to be dismissed and yet one which, if couched in mythological terms, ceases to have any real existence because its symbols are fictitious. In every aspect of human life: in politics, in personal relationships, as sin, falsehood, lust for power, the financial exploitation of sex, as ugliness, natural calamity, accident, cruelty, and death there is evidence of 'something' which Barth is at pains to describe, something which might be called primal or radical evil which

is prior to original sin. Indeed, the problem of the *Nichtige* is one of the ultimate problems of existence and is antecedent to that of original sin because the latter is only the manifestation of it on the human level. How comes it that on subhuman[1] and prehuman levels there is everywhere in evidence this element of destructiveness, present even in the decay of organic matter and in the corrosion of the inorganic as well as in the more elusive 'sinister' as a quality inherent or immanent in things? The late Dr N. P. Williams, in his Bampton Lectures on *The Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin*, suggested that the 'life-force' may have gone wrong and have been 'vitiated' even before creation and thereby infected the created order with a taint that cannot be eliminated. Perhaps so; if there is a 'life-force' it is at least possible; but then we are faced with the further question of what made it go wrong? If there is, in a term once used by Sir Henry Jones, a 'split in reality', what, or who, caused it? and, if anything caused it, is it a permanent structural element in reality? The *Nichtige* may have no *Bestand*, no definable substance and may lack the attributes of being; but, as Barth would say, it nevertheless 'is'.

When, however, he discusses the defeat of this 'thing' which is over and against both God and His creation, and which may even be immanent in the latter, Barth enunciates the answer of an evangelical theology. The *Nichtige* is routed by Christ on the Cross and by the power of his Resurrection. But in what sense is this true? How far is it legitimate to argue from the Resurrection or the Incarnation to a general destruction of anti-creation within time and history, especially on the non-moral level? The thought of Jesus as 'fighting' the hosts of evil as the embodiment of the *Nichtige* and driving them from the field of battle may have value in inspiring militant hymns and in giving the Christian a plausible notion of security. Nevertheless the fact remains that the Kingdom of the *Nichtige*, the rule of Evil, has not been liquidated. If the term 'defeat' has any meaning it is that the enemy is no longer there or has been disintegrated or has capitulated, that is, it has no more power. This is manifestly not the case. The sinister is as potent as ever; new or recurrent forms of it are continually emerging. Even one of Hitler's generals, Halder, expressed the view that it was

[1] Cf. Karl Heim, *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*, 1953, pp. 253-6,

the diabolical, not genius, which gave the Führer his dynamic power, and there is ample evidence from other sources that this impression was not confined to one man. Forms of nihilism exist on a vast scale; and whatever else the Incarnation and the Crucifixion and Resurrection mean they do not mean the present liquidation of Evil and the dissolution of the lie; they are not relevant to the problem of physical decay of chemical disintegration and the corruption of matter. The *Nichtige*, or the Satanic, is always contemporary, and the demonic, as Tillich conceives it, seems to be a structural part of reality. The Christian doctrine of creation, however, does presuppose a form of divine overruling, even though this has somehow to be made compatible with the recognition of the *Nichtige* as existing by divine permission, if not by the divine will, but rather, as Barth has said, in contravention of the divine will. The problem may be stated, but not solved, in terms of Biblical myth, whether of the Creation or of the hierarchic cosmocracy, the unseen, discarnate intelligences, of St. Paul's disturbing demonology. There is a point which theology cannot reach, and that point is the accounting for the demon-world which Barth so magnificently describes at the end of §51 (pp. 618-19). The realm of the Lie covers all life; the various forms under which it appears, in ever-changing transformations, constitutes, in Barth's telling phrase, 'a horrible fifth or sixth dimension of existence' (*'eine scheussliche fünfte oder sechste Dimension des Daseins'*); they are visible even in the *inertia theologorum*, attacking the very citadel of religious thinking. 'We should not deny the existence of the demons, but rather in all sobriety recognise that like the tentacles of the octopus they are active everywhere.' Only the truth of God can expose them and unmask them for what they are; this alone is the final impregnable frontier against their depredations.

Perhaps the answer to our problem can after all be given only dialectically, in the form of paradox: the truth of God is the only instrument in routing the *Nichtige*; but it is nevertheless not yet routed. The sinister twist in creation exists by the permission of God, yet in reality only in a permitted opposition to it. The Incarnation has not routed the demonic manifestation of the *Nichtige*, but it alone is able to do so.

THE ATONEMENT AND THE ONENESS OF THE CHURCH[1]

by The Rev. Professor T. F. TORRANCE

In August 1952 the *Third World Conference on Faith and Order* meeting at Lund, formulated its Ecumenical objective in terms like this: Our major differences clearly concern the doctrine of the Church, but let us penetrate behind the divisions of the Church on earth to our common faith in the one Lord. Let us start from the central fact that Jesus Christ loved the Church and gave Himself for it, and by His Spirit made it His own Body. From the oneness of Christ we will try to understand the unity of the Church in Him and from the unity of Christ and His Body we will seek a means of realising that unity in the actual state of our divisions on earth. What is envisaged here is a thorough-going Christological criticism of our differences in order to open up the way for reformation and reunion of the Church in obedience to the one Lord.

That I believe to be sound theological procedure. The Church is the Body of Christ—that is no mere figure but reality—and therefore the doctrine of the Church must be formulated in the closest connexion with Christology, as the corollory of it and strictly in terms of the analogy of Christ. In other words, it would seem that the relation between Christ and His Church, and the nature of the Church, are to be interpreted in the light of the Catholic dogma of Christ, as found, for example, in the Ecumenical Councils or the Creeds and Confessions of the Churches. That does not mean, however, that a doctrine of the Church can be formulated today simply by application of the formulations of classical Christology, for we have to take into major account the vast material provided by modern Biblical study. It is in fact this Biblical study that has drawn discussion back within the orbit of Patristic Christology, but in so doing it has also made clear that the classical terminology of

[1] The *Albrecht Stumpff Memorial Lecture* delivered at the Queen's College, Birmingham, on 3rd May 1954. In this printed form the argument has been somewhat expanded.

the Church in its formulation of the doctrine of Christ needs qualifying and reminting in the Biblical studies of our day if it is to be an adequate instrument of ecumenical theology.

Perhaps the first step to be taken in this direction is the re-examination of the relation of Atonement to Incarnation and the bearing of Atonement upon the Church. It is the purpose of this essay to raise that issue for discussion, in the conviction that the oneness of the Church is grounded in the incorporating and atoning action of Christ, and, therefore, in the persuasion that we must bring our differences to the Cross of Christ. It was there that the divisions wrought by sin were exposed and overcome, and it was there that God made peace by the blood of Christ, that through Him He might reconcile all things to Himself. The whole relation between Christ and His Church, Christ in the Church and the Church in Christ, needs to be understood much more from the perspective of reconciliation, in terms of *Christus pro nobis*. In the words of the Lund Report: 'What concerns Christ concerns His Body also. What has happened to Christ uniquely in His once and for all death and resurrection on our behalf, happens also to the Church in its way as His Body . . . so that the way of Christ is the way of His Body' (p. 7 f).

In order to raise this question, I should like to discuss three primary conceptions of classical Christology in their relation to the death of Christ, and then to examine three ways in which an understanding of Atonement may cut behind our differences and point us to a deeper unity.

I

(*a*) We may begin with the conception of the *hypostatic union* of God and Man in Christ. There can be no doubt that the Chalcedonian formulation of the Union in Christ was one of the greatest and most important in the whole field of theology, and yet it was formulated in almost entire abstraction from the historical life and work of Jesus Christ from His birth to His resurrection. It is one of the most pressing needs of theology to have the hypostatic union restated much more in terms of the mission of Christ, much more from the perspective of the cross and resurrection. I do not mean that we should contem-

plate any change in the fundamental position adopted at Chalcedon or even in the terminology of Leo's Tome which conserves so wonderfully the whole mystery of the God-Man in the negatives *inconfuse*, *immutabiliter*, *indivise*, *inseparabiliter*, and, therefore, I can only reject the way taken by some Orthodox theologians in recent years, in an attempt to offer a positive account of the hypostatic union in terms of sophiology. What I mean is that the Chalcedonian Christology needs to be filled out in accordance with its own fundamental position, in a more dynamic way, in terms of the incorporating and atoning work of the Saviour, for the only account the New Testament gives us of the Incarnation is conditioned by the perspective of the crucifixion and resurrection.

Look at it like this: When we think of Jesus Christ in Himself, in the mystery of His own Person, the Chalcedonian formula is quite adequate, for it expresses all that we can say, warding off on each side harmful error and reminding us that here we are face to face with a mystery that is more to be adored than expressed. But when, on the other hand, we think of His mission in relation to sinful man, of His Incarnation as the incorporation of Himself into our body of the flesh of sin and the carrying of it to its crucifixion, when we think of His entry into our estrangement in the contradiction of sin, and of His working out, in the midst of our humanity and alienation, reconciliation with God, then the Chalcedonian formula does not say enough, for reconciliation is not something added to hypostatic union so much as the hypostatic union itself at work in expiation and atonement. Following the Epistle to the Hebrews, we must give the hypostatic union more dynamic expression in accordance with Christ's learning obedience and His bringing His relation with sinners to their *telos* through suffering. We must think of Christ entering upon His active ministry as true God and true Man in one Person, in a union which penetrated into our sinful humanity and created room for itself in the midst of our estrangement, at once gathering sinful man into one Body with the Saviour, and opening up a new and living way into the Holiest. That movement gathered intensity until it reached decisive enactment in the crucifixion and fulfilment in the resurrection and ascension. Throughout the whole life and mission of Christ, hypostatic union and

reconciliation, incorporation and atonement, involved each other in redemption and new creation. It is in that mutual involution that the Church is grounded as the one Body of the one Lord.

And yet while we cannot separate hypostatic union and atonement we can see that there are distinct 'moments' in that movement. That is apparent when we see the actual way in which Jesus Christ founded the Church. The first thing He did as He entered upon His active ministry was to be baptised in a crowd of sinners—that was His identification in the body of His flesh with the whole mass of sin and death. By Baptism He made Himself one with us all. He spoke of that Baptism later in terms of the Cross, for it was in the Baptism of blood, that by crucifixion He was incorporated wholly with us in judgment. Meantime Jesus chose twelve disciples out of the baptised multitudes to be with Him in His ministry, to continue with Him in His tribulations, and even to watch and pray with Him at last in the Garden of Gethsemane. As long before Elijah had gathered together twelve stones representing the twelve tribes of Israel to build an altar for sacrifice, Jesus gathered twelve living stones, such as the rock Peter, and built them round Himself the Lamb of God to be offered in sacrifice. Upon this Twelve, the reconstituted Israel, He was to build His Church, and so He formed and fashioned them into a foundation, in a profound sense, one Body with Himself. Their Baptism into one Body was to be worked out in self-denial and crucifixion, such that each was a member of Christ, each renounced his own name and lived in the name of Christ. That is why at Caesarea Phillipi, when Peter confessed the name of Christ, Jesus immediately initiated them all into the inner mystery of the Kingdom, the union of God and Man in atonement on the Cross. The Twelve were thus the Many inhering in the One. They had one name in the Son of Man who came to give His life for the Many. In the co-inherence of the One and the Many, involving self-denial and crucifixion, the nucleus of the Church received shape and form, and together the little flock went up to Jerusalem where it was to be given the Kingdom. Then there took place the Last Supper, where Jesus in covenantal action appointed to the disciples a Kingdom, and they were made a royal priesthood, to sit on twelve thrones with

Christ in His Kingdom, i.e. on the basis of communion in the Body and Blood of Christ, for the Son of Man gave them to eat His Body and drink His Blood, and to become one with Him. There followed immediately the crucifixion and resurrection.

On that ground the Church was inaugurated at Pentecost, but the movement of union creating and founding the Church involved a dual 'moment'. After Baptism we see the Church as the Body of sin or sinners, into which Jesus Christ incorporated Himself in order to be the Saviour of the Body. After the Last Supper where that union is confirmed, He immersed Himself in sacrificial death for sin, that the Body of sin being destroyed He might raise it again, a glorious Body in His Resurrection. It was then that the hypostatic union, carried through crucifixion to its *telos* in the Risen Christ, was through the breathing of the Spirit inserted first into the nucleus of the Church on Easter evening, and then, after Christ's Ascension to fill all things, into the whole Church at Pentecost. In other language, through *koinonia* the Church, for which Christ died and rose again, was given to participate in the hypostatic union, in the mystery of Christ. Before the crucifixion Jesus Christ came as the Son of Man who joined Himself to the Many in order to give Himself for them, the One representing the Many, but after Pentecost and on the ground of the work on the Cross the Church was sent out as the Many to represent the One Son of Man, the Saviour Lord. Thus the relation of the One to the Many carries with it and begets the relation of the Many to the One. The One and the Many is the doctrine of Christ. The Many and the One is the doctrine of the Church, the Body of Christ.

(*b*) We have now overtaken the point where we must consider the conceptions of *anhypostasia* and *enhypostasia*. By *anhypostasia* classical Christology asserted that in the *assumptio carnis* the human nature of Christ had no independent *per se* subsistence apart from the event of the Incarnation, apart from the hypostatic union. By *enhypostasia*, however, it asserted that in the *assumptio carnis* the human nature of Christ was given a real and concrete subsistence within the hypostatic union—it was enhypostatic in the Word. *Anhypostasia* and *enhypostasia* are inseparable. In the Incarnation the eternal Son assumed human nature into oneness with Himself but in that assumption

Jesus Christ is not only real man but a man. He is at once the *One* and the *Many*.

This is of supreme importance in application to the atonement. When we interpret a term like ἱλάσκεσθαι in this light we must say on the one hand that God is the Subject of the whole atoning action: '*God* was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself', and yet on the other hand Jesus Christ is Himself the ἱλασμός, for within the divine act of atonement Jesus as Man has a particular place in obedience. Reconciliation is God's supreme action, but within it, it is the concrete action of Jesus Christ that reconciles us. It is appropriate therefore that the middle voice should be used: ἱλάσκεσθαι. Because *anhypostasia* and *enhypostasia* are inseparable we cannot speak of two actions in the Cross, but of the act of the God-man.

The significance of that is apparent when we consider a view of atonement such as that advocated by Aulen in *Christus Victor*. If *anhypostasia* alone were to be applied to the atonement then Aulen's view would be right and proper, but that would mean that the deed of atonement would be a pure act of God over the head of man, and not an atoning act involving incorporation. Certainly the atonement is act of God, supremely act of God, but that act of God is incarnated in human flesh, giving the human full place within the divine action issuing forth out of man's life. On the other hand, if *enhypostasia* alone were to be applied to the atonement without *anhypostasia* then atonement would have to be understood as a Pelagian deed placating God by human sacrifice. The inseparability of *anhypostasia* and *enhypostasia* in application to the death of Christ is thus supremely important for it means that while atonement is throughout act of God for us, we are to understand it as act of God done into our humanity, wrought out in our place and as our act.

This has been very well put by the late Dr F. W. Camfield in the *Scottish Journal of Theology*: 'What we could not accomplish, Christ accomplished on our behalf. The infliction and judgment which we could not bear, He bore for us. He took our place and on behalf of us all He made satisfaction for our sins and for the sins of the whole world. It was not Godhead *qua* Godhead that atoned; it was the God-manhood. And that means not simply God *in* man but God *as* man. The manhood was integral and essential and not merely instrumental. And

that means, in the concrete sense, substitution.' (*S.J.T.*, vol. 1, p. 292.)

If this is right, that the manhood of Christ was 'integral and essential and not merely instrumental' in atonement, that is to say, in the language that I have been using, that it was enhypostatic and not merely anhypostatic, then we must give the element of concrete *substitution* much greater place in our understanding of atonement. It is this aspect of substitution that needs to be added throughout to our understanding of the movement of the One and the Many we considered in terms of the hypostatic union.

The Incarnation is the movement of the eternal love of God, in which He gives Himself to man and reconciles man to Himself. This movement into our actual flesh and history of the gracious will of God to be one with man in spite of his sin involves the meeting of God and man in the very situation caused by sin. That is the life and work of the Son of Man. He was the love of God incarnate, pouring Himself out in utter compassion to man, penetrating into his existence and need, and gathering his life into the Life of God. In this ultimate self-giving of God to man in Christ man is confronted with the ultimate things, the last things before which all the secrets and intents of his heart are revealed. And so the very union of God and man which the Incarnation involved actually intensifies the state of enmity between man and God. By uniting God to man the judgment of God is brought to bear on man as never before; by uniting man to God man is brought under the divine judgment as never before. The Incarnation of the Son of God means the gathering of this intensification into the one Son of Man, but in Him the Incarnation takes the form of substitution as well as incorporation. It is not as a third party that Jesus intervenes in our human situation where God judges man and man contradicts God. The Incarnation means that God the Son entered into our human alienation from God and stood in the flesh and place of man in subjection to law and judgment. He stepped into the conflict between the covenant faithfulness of God and the unfaithfulness of man and took that conflict into His own flesh as the Incarnate Son and bore it to the very end. He shared in it from both sides, from the side of God who is offended by man and from the side of man who

is under the divine judgment of death. Within our flesh He was thus act of God the Judge condemning sin in the flesh, and within our flesh where man has no justification before God, He the Just in the place of the unjust stood under judgment and rendered to God the answer of complete obedience, even to the death of the Cross.

In Him who stood in our flesh and place like that, where God's heart beats for man and man is placed under the Majesty of God, there is a substitution where the guilty does not shelter behind the innocent, but such a substitution that the guilty is faced with the Light, that man is dragged out of his self-isolation and brought face to face with God in His compassion and holiness. Because it is God Himself who here steps into man's place and takes his status upon Himself, man is not sheltered from God but exposed to His judgment, for in our place He claims to displace us and demands that we renounce ourselves for Him, in order to be one with Him.

If such incorporation and substitution are the way of the Son of Man, they are the way of the Church as His Body. The atonement began with the Virgin Birth of Christ, entered upon active operation at His Baptism and reached its culmination in the crucifixion—the whole of Christ's life and ministry were involved in the work of reconciliation as well as His death. In Birth and Baptism He the sinless One incorporated Himself into our flesh of sin that through substitutionary atonement we who are sinners might be incorporated into Him as His body who was raised for our justification. If incorporation and substitutionary atonement are bound up together in this way then the only way the Church can arise and become the Body of Christ is to be ingrafted into His death and incorporated into His resurrection. The only way the Church can follow Him is by way of *anhypostasia*, by way of self-denial and crucifixion, by letting Christ take its place and displace its self-assertion; and by way of *enhypostasia*, by way of incorporation and resurrection, by receiving from Christ the life which He has in Himself and which He gives His own. It is the way of Baptism and Holy Communion. There is no other way for the Church, and so no other way to reunion, than by the way of the Cross, for it is the Cross which is the way to the resurrection of the One Body.

(*c*) In order to consider the full application of this Christology to the doctrine of the Church we must make use of yet another primary conception of Catholic Christology—*the analogy of Christ*. That was raised at a decisive hour by Athanasius when a crypto-Arianism was threatening to destroy the whole analogical basis of Christian theology by compromising the true doctrine of the Son. Against the misuse of figures and analogies by the *Tropici* in their greatly impoverished doctrine of the Spirit Athanasius insisted that all analogies must be subordinated to, and criticised by, the unique Revelation of the Father in the Son, for it is solely from the Incarnate Son that they have their legitimate place in Christian theology and therefore it is only in accordance with the analogy of Christ that they are to be applied. The analogical relation between Christology and the Sacraments was expounded by Theodoret and Gelasius I and that was extended by the Reformers to the doctrine of Holy Scripture, and also to the doctrine of the Church, but this has yet to be worked out fully. We cannot attempt that here, but we may content ourselves with indicating the main aspects which the analogical relation assumes within the body of Christian theology with particular reference to the Church.

Logically, the notion of analogy has been given the closest scrutiny as a relation involving neither identity nor difference but something of likeness and something of difference *proportionaliter*. Apart, however, from telling us how analogical predication should be framed, that tells us nothing at all, until we come to the actual relationship that has been established between God and man in the Incarnation. It is on the ground of that real and substantial relation that we may speak *proportionaliter* of the relation of Christ and His Church.

Christologically, the analogy of Christ means that the terms *inconfuse* on the one hand and *inseparabiliter* on the other, which the Chalcedonian dogma applied uniquely to the two natures of Christ, may be applied in a secondary and cognate sense to the relation between Christ and the Church as His Body. In regard to the Eucharist the *inconfuse* would negate a doctrine of transubstantiation as heresy, and the *inseparabiliter* would negate a doctrine which separates the elements from the Body and Blood of Christ as heresy. In regard to the Church, the

inconfuse would negate a docetic conception of the Church as if it had been transubstantiated into something beyond history, and the *inseparabiliter* would negate a conception of the Church which divorced it from ontological union with Christ Himself.

Soteriologically, the analogy of Christ involves a substitutionary relation, the *mirifica commutatio*. 'Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ that though He was rich yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might become rich' (2 Cor. 8.9). 'God made Him to be sin for us who knew sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him' (2 Cor. 5.21). Thus the analogical relation between Christ and the Church reposes entirely upon what He has done for the Church by taking its place that it might be conformed to Him, and is maintained because Christ continues to live for the Church so that the life of the Church is to be found not in itself but in Him. This element of substitution between Christ and His Church involves a soteriological inversion of the relationship: 'Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us' (1 John 4.10). 'Ye have not chosen me but I have chosen you' (John 15.16). 'Ye have known God or rather are known of God' (Gal. 4.9).

Pneumatologically, the analogy of Christ tells us that as Christ was born of the Spirit, baptised and anointed in the Spirit, through the eternal Spirit offered Himself to the Father, and was raised by the Spirit of Holiness from the dead, so through the Spirit the Church is joined to Christ as the Body of which He is the Head in the irreversible relationship which that establishes—the relation of the servant to his Lord. Through the Spirit the Word became flesh; the flesh did not become Word. Through the same Spirit Christ has assumed the Church as His Body, and is free to be present in the Church and to realise the relation of the Church to Himself giving it life-unity with Him as Redeemer and Lord of its being.

Within the orbit of this whole relation between Christ and His Church and within the analogical form which it demands, we may seek cautiously to apply the conceptions of *anhypostasia* and *enhypostasia* to the Church. *Anhypostasia* would then mean that the Church as Body of Christ has no *per se* existence, no independent *hypostasis*, apart from atonement and communion through the Holy Spirit. *Enhypostasia*, however, would mean

that the Church is given in Christ real *hypostasis* through incorporation, and therefore concrete function in union with Him. That is why to speak of the Church as the Body of Christ is no mere figure of speech but describes an ontological reality, enhypostatic in Christ and wholly dependent on Him.

Thus while *anhypostasia* asserts that the Church as Body of Christ has no independent existence or oneness but insists on an eschatological relation between the Church and Christ in terms of His mighty acts for and in the Church, *enhypostasia* asserts a teleological relation between the Church and Christ in terms of real continuity of being. On the ground of the substitutionary work of Christ, who incorporated Himself into our humanity and took our place in order that we might be incorporated into His new humanity, we can only speak of the ontological reality and continuity of the Church in terms of *communicatio idiomatum*, while the conjunction of *anhypostasia* and *enhypostasia* reminds us that even here we can only speak in terms of analogical unlikeness as well as likeness to Christ.

At this point we must remind ourselves that all this needs to be stated more dynamically in terms of the living movement of hypostatic union and atoning reconciliation in Jesus Christ. That is the way in which it was frequently interpreted in the Fathers (*analogia* in terms of active *anagoge*) and that is certainly the emphasis in the New Testament.

Thus when we turn to the teaching of St. Paul and hear him say: 'Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus' (Phil. 2.5), we find him insisting that the whole movement of humiliation and exaltation in Christ, His Incarnational *katabasis* and His glorious *anabasis* has to be translated into the Church as Christ's Body. We find the same argument in 2 Cor. 4, Eph. 1 and 2 and in Col. 1. The same analogical perspective is found in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Thus in the twelfth chapter the author asks his readers to look away from themselves to Christ the Author and Finisher of the Faith, who for the joy that was set before Him endured the Cross, despised the shame and is set down on the right hand of the throne of God, and then he demands that they work that out analogically in themselves.

Is it not at this point that we can attack the cleavage between a so-called 'eschatological view' of the Church on the one hand

and a so-called 'ontological view' of the Church on the other? If here both eschatology and ontology are understood as the analogical transposition of Christology and soteriology to the Church, then the real cleavage is demolished. If we think of the Church only in terms of the Incarnation and incorporation then we tend to entertain the false conception of the Church as a *Christus prolongatus* or an extension of the Incarnation. If we think of the Church anhypostatically alone, only in terms of eschatological event, then we rob the Church of its ground in the Person of Christ and demolish the understanding of it as His Body. But if, on the contrary, we think of the Church as grounded on the atoning and incorporating work of Christ, the ontology of the Church must be thought out in terms of the substitutionary death of Christ for the Church, and the eschatology of the Church must be thought out in terms of incorporation into the risen and ascended Humanity of Christ. Only when ontology is interpreted apart from *anhypostasia*, and eschatology is interpreted apart from *enhypostasia*, can there be divergence, but when we recall that only by Christ's substitution of Himself in our place is incorporation possible, while substitution is possible only on the ground of incorporation, we are unable to regard these two as alternatives. They belong together inseparably. In other words, if we think of the Church consistently in terms of Christ who died and rose again and apply that analogically to the Church so that we understand it not only as constituted by the substitutionary work of Christ but as so incorporated into Him that it bears about in its body the dying and rising of the Lord Jesus, then we cannot have an 'eschatological' view of the Church that is not also 'ontological', nor an 'ontological' view of the Church which is not also 'eschatological'. The ontology will speak of the miraculous preservation of the life and being of the Church through death and resurrection in Christ, and eschatology will speak of the real and substantial union of the Church with the Risen, Ascended, and Advent Lord.

II

We may now proceed to examine several ways in which the doctrine of atonement may be applied critically to our differ-

ences in the doctrine of the Church and so point us to a deeper unity.

(*a*) *The form and order of the Church*

If the Christological conceptions we have been discussing are to be applied to the Church, as I believe they must be, then on the analogy of Christ we must think of the Church sent out into the world from the Cross as the *suffering servant*. 'As the Father hath sent me, so send I you.' The Church Militant is still under the Cross and it belongs to its life and mission to work out analogically in itself what happened in Christ for the Church, to fill up in its body that which is eschatologically in arrears of the sufferings of Christ and so to fulfil the Word of God (cf. Col. 1.24 f).

It is essentially the same point that St. Paul expounds in 2 Cor. 5, 'The love of Christ *constrains* us in that we make this judgment that if He died for all then were all dead'. We think immediately of those words of Jesus where the same word in Greek is used. 'I have a baptism with which to be baptised, and how I am *straitened* until it is over' (Luke 12.50). Christ was anticipating the Cross and the mighty power of the divine love in Him which kept pressing Him toward the Cross, where this love would be released to the whole world in reconciliation, was so great as to be almost unbearable. The birth-pangs of the universal Gospel were already upon Him, and He was straitened in agony until it was accomplished. That is what happens to the Church as the Body of Christ, for before the Cross it is put under the constraint of the passion of Christ. It cannot contain itself—the agony of Christ is upon it. The Love of Christ shed into the Church by the Spirit must break out in the mission of redemption. And so the Church goes out into history participating in Christ's ministry of reconciliation, bearing about in its body the dying of the Lord Jesus that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in its mortal flesh.

This participation of the Church in the ministry of the Son of Man must be thought out in terms of analogical difference as well as likeness. In the words of the Lund Report, 'What happened to Christ *uniquely* in His once-and-for-all death and resurrection on our behalf, happens also to the Church *in its way* as His Body'. Thus for example, priesthood cannot be predi-

cated of Christ and of the Church univocally, nor can sacrifice be predicated of His work and of the Eucharistic action in the same way. Jesus Christ was Suffering Servant in a unique sense in that He had a ministry of substitutionary and vicarious atonement in which His act was act of God. The Church is suffering servant like Him but in a different sense. The Church participates in His ministry of reconciliation *by serving* Him. That is the point of supreme importance, for differences arise on the one hand where the analogical likeness between the Priesthood of Christ and the priesthood of the Church is not observed, and on the other hand where the analogical difference between them is not observed.

We must understand this analogical likeness and difference between the ministry of the Church and the ministry of Christ in terms of substitutionary incorporation into Christ or substitutionary participation in His ministry.[1] The ministry of the Church is not to be related directly to the ministry of Christ as if it were an extension or prolongation of His ministry or even an extension of certain of His ministerial functions. There can be no question of distinguishing between certain functions of Christ as primary and non-transferable and other functions which can be transferred by His authority to chosen representatives. The New Testament nowhere makes any such distinction but boldly speaks of the Church as participating in Christ's own ministry. He fulfils His ministry in a unique and unrepeatable way, as Prophet, Priest, and King. The Church's ministry as prophetic, priestly, and kingly is correlative to Christ's whole ministry but entirely subordinate to it and fulfilled *alterius rationis*, in a way appropriate to the Church as the Body of which Christ is the Head, as the servant of which He is the Lord, as the herald of which He is King.

The Church exercises its ministry, then, in such a way as to allow Christ to displace the Church and be Himself through the Spirit the Lord and Master of the Church's ministry. The Church can only participate in Christ's ministry in humble obedience and self-denial, so that on the ground of substitution ('He must increase, I must decrease', 'Not I but Christ') it is

[1] In technical terms this likeness and difference are to be stated in terms not of direct analogical attribution nor of a mutual relation of proportion, but of similarity and dissimilarity of proportion—i.e. the analogy of proportionality.

Christ Himself who stands forth in the midst of the Church as Prophet, Priest, and King. The Church can only be the *Vicar* of Christ not by substituting itself in Christ's place but by letting Christ substitute Himself in the place of the Church. As in atoning reconciliation incorporation in Christ is on the ground of substitution, so in the ministry of reconciliation participation in that ministry is on the ground of substitution. Thus the Church is committed with the ministry of reconciliation not in such a way that the Church reconciles the world to God, but in the sense that as the Church proclaims the Word of reconciliation in Christ's stead, it is Christ Himself who fulfils His own ministry and actually reconciles the world to God.

It is by this substitutionary incorporation into Christ and substitutionary participation in His ministry that the form of the Church is determined as the form of a servant correlative to the Son of Man. It is through baptismal incorporation, through self-denial and bearing the Cross, through Holy Communion that the Form of the Son of Man becomes the form of the Church His Body. 'It is enough for the disciple that he should be as His Master, and the servant as his Lord' (Matt. 10.25).

His visage was marred more than any man's, and He hid as it were His face from us. So deep was His humiliation that He had no form nor comeliness that we should look upon Him, and there was no beauty that we should desire Him. That is the Body and Form of Christ to be discerned in the Church that is planted into the likeness of His death that it should also be in the likeness of His resurrection. As the Body of Christ, the Church is cruciform, but that has to be understood in terms of active analogy, of daily crucifixion and resurrection. Wherever in obedience to the blood of Christ the Church is found engaged in the ministry of reconciliation, pouring out its life like the Son of Man that the Word of reconciliation might be delivered to all men for whom He died, wherever the Church shows forth His death until He comes and presents its body a living sacrifice, there the image of Christ is to be seen and His Body is to be discerned in the Church. It is as a royal priesthood actively engaged in Christ's ministry of reconciliation that the Church manifests its true form.

The understanding of the Church as suffering servant is also

of profound significance for the question of order, for this means that all conceptions of order and validity have to be determined by the servanthood of the Church under the Cross. That was the significance of the temptation of Christ following upon His Baptism, the temptation to gain the authority and glory of the kingdoms of this world by avoiding the Cross. He chose the way of the Servant, and the way of Christ must be the way of the Church which is His Body.

As the Servant Jesus Christ was made *under the law* and yet through His death and resurrection He justifies the Church *apart from law*. This Church which is redeemed by Christ and through His Spirit formed into His Body is sent out on a mission into history made under the law as a servant of Christ. To see the full significance of that we may draw out the Biblical comparison between Christ and Adam. Adam refused to preserve the order of Paradise, the limitations imposed on him by God, and man as Adam's child refuses to fit into the order of restoration; he will not admit that he is flesh standing under judgment and can only live by grace. But Jesus Christ entering within our existence did not want to be like God, or on an equality with Him. On the contrary He confessed before God the state of man as fallen, bearing the wrath of God as a necessary righteous wrath. He did not avoid the lowliness of this estate but humbled Himself and was made servant under the law, willingly taking its consequences upon Himself. Thus He entered our human existence in this age, with its form of law, ranged Himself beside sinners and stood with them under judgment. By His obedience He acknowledged God's judgment on sin and so condemned sin in the flesh. By His obedience He accepted the verdict upon sinful man, the limitations of the creature under law and judgment, and within those limitations wrought out the mighty deed of redemption.

The Church is called to follow Christ in that lowly way of the servant, but also to follow Him who by His obedience unto death has justified the Church apart from law and risen again for its justification. While the Church follows Christ by undertaking His mission within history and within the form of law which this age through sin and judgment involves, nevertheless the Church follows Christ as justified, reconciled, and risen with Him, and is therefore differently related to the *nomos*-form

of this age. In the nature of the case the reconciliation of the Church with Christ and the Church's participation in the power of His resurrection, mean the breaking-up of the form of law and the relativising of the historico-juridical forms of the Church, for all these forms are forms of this present age which passes away and are impregnated with human selfishness and sin and guilt. That guilt-laden and sin-impregnated history with its dire determinism has been overcome by the death and resurrection of Christ, so that the Church goes out into history on its mission at once to use the forms of this world within which it is a servant to Christ, but not to abuse them for its own ends or self-justification; not to be fettered by the *nomos*-forms of this age but freely to live within them in order to preach the Gospel to the poor and to proclaim liberty to the captives. Within this dialectic of justification, *under the law* and *apart from law*, the old Augustinian distinction between a *valid* and an *efficacious* ministry breaks down, for that is really valid which under the law ministers to the freedom of the children of God apart from the works of the law. As St. Paul puts it, 'For I through the law am dead to the law that I might live unto God' (Gal. 2.19). Likewise the whole conception of order and authority needs reinterpretation in terms of the Son of Man. He possessed supreme authority, Lordly ἐξουσία, but He exercised it in the form of a Servant. In the Person of Christ the Lordly authority and the servant form were uniquely one, so that just when He was weakest, on the Cross, His majesty as Son of God was most apparent. The weakness of God is stronger than men. The Church follows its Lord in His servant form and by participating in His authoritative ministry, but the servant form and the authority are not identical in the person of the Church, for here the Servant form is given authority precisely as the person of the Church is through self-denial and crucifixion displaced by the Person of Christ. The Church does not act in its own name but solely in the name of Christ. The Church serves an authority not its own, and serves it in such a way as not to usurp it as if it were its own but to make room for the Lord the Spirit in its midst. Authority in the Church is mediated through the weakness of the Church bearing the reproach of Christ, through its submission to the way of 'the Son of Man who came not to be ministered unto but to minister and to give His life

a ransom for many'. But this brings us to examine the relation of the atonement to the time of the Church.

(*b*) *The time of the Church* (that is, the notions of succession and tradition)

We may begin by noting that the atonement has backward as well as future reference. It has retroactive effect going back to the very beginning, and so Christ in the *Apocalypse* is spoken of as the First and the Last, the Alpha and the Omega. In the Cross we do not have mere amnesty for sin but such a total act of forgiveness and justification that guilt is utterly undone and done away. At the Cross God puts the clock back. He restores the years that the locust has eaten, for He breaks the power of guilt and liberates man from the determinism of a guilty past. Guilt and the irreversibility of time, as we know it in our sinful world, are bound up together inseparably, but in the form of guilt what is irremediable and ineradicable in the past is present determining man's existence under judgment and binding him in its tyranny. It is that in man's *anamnesis* that works his continuous condemnation, which applies not simply or even primarily to the individual but rather to the whole Adamic race, the whole of human existence, which as St. Paul says was piling up wrath against itself in the day of judgment. In His death on the Cross Jesus Christ descended into that awful pit of man's past existence, into Hell itself, and by His atonement He broke it open, leading captivity captive, and now He holds the keys of death and hell in His power. Through atonement, then, Christ broke into the kingdom of the irreversibility of time and guilt with its strength in the law, and by a complete act of expiation He has undone its power and cancelled guilt and sin. That means that in the death of Christ we have an act of justification that penetrates back to the very beginning and sets man's life on the basis of God's creative purpose. The Cross makes contact with creation. Christ the Second, the Last Adam undoes the work of the first Adam and heads the race to a new and higher glory that far transcends the old, for here the past is not only undone but suborned by the Cross and made to serve the purpose of God's redemption.

The application of this to the doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ has real importance for our understanding of

historical succession and tradition. On the analogy of Christ this must be considered in terms of the whole historical life of Jesus as bracketed between His Virgin Birth and His Resurrection in Body, both of which involve at once continuity and discontinuity, so that we are to think of the work which God does through His Word in the Church as *consummans et abbrevians*, as the Vulgate puts it, involving teleology as well as eschatology. We cannot enter fully into that here but may glance at the bearing of atonement on the *time* of the Church in history, examining, by way of illustration, the New Testament concept of στοιχεῖον.

The root meaning of στοιχεῖον which it never lost is *succession*, from στοῖχος a row or στοιχέω to go in a row, like a row of columns or soldiers in single file. στοιχεῖον thus means to be in succession like the letters of the alphabet, A, B, C, etc. or the planets in their heavenly procession. Out of this there emerges a number of secondary meanings. (*a*) The letters of the alphabet, and so the A B C of a thing, the elements of knowledge (cf. Hebrews 5.12). (*b*) The physical elements or the ultimate indivisible elements, and so the first principles of which the visible, tangible world consists (cf. 2 Peter 3.10). (*c*) The heavenly elements or the metaphysical principles which lie behind the temporal successions of the cosmos, and so the rudiments of philosophy (cf. Col. 2.8). (*d*) There is also another sense of στοιχεῖον which refers to the shadow cast by a sun dial indicating the time of day (cf. Col. 2.17). Behind all these there lurks the notion of succession, and succession in relation to time. That is certainly clear in the Pauline usage. In the Epistle to the Galatians στοιχεῖον refers to succession in terms of Judaistic Tradition which has assumed the form of *nomos* or principle of the cosmos with reference to days, months, times and years, or in the language of the Epistle to the Colossians, a holiday, or the new moon or the sabbath as well as ordinances about meat and drink and other human traditions. Here στοιχεῖον appears to refer to temporal succession turned into a legal tradition or cosmological principle, and this is coloured by the derived sense of rudiments of philosophy. When St. Paul links στοιχεῖον to κόσμος he clearly has in mind temporal succession turned into *nomos*, turned into a theological or legal principle, but as such the στοιχεῖα become demonic, for, like the renegade ἐξουσίαι and

ἄρχοντες and παραδόσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, they seek through *nomos* to usurp the power of God. They belong to the tyrant forces from which we are redeemed by the blood of Christ for He has robbed them of their usurped authority and power. And so St. Paul says to the Galatians: 'You were once enslaved to the στοιχεῖα, but now that you have known God or rather are known of God, how is it that you turn back to the weak and beggarly elements, whereunto you desire again to be in bondage?' (Gal. 4.4-9). And he asks the Colossians: 'If you are dead with Christ from the successions of the cosmos turned into theological principles, why as living in the cosmos do you dogmatise about them?' (Col. 2.20). The teaching in both Epistles is the same: for the Church to walk κατὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου is to walk οὐ κατὰ Χριστόν (Col. 2.8).

Now this does not mean that the Church must have nothing to do with στοιχεῖον, any more than it must avoid παράδοσις or νόμος or the σχήματα of the cosmos, but it does mean that the Church is not to be enslaved to them. By the death and resurrection of Christ succession is a poverty-stricken principle and must not be turned into a law or a dogma to enslave the Gospel. Because the στοιχεῖα have been robbed of their tyrant force by the blood of Christ, the Church must learn to redeem time or to buy back time out of the market of slavery and law and to use succession in Christ, in the power of His crucifixion and resurrection.

The same teaching is found in the New Testament elsewhere with regard to tradition, for when tradition degenerates into an independent principle it becomes the tradition of men against which Jesus set His face in sharp antagonism. In the language of St. Peter, it is by the precious blood of Christ as a Lamb without blemish and without spot that we are delivered from the vain conversation of the tradition of the fathers (1 Pet. 1.18). That is not to repudiate tradition. 'I delivered unto you that which also I received', said St. Paul. The true tradition of the Church is the *traditio corporis* in the Eucharist; it is tradition in terms of the crucifixion and resurrection of the Body of Christ. That carries me to my last point.

(*c*) *The sacramental life of the Church*

We have to take into more account than we do the relation

that the atonement bears to the Church as the Body of Christ in terms of ἀνακεφαλαίωσις which combines hypostatic union and reconciliation in one living redemptive movement gathering up the Church into the mystery of Christ. Here there is not only an unravelling of the skein of guilt and sin-laden time but a creative restoration of our being and its unification in Christ the Head of all things. Or to put the matter the other way round, the mutual involution of Incarnation and atonement is to be applied sacramentally to the Church in terms of its birth and growth as the Body of Christ. If Incarnation and atonement are to be understood in terms of each other, the same is true of Baptism and Eucharist in terms of one living, saving operation of reconciliation and unification. But if Incarnation and atonement are to be distinguished as dual moments in the one movement, similarly Baptism and Eucharist enshrine a corresponding duality. Both Sacraments belong to the fulness of time and have to do with the whole Christ clothed with the Gospel of reconciliation and resurrection, but in Baptism we have to do particularly with the objective and perfected event, and in the Eucharist we have to do particularly with participation in that completed reality in the conditions of time within which the Church engages in the mission of the Cross. Baptism speaks of our justification and incorporation into Christ as an abiding reality; the Eucharist speaks of it as an eschatologically repeated event to be inserted into our flesh and blood, into time and history, as often as we partake of the Body and Blood of Christ until He come.

While on the one hand we are given the real presence of the whole Christ, on the other hand that is daily to be realised in sacramental obedience. We are concerned at every point with a reconciliation that is thrust into a world which continues in estrangement and alienation, so that in addition to Baptism, the Lord's Supper is given to teach us that while we are complete in Christ, yet we are engaged in a battle with the contradictions and divisions that mark the empirical history of our fallen world.

In terms of reconciliation as the movement of unification in Christ this means that through Baptismal incorporation the Church is given unity of the Spirit, a perfected reality which is to be kept, but through continuous Eucharistic communion

in the death and resurrection of Christ the Church is given to grow up in the unity of the faith in the knowledge of the Son of God until it come to a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. But this growth from unity to unity in the fulness of Christ is not merely a growth. It is a desperate struggle in which we wrestle not against flesh and blood but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places (Eph. 6.12), so that Baptism and Eucharist have correspondingly another aspect in the life of the Church.

Through the atoning and incorporating action of His Incarnation, death and resurrection, Jesus Christ has once and for all made the Church one with Him in His crucified and risen Body. In assuming our body of flesh and in carrying that to the Cross Jesus is the place at once of love and judgment, of the love that binds God and man inseparably together, and of the judgment that is brought about in that conjunction of Holy God with our humanity. The Body of Christ crucified is at once the sphere of union and judgment, and that is the Body into which the Church is baptised. To be baptised is to be planted into that judgment, to be ingrafted into the Body of death, inserted into the sphere of union where judgment and crucifixion are enacted as saving operation. It is therefore through baptismal incorporation into Christ that our sinful divisions are brought under the mortification of the Cross and are destroyed in Christ. If through this Baptism the Church participates in that action for it, is sacramentally incorporated into the one Body of Christ, then Baptism is the primary enactment and expression of the oneness of the Church. In Jesus Christ the Church is holy and perfected, for He presents it to the Father as His own Body pure and spotless, but on earth the Church is still the body of sinners waiting for the redemption of the body of sin and death, living in the midst of estrangement and the dividedness of mankind.

This Church, the Church militant, is also given the Eucharist in order to engage in the battle, and so to participate in the death and resurrection of Christ that it may daily be mortified and daily renewed, daily be healed where it is broken and reconciled where estranged. The Eucharistic communion does not add anything to the wholeness of Baptismal incorporation

but it is a renewal of the Church's oneness in the Body of Christ, and such an anticipation of the fulness to come that through it the Church may live out bodily and spiritually in the midst of the broken and divided world the oneness of the Body of Christ.

In other words, the sacramental life of the Church has to be translated into the terms of the Church Militant, into terms of its mission as suffering servant showing forth the Lord's death till He come. The sacred symbols of our faith, broken bread and poured out wine, are the symbols of violent death. The Church that communicates constantly through them in the Body and Blood of Christ is engaged in a mission correlative to the crucifixion, and must live out its life in this world in obedience to the blood of the Cross. Such a Church cannot conserve its wholeness or unity that it has in Christ by looking to itself or by trying to preserve intact its own life and tradition, but only by spending its life and offering its body in sacrifice for Christ's sake and the Gospel's. As the Church is empowered by the Spirit to engage in the mission of reconciliation and forgiveness, so it maintains the unity of the Spirit by engaging obediently in the activity of reconciliation. The very nature and continuity of the Church are inseparably grounded in the mission of the Cross, and the oneness of the Church in history reposes upon the oneness of that mission.

That is why the Apostolic Church rejoiced in the face of tribulations which it was called upon to endure in the fulfilment of the ministry of reconciliation in the world, for they provided the actual occasions within which, through the Spirit, the Church could live out in the world the life of the servant, obedient like the Son of Man unto the death of the Cross. If it was by His atoning death that Jesus Christ wrought reconciliation and of twain, Jew and Gentile, wrought one new man, it is by entering into Christ's passion for the redemption and unification of a broken and divided world that the Church will find its unity in the crucified and risen Body of the one Lord. *The road to unity lies through atonement.*

We may conclude by noting the significance of that upon the Eucharist. The Sacrament of the Eucharist reposes upon a prior unity and takes cognizance of it, the unity we are given through Baptismal incorporation, but that is the living, growing

unity of unification and reconciliation, unity engaged in victorious battle with the powers of disorder and sinful division. The Eucharist is not, however, merely a cognitive sacrament, but an effective sacrament through which Baptismal unity is ever being inserted anew into the flesh and blood of our broken and divided humanity. The Eucharist is therefore effective of unity for in it in the very fraction of the Body and the pouring out of the blood atoning unity is effectively re-enacted in the Church as the Body of Christ.

Here on the one hand the Church baptised into the Body of Christ eats and drinks mortification and judgment upon its dividedness as it eats the Body and drinks the Blood of Christ, and it is only through this reconciliation and healing of division mediated through Eucharistic communion that it participates in the oblation of Christ whereby He presents us in Him as one Body to the Father. But here on the other hand the Church baptised into the Son of Man, renews its incorporation into the new Humanity of the risen Christ as it communicates in His death and resurrection, and it is because the Church as the Body of Christ is thus itself the new humanity in germ that the life of the Church consists in a movement of continuous expansion and growth correlative to the ascent of Christ in order to fill all things and to gather them up into Himself the Head of all. Thus the sacramental life of the Church is not only one of active reconciliation and unification but of growth into the fulness of Christ, of increase into the full stature of His Humanity. The Church is at once the sphere of reconciliation where the mighty victory of Christ on the Cross over all the forces of sin and division is savingly operative in the midst of the world, and at the same time the one Body headed by the New Adam in which the whole of the new humanity is concentrated and through which this concentrated humanity must break forth by the power of the resurrection to the ends of the earth and the ends of the age.

The Church is, so to speak, the atonement becoming actual among men in the resurrection of a new humanity. Because the Church's life is life in the power of the death and resurrection of Christ, the very life and function of the Church have to do with reconciliation in the midst of division and the resurgence in the world of the new creation in Christ. Nothing could be

more destructive of the life of the Church than to limit the atonement, to restrict the range of reconciliation, by erecting barriers to intercommunion, or would more quickly inhibit its own life-movement in the Spirit than to draw limits to the expansion of the new humanity through the power of the Gospel by becoming self-contained and stabilised and entrenched upon a partial tradition. That would be to sin against the Incarnation, to fight against the Cross, to deny the Resurrection, to quench the Holy Spirit.

In a word, the bearing of the atoning and incorporating work of Christ to the oneness and to the fulness of the Church insists that the road to the unity of the Church and to the evangelisation of the world lies through *Intercommunion*, so that all who are baptised into the one Body of Christ may be healed of their dividedness through Eucharistic Communion and in the reconciliation thereby effectively enacted in their flesh and blood show forth to the whole world the death of Christ until He come.

DIVINE SERVICE IN THE CHURCH[1]

by PROFESSOR PETER BRUNNER

WHEN Holy Scripture says, 'Serve the Lord', it means that our whole life should be spent in continuous service of God. But we, the disciples of Jesus, cannot serve the Lord without assembling in His Name in order to hear the Word of God, to celebrate the Lord's Supper, and to offer prayer, praise and thanksgiving. The service of God which involves our whole life, has as its living centre the service of worship by the assembled congregation. The subject of this lecture is Divine Service or the worship of the congregation assembled in the Name of Jesus Christ.

This service of worship has existed only since the Day of Pentecost, at the end of the way that God has traversed with men in order to bestow upon them final salvation. Unless God had 'spoken unto us at the end of these days' in the incarnation of His Son, there could be no Divine Service. Christ had to suffer and die and rise again, before the Spirit was poured out, and the congregation of the last days assembled for the Service of Worship. The foundation of the Divine Service is the Cross of Jesus and His resurrection. Jesus died and rose, *for us*. When He came down upon this earth and took upon Himself the curse of the Cross, He reached out for us, He gathered us lost and condemned creatures unto Himself, He took our sinful existence upon Himself, and He recorded our names as members of His Body. God condemned us—*in Him*. God saved us —*in Him*. Because Jesus 'incorporated' our lives in His Body, we share the bloody judgment of death to which He submitted; so also He carried us along in His victory over death and the grave, and by His bodily resurrection gave unto us imperishable life.

The Cross of Jesus and His resurrection mark the beginning of the 'last things'. The Cross of Jesus and His resurrection are

[1] A lecture delivered at the Lutheran World Federation Assembly, Hanover 1952, now translated by J. Bodensieck and A. T. Mackay.

the point where two aeons meet. The Cross and resurrection of Jesus lift, as it were, the old aeon from its hinges and burst open the door for the new aeon to come to us. The Holy Spirit is the first-fruits of God's new world to come. The Service of Worship held by the Church presupposes this turn of the aeons; each Service contains this turning point; in its Service the 'last things' begin. Divine Service—like the Spirit, like the Church itself—is an eschatological phenomenon. In Service we stand at the farthest edge of history; we are near the return of Christ. The Lord is at hand. The Kingdom of God is near. The resurrection of the dead is nigh. It is in this atmosphere of the end of all things that the Church celebrates its approaching Service.

But the Lord has not appeared as yet. The bodies of the dead have not yet been raised. We are still pilgrims. We still live in the transitional period between the Lord's ascension and His return. We conduct Service *in this transition.* It determines the nature of our Service. Divine Service resembles the tabernacle of the Israelites travelling through the desert, who behold already from afar the city in which there will no longer be any temple and God will be all in all. In the 'Exodus' from the land of death, on the journey over to the heavenly Jerusalem, the Church celebrates its Service.

In the life of the individual, Divine Service also represents a transition. Before you can fully participate in it, something must happen to you. Certainly, long before you were born, Jesus received you as a member of His Body, took your guilt upon Himself, and redeemed your life. But now, since you have been born, the things which were realities in Him must become realities also in your present bodily existence. This is accomplished by Baptism. Your Baptism means that you, as a being with physical existence, have an *actual share in Jesus' death.* By your Baptism you were incorporated into the sacrificial Body of the crucified and exalted Lord. Only after passing through the waters of Baptism and joining the eschatological people of God as a member of the Body of Jesus, a member of the *Ecclesia,* can your service of God commence. Baptism is the foundation of Divine Service.

When you passed through the baptismal door, Gospel and Baptism gave you all that pertains to salvation. But salvation

may be lost, squandered, or abandoned. You need to watch over it, especially in seasons of temptation and of assailment; you will have to struggle valiantly in order to preserve it. But the only way to preserve our salvation is by a continual return to Baptism, i.e. by *abiding* within the Body of the crucified and exalted Lord. To this end we have been given the preaching of the Word and the Lord's Supper. As long as we walk in this earthly body, we sin daily and daily deserve the wrath of God. For this reason everything in the Christian world, including Service, is directed towards the forgiveness of sins. The living Word and the Lord's Supper are given us in order that we may ever anew receive forgiveness of sins.

Whenever man in faith accepts the forgiveness of sins, he actually experiences the new creation: the old Adam dies and the new man is raised, who both receives God's saving gift and glorifies His Name. Having been brought to life by the Holy Spirit, the Christian believer is permitted even now in the Divine Service, to join the angels' eternal songs of praise, although his words are but feeble, defective, and stammering. Service, in other words, occupies a place between the believer's baptismal death and his physical death, between baptismal awakening and heavenly consummation. Service has its place where sinners are being justified and, having been justified, praise God in the power of the Spirit. In Service the saving gift of God comes down to us and we in turn give glory to God in the sacrifice of thanksgiving and praise. In Service our earthly pilgrimage and our citizenship of Heaven reveal themselves in one and the same event. The place where we die with Jesus by living with Him, and where we live with Jesus by dying with Him—this eschatological transition from death to life, is the place of Divine Service.

The Church's Service of worship is surrounded by the angels' worship in Heaven. Angels are individual beings like us, except that they are beyond the possibility of temptation and assailment. They devote their total existence exclusively to the uninterrupted praise of God. Their adoration, praise and testimony form, as it were, the sounding board reflecting and re-echoing God's nature and deeds.

Divine Service in the Church is surrounded by the worship which the so-called mute creation offers to God. Creation is

mute' only in the sense that we are unable to hear its voice. Even now, all creation is continuously at work, praising the Creator who called it into being by His creative Word. The 'groaning of creation, earnestly expecting the liberty of the glory of the children of God', is only a thin veil covering for the present moment the eschatological jubilation which will break forth and join the chorus of the heavenly hosts when all things are made new. When that great day comes, we shall hear the voice of the cosmos, from most sublime heights to lowest depths, as it ascribes blessing, glory and honour unto Him that sitteth on the throne and unto the Lamb.

Divine Service occupies a place *between* the angels' worship and nature's worship. The worshipping Church lifts its eyes to the heights above, where the angels worship, but it also is ready to join in the songs of the cosmos. These three, the angels' Service above, the Church's Service here on earth and the Service rendered by the cosmos, are directed toward one and the same goal; they are converging lines, as it were, and will ultimately merge on the last day in one grand, all-inclusive Service of Worship.

Thus the Church's Service is conducted in a period of transition which may be regarded from three points of view: soteriologically, as between Christ's ascension and His glorious return; anthropologically, as between man's baptismal death and his physical death; cosmologically, as between the superhuman creation in Heaven above and the subhuman creatures here on earth. The place of the Divine Service is where God's world to come breaks in upon this present world by the Holy Spirit; where the new man, raised to life with Jesus, through faith and love and hope, by the death of the old man, grows unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ; where nature's praise of God reaches out towards the Church's worship and where the Church seeks to add its songs of praise to the anthems of the angelic host. Expressed differently, the point at which the Church conducts its Service of Worship witnesses a threefold eschatological movement: firstly there is the transformation of this perishing world into the Kingdom of God; secondly, the transition of the justified sinner from a life filled with temptation and assailment to final and complete union with Christ in the resurrection; thirdly, the transformation which bestows upon

the entire cosmos the liberty of the children of God and raises the children of God to the heights where the hosts of Heaven sing God's eternal praise. This threefold transition with its eschatological implications determines and limits the nature of the Church's Service of worship.

What actually takes place in Church Service, is an eschatological mystery. What we hear and see are human words, human actions, and poor, earthly signs. But in, with, and under these human words God Himself is speaking. In, with, and under these human actions He Himself is acting. In, with, and under the bread and the wine in the Holy Supper the Body and the Blood of our Redeemer are really present. In, with, and under the words of human persons, a Spirit-wrought word will rise through all the reaches of the universe to the throne of God and converse with God in the Spirit. In, with, and under these words and actions of men, there shines the reflection of the glory of God, magnifying the Lord. In, with, and under human and earthly elements—God Himself, the Lord Himself, the Spirit Himself! This is what makes Church Service an eschatological mystery.

Divine Service has two aspects: God speaks to us in His holy Word, and we in turn may speak to Him in prayer and praise. Christ remains in the midst of us as He that serves; in His Word and in His Supper He gives Himself to us. And we in turn may freely serve Him, the Lord of lords and King of kings. God serves us. The service is *sacramentum*. We may serve Him. The service becomes *sacrificium* at God's pleasure. These two phases interpenetrate. Even the sermon is a praise-offering. Even by listening to the sermon we praise the Lord. The Gospel can be preached or heard only by those who pray. The Holy Supper can be celebrated only in an atmosphere of prayer. Prayer, as Doerne says, is a *Totaldimension* of Service, i.e. permeates every part of it. When we offer our praises we proclaim the great deeds of God. In the Lord's Supper we do not only receive God's gift of grace, but we also gratefully proclaim the Lord's death till He come.

God's service to us is the basis for our service to God. His Word enjoins us to answer; His gift of Himself, to give ourselves to Him. Let us, therefore, consider on the one hand how God serves us through the proclamation of the Word and through

the Sacrament, and on the other hand, how we may serve Him through prayer, confession, and praise.

The proclamation of the Word includes more than the sermon. Preaching serves the Scripture that has been read. The congregation also proclaims the Gospel in the form of psalms and hymns and songs of praise. In the words of absolution we have the heart and centre of the gospel.

The Word is proclaimed by order of the risen Lord. The preaching of the Gospel has within itself the authority of Him who said, 'All power is given unto me in Heaven and on earth'. When the Apostolic Gospel is proclaimed, Jesus Christ comes to His assembled congregation as its contemporary Lord. Where He is present, there also His words and deeds become present and contemporary. What Jesus has done for our sakes, cannot any longer be confined within the limits of time and space. His Cross and His resurrection have lifted our old world from its foundations. The ageing history of our world has no longer the strength to assimilate the Cross of Jesus and His resurrection like other earthly occurrences. The incarnation of the eternal Son of God, His suffering, death, and resurrection have burst open the portals through which the new world of God breaks into this old, still present world. The Cross and the resurrection themselves stand directly in the doorway leading from the old world to the new. They are events which occurred in history once and for all; but nevertheless they share the sovereign eschatological freedom of the Kingdom of God. The events of the life of Jesus Christ which took place away in Palestine in the days of the Caesars and their governors, have pierced the texture of history; they have overcome the dominion of the aeons governing this world's history, and have entered into the royal freedom of the Kingdom of God where the boundaries of time and space no longer take effect. Jesus' victory on the Cross is part of this sovereign eschatological Kingdom and now, by the Gospel, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, becomes contemporary with us, tangibly and truly present. Gospel, Baptism, and Communion are, as it were, the arms with which Jesus' Cross and Jesus' victory reach out for us; the hands with which He gives Himself to us. In the Word of the Cross the soteriological event of Christ's crucifixion is made contemporary by virtue of its sovereign eschatological freedom.

In the word of reconciliation the event of reconciliation occurs. Through the proclamation of the Gospel the things which Jesus accomplished for our sake, become actually present before us, just as food and drink set on a table for a man to take and touch and eat.

The spoken Gospel, therefore, is no empty word. It is filled to overflowing with the superabundant blessings of salvation. It is a creative Word. It creates whatever it says. It is the open hand with which God distributes the treasures of forgiveness, life, and salvation. When the Gospel is proclaimed in truth and purity, by Jesus' command and upon the invocation of His Name, then the word of the preacher becomes and *is* the saving life-giving Word of Jesus by virtue of His unwavering faithfulness. There is no room here for doubt or debate; here is unshakable certainty. The eschatological freedom of grace is to be seen most clearly in the fact that, by virtue of Jesus' unwavering faithfulness, it is present with unshakable certainty in the living Word of the Gospel and is offered, given and distributed to us.

Since this Word contains the fulness of eschatological salvation, all those who hear it face the eschatological crisis. The Gospel would save, and not condemn. In the power of Jesus' victory it bursts the locks of our hearts and enters into the very centre of our existence. Now we face the crisis where the decision is made whether we allow Jesus the Saviour to accomplish His saving purpose in us and accept it in faith, or whether—unfathomable mystery!—we harden our hearts and reject the work of the Spirit. Faith means life everlasting; obdurate unbelief, eternal death. The Word of God is full power, but it never 'overpowers' or violates a human being. Puzzling though it seems, man is left the power to reject the salvation proffered to him in the Word. The proclamation of the Word thus makes Divine Service the place where the final decision concerning salvation or damnation is made, a decision which is directly connected with the Last Judgment. The question whether in the Last Judgment I shall be acquitted or whether I shall be damned, is decided here and now when I meet the living Word of the Gospel.

The Gospel is preached to all men, the unbaptised as well as the baptised. The preaching service is a public service open to

everybody. The Lord's Supper, however, is a service where only the baptised members of the Church participate and the doors to the outside are closed. The Lord's Supper is the special gift of Jesus for those who have crossed the waters of baptism; it is the specific means of grace for the already constituted congregation of His followers. The most distinctive part of the Service of Worship is the Lord's Supper.

The Lord's Supper which we celebrate, was instituted by Jesus. To deny this means to discard the Sacrament. The sacramental reality of this meal flows forth from the authority of its being instituted by Jesus and from the authority of His work of institution. The Supper which Jesus celebrated with His disciples in the night in which He was betrayed has the power within itself to initiate a series of celebrations which go beyond this particular hour and this particular group of disciples and at each of which that original meal again becomes present, to inaugurate a series of identical suppers in which the original meal is ever and again re-enacted. The same Lord who on the night of His betrayal acted and spoke in the fulness of messianic authority, now acts and speaks with the same divine authority every time His congregation celebrates the Holy Supper in His memory; and thereby He constitutes it as His Supper.

The sacramental reality of the Lord's Supper is like a large circle; from its centre shining rays emanate in all directions and extend to every part of the area within the circle, filling the entire area with the deep meaning of the Holy Supper.

The Lord's Supper is Gospel proclaimed by word and action. Whatever we have said concerning preaching also applies here. The Lord's Supper, however, has several distinctive features. The Lord's Supper is the form of a symbolic action, endowed with eschatological content, in which Jesus' act of salvation in the power of its eschatological freedom becomes present. That unique eschatological act of salvation which is concentrated in the Cross of Jesus becomes present in the Lord's Supper by an actual re-presentation. Jesus allows His disciples to share in the atoning power of His death which is already mysteriously present within the Word and the symbol of the action. What happens when we celebrate the Lord's Supper today, is the re-presentation of Jesus' total work of salvation. In terms of the

comparison used above, this re-presentation is the area of the circle, but not yet its very centre.

The innermost centre is created and revealed by the words which Christ spoke concerning the bread and the cup: 'This is my body broken for you. . . . This is my blood of the new covenant shed for you unto the remission of sins.' These words do not interpret an action or a symbol. They state what the food is that is used in this action. The relation which Jesus establishes between bread and Body and between wine and Blood is 'not analogy but identity' (Lohmeyer). The bread remains bread, and the wine remains wine. But by virtue of Jesus' word of institution this bread is His Body given to death for us, and this wine is His blood shed for us.

The Body of Jesus which we receive in the Lord's Supper is the bodily humanity of Jesus in which He accomplished our salvation. Jesus' saving work, Jesus' saving suffering, Jesus' saving victory, Jesus' entire physical life, lived for our sake, His death suffered for our sake, His victory won for our sake—all of that is *in* His Body and *is* His Body which we receive in the Lord's Supper in the form of bread. Jesus' Body, in particular, is His sacrificial Body. This Body and His sacrificial death are identical. In His sacrificial Body we have His sacrificial death. Also in the covenant-blood of Jesus we have the presence of His covenant-sacrifice. In giving us this Blood the sacrificial Lamb gives Himself to us. The duality of bread and wine, of Body and Blood calls our attention to the fact that the Body which was sacrificed on the Cross and the sacrificial Blood of Jesus which established the new covenant and His sacrifice on the Cross itself are really present in the Eucharistic food and are offered to us and received by us when the bread and the wine are being distributed.

Forgiveness of sins and life eternal are given us in the Lord's Supper in such a way that they are included in the sacrificial Body of Jesus which is really present in the Eucharistic food. The treasure chest—the sacrificial Body—and the treasure—forgiveness of sins—are here united and identical. Nothing stands between the Cross and forgiveness. The gift and the Giver are one, the sacrifice and its effect are one.

The Lord's Supper bursts open all the bolts and fetters of this perishing world of death. Clothed in the garments of salvation

we ourselves are placed within the doorway which has been opened by Christ's sacrificial death and leads directly into God's world to come. The Lord's Supper takes on the character of an eschatological festival of joy. The Lord's Supper already reflects something of the joy of that meal in Heaven when in His Father's Kingdom our Lord will drink anew with us of the fruit of the vine. Thus the Lord's Supper is a symbolic anticipation of Christ's royal marriage feast. While we celebrate the Lord's Supper here below we are close to that other supper that will be celebrated when the great multitude in Heaven cries aloud, 'The marriage of the Lamb is come!' We celebrate the Lord's Supper on the threshold of that other feast. In the Lord's Supper the presence of the other feast is only thinly veiled; in this feast the congregation already hears the voice of the Lord saying, 'Behold, I come quickly,' and the response of the Spirit and the bride, 'Come, Amen. Come, Lord Jesus.' It is there, where this dialogue takes place, where Bride and Bridegroom are near the final threshold, waiting for each other, that the Church of Jesus Christ celebrates the Supper of her Lord.

Like the preaching of the Gospel, the Lord's Supper brings the congregation and each communicant into the eschatological crisis. The meeting with Christ remains in the Communion also a meeting between persons; this meeting requires a decision on our part, and it leads to a decision concerning us. 'Let him that loveth the Lord come! If any man love not the Lord, let him be anathema! Maranatha!' These words were recited in the apostolic age at the beginning of the Communion celebration; they are an earnest reminder that the Lord's Supper does not release us from the eschatological crisis.

In the Lord's Supper all of us who commune are incorporated into the one sacrificial Body of Jesus. Thus the many become the one Body, which is pervaded by the sacrificial love of Jesus. Woe unto him who ignores this fact! Woe unto him who forgets that this one Body, as members of which we have been re-established in the Lord's Supper, can exist only by virtue of Jesus' sacrificial love. Whoever ignores this, fails to 'discern' the Body. In so doing he casts away the love transmitted to him in the sacrificial Body of Jesus and brings judgment upon himself. The Sacrament of the Altar saves only provided that

it is received in faith which includes love and is active in love.

We are certain that in the Gospel and in the Lord's Supper God offers to us the gifts of salvation. He serves us. Whether we serve Him is open to question. Our Divine Service is service of God only when we pass through the eschatological crisis in such a way that we accept in faith the proffered blessings of salvation. Unless God awakens us by His Holy Spirit, we are unable to worship Him in Spirit and in truth. We cannot grasp with our intellect but only gratefully confess that the eschatological crisis does not in all cases result in hardening of the heart and unbelief but that also the blessed miracle of faith takes place. Worship is a fruit of such faith. Worship is 'new obedience'. Because of this, our worship in this life will always be imperfect. The new man's obedience and the old Adam's disobedience are warring against each other, like spirit and flesh. Therefore our worship will only be service to God when we through Baptism possess our life, when we daily die with Him and through dying live with Him.

Since Divine Service is 'new obedience', it is not governed by the coercion of the law. Our worship is characterised by a spontaneousness which is produced solely by the Holy Spirit. This Service does not resemble a violent struggle but rather the unselfconscious happy play of the child. This Service is rendered not with murmuring, but with gladness.

The fundamental form of Service to God is prayer. The mysterious character of Divine Service may be most plainly observed in prayer. We do not know how to pray as we ought. Our prayers are but the vessel to be used by another One. What matters is that this other One, the Spirit, enters into our words and that He Himself in, with, and under our words makes intercession for us before God with groanings which cannot be uttered.

Prayer is the supreme privilege of the sons of God. Prayer is the exercise of the right of sonship in the family of God. Sons may freely speak in the family circle. Prayer is the form in which even now God allows His children to share the dominion exercised by the only-begotten Son, our Brother forever. The Church is a royal people and shows it above all by praying.

The prayer of sons is first of all petition. Sons are wholly dependent on the gifts and presents of their Father. They are

still pilgrims, victims of need and temptation, engaged in battle day and night. Petition and eschatological struggle belong together, as do petition and eschatological hope. Our cries and supplications will not cease until the return of Jesus when nothing will be left but thanksgiving, adoration, and praise.

When the children of God voice their petitions, their foremost concern is *His* cause: that *His* Name be hallowed, that *His* Kingdom come, that *His* will be done. But at the same time we may lay bare before our Father all our needs, even in the depths of our hearts. Sons hide nothing from their Father. They talk to their Father frankly, without disguise or deceit, about all the things which threaten and torment them.

Sons are certain of being answered when they talk to their Father. While they ask, they recognise what has been given them in the past. While they ask, they receive an advance pledge of the blessing asked for. Thus the prayer of petition turns into thanksgiving. That we are sons of God and therefore His heirs, makes us eternally grateful to God for all that He has done for us in His Son. Thus the Church's prayer turns into the prayer of thanks (*Eucharistia*), into the thankful recital (*Anamnesis*) of the marvellous saving works of God.

Prayer reaches its culmination in the adoration and praise of God. We cease to supplicate and entreat when we praise God. The praise of God rises above thanksgiving also. Praise of God reflects the very glory of God. Praise expresses itself in exultant hymns of adoration. When we praise God—though we are still pilgrims on earth—we have a foretaste of the Service rendered above by the hosts of Heaven before God's throne.

To prayer is added confession. The confession offered by the congregation assembled to worship God is their immediate reaction to having met the living God in His living Word. This encounter forces us on to our knees. The confession is of sin. Sinners who confess receive grace. This encounter raises us up and lays the *credo* on our lips. The creed adds the congregation's Amen to God's message. The confession becomes one of faith. When confessing her faith the Church is reminded of the fact that she is still engaged in battle against the world. As a witness to her faith the confession is the last word which the Church can utter as she is arrainged by the world. Beyond this can come only witness by martyrdom.

The confession has no design or purpose or any ulterior motive; it announces simply with the inner compulsion of the Spirit what is, what God has done for us. The confession takes on the character of an offering of thanks and praise. The confession is the public, thankful acknowledgment of salvation as planned by the Father, accomplished by the Son, and bestowed on us by the Spirit. It is jubilant praise of those who are saved. It resembles the Church's hymns of triumphant joy.

Both prayer and confession reach their climax in glorifying the Triune God; 'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost! Glory to God in the highest! Glory be to Thee, O Lord! Hosannah, praised be He that cometh.' These are acclamations. Here the congregation offers homage to its King. These exclamations make manifest the dominion of this Lord; they are means of the epiphany of this dominion. At the end of time every knee shall bow and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, but the congregation of the Lord renders this homage voluntarily, now. As the Church worships, the last things begin to assume shape. The Service celebrated in the city to come casts its radiance upon the Service of the pilgrim Church. This indicates that the Church's Service of Worship has a relation also to the earthly *polis*. The very act of conducting a Church Service is a fact of political significance. When the assembled congregation ascribes all glory to God, it rejects any deification of earthly political powers of rulers. Whenever political rulers snatch after the glory of God and seek to adorn themselves with divine dignity, then the mere fact that the Church keeps on conducting Services of Worship is equivalent to a political challenge and act of war. The battle between Christ and Antichrist will go on until the end of this world, and then the Church's doxologies will turn into the cosmic song of praise when the tongues of all beings in Heaven, on earth, and under the earth shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God.

This acclamation is excelled only by the hymns of praise and adoration. Here the Church reaches the limit of what it says of God to God. In prayer, confession, and ascription there still are tangible traces of the eschatological struggle, but the hymn of praise presupposes the end of all struggle. It is the hymn of victory. It shares in the new song of those made

erfect. In its hymns of praise the Church on earth joins with ll the angels and archangels, with principalities and powers nd all the company of Heaven. In this last word which the reature may say of God before God, his whole existence is for God alone without other intention, purpose or aim, and his articular nature lies completely in being, and in needing to e nothing else but the perfect mirror of God's glory. Now akes place what is the first, the last and the eternal purpose of ll creaturely being; so to receive God's glory that it may be nirrored by the creature and shine out to fill the universe and hat God may be all in all.

ST. MARK 13

by The Rev. C. E. B. CRANFIELD

Part I. 3 (*continued*)

(*iii*) Vv. 28-37

To these last ten verses of the chapter we may give the general title, *Watch therefore!* The section falls naturally into three parts (vv. 28 f, 30-32, 33-37), marked off by 'learn', 'Verily I say unto you' and 'Take ye heed'.[1]

The first of these contains the parable of the Fig Tree and its application. Strictly speaking, the word ταῦτα ('these things') in v. 29 should refer to the coming of the Son of Man mentioned in the previous section; but, as the sense would then be, 'When you see the Son of Man coming, know that He is at hand', which would be pointless, we take it rather to refer to the signs of the End described in vv. 5-23.[2] It is unnecessary, however, to conclude that vv. 28 f[3] or vv. 24-27[4] are out of their original context; for such looseness of structure as is involved, if we understand 'these things' to refer to the signs of vv. 5-23 in spite of vv. 24-27 being in between, is natural enough, and we actually need something like v. 26 here to provide a subject for the verb 'is' in v. 29. We take vv. 28 f then to mean that, when the disciples see the various things coming to pass that have been described in vv. 5-23, they are to know that the Son of Man is at hand, His Parousia imminent.[5]

[1] Cf. Lohmeyer, op. cit., p. 280.

[2] To take it to refer to the celestial portents of vv. 24 f would be no easier, as what was last mentioned would still not be included. Moreover, it is preferable to regard vv. 24-27 as describing a single event rather than a series of events.

[3] So Lohmeyer, op. cit., p. 281.

[4] So W. Michaelis, *Der Herr verzieht nicht die Verheissung*, pp. 24 and 31.

[5] For other interpretations of the parable that involve loosing it from its Markan context see C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (3rd edit.), p. 137; B. T. D. Smith, *The Parables of the Synoptic Gospels*, pp. 89 ff; J. Jeremias, *Die Gleichnisse Jesu*, p. 78 f. The imaginative suggestion of E. Schwartz and J. Wellhausen that Jesus was referring to a particular withered tree near Jerusalem, which according to popular expectation was once more to bud when the Messianic End-time was at hand, and that in 11.14 He was repudiating this popular fancy, while in 13.28 He takes it over, has little to commend it. Calvin's interpretation here, though

We are immediately up against one of the main problems of NT studies—that posed by the NT insistence upon the *imminence* of the End. Scholars are not agreed on the answer.

One solution that has been offered is (*a*) the so-called *konsequente Eschatologie* ('consistent eschatology') of A. Schweitzer, M. Werner, F. Buri and others, who maintain that the chief thing in Jesus' teaching was the assertion that the End was just about to happen, an assertion which subsequent history quickly proved mistaken. They think they see throughout the NT the marks of the disappointment and bewilderment caused by the non-occurrence of the Parousia. In fact, the most characteristic feature of the early Church according to them would seem to be its heart-sickness due to hope deferred! Mark 9.1, 13.30, Matt. 10.23 are among the passages on which they base their argument.[1]

The majority of scholars, while not going so far as Dr Schweitzer and his followers, take it for granted that the early Church was dominated by the idea of an imminent Parousia. So, for instance, Dr Rawlinson says: 'The expectation of the coming End of the Age, and the belief that it was close at hand, we know to have played a dominating part in the thought and outlook of the earliest believers.'[2] Professor T. W. Manson writes: 'The early Church was certainly obsessed by the idea of the imminent return of the Lord.'[3] Similarly Dr Taylor: 'Mark, and the Church for which he wrote, eagerly expected the Advent of Christ. Within a generation Christ would come with the clouds, invested with divine glory . . . there is no reason to suppose Mark expects a long interval. . . . What he understands the saying [v. 32] to mean is that within a short time the End will come, but just when only God knows.'[4] It is also commonly held that the delay of the Parousia caused the early Church some embarrassment, which has not been

interesting, is unlikely. The 'mystical meaning' which is given by Bede (Migne, *PL* 92, col. 264) is worth mentioning for the sake of its ingenuity. According to this the disciples are to know that the End is near, when, after the fulness of the gentiles has been brought in and the hardening is removed from Israel (Rom. 11.25 f), the fig tree which is Israel once more becomes fruitful, that had been condemned to eternal barrenness by the Lord on account of unbelief (Mark 11.14). For 'at the doors' cf. James 5.9.

[1] For a convenient summary cf. C. K. Barrett, 'New Testament Eschatology' in *SJT*, 6, p. 152 f.

[2] *The Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. 177.

[3] *The Teaching of Jesus*, p. 260. [4] op. cit., p. 637.

without effect in the transmission of the Gospel tradition. So, for example, Professor A. M. Hunter suggests that the purpose of the Jewish Christian writer of the apocalypse which he sees in Mark 13 was 'to reassure Christians in their time of trouble that the Lord Himself had foreseen the delays in his Second Coming'.[1] And Professor Dodd, Dr B. T. D. Smith, and Dr Taylor agree that the compiler has used the parable of the Fig Tree for a purpose other than that for which it was originally intended.

But here we must notice a significant difference of opinion. Some hold (*b*) that the responsibility for the mistaken belief that the End would occur within a short time is to be laid at the door of the early Church; others think (*c*) that Jesus himself was the originator of the mistake. According to the former view (*b*) the disciples misunderstood Jesus and read into His teaching ideas they had derived from the Jewish apocalyptic with which they were familiar. So for Professor Dodd the essential thing in our Lord's teaching about the Kingdom of God is its *Schonanbruch*, i.e. the fact that it has already come[2]; but Jesus' teaching has been subjected to 'reinterpretation in terms of the developing eschatology of the early Church'.[3] Dr T. F. Glasson has continued the de-eschatologising of the teaching of Jesus with an uninhibited thoroughness in his book, *The Second Advent*, to which he has now added besides many like words in a sequel. Dr Taylor is more cautious. He admits that Jesus probably did speak of His return, though 'in terms less explicit and apocalyptic than 8.38 and 13.26 would suggest'.[4] He thinks it likely that Mark's account of Jesus' teaching has been 'coloured and to some extent distorted' by the influence of views tenaciously held in the early Church and shared by Mark.[5] Of vv. 14-23 of this chapter he says: '. . . an apocalyptic interpretation has been superimposed on the tradition. What Jesus had said is seen through an apocalyptic haze',[6] and elsewhere he speaks of detaching from our Lord's shoulders 'the glittering apocalyptic robe with which primitive Christianity clothed Him'.[7]

[1] *The Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. 123.
[2] op. cit., pp. 34-110. But see also C. H. Dodd, *The Coming of Christ* (1951), in which his earlier views seem to be significantly modified.
[3] op. cit., p. 102. [4] op. cit., p. 117. [5] op. cit., p. 116.
[6] op. cit., p. 642. [7] op. cit., p. 644.

The latter view (*c*) is expressed by Professor T. W. Manson, when he says: 'The conclusion thus appears to be that Jesus expected the consummation of the Kingdom to take place at some time in the immediate future, and that this expectation was not realised',[1] and many scholars agree with him. This group of scholars, for whom we have let Professor Manson speak, are to be carefully distinguished from the *konsequent-eschatologische* School; for, while they agree with it *to some extent*, they do not share its exaggerations and obsessional one-track-mindedness. Of the three positions that we have tried thus briefly to indicate it is this one which in our opinion deserves the most serious consideration. Nevertheless we do not think that it is adequate.

It is *not* that we object on principle to the suggestion that Jesus was mistaken. (Though it should be pointed out that there is a significant difference between asserting that Jesus shared with His contemporaries mistaken views on such matters as the authorship of the Psalms and asserting that He deliberately claimed to possess an authoritative knowledge—note the 'Verily I say unto you' in 9.1, 13.30, two of the passages usually brought forward in this connexion—which in fact He did not possess. While in the former case moral imperfection is not involved, in the latter it surely is; for to make such a claim would hardly be consistent with a true humility.) Our objection is rather that we do not think that this conclusion is the one to which the evidence really points. Jesus' paradoxes are far too lively to be successfully caught and confined in so simple and rectilinear a strait-jacket. The answer to the problem posed by the NT insistence on the imminence of the End is to be found, we believe, neither in the assumption that the early Church has superimposed its own mistaken notions upon the teaching of Jesus, nor in the assumption that Jesus Himself was mistaken, but in *a more theological understanding of the imminence of the End*.[2] An invitation to explore in this direction is surely given to us by the very nature of the NT material—at least if we are willing to ask whether the

[1] op. cit., p. 282.

[2] This conviction, to which I came several years ago and tried to express in *The First Epistle of Peter*, p. 92 f, has been confirmed by a reading of W. Michaelis' useful book, to which reference has already been made, and of Karl Barth's *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, 3/2, pp. 560-616, to which I am very greatly indebted.

apparent contradictions contained in it may be intentional paradox, before we jump to the conclusion that we have to do with different mutually inconsistent sources. The fact that Mark apparently sees no inconsistency in including in one discourse vv. 7, 29 and 32 is surely significant. Perhaps after all our Lord's conviction that the End is near is not exactly the same thing as a conviction that it is going to occur within a few years.

The clue to the meaning of the nearness of the End is the realisation of the essential unity of God's Saving Acts in Christ —the realisation that the Events of the Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection, Ascension and Parousia are in a real sense one Event. The foreshortening, by which the OT sees as one divine intervention in the future that which from the view-point of the NT writers is both past and future, is not only a visual illusion; for the distance actually brings out an essential unity, which is not so apparent from a position in between the Ascension and the Parousia.[1] The NT itself, while clearly distinguishing between these Events, also bears witness to their real unity. That is the significance of calling the whole period beginning at the Incarnation 'the last days'.[2] The Fourth Evangelist is witnessing to this unity, when he leaves us to understand the fulfilment of the promise of Jesus in 14.18 to include Easter, Ascension, Pentecost and Parousia.[3] From the vantage-point, which the realisation of this essential unity of the Saving Acts of God in Christ affords, we can see that, however many centuries may pass between the Ascension and the Parousia, the Parousia is, theologically speaking, all the time near; for the two moments (Incarnation-Crucifixion-Resurrection-Ascension on the one hand and Parousia on the other), belonging together as one Event, are being, so to speak, drawn together by an overwhelming magnetism and yet for a time are held apart. That moment which will be the completion of the Event is held back in suspense, and that which holds it back is God's will to give men an opportunity to repent and believe. The interval is something essentially extra and supernumerary, an insertion added by the mercy of God.

[1] Cf. Barth's vivid illustration of '*der Gesamtkomplex "die Alpen" vom Jura aus gesehen*' (op. cit., p. 598).

[2] For references see *SJT* 6, p. 287, n. 3.

[3] Cf. Barth, op. cit., p. 597 f. We might perhaps also compare John 16.16.

But this unity we have been speaking about is no impersonal principle but the person of Jesus Christ Himself, who is 'the same yesterday and today, yea and for ever' or in the words of Rev. 1.8, which Barth expounds so magnificently in this connexion, 'which is and which was and which is to come'. 'Strictly speaking', says Barth, 'there are no "last things", no abstract, independent "last things" beside and apart from Him, who is *the* Last. . . . If one understands this, then one also understands that, and why, the NT hope could only be the hope of the *imminent* coming of the kingdom—that, and why, it could and must as such ever renew itself and could not turn into disappointment. . . . Would He really be the One who has already come and is already present, the One who is already believed on and already loved, if He did not as the One who is coming and hoped for stand *immediately* before the door and knock? And would He really be recognised as the One He was and is, if His coming were not expected as *imminent*?'[1] But, if it really is Jesus Christ who is expected, then the fact that another day or another century passes without His final coming taking place cannot alter this expectation at all, much less endanger it; for it is what He was and is that makes it impossible not to hope for His future coming, and the fulness of what He was and is, of His Incarnation, Crucifixion, Resurrection, Ascension, and of His present power and activity, is sufficiently tremendous to enable this expectation to be a *patient* expectation.[2] So the error of the exponents of 'consistent eschatology' lies, according to Barth, in a failure to realise the power of the Resurrection (as though the early Church had behind it darkness, whereas actually it had great light behind it, and was journeying from grace as well as to grace)[3] and to take into account the Spirit, through whom 'the lordship of Jesus is at no time merely past or merely future, but at all times is Event in such a way that one must expect His coming always and expect it soon, and at the same time both can and may wait for it always with patience'.[4]

The NT insistence on the nearness of the Parousia, so far from being something for us to explain away with a greater or lesser degree of embarrassment as a mistake on the part of Jesus or of the early Church, is of the very essence of the Gospel. We

[1] op. cit., p. 589 f. [2] ibid. [3] ibid. [4] op. cit., p. 613.

believe that Barth is right, when he insists that, where this *Naherwartung* (literally 'near-expectation'), that is at the same time both impatient and patient, is wanting, Christian faith is altogether endangered.[1]

To return to v. 29—the things about which Jesus has spoken in vv. 5-23, the presence of deceivers and false prophets and false messiahs, wars, earthquakes, famines, persecutions, and every fresh incarnation of Antichrist in proud and sacrilegious men—all these things are to be to the eye of faith so many pointers to His coming, reminders and pledges of its imminence, and therefore not reasons for despair, but rather for confidence. Compare Luke 21.28: 'When these things begin to come to pass, look up, and lift up your heads; because your redemption draweth nigh.'

But does not v. 30 disprove what we have just been saying? Does not Jesus here say plainly that all the things described in vv. 5-27 (including His Parousia) will come to pass before his contemporaries have all died? Certainly that seems the obvious meaning at first sight. It is not, however, the only possible one. We mention first four other possible meanings of ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη ('this generation'): (*a*) mankind in general (mentioned as a possible meaning by Jerome[2] and Bede[3]). Compare perhaps Phil. 2.15.[4] (*b*) the Jewish people (the second possibility mentioned by Jerome and Bede). So J. Knabenbauer,[5] J. Schniewind,[6] F. Busch,[7] H. Roux,[8] K. Hennig.[9] For the use of γενεά of Israel compare Jer. 8.3 in the LXX. Busch understands as a threat; but Schniewind and others with more probability as a promise—the Jewish people will survive till the End (there is perhaps a hint of what is worked out more fully in Rom. 9-11). For this idea compare Isa. 54.10, Jer. 31.36. (*c*) disciples, Christians. So Chrysostom and Victor.[10] Theophylact says: ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη, τουτέστι τῶν πιστῶν.[11] (*d*) in a more general sense—'this sort'. Favoured by Michaelis, who understands it to mean

[1] op. cit., p. 592 f.
[2] Quoted by Lagrange: 'aut omne genus hominum significat, aut specialiter Judaeorum.'
[3] 'Nomine generationis aut omne hominum significat genus, aut specialiter Judaeorum' (Migne, *PL*, 92, col. 264).
[4] Cf. Michaelis, op. cit., p. 32. [5] Cited by Lagrange.
[6] op. cit., p. 176; cf. his *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus*, p. 246.
[7] Quoted in Michaelis, op. cit., p. 74, n. 18.
[8] op. cit., p. 289 f. [9] op. cit., p. 118.
[10] Cited by Lagrange, op. cit., p. 348. [11] Quoted by Swete, op. cit., p. 315.

that there will be unbelievers till the End.[1] Perhaps compare Matt. 13.29 f. There are also alternative ways of taking *ταῦτα πάντα* ('these things'): (*e*) meaning only the destruction of the Temple. So Bengel, Lagrange.[2] Taylor thinks this was the original reference of the saying, though in its present context he thinks *ταῦτα πάντα* must refer to all the events mentioned in vv. 5-27.[3] (*f*) meaning the signs of the End (vv. 5-23), so the same as *ταῦτα* in v. 29.[4] (*g*) Cullmann,[5] Barth[6] and R. H. Lightfoot[7] see here a reference to Christ's Passion and Resurrection, in which all the things spoken of in vv. 5-27 have in a real sense their 'fulfilment'. Finally, (*h*) turns on giving a more subtle nuance to *οὐ μὴ παρέλθῃ* ('shall not pass away'), so that it need not necessarily refer to this life.[8] Compare 1 Thess. 4.15, 2 Cor. 5.10, etc. Of these interpretations we regard (*f*) as the most satisfactory. It has the advantage of giving *ταῦτα πάντα* the same reference as *ταῦτα* has in the previous verse, and seems the least strained generally. The signs of the End which Jesus had described in vv. 5-23 were not confined to a remote future; His hearers would themselves witness them. We compare Calvin's comment:

> . . . before a single *generation* shall have been completed, they will learn by experience the truth of what he has said. . . . Now though the same evils were perpetrated in uninterrupted succession for many ages afterwards, yet what Christ said was true, that, before the close of a single *generation*, believers would feel in reality, and by undoubted experience, the truth of his prediction; for the apostles endured the same things which we see in the present day. And yet it was not the design of Christ to promise to his followers that their calamities would be terminated within a short time (for then he would have contradicted himself, having previously warned them that *the end was not yet*;) but, in order to encourage them to perseverance, he expressly foretold that those things related to their own age. . . .[9]

The general significance of v. 31 becomes plain, when we compare the following OT passages: 'Lift up your eyes to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath: for the heavens shall vanish away like smoke, and the earth shall wax old like a garment, and they that dwell therein shall die in like manner:

[1] op. cit., p. 32 f. [2] op. cit., p. 348. [3] op. cit., p. 521.
[4] Mentioned by Michaelis, p. 30, as a possibility.
[5] *Le Retour du Christ*, p. 26 f. [6] op. cit., pp. 601-3.
[7] *The Gospel Message of St. Mark*, pp. 48-59 (esp. 54). See also A. M. Farrer, *A Study in St. Mark*, pp. 135 ff.
[8] Is there a hint of this in Schlatter, *Das Ev. nach Matthäus*, p. 361?
[9] op. cit., p. 151 f.

but my salvation shall be for ever, and my righteousness shall not be abolished'[1]; 'Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth; And the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure: Yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; As a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: But thou art the same, And thy years shall have no end'[2]; 'All flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field: the grass withereth, the flower fadeth; because the breath of the Lord bloweth upon it: surely the people is grass. The grass withereth, the flower fadeth: but the word of our God shall stand for ever'[3] Compare also Pesikta Kahana 13.116*a*, where it is said concerning the title of the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah: 'If you are worthy, the Word of God, but if not, the words of Jeremiah. And what is Jeremiah? He passes away and his words pass away. What is God? Living and abiding, and His words are living and abiding.'[4] Here is the contrast between God, His Salvation, His righteousness, His words on the one hand, and created things, on the other hand. In v. 31 Jesus sets His words on *God's* side of this contrast, and thereby lays claim to *divine* authority. As we should expect, Judaism asserted the eternity of the Law: 'Every one of thy righteous judgments endureth for ever'[5]; 'the law that endureth for ever'[6]; 'the incorruptible light of the law'[7]; 'For we that have received the law shall perish by sin, and our heart also which received it. Notwithstanding the law perisheth not, but remaineth in its honour'[8]; 'Then God answered, "Solomon and a thousand like him shall pass away, but a word of thine (addressed to the book of Deuteronomy) shall not pass away" '.[9] In Matt. 5.18 we have a saying of Jesus which asserts: 'Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished.'[10] But it is to be noted that this does not go so far with regard to the law as Mark 13.31 goes with regard to Jesus' words. Of the law it is only said that

[1] Isa. 51.6. [2] Ps. 102.25-27. [3] Isa. 40.6-8.
[4] Quoted by Schlatter, *Der Evangelist Matthäus*, p. 713.
[5] Ps. 119.160: cf. vv. 89, 152.
[6] Bar. 4.1. [7] Wis. 18.4. [8] 2 Esdras 9.36 f.
[9] p. Sanh. 2.20c 39, quoted in Str.-B. I, 244, where other references will be found.
[10] But with regard to Matt. 5.18 and the Lukan par. see T. W. Manson, *The Sayings of Jesus*, pp. 135, 154.

it will abide inviolate till heaven and earth pass away, i.e. till the final consummation, whereas Jesus' words are to outlast heaven and earth.

So much for the general significance of v. 31. When we go on to ask how exactly does it bear upon its context, the answer is not so easy. We may perhaps suggest that, on the one hand, it serves to underline the solemnity and authority of the preceding verse or verses and to reassure the disciples whose comfort and strength the Lord's words will be during the time before the Parousia, and, on the other hand, it may be regarded as standing to v. 32 in the position of a concessive clause—although Jesus' words are of such authority, nevertheless even He does not know the day or hour of the End. But the connexion of v. 31 with vv. 30 and 32 seems to us rather loose. Moreover, v. 32 would follow very well on v. 30. Perhaps v. 31 was originally an independent saying. (The fact that it contains the word παρελεύσονται ('shall pass away') might account for its insertion here after παρέλθῃ ('shall pass away') in v. 30.)[1] In that case 'my words' might originally have meant Jesus' teaching as a whole. *Pace* Bultmann[2] and Taylor, we do not see any convincing reason for doubting the authenticity of the saying.[3]

The saying which follows ('But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father') is one of P. W. Schmiedel's 'foundation-pillars for a truly scientific life of Jesus'. Dr Taylor is surely right, when he says: 'Of its genuineness there can be no reasonable doubt. . . . Its offence seals its genuineness', and brands as 'wholly improbable' the suggestion (accepted by Dr Bultmann) that it is a Jewish saying to which a Christian redactor has added 'neither the Son, but the Father'.[4] An assertion of Jesus' ignorance is not the sort of saying that the early Church is likely to have created. Even supposing the early Church had been as embarrassed by the delay of the Parousia as some try to make out, would there not have been ready to hand less uncongenial expedients than this for explaining away the embarrassment? That it was early an offence is probably indicated

[1] Cf. Lohmeyer, op. cit., p. 280; Taylor, op. cit., p. 521.
[2] *Die Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition* (2nd edit.), p. 130.
[3] Cf. Lohmeyer's defence of its authenticity (op. cit., p. 282).
[4] op. cit., p. 522. Cf. Lagrange, 350; Lohmeyer, 283; Schniewind, 175.

by Luke's omission of the saying. In the Matthew parallel the words 'neither the Son' are omitted by W, the Lake Group, the majority of the Byzantine MSS., the Vulgate and some Old Latin MSS., the Sinaitic and Peshitta Syriac, the Sahidic and Bohairic Egyptian, and by one of the correctors of Sinaiticus.[1] In Mark, which was less commonly read than Matthew, there was naturally less likelihood of the words being omitted, though they are, according to Legg, in the Codex Monacensis and in one MS. of the Vulgate. At the time of the Arian controversy it was naturally an embarrassment for the orthodox. Ambrose went so far as to explain the phrase 'neither the Son' as an Arian interpolation.

The particularly strong claim of this saying to be regarded as authentic gives special significance to the absolute use of 'the Son'.[2] It is an important piece of evidence conflicting with Dr Bultmann's view that Jesus could not have thought of Himself as the unique Son of God—though he deals with it to his own satisfaction by a quick application of his convenient *Amputierungsmethode*. Compare Matt. 11.27 =Luke 10.22.

It is not at all surprising that this admission of ignorance on the part of Jesus was used by Arius and his followers, who argued that He who knows and He who does not know cannot be equal. It is scarcely more surprising that it has at times proved difficult for the orthodox. But their difficulty has been due to their failure to take the reality of the Incarnation seriously enough. Calvin goes to the root of the matter, when he speaks of the Son of God 'enduring' this ignorance 'on our account' and connects it with His 'discharging the office of Mediator'.[3]

By 'that day' the Day of the Parousia and Last Judgment is clearly intended. In the OT 'that day' is an eschatological technical term.[4] (In view of this fact it would be unwise to press the contrast between ἐκείνης ('that') in this verse and ταῦτα

[1] For the view that this is the original reading in Matthew see Taylor, ibid.

[2] Cf. Lohmeyer, op. cit., p. 283, and Joachim Bieneck, *Sohn Gottes als Christusbezeichnung der Synoptiker*, p. 39 f (the whole book is an interesting and significant discussion).

[3] op. cit., p. 153 f.

[4] Cf. Lohmeyer, ibid.; but, when he says: 'in den synoptischen Evangelien benutzt nur dieser Spruch die aus dem AT geläufige Wendung', he forgets Matt. 7.22, Luke 10.12.

and *ταῦτα πάντα* in vv. 29 and 30[1] to support our contention above that *ταῦτα πάντα* in v. 30 does not include the Parousia.) The addition of 'or that hour' perhaps indicates, as Lohmeyer suggests, the suddenness and devastating force of the eschatological event. He compares Rev. 18.10: 'in one hour is thy judgment come.'

It is possible—though by no means certain—that this verse is an independent logion owing its present position to compilation; but to go on to assert that it is 'out of harmony with the trend of vv. 5-31' reflects a misunderstanding, not of v. 32, but of vv. 5-31. This saying certainly does reflect 'an attitude alien to apocalyptic speculation, with its emphasis on an orderly succession of events preceding the End'[2]; but to regard vv. 5-31 as such apocalyptic speculation is to misunderstand them.[3] The language of Jewish apocalyptic is indeed used, but the purpose for which it is used and even the form of the discourse are different. While it is characteristic of Jewish apocalypses that the seer is himself addressed or else relates in the first person what he has seen and heard, this discourse is marked throughout by its use of the second person plural imperative.[4] What we have here is exhortation, not ordinary apocalyptic. Its purpose, as we saw above,[5] is not to impart esoteric information, but to sustain faith. We judge therefore that there is no real conflict between this verse and the rest of chapter 13.

'By this sentence', says Calvin, 'Christ intended to hold the minds of believers in suspense, that they might not, by a false imagination, fix any time for the final redemption. . . . He wishes his disciples so to walk in the light of faith, that while they are uncertain as to the time, they may patiently wait for the revelation of him.'[6] We would underline the words 'faith' and 'him'. A 'map of the future' would be a hindrance rather than a help to faith; for faith has to be lived out under the ordinary conditions of human ignorance about the future.

[1] Cf. Bengel on the Matthew parallel: '. . . utrumque *haec* antitheton facit ad *illo*, *ἐκείνης* v. 36. hoc sensu: HAEC omnia, quae ad Hierosolyma pertinent, fient, antequam haec generatio praetereat: sed de ILLO (remotiore, novissimo, judicii) die, nemo novit, etc.'

[2] Taylor, op. cit., p. 522 f.

[3] Cf. Busch, quoted in Michaelis, op. cit., p. 74, n. 13; also Lohmeyer, op. cit., p. 283 f.

[4] Cf. G. R. Beasley-Murray, 'The Rise and Fall of the Little Apocalypse Theory' in *ET*, 64, p. 348 f.

[5] *SJT*, 6, p. 196. [6] op. cit., p. 153.

And it would have served to distract the disciples' attention from Christ Himself. This verse should remind us that we are not to let ourselves be preoccupied with the details of an apocalyptic time-table, nor are we to concentrate our expectation on a variety of future events, but simply upon the revelation of Him. In other words, Christian eschatology must be Christological eschatology!

Clearer warning against all idle speculation about the *when* of the Parousia than this could hardly be imagined. Such speculation is shown to be plain disobedience and the folly of those who think they know the date is clearly indicated. Says Calvin with characteristic vigour:

> We ought therefore to be on our guard, lest our anxiety about the time be carried farther than the Lord allows; for the chief part of our wisdom lies in confining ourselves soberly within the limits of God's word. That men may not feel uneasy at *not knowing that day*, Christ represents *angels* as their associates in this matter; for it would be a proof of excessive pride and wicked covetousness, to desire that we who creep on the earth should know more than is permitted to the *angels* in heaven. Mark adds, *nor the Son himself*. And surely that man must be singularly mad, who would hesitate to submit to the ignorance which even *the Son of God himself* did not hesitate to endure on our account.[1]

But, says v. 33, ignorance of the date of the End is not an excuse for being unprepared, but a reason (note the γάρ!) for unceasing vigilance. As to vv. 34-36, when we investigate their contacts with various passages in Matthew and Luke, we discover a very complicated situation, as a glance at Huck's *Synopsis* will show. It is hard to determine which passages of Matthew and Luke to set opposite them. They have contacts with the following: Luke 12.35-38; Matt. 24.42-44 = Luke 12.39 f; Matt. 24.45-51 = Luke 12.42-46; Matt. 25.1-13 (actually with v. 13); Matt. 25.14-30 = Luke 19.12-27. In view of this and also the fact that there are difficulties within the three verses themselves,[2] it seems likely that Dr Taylor is justified in saying: 'Verses 34-36 would seem to be a homiletical echo of several parables.'[3] But their general sense at any rate is clear enough. It is the same as that of v. 33 and is summed up again in v. 37.[4]

The absence of the master puts the slaves' fidelity to the test.

[1] ibid.
[2] For a discussion of these see Lohmeyer, op. cit., p. 284.
[3] op. cit., p. 524.
[4] For a different interpretation see Dodd, op. cit., pp. 158-67.

Similarly Christ's absence will test the loyalty of His disciples. But they are to remember that, as His return is in no way dependent on their plans, it may well occur at a time they least expect; therefore they must expect Him every moment, lest He find them unprepared.

We may wonder why the porter is specially mentioned, seeing that according to the application all are to watch. Is it simply a vivid detail of the parable? Or is it a sign that there was more than one parable behind these verses? Or is there here a special reference to the officials of the Church (a trace maybe of the circumstances of a later time)? Or is the figure of the porter singled out in order to give special emphasis to the general obligation to watch? It may be that the second or the first explanation is most likely. But the third and fourth suggest elements of exposition, which, even if they do not come out of this particular feature of the parable, are certainly implied by the verses as a whole. It might cause an altogether wholesome disturbance of our discussions of 'the ministry', if instead of our claims and counter-claims we began to ask how far *any* of our ministries is really fulfilling this function—the service of the porter who watches in order to be ready to open the door to Christ, when He comes to His people. On the other hand, it is surely true that this expecting Christ every moment is the whole duty of all Christians.

But what exactly does expecting Christ mean? Certainly not a waiting with folded arms or a despising of the time during which He remains absent! Christ 'did not give them this hope', says Schlatter, 'in order that they might despise the present and leave unused that which is given to them now, as though they could sleep till the day of the Lord breaks and console themselves with the thought that everything that is present is worthless and perishes. On the contrary, it was in order that this present life might be important to them. . . .'[1] The importance of the present is very clearly indicated by the three eschatological parables of Matthew 25, which draw out the implications of the preceding discourse and which, as we have just noticed, are related to this Markan parable of the Absent Master.[2] The

[1] *Das Ev. nach Matthäus*, p. 364.

[2] Here I am greatly indebted to the magnificent exegesis of Matthew 25 in Barth, op. cit., pp. 607-12.

parable of the Bridesmaids (25.1-13) confronts us with the question whether we really have *now* that which at the Bridegroom's coming will enable us to take our place beside Him. The parable of the Talents (25.14-30) questions us about our *present* doing, about our fulfilment of our mission as the congregation of Jesus Christ in this time between His Incarnation and His Parousia. It informs the Church that 'That same word, which it has heard, desires fresh hearers: the Church (*Gemeinde*) is not to hear it without declaring it further. That same Spirit, who is given to it, desires fresh dwelling-places and fresh witnesses. . . .' and that the Church which has not by its witness sought to the utmost of its power to woo and win (*werbend und gewinnend*) will at the Parousia stand outside in the darkness.[1] The parable of the Sheep and Goats (25.31-46) or, as Barth more accurately calls it, 'The Discourse of the Final Judgment' —for it is not really a parable at all—questions us (again from the standpoint of the Parousia) about our *present* relation to the Son of Man in His hiddenness as He confronts us in the persons of the hungry, the thirsty, the strangers, the naked, the sick, the prisoners, and reminds us that 'It is for these that He stands at the right hand of the Father, so that no one can recognise Him in His majesty and honour and love him as Son of God, without thereby being pointed to these His brethren, even these least—indeed, so that no one can call God Father in His Name without for that very reason being both permitted and obliged (*dürfen und müssen*) to treat these His brethren, even these least, as brethren'.[2] Those who expect Him every moment who are truly watching for His final and manifest coming, 'looking for and hasting unto the coming of the day of God',[3] are also prepared to recognise Him in His intermediate and hidden comings in His Word and Sacraments *and also* in the least of His brethren. NT eschatology is inseparably linked with ethics. To expect Him every moment is to be permitted and obliged to love. Compare Rom. 13.8-14, 1 Pet. 4.7-11, Phil. 4.4-7, 1 Thess. 5, James 5.7-11, Heb. 10.24 f.

One thing remains to be said here. It is abundantly clear from Matthew 25 that the Parousia will be critical for the Church as well as for the world. This is also clearly indicated by the Markan parable of the Absent Master. Jesus' words are

[1] ibid., p. 609 f. [2] ibid., p. 611. [3] 2 Pet. 3.12 (A.V.).

addressed to the disciples—the warning is for *them*. In this Jesus' discourse differs fundamentally from all messianic expectation that regarded the terrors of the Judgment as exclusively reserved for the heathen.[1]

As to v. 37—it sums up vv. 33 ff and also the whole discourse from v. 5. The command to watch is given in the first place to the four disciples, Peter, James, John and Andrew; but it is addressed not only to them, but also to the rest of the Twelve, to the disciples outside that inner circle, to Mark's readers in the Church in Rome, and to the whole Church throughout the last times.

Part II

In view of the unexpected length of Part I of this article we have had to modify our original plan for Part II. Instead of attempting a fairly full treatment of the critical questions we shall now limit ourselves to making some tentative suggestions on the basis of the foregoing exposition.[2]

One of the main objections to the authenticity of the discourse is its alleged inconsistency. Our first suggestion is that this inconsistency is highly questionable. Behind the assertion that the idea of a sudden Parousia cannot be reconciled with that of a Parousia heralded by signs and that v. 32 is 'out of harmony with the trend of vv. 5-31'[3] there lie, we suggest, two serious errors. The first is the assumption that this discourse contains precisely that sort of 'apocalyptic speculation, with its emphasis on an orderly succession of events preceding the End'[4] that the saying in v. 32 was originally meant to discourage. In other words, it is the failure to see that this discourse differs radically from typical Jewish apocalyptic. This radical difference we have already tried to indicate.[5] The second error consists in failing to reckon here with the possibility of intentional paradox. But paradox is highly characteristic of the Gospel—compare, for example, 2 Cor. 4.7-11, 6.8-10! To see that the apparent contradictions here may be

[1] Cf. Schniewind, *Das Ev. nach Matthäus*, p. 247.

[2] For a history of the 'Little Apocalypse' theory and of the various alternative analyses put forward by those who have felt the difficulties of that theory the reader may refer to Dr G. R. Beasley-Murray's article, 'The Rise and Fall of the Little Apocalypse Theory' in *ET* 64 (1952-3), pp. 346-9. See also his recently published book, *Jesus and the Future*.

[3] V. Taylor, op. cit., p. 523. [4] ibid. [5] See p. 295.

not inconsistencies due to unintelligent compilation but intentional paradox is, we would suggest, to hold a key to the understanding of the discourse.

There is a tension between, on the one hand, the absolutely clear warning against attempting to know the date of the Parousia which is contained in v. 32, and, on the other hand, the words of vv. 28 and 29 and all that is said about the signs of the End in vv. 5-23. Both are to be taken seriously. Where either is neglected, Christian faith and obedience are endangered. To fail to heed the warning of v. 32 is to make shipwreck of faith. That way lie fantastic illusions. But it is an equally false way, we believe, to take account only of the fact that we cannot know the 'when' and pay no heed to the signs of the End.[1] To disregard the signs as a mere relic of Jewish apocalypticism is to be in danger of reducing eschatology to something purely academic, of losing sight of its relevance to the present. Would not a church that had no longer an open eye for these signs of the End be a church that had ceased to expect in any vital sense its coming Lord? For the signs are reminders of the coming Lord *in the midst of history*. They are pointers to the relevance of the End to the life of the present. Their significance is that by pointing to the coming Lord they summon us to renewed faith and repentance, obedience and joy—*now*.

There is a similar tension between, on the one hand, 'the end is not yet' (v. 8) and 'the gospel must first be preached unto all the nations' (v. 10) and, on the other hand, 'when ye see these things coming to pass, know ye that he is nigh, even at the doors' (v. 29). Once more the two elements of the paradox must be held together, so that each may control, and help to interpret, the other. If we do seriously attempt to hold them together, we shall avoid the mistake of assuming that the NT insistence on the nearness of the End is exactly the same thing as an insistence that it is going to occur within a few years.[2]

In the second place, we wish to suggest that the view that the teaching contained in vv. 5-37 is inconsistent with the teaching of Jesus elsewhere needs to be questioned. It was stated with emphasis by Professor T. W. Manson in his book, *The Teaching of Jesus*: 'the picture of the times of the end given

[1] Cf. K. Hennig, *Das Markusevangelium*, p. 113 f. [2] Cf. pp. 287-8.

in the Little Apocalypse does not square with the account given by our other sources, notably Q. . . . The Q account of the Day of the Son of Man is totally different. . . . These two pictures are irreconcilable.'[1] But the inconsistency which he alleges between the teaching of Mark 13 and the teaching of Jesus elsewhere is precisely the same as the alleged inconsistency inside Mark 13.5-37—the supposed incompatibility of a sudden coming with one heralded by signs—and what we have said above applies equally here too.

To substantiate our second suggestion fully would obviously require a thorough survey of the teaching of Jesus, which is impossible here; but it is hoped that Part I has made some contribution toward its justification.

Thirdly, we suggest that the discourse (vv. 5-37) is not really incongruous with its immediate context. For justification of this the reader is referred back to Part I, *S.J.T.*, volume 6, p. 195 f, 297-300.

Our fourth suggestion is that there is no sufficient ground for asserting that any substantial part of the discourse could not have originated before the Crucifixion. If we take the sections into which Huck's *Synopsis* divides the discourse (vv. 5-8, 9-13, 14-20, 21-23, 24-27, 28-29, 30-32, 33-37), there is none which *as a whole* must be judged to reflect the conditions of a later time. We have not space here to re-examine them all from this point of view. Suffice it to refer to two of them.

In the case of vv. 9-13, we have the support of Dr Taylor for the view that 'substantially the predictions of persecution are historical'.[2] With regard to vv. 14-20 we would again refer the long-suffering reader back to volume 6, pp. 297-300, which we think might be judged to make it feasible to regard the section as substantially authentic.

What then is our tentative conclusion? It is that vv. 5-37 do give us substantially our Lord's teaching. If the four suggestions made above are justified, then the balance of probability can hardly be said to be against the authenticity of the discourse. When we use the word 'authenticity' in this connexion, we certainly do not mean to imply that we have here the exact words of Jesus. Doubtless His words have been modified in the course of transmission here as elsewhere in the Gospels. Nor

[1] p. 261 f. [2] op. cit., p. 507.

do we mean to imply that vv. 5-37 were uttered as a single discourse on one particular occasion. That the discourse is composite, just as 4.1-34 probably is, is clear enough from the fact that some of the sayings in it occur in Matthew and Luke in different contexts. What we do mean to imply is that these verses consist, substantially at any rate, of authentic sayings of Jesus which have been brought together intelligently, so that the resulting discourse does not misrepresent the teaching of Jesus. We do not think that we have here a mixture of authentic sayings with a lot of extraneous material of an alien spirit, or that the chapter gives us 'a wrong impression of His eschatological teaching'[1] or that in it we only see our Lord's real meaning through a haze.

A natural result of the disparagement of this chapter by much recent critical scholarship has been that ministers have been discouraged from preaching it; and this has meant, we submit, a serious impoverishment and weakening of the Church's life. That there is a close connexion between eschatology and ethics in the NT will scarcely be denied—Rom. 13 and 1 Pet. 4.7 ff are clear enough indications of it. Where men truly wait for the coming Lord, they do not fail to recognise Him in His intermediate comings in the persons of the least of His brethren. We are witnessing at the present time a remarkable revival of interest in eschatology; but it is important to remember that even when the discussion of eschatology is most vigorous it does not necessarily follow that the expectation of the coming Lord has effected a real and radical disturbance in our living. Our interest in eschatology can only too easily be merely academic. It is just here that the special contribution of Mark 13 comes in. Its insistence on the signs is a help to faith and obedience that we can ill afford to dispense with. The recognition that the events of history are signs of the End rescues eschatology from the realm of merely academic discussion and makes it relevant to faith and obedience. As our faith recognises the signs as they occur, we are again and again put in remembrance of our hope. Our gaze that is so easily diverted from the Lord who is coming to us is thus again and again directed back to its proper Object, and the events of the present become for us God's summons to renewed penitence, trust, love, obedience, joy.

[1] T. W. Manson, op. cit., p. 262.

There is then a sober and obedient recognition of the signs of the End which is something entirely different from the stupid illusion that they enable us to predict the date of the Parousia. To disregard this is surely to despise a God-given help. If it is true that in these recent months our British Churches have failed to speak out courageously and unambiguously for justice and mercy and truth, is it perhaps because we have failed to discern the signs and so have failed to keep our eyes on our coming Lord and so have failed to recognise Him in His intermediate comings in the persons of the least of His brethren.

(*Concluded*)

BOOK REVIEWS

Schism in the Early Church. By S. L. Greenslade. S.C.M. Press. Pp. 247. 21s.

According to the hostile Celsus, 'At their beginning the Christians were few and were of one mind, but since they have become a multitude they are divided and rent asunder'; and Origen replies that from the beginning there were disagreements, as is natural with any teaching that has a serious origin and is beneficial and essential to mankind. Schism is, therefore, not a post-Reformation phenomenon but one which has recurred at all ages of the Church's history from the earliest times. Inasmuch as some normative authority belongs to the early Church, a study of the nature, causes and effects of the early schisms will be relevant to the problem of divided Christendom today.

Canon Greenslade's book, substantially the Edward Cadbury Lectures delivered in the University of Birmingham in 1949-50, has a twofold purpose: (i) to explain what actually happened, and (ii) to relate the experience of the early Church to the modern situation. Its method is not to study each Schism separately but, using them as illustrations, to discuss the principal causes of Schism. Any difficulty thus created for the uninitiated may be overcome if he will first read Appendix I where he will find a Synopsis of the Schisms, briefly recording the facts in each case.

Beginning with a discussion of the distinction between schism and heresy, recognised by most of the Fathers but not rigidly adhered to, Canon Greenslade goes on to consider schismatic movements usually regarded as orthodox, classifying them in five groups as they seem to be principally motivated by personal considerations; National, Social and Economic factors; Rivalry of Sees; Liturgical Disputes; and, most important of all, Problems of Discipline. Of course most schisms exhibit several if not all of these influences, and in a study of this sort it would be all too easy to paint exclusively in black and white. Canon Greenslade is throughout scrupulously fair. The facts in each case are set forth with complete historical objectivity and amply documented, and the judgments are most carefully balanced where there is danger of overestimating or underestimating the weight to be attributed to any particular cause, or

where the facts are disputed. This is an authoritative treatment of certain important chapters in the early History of the Church.

Part III deals with the Church's Response to Schism. Earlier, Canon Greenslade has shown the grave view of schism taken by the Fathers, as the disruption of the Body of Christ, and the supreme sin against charity and the Holy Spirit; and he would have us share this view when, as 'at its best', it is coloured by zeal for Christian truth. Nevertheless he is critical of some of the methods employed by the Church against Schism, especially coercion, which in the fourth century became the usual and, it may be admitted, the most effective method at least superficially. Most interesting is his criticism of the method of 'Theological Reconsideration' as employed by Augustine in connexion with the Donatist Schism, for here his own position in the modern ecumenical debate begins to appear. He cannot accept the Cyprianic view that outside the Church, identified with the actual hierarchical institution, there is no salvation, no grace, no ministry or sacrament, though he admits the logical and historical strength of that position, as also the truth it contains, i.e. that somehow Church ministry and sacraments must belong together. The Catholic Church itself virtually abandoned it when it declared authoritatively at Arles that Baptism by whomsoever performed, if performed as in the Catholic Church, was valid Baptism. This principle Augustine extended to include Ordination, thus conceding that there could be a valid ministry and valid sacraments outside the Church while denying to them any efficacy for salvation. This was in effect to hold on to what was false in Cyprian's view and to give up what was true.

It has become harder now to deny that there are spiritually efficacious ministeries and sacraments in denominational churches which may have to be regarded as schismatic. Canon Greenslade's solution is that these must be considered to be 'within the Church', so that schism really divides the Church and does not put the schismatic body outside. In this way he maintains that there can be and ought to be intercommunion between churches which acknowledge the Bible, accept the Apostles' Creed, ordain a spiritually effective ministry, and celebrate Baptism and Holy Communion with the intention, expressed liturgically, of doing and receiving what Christ intended us to do and receive through them. Such intercommunion would at once remove one of the major scandals of our divisions and would lead to a growing mutual understanding and create new conditions for an advance towards corporate unity. This will not please the fundamentalist on both sides,—those who demand a more rigid attitude towards the Bible, and those who maintain that there can be no valid ministry unless received through the historic

Episcopate. But for the great majority of orthodox Christians who feel unhappy about the divided state of Christ's Church, Canon Greenslade will seem to have indicated the only hopeful way forward to unity. On the other hand the important point is made that fulness of unity is not something the Church once had and has since lost. 'It would seem that the Lord Himself knew that the unity of His Church would not be an easy thing. He had to pray for it, and it must be given by God.'

The great interest of this book as a contribution to modern ecumenical discussion should not be allowed to obscure the fact that it is soundly based on a foundation of solid historical learning. It is a striking illustration of Croce's dictum that all history is contemporary history.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

Church and State from Constantine to Theodosius. By S. L. GREENSLADE. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.

PROFESSOR GREENSLADE'S latest publication, which reproduces his Frederick Denison Maurice Lectures, examines an important phase of the recurrent problem of Church History and perennial problem of Church polity: the relation of the Christian society to the secular power. Much has been written on this topic in the setting of the later periods which bring it prominently to light: there is a considerable literature on the conflict of Pope and Emperor in the Middle Ages; the religio-political tensions of the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries; the Church's struggle *vis-à-vis* the totalitarian systems of our own day. But although works on the fourth century abound, this aspect of its ecclesiastical history has had less specialised attention than it deserves; and Professor Greenslade's volume is thus all the more to be welcomed. No more than in any other age was this question reserved for academic discussion. 'Theory', the author remarks, 'arose from the concrete situations of history'; and it was the vicissitudes of imperial policy towards the Church from the time of Constantine's first gesture of toleration that induced Christians to consider how they stood towards the civil power and, more specifically, that compelled the bishops to define their attitude to the Emperor. Accordingly, we find the leading churchmen of the age—Eusebius, Athanasius, Hilary, Martin, Ambrose—applying themselves to this problem; and it is not altogether surprising that their theories, which the Professor skilfully expounds, adumbrate much that is characteristic of later points of view on the relation of Church and State. Thus Eusebius might have won the approval of James VI and I; and Lucifer of Cagliari joins hands across the centuries with the Monarchomachi and the Covenanters. Although

he disowns the intention of discussing the general theory of Church and State relations, Professor Greenslade adds to his exposition some valuable reflections on his theme and his comments are often pertinent and incisive: 'The more independent the Church becomes, the more necessary is it to avoid clericalism, and the resulting anti-clericalism'; 'In the fourth century, at any rate, the demand for ecclesiastical liberty somehow culminated in an established church, with the approval of all catholic Christians'; 'It may be a proper conclusion that . . . the actual relation between Church and State will always be fluid, and the application of theory difficult'. This is a highly competent and illuminating study of a complex subject. Our one complaint is that it is not considerably longer. We hope that Professor Greenslade will return to this theme.

D. E. Easson

Christianity and the New Situation. By E. G. Lee. Allen and Unwin. 12s. 6d.

Here is a pattern of many threads—Lessing's contrast between the religion of Christ and the Christian religion; Tillich's tension of message and situation; Bultmann's hermeneutics and history—some with a novel twist and some dyed in a different colour in the new web.

The author has occupied charges in the Unitarian ministry at Bolton and Shrewsbury. He is editor of the oldest non-conformist journal in the country, *The Inquirer*.

The centre-piece is an essay published two years ago in the *Hibbert Journal*, and now substantially reproduced, on *The Jesus of History*. It is a moving chapter. Leading up to this is a discussion of the nature of faith, putting forward the view that faith has its 'guarantees' in reason, in will, and in spiritual integrity. Then comes a study of the Christ mysticism first of St. Paul and of the author of the Fourth Gospel, and then of all Christians since; and the conclusion is reached that such Christ mysticism is 'an imaginative truth created by the mind of man to make clear to him—within a certain culture—the nature of God' (p. 97).

The writer would not agree with the conclusion of Bultmann (drawn already in his volume on Jesus in the series *Die Unsterblichen*, 1929) that the Jesus of history is beyond our reach; but he claims that the Jesus of history can be known only through the religion of Jesus, here described as 'the consummate triumph of the human spirit'. If a religion is to remain alive, its symbols must constantly be transformed. This is the theme of one chapter, which analyses from that angle two of the symbols most important to Christianity, the Ascension and the Resurrection; but the result, as one might

expect, is that in changing the form of Christianity the chapter is in danger also of transforming the content. In particular, the place of history is not very clearly defined and under this treatment it tends to be a kind of inexplicable irrationality in the structure of the world, supplying only 'the drab evidence of historic fact' (p. 116). Concerning the Resurrection we read (p. 121) 'If the manifestations really took place that is one thing; if they did not take place that is another thing; but neither of these things have the least effect upon the ultimate religious insight of Paul and the disciples'.

Clearly, this might also be extended to the fact of the Incarnation, so bringing us back to a mythical theory. Nor does the author fully realise, perhaps, that if his reading is correct then the Christ-mysticisms of Paul and John and a multitude of others are not merely different ways of understanding Christ but are total misunderstandings and just plain idolatry; for the truth is evident: what they all saw in Jesus was none of the things which are here mentioned, important though they are (victory over the tragedy of death, illumination on the path of life) but forgiveness of their sins; and it is the treatment of this theme that we greatly miss in the book. When the believer reads (p. 139) 'There is not the slightest hint that the "saving power of Christ" can pierce the impersonal-rationalist assumptions that now surround the nature of man', his simple reaction is to proclaim, 'The strange thing is that it can and does'.

The book has a distressing tally of misprints. Sometimes (as on pp. 12, 120, 125, 130) they are immaterial; but occasionally (pp. 62, 119, 121) they may baffle the reader at an important stage of the argument.

There is a valuable comment on certainty with a useful warning against premature certainty (p. 75) and an equally sensible caution to psychiatric practice not to imagine that the end has been achieved when the evil spirit has been exorcised and the room of the soul swept and garnished.

EDGAR P. DICKIE

Way to Wisdom. By K. JASPERS. Gollancz. 10s. 6d.

THIS, as the publishers justifiably claim, is 'a book of a very rare type. A great philosopher, and one standing in a particularly close relation to his age, explains to the widest public—the book sprang from a series of radio talks—both the classical problems of philosophy and his own philosophical perspective. . . . Introductions to philosophy from really first-rate philosophers are not common'.

It is the sort of book that Socrates might have written—with all its strength, and also its weaknesses. It is shot through with a simplicity and a reverence, a deep maturity and a childlike wonder,

which is at once humbling and quickening. Its temper is deeply liberal and profoundly anti-dogmatic. 'The Greek word for philosopher . . . signifies the lover of wisdom (knowledge) as distinguished from one who considers himself wise in the possession of knowledge. . . . The essence of philosophy is not the possession of truth but the search for truth. . . . Philosophy means to be on the way' (p. 12). Philosophy is maieutic: it 'does not give, it can only awaken—it can remind and help to secure and preserve. In it each of us understands what he actually knew before' (p. 51). It is questioning: 'The most devastating threat to truth in the world is the overweening claim to the absolutely true. In the certainty of the moment the humility of the enduring question is indispensable' (p. 70). It is wondering: 'He who has ceased to be astonished has ceased to question. He who acknowledges no mystery is no longer a seeker. Because he humbly acknowledges the limits of possible knowledge the philosopher remains open to the unknowable that is revealed at those limits' (p. 127). It is venturing: 'I do not know; I do not even know whether I believe; however, such faith, expressed in such propositions, strikes me as meaningful; I will venture to believe in this way, and I hope I shall have the strength to live by my faith. In philosophy there will always be the tension between the seeming indecision of the suspended utterance and the reality of resolute conduct' (p. 95).

Philosophy means remaining open—open to the Unconditional. 'The unconditional is a foundation of action and hence not an object of knowledge but an element of faith. . . . Only when I live by something that can no longer be explained by object-knowledge do I live by the unconditional' (pp. 55-6). This is what belief in God means. 'My certainty of God has the force of my existence. I can have certainty of Him not as a content of science but as presence for existence. . . . God exists for me to the degree to which I in freedom authentically become myself' (pp. 45-6). 'To live by God does not mean to base oneself on calculable knowledge but to live as though we staked our existence on the assumption that God is' (p. 50).

But on what is this assumption based? Knowledge must be denied to make room for faith; but what faith? It is here that Jaspers remains with Socrates while his master, Kierkegaard, walked with Christ. 'Our independence requires help. We can only do our best and hope that something within us—invisible to the world—will in some unfathomable way come to our aid and lift us out of our limitations. The only independence possible to us is dependence on transcendence' (p. 118). Yet 'God remains in the distance and remains a question' (p. 50). He 'cannot be encompassed by any of the historical manifestations through which He speaks to men'

(p. 47). 'For God does not disclose Himself in history in any single exclusive way. Potentially each man stands in immediate relation to God' (p. 105). This is precisely the Socratic position which Kierkegaard characterised so unerringly in the *Fragments*. It rejects the offence of the absolute paradox, that our eternal salvation depends upon a moment in time. Consequently it has in the end no gospel of salvation at all. The most it can do, in Jaspers' fine phrase, is to 'cast an anchor through history into eternity' (p. 109). It knows nothing of a God who has cast an anchor through eternity into history.

And yet a world without Socrates would be a world deeply impoverished, and a Europe without the religious humanism of Jaspers would be a very much poorer place. It is seldom that an introduction to philosophy directs its readers with such sureness of touch to the really authentic questions of our existence. In a time of disintegration, while smaller men lay waste their powers on the meaning of meaning, it is good that there still stands one to point philosophy as a Way to Wisdom. A Socrates—but also a Boethius, recalling a crumbling civilisation with rare and noble beauty to the consolations of philosophy. His own *confessio fidei* makes a fitting close.

'Life is always an experiment. In this experiment the essential is that we dare to immerse ourselves in it, neither shunning nor closing our eyes to the extreme, and that we let unlimited integrity govern our vision, our questioning and our answering. And then let us go our way, without knowing the whole, without tangibly possessing the authentic, without letting false arguments or illusory experience provide us with a peephole, as it were, by which to look objectively and immediately out of the world into transcendence, without hearing any direct and unequivocal word of God, but reading the symbols of the polyvalent language of things and yet living with the certainty of transcendence. Only transcendence can make this questionable life good, the world beautiful, and existence itself a fulfilment. If to philosophise is to learn how to die, then we must learn how to die in order to lead a good life. To learn to live and to learn how to die are one and the same thing' (pp. 125-6).

JOHN A. T. ROBINSON

An Approach to Christology. By A. R. VINE. Independent Press Ltd. 21s.

THE first part of this book is a competent, and often intriguing study of the metaphysic and Christology of Nestorius, as found in the 'Bazaar of Heraclides', and shows that after all he was not a 'Nestorian' in the accepted sense. True, Dr Vine has many hard things

to say about his exasperating perplexities and obscurities, and has no wish to reverse the verdict of Ephesus. Yet he believes that, while Cyril was chiefly set on maintaining the Christological *facts* ('two natures, one hypostasis'), Nestorius (like us) was more concerned with the Christological *problem* (how these things are so), and was groping after ideas which have a profound bearing on it. These he now sets himself to make explicitly plain. And the result is a fine piece of clear, well-illustrated exposition, which is a pleasure to read. An excellent Appendix of notes on the 'Bazaar' is added to assist the reader to test for himself whether it will really bear the interpretations here put on it.

The second part of the book, following the pointers found in Nestorius, outlines the approach to a Christology which may be acceptable to the modern mind (modern enough, that is, to know of men like Bergson, Jeans and Einstein, but hardly yet Heidegger and Sartre). It is first explained that ultimate truth is beyond our ken, but we shall best approximate to it by continually reviewing (and if necessary revising) our postulates and hypotheses as each new fact or area of knowledge comes to hand and has to be fitted into a harmonious view of things. Such a general view is then outlined: The universe is the creation of a Supreme Mathematician, and comprises a vast array of different units—'protocumatic', atomic, 'hylic', 'biotic'—arising from, and still engaged in, a long and varied series of precisely calculated integrations, disintegrations and reintegrations. In man a human spirit (specially created by *empneusis* instead of by *fiat*) is integrated with a material body and animal soul into a special 'biotic unit', endowed with the power to fulfil various conditions under which God's laws will operate, and thus to produce new unities, not merely natural but 'theletic' and 'telic' (i.e. wilfully produced for some end); and in so doing he realises 'functional', 'pulchral' and moral values, positive or negative according as his activity is centred more on God's purposes or his own, but unhappily never 100 per cent positive owing to the apparent impossibility of achieving complete and lasting Theocentricity. God is the Supremely Perfect, whose many attributes are grouped under the twin head of 'exoschematicity' and 'endoharmony'; and the Creator is only one of three personal and functional manifestations of the 'incomprehensible suprapersonal totality of Godhead' (p. 355), of whom the second (God the Word) has the special function of so manifesting the Divine love among men as to kindle the responding devotion and faith in which complete self-surrender (Theocentricity) becomes possible.

Finally, an orthodox Christology is fitted into this modern metaphysic: God the Word particularises within Himself 'an "area" of

function and appreciation' (p. 365) exactly corresponding to a perfect human spirit. But instead of dismitting it by *empneusis* in the ordinary way, He retains it within Himself, while also integrating it *in utero virginis* with the embryonic body and soul of Jesus. The resulting 'biotic unit' is Jesus Christ—the sole human Example of perfect and abiding Theocentricity, and also the Means whereby others may attain to it. It is then shown how, according to the previous definitions, He is truly a unity, fully Man and fully God. And after discussing the problems of kenosis, growth and development, miracles, and death, the book closes by expounding the Definition of Chalcedon in this new light.

Dr Vine is determined to be orthodox. He uses a host of new terms (all carefully explained, if perhaps not all obvious improvements). But his aim in doing so is to clothe the bones of 'dead orthodoxy' with the flesh of modern thought. Yet it requires also the Spirit of God to make them really live. And one wonders how far this, too, has here been taken into account.

For one thing, the Spirit does not always speak the same language as philosophy (ancient or modern), even when using the same terms. (When, for example, the believer says God is supremely perfect, he is accepting a new standard of perfection; when philosophy speaks of the Supremely Perfect, it is projecting our normal standard to some highest, or infinite point.) And it is often far from easy to say whether or not Dr Vine is allowing for the necessary qualification of content. For another thing, the Spirit often demands the reversal of what we should normally like to think. (For example, He teaches that ultimate truth *is* knowable, because revealed; that the space-time continuum is not irrelevant to God, a mere testing-ground for human spirits on their way to eternity, but rather the stage or theatre in which to play out the amazing story of His partnership with men; that sin is an unreasonable act of rebellion, rather than the natural result of a scheme of things in which freedom to choose the best necessarily involves also freedom to choose the worst; that, indeed, our natural insistence on the freedom of the will is an obstinate attempt to mask its servitude; that the atoning work of Christ makes reconciliation not merely a possibility but a fact; that ethics properly belongs under the head not of trial but of gratitude.) And although most of His teaching is quietly brought in somewhere, or at least inferred, yet one could often wish it were given a more central and normative relation to the rest. For then it must be much plainer exactly how far our normal ideas are in fact parallel to the truth and how far they are quite contrary to it.

Here would seem to be the main problem of Dr Vine's book. Granted the rightness of his concepts of unity, man and God, he has

no doubt shown how an orthodox Christology can be constructed along these lines. Only, an explicit clarification of the more dubious points might well render the concepts less acceptable after all to the modern mind. Even as it is, however, this is a worth while book. All but those who choose to ignore modern thought altogether and think in a sort of theological vacuum will find in it much that is valuable and much that repays careful, if also critical study.

JAMES W. LEITCH

Das Kerygma und der Mensch. By WALTER HOLSTEN. Chr. Kaiser Verlag, Munchen, 1953.

To the searching study of 'The Missionary Obligation of the Church' which has been going on since before the International Missionary Council began to prepare for 'Willingen, 1952', this closely argued book will be a notable contribution. It deals with two subjects, 'Religionswissenschaft' and 'Missionswissenschaft' and begins by observing that they have their roots in the Enlightenment and in Pietism respectively, the one with its confidence in human reason, the other relying on religious experience. In consequence they have not had much in common. This study, however, brings them together by setting both in relation to the *articulus stantis et cadentis* of the Faith, namely in the *Kerygma* and in man's situation before God.

The sections of the book which deal with the first subject are richly suggestive, but undoubtedly the book is more thorough in its study of 'Missionswissenschaft', a subject which, it complains, Systematic Theology has too long treated as marginal, at best a department of 'Practical Theology'. This neglect it traces to the origins of the modern missionary movement in the particular sense of obligation felt by persons of a particular religious experience, which has made it the concern of the 'missionary society' rather than of the Church as a whole.

'Mission', the concern of interested people, has been nurtured by means which sustain their particular interest, namely the supply of a special kind of information. This does not automatically change when the Church replaces the 'society', for this interest of the Church also demands special information to nourish it. The foreign missionary is romanticised, emphasis is laid on his special calling, heroics are provided by tales of adventure and interest sustained by vivid accounts—today supplemented by films—of strange lands, peoples and customs. The missionary sermon is not expected to be a preaching of the Gospel but is the story of achievements in remote, exotic situations. 'The "Theologia gloriae" records its triumphs.' Such means are needed to enlist 'Friends of the Mission'.

Holsten will have none of this. The missionary obligation of the Church rests upon the whole body, as vital to its being as the hearing of the Word and the celebration of the Sacraments, for that indeed is what it is—the proclamation of the Word. The missionary is not a hero of special calling, but the ordinary believer fulfilling his vocation, often more effective when he has not the label 'missionary'. The story of the Church's mission is not important because it reaches outlandish and 'different' people, but precisely because these people are like the senders, sinners to be justified before God. So the Mission of the Church does not ask for special 'friends' but for the awakening of the whole Church to its essential tasks, and the missionary sermon is no other than the preaching of the Gospel, albeit with illustrations drawn from the life of the Church where it stands close to Baptism as a decisive event.

From this standpoint too the missionary task itself must be understood not as the propagation of ideas or ideals. It is the proclamation of the decisive acts of God, proclamation which calls for decision. The missionary enterprise is criticised as having too often been entangled in the propagation of a culture, a fact which to this day results in the call for teams of missionary 'experts' in various spheres whose avowed purpose is to demonstrate the superiority of the Christian pattern of living. The world of alien faiths is to be challenged by visible achievement. Here again is the 'Theologia gloriae'. Here we are not relying on the *Kerygma* but are providing it with supplements which may confuse even more than they clarify, for our attempt to demonstrate the Christian faith, in activity or in education, is always ambiguous. Education is important as a 'daughter of the Church' (Gemeinde), to edify those who have received the word, but as the 'Mother of the Church' it fails and that too because it is ambiguous. It does not demonstrate the superiority of the faith, because what impresses is not the fact that the education is Christian but that it is efficient, not that the missionary is of a particular faith but that he is competent. Even so, it is not to be assumed that the efficiency or the competence will appear, and if we stake our cause on such things then the faith must lose when governments or others use improved techniques or larger resources! There is no substitute for the proclamation of the mighty acts of God!

The main theme of the book must be taken seriously. Much of the missionary enterprise of the Church has been confused by failure to realise what its essential nature is. We cannot 'demonstrate' the superiority of the Gospel, and the more sensitive a missionary is the more keenly does he realise how miserably his best effort is stained by human sin and failure, and so cannot take the place of even the

most halting announcement of the things God has done. On the other hand, how much true Christian service has been confused by the suggestion that it can only be justified if it secures an audience for the Gospel!

Yet while the author has effectively cleared away a confusion of functions, one must ask whether the uncompromising nature of his book does not lead to an equally dangerous isolation of functions. For while it is a sheer blunder to make works of Christian service an attempted demonstration of the Gospel, it is equally a travesty of the Gospel to think that the Church could live in a world of need without trying to obey its Master's call to succour the needy. This obedience must take very varied forms, but service in Christ's name there must be. Those called to such service cannot be silent about the Gospel which has made them, nor can we close our eyes to the humbling truth that ever and again God has used even men's faulty service, offered sincerely and without thought of the 'impression' it makes, to draw men toward the Gospel itself. Here are facts which concern intimately the total calling of the Church in its missionary task, which one cannot but feel are treated too lightly.

Again, while one must welcome the protests of those who try to take away the haze of false heroics from the missionary's special calling, and so bluntly to remind the whole Church that the 'Mission' concerns every member, one questions whether this book sufficiently recognises the fact that there are 'diversities of gifts' and that God gives and uses that urgent sense of vocation which leads a man into the unknown because he 'can do no other'. Properly understood such special callings do not mask the responsibility of the whole but may be the means to arouse it. One must plead for second thoughts among those who seem ready to dismiss such a vocation as mere romanticism.

As a plea that these themes belong not to the peripheral but to the central in Christian Theology and as a valuable introduction to their fuller study the book must be judged as highly successful. Its range of interests, which includes Jewish Missions, Christian Education, Missionary Films and many other themes, is richly suggestive. There is a careful study of much modern literature on the subjects, with due but critical consideration of the findings of the I.M.C. at Whitby (it was written too early to take account of Willingen). Finally, for the student who wishes to pursue the subject there is a bibliography appended to each chapter which in the aggregate totals over forty closely printed pages, and which will prove an invaluable guide into the literature of the field particularly in German, English and Dutch.

William Stewart

New Birth. By B. Citron. Edinburgh University Press. 21s.

It is a welcome sign of the times to have once again an investigation of conversion from the doctrinal rather than the psychological angle. The preoccupation with religion as a subjective experience necessarily involved an almost exclusive interest in it as a psychological problem. But genuine Christianity has never allowed that the new birth, or conversion, can be understood or classified as a human experience of religion. Even when we make every allowance for the fact that the redemptive work of God must have its subjective side, it is still the case that this subjective side is the work of the Holy Spirit. It is worked out in terms of human life. To that extent it can be studied on the human level, just as the life of Jesus Christ can be subjected to historical investigation. But the real mystery of it is elsewhere.

It is the merit of Dr Citron that from the very outset he perceives that the new birth, or conversion, must be in relation to the redemptive action of the Trinity. He will not allow, indeed, that as an experience conversion is individual. It is the experience of the whole Church. But as that experience it is not on the same level as ordinary religious experience. It is an entry into the life of Jesus Christ. It has its origin in the purpose and work of the Triune God in election, redemption and regeneration.

The detailed outworking of this thought leads the author into a discussion of many basic theological problems: the good works of the unconverted, the meaning of faith, the bondage of the will, the interpretation of Baptism, the perfectionist teaching of Wesley. In all these questions he makes good use not only of the scriptural but of the plentiful historical material, especially in the Protestant dogmatics and confessions. From one point of view this is excellent, for much of the valuable historical material has been comparatively neglected in recent years. But the emphasis falls perhaps overheavily on this side, so that the author seems unable to win through to an independent assessment either of the scriptural teaching or even of the Reformers.

A further point of criticism is that he has not sufficiently tackled what is inevitably a crucial question for those born into a Christianised society: the extent or manner in which regeneration can be related to a pre-conversion Baptism. To say this is not to deny the value of what Dr Citron has actually done, and we must be grateful to him for the insights he has given us, the materials he has so carefully assembled and sifted, and above all his fine conception and sincere and reverent handling of a high and holy theme.

G. W. Bromiley

Baptism and the Anglican Reformers. By G. W. Bromiley. Lutterworth Press. 21s.

In the contemporary debate on the Sacrament of Baptism, there will be general agreement that it is to the teaching of Scripture that we must turn, and upon which we must found our doctrinal teaching and sacramental practice. That is the indubitable foundation stone. At the same time there is clear gain to be had from the consideration of the doctrinal history of the subject, for the great majority of the questions which occur in the Baptismal controversy have already been debated by generations of Christian thinkers (and it is to be feared, Christian non-thinkers), and there is much to be learned by reviewing their arguments.

This is particularly true when the period considered is such a formative one as that which is covered by Dr Bromiley's study. For it was not misconceptions, or popular corruptions in the traditional doctrine, which the Reformers, Continental and Anglican, repudiated but the medieval theological formulations of Christian doctrine. There were here fundamental disagreements, and a necessary rethinking involved.

This rethinking was done on the Continent rather than in England, and it is one of the virtues of Dr Bromiley's study that he sets English opinion and debate clearly in its Continental context. We are not merely given a summary of the opinions of the Anglican Reformers; but these are linked up into the context of Luther, of Calvin, of Zwingli, and of other Continental theologians.

If one were to criticise this study, it would be on the ground of its rather rigid plan. The theme is divided into four headings: the Sacrament; the Participants; the Rite; the Grace. Each of these is subdivided into four headings, for example, in chapter 2, the Participants, we find the Minister; Irregular Ministers; the Subjects; Infant Baptism. Under the subtitles we get a further series of topics each taken up and dealt with, all in very orderly fashion, but at times giving the impression of lists of opinions gathered under their headings and subheadings. It is at times a little stilted and trying to read. But it has the virtue of giving, on any point, a useful conspectus of views, particularly useful in its inclusion of Continental Reformed, Tridentine, and Medieval references.

Moreover Dr Bromiley can assist us to the fundamental theological principles involved. We are, for example, shown how the ultimate debate between the Anabaptists and the Reformed teaching, depends finally upon the difference between an anthropocentric, and a theocentric approach. The question is whether the Sacrament is to be interpreted in human terms, as a sign of faith, and primarily with a subjective reference, or to be considered as primarily a

declaration of Divine grace, and hence objective. There is a further link with the contrast between a Pelagian and an Augustinian view of man. In Scripture Baptism is connected with the remission of sins. If it is denied to infants, then either their sins are not remitted, or they have no sin which needs to be remitted. Faced with this dilemma, the Anabaptists tended to reveal themselves as frankly Pelagian, and what was for the Reformers the heart of the Gospel, that all men are sinners for whom there is no salvation except in and through the redemptive work of Jesus Christ, is denied.

Within the agreed repudiation of traditional doctrine, there was considerable variety of outlook, and in the sixteenth century three permissible lines of Anglican thought are distinguishable. In contrast to the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper, Luther's Baptismal teaching was never explicitly rejected, and it appears that it left its mark on 'the ceremonial and devotional character of the Baptismal offices'. Hooker, Bancroft and others stood for a cautious High Anglicanism. The predominant interpretation was, however, that of the Reformed theologians, the majority of divines accepting 'a kinship with other Reformed Communions on all the main doctrinal questions'.

This leads Dr Bromiley to a further point. He is concerned not only with the study of the Doctrine of Baptism at a certain point in past history, but with the relevance of this to the Church's present day situation in another dimension, the ecumenical. There can be no possible disloyalty, he claims, in regarding the Prayer Book and Articles in the Reformed sense, for, whatever other conclusions can be drawn from them, this is the one interpretation which 'the formularies do both state and demand' (p. 224). There is therefore nothing in the confessional statements of the Church of England which constitutes a doctrinal barrier to intercommunion, either with Lutheran or with the Reformed Churches. 'In their basic theology of Baptism, the Anglicans, not only agreed substantially with the Protestant Churches abroad, but they were proud of that agreement. And that means that a true loyalty to their work carries with it an acceptance of the kinship which they themselves both acknowledged and proclaimed' (p. 224). To reacknowledge this doctrinal kinship, and 'the obligation of intercommunion it was at one time thought to entail' would thus be a positive step towards greater unity amongst the Churches.

This is of course a plea for 'home consumption'. On the broader issue, as a contribution to historical dogmatics, this volume will be gratefully received, as an example of the kind of spadework which is necessary. It places all students of the problems of Baptism in deep indebtedness to the scholar who has done it so well. IAN A. MUIRHEAD

Melanchthons Werke. Bd. I. *Reformatorische Schriften.* Edited by Robert Stupperish, C. Bertelsmann Verlag, Gütersloh, 1951. D.M. 15.

It is significant that in the renaissance of the theology of Luther and Calvin today the works of the other Reformers are being examined and re-edited in critical editions and made available for general use. The publication of Melanchthon's works in a *Studienausgabe* is of special importance, for it puts in our hands material which helps us to understand the development of Lutheran theology. Recent studies of Luther's works have revealed a great deal that did not see perpetuation in Germany. His massive mind and wide catholic outlook dominated the Reformation, but certain aspects of his teaching (such as his Pauline as against his Johannine emphasis) were given unbalanced predominance after his death due to a certain extent to the rough polemics of some of his lieutenants; but there were other more subtle changes evident in the thought of Philip Melanchthon and apparent already in the *Augustana*, e.g. its doctrine of the Church. Calvin's correspondence with Melanchthon, and about him, is particularly revealing for this phase of the Reformation, for in his passionate desire for friendship and for unity with the Lutherans we sense his uneasiness about the humanistic and scholastic tendencies in Luther's successor-tendencies which later were to have such a hardening effect upon Lutheran theology and confessionalism. That Peter Vermiglio's exegetical works could be redacted both on the Continent and in England into a *Loci Communes*, against the whole genius of Reformed theology, shows the way that the interpretation of the Reformation was taking, if not also the direct influence at this point of Melanchthon himself.

That is not to dismiss Melanchthon by any means, for unquestionably he had a great deal to offer beyond the contribution of Luther in width of learning and sympathetic understanding of earlier theologians, particularly of the Fathers. That is one of the distinctive marks of the works published in this volume, the smaller German and Latin writings and tractates from the years 1519 to 1559, such as the valuable little work of 1539, *De ecclesia et de autoritate verbi Dei.* In that we have a doctrine rather like that of Butzer and Calvin, but clearly moving away from their insistence upon the visible institution of the Church due perhaps to an overemphasis upon the dialectic between *vera et falsa ecclesia.*

The editing and printing of this first volume are admirable. Others have followed and are still to come. Volume 2 in two parts, comprises the *Loci* of 1521 and 1559, edited by Hans Engelland; vol. 3 is devoted to exegetical works edited by Gerhard Ebeling;

vol. 4 is entitled *Humanistische Schriften* edited by Richard Vürnberges; and vol. 5 gives us his Letters edited by Hanz Volz. It is expected that there will be an additional volume. This is an edition that every self-respecting library of theology will insist on having, and one which is within the reach of private libraries as well.

T. F. Torrance

Calvini Opera Selecta. Band II. Edited by Pater Barth and Dora Scheuner. Chr. Kaiser Verlag, München. 1952. D.M. 30.

With the appearance of this work the edition of selected works of Calvin undertaken by W. Niesel and P. Barth is brought to its completion. Work on volume 2 was interrupted by the death of Peter Barth in 1940 which deprived the Reformed Churches of one of their greatest scholars. The editing and publication of that volume has been undertaken by Dora Scheuner in a manner worthy of Peter Barth. The texts have been carefully worked over and are now put out with an excellent critical apparatus and introductory notes which make it of great value to the scholar and to theological students.

Volume II of the *Opera Selecta* comprises some of the smaller theological works along with ecclesiastical documents from the years 1542 to 1564. In them Calvin stands out as the Doctor of the Reformed Church, shaping its polity, guiding its life and work, and maintaining its growth by instruction and exhortation. Here we are given *La Forme des Prieres et Chantz ecclesiastiques* of 1542, the *Catechismus Ecclesiae Genevensis* of 1545, the *Confession de foy* of 1559, and *Les Ordonnances Ecclesiastiques* of 1561, along with several works on the unification of the Church and the Sacramental controversy, notably the *Defensio sanae et orthodoxae doctrinae de Sacramentis*, together with a little tract on *Usury* and the remarkable *De Scandalis* of 1550. Here is in fact a collection of documents in one volume which are of the greatest moment to the Church historian, and which will provide an admirable text-book for the theological seminar. There are other works one would like to have bound up in the same volume such as the reply to Hesshushius, but the selection has on the whole been admirable.

We are particularly indebted to the editors for this readily available text of the *De Scandalis*, a comparatively little known but beautiful work in which Calvin speaks of the Church in terms of the suffering servant wearing the image of Christ, and has characteristic and profound things to say of the nature of the Church Militant and its ministry in the Kingdom of Christ on earth which are of immediate relevance to us today. This is Calvin at his best, where predestination, that *mare scandalorum*, as he calls it, and about which

he wrote mainly only in controversy, is put in its proper place, and assurance of election is roundly declared to be grounded in the glad hearing of the voice of the Good Shepherd. Here too in this volume Calvin's characteristic combination of eschatology and activism comes out in *la vraye vie saincte et divine conioincte aveques toute bonne action et ioyeuse attente de la vie future.*

It is perhaps churlish after such a fine edition to ask for more, but one would have liked to have in addition to the five volumes now published a further volume giving us the text of many of Calvin's most important letters in which the whole range of his thought and interest comes out. There is a side to Calvin, which has long been recognised by humanist scholars on the Continent but which has been overlaid by a very one-sided tradition about Calvin in our own country. That picture needs to be revived, and a new edition of his letters along with these *opuscula* would go far toward that end. They would help us to recognise the genius of one of the greatest Frenchmen that ever lived, whose *humanité* was his outstanding personal characteristic, and whose humanism left its indelible imprint on the French language. It is in his letters and smaller writings that Calvin the man emerges, for they give us the window in which we are able to see behind the reserve of the timid scholar into his deeply emotional and sensitive nature. When we collate the language of the *Institutes* with the language of his letters we find that Calvin's description of the way in which God approaches us and prattles to us in Holy Scripture is drawn from his description of the way in which his gentle wife tiptoed over to the cot of her dying infant to speak words of comfort and love. That is the genuine Calvin that appears in the *opuscula* and *orationes* of this volume.

T. F. Torrance

The Unity of the Bible. By H. H. Rowley. Kingsgate Press, Ltd. 15s.

Professor Rowley combines in this book two courses of lectures delivered two or three years ago on a much emphasised theme in recent Biblical studies. Although there is one large section of the argument in which the majority of readers will lean towards the contrary view, the book as a whole is rich in clear, profound thought. It is the kind of book which could be written only by a man with a vast range of scholarship wedded to deep Christian conviction and evangelical insight and concern. This is a combination of qualities which Professor Rowley possesses in outstanding measure. We must believe him when he says that he has restricted the footnotes to a minimum; but, as in all his other books, the provision of references

is elaborate; and readers, other than those with an expert eye for detail, may safely pass most of them by.

In one sense it is strange that the modern emphasis on the unity of the Bible should be necessary at all. What has actually happened is that there has been a kind of pendulum reaction from one emphasis to another. Even at the very same time, our scholar will write a book on 'The Varieties of New Testament Religion', and another scholar a book on 'The Unity of the New Testament'. A just balance requires to be held, and that is what Dr Rowley is seeking for. It would be grave indeed if it were ever seriously doubted within the Church that there is an essential oneness in the Bible, that it makes an imperishable and unalterable contribution to religion, that God speaks to the soul of man in the Bible as He does nowhere else. The emphasis on the diversity of experience, conception and type can have been harmful only if it was destructive of the basic unity of all the Scriptures. As one of the world's leading Old Testament scholars, Dr Rowley naturally and rightly deplores the neglect of the Old Testament; and fully one half of the book is devoted to an exposition of the foundations of Hebrew religion. The approach here is soundly historical, and he is sensitive to the dangers of allegorising and typology, so that we are in a very different world from that of scholars like Vischer and Hebert. The essential theological significance is set out decisively in the opening chapter which expounds a dynamic as opposed to a static conception of unity, and so the idea of revelation is amply safeguarded. All Biblical study in our time is affected by the revived interest in theology, and that in turn has its roots in deeper Biblical study. Accordingly it is possible now to speak of Biblical Theology in a more coherent sense than when famous scholars like A. B. Davidson were writing on Old Testament Theology or Stevens on New Testament Theology. Hence this is a book which has much help to offer to those who may be unduly puzzled by the supposed contradictions of the Bible.

Professor Rowley brings back the foundations of ethical monotheism to Moses, and he singles out the principle of election and the Covenant idea as that which primarily gives unity to the Old Testament. He welcomes the breaking down of the sharp antithesis between prophet and priest or lawgiver, and he is confident that the compilers of the Old Testament Canon accepted no such distinction in an extreme form. His statement of the place and function of the 'cult-prophet' is wise and proportioned. The prophets were not anti-cultic, except for the sake of the primary emphasis on the necessity for obedience to God, and he shows that the Law is in agreement with the prophets here. Judaism was not as hard and legalistic as it has often been regarded.

The basic thought of the Bible on God is carefully examined—His oneness which can never be represented by idols, His self-revealing character, the upholder of justice and righteousness, His compassion for the oppressed, His activity with a view to save His people, His faithfulness, His unchangeableness and His initiative in grace. On the other hand, man's uniqueness consists in his having been created by God in His own image, with a capacity for fellowship and obedience; his true well-being lies in a right relationship so God, which in turn implies the hope of a new community, a kingdom in which there is no place for arid or extreme individualism.

Professor Rowley states the inevitable paradox of fundamental differences between the Testaments, and then proceeds to show how they are interlocked. He argues forcefully that the Old Testament was not fulfilled in post-Biblical Judaism which, unlike Christianity, was never missionary. On the subject of Christ's fulfilment of the Law and of the Servant passages and of the kingdom hopes, this book is unusually helpful; and there is a valuable chapter on the Cross, considered in terms of this concept of dynamic unity. A little more might have been expected on the theme of Resurrection.

It is not easy to see why the last chapter did not deal with the doctrine of the Church, the new Israel into which the life of the old Israel has passed, rather than with the Sacraments. Dr Rowley is himself conscious of this objection when he recounts the story of the Baptist preacher who, no matter what the text might be, always introduced the last division of his sermon by 'Finally, my brethren, a few words about baptism'. In this case it is not a few words but twenty-five vigorously argued pages—surely a disproportionate amount of space. He sees no ground for infant baptism in Jewish proselyte baptism, nor any analogy in circumcision. Recent writers on the subject, like Cullmann, Marcel, and Flemington came in for much criticism. The crux of Dr Rowley's argument is that the doctrine of baptism which is held by most of the Churches of the world is tenable only by abandoning great basic Biblical principles; and that its essential New Testament meaning is secured only when 'it is charged with meaning at the moment of baptism'. He rejects the contention that the demand for faith prior to baptism makes the decision of the believer do all that is necessary for salvation, and for him prevenient grace is manifested not in Baptism but only in the Cross. He believes that many paedobaptists are driven to great lengths in their efforts to rationalise their position. The whole issue is prominently under review at present, and one thing that the scholars of the Churches adhering to paedobaptist doctrine and practice should do is to examine Dr Rowley's footnote references to the writings of the Fathers and the interpretation which he puts

upon them. By contrast, the closing pages of the book, dealing with the Lord's Supper, will command the general agreement of all within the Reformed tradition. GEORGE S. GUNN

The Church in the New Social Order. By EMIL BRUNNER. S.C.M. Press. 3s. 6d.

THE lecture which Professor Brunner delivered to the National Congress of the Free Church Federal Council in 1952 has been published in this form. By the New Social Order Dr Brunner means the present social order in Great Britain with all the changes that have taken place here particularly since the war. In his opinion it holds a fair balance between the interests of the individual and those of the collectivity. To go any further, however, towards socialisation would be to incur the dangers of totalitarianism.

Brunner's primary contention is that the task of the Church in the new social order is the same as in any previous or future order. It must preach redemption and eternal life and proclaim the Kingdom of God which transcends all social orders. The new order makes no essential difference; but it presents the Church with new challenges. For one thing, the Church must oppose the utopian illusion that by making the social order more collective you make the life of men more human, and it must beware lest men become used to looking to the State for every kind of betterment and begin to think that they need a Saviour no longer, for, by means of the State, man can be his own saviour. More important, the Church must seek to personalise and communalise its own presentation of the Word of God. 'What we need now is a new social Gospel, but different from that of the last generation in that it does not strive for a social *order* but for personal community. We also need a new revival, but not one which is concerned merely with the saving of souls but which, again, seeks the true personal life in a real communion with God and man.' Brunner makes the same point when he speaks of the discovery of the sociological meaning of the Word of God and the theological meaning of community, and combines the two in one phrase: 'the rediscovery of sacramental existence.' Word and Sacrament are a unity, and the Sacrament is indeed a transformation, not of the elements, but of the persons who eat and drink, into the Body of Christ.

To elucidate the matter further Brunner sets the Gospel over against two characteristic movements of our age—Communism and Existentialism. 'You may call the Gospel existential truth, because it cannot be grasped objectively but only in an act of total personal surrender; you may call it community-truth, because it cannot be had outside of the community with Christ and His people.'

Where so much is so well said, it is a pity that Brunner insists more than once that the 'New Testament *Ekklesia* is never an institution; it is always and exclusively a communion of persons, . . .' Behind this statement there lies, presumably, the contention of his volume, *The Misunderstanding of the Church*, that the *Ekklesia* is not an external means of salvation but rather an expression of salvation, belonging to the very substance of the Divine revelation. To say, however, that it is not an institution is to make a sharp cleavage between it and the historical Church. It is impossible, however far back one goes, to find a point where the Church was a pure communion of persons. There was a traitor in the Upper Room and an Ananias in the earliest days, and the Church in Corinth was apparently a corrupt institution, albeit a simple one. Why hesitate to admit that the Church at every moment of its history stands at the intersection of two planes—the horizontal plane on which it is an institution, subject to the processes of growth and decay that affect institutions in this world, and the vertical plane on which it is the Divine Society against which the gates of hell shall not prevail? To accept the one perspective alone is misleading.

On page 14 the name Ramsay is misspelt.

STEWART MECHIE

Liturgik des Römischen Ritus. By JOSEPH LECHNER. 6th ed. Freiburg, Verlag Herder, 1953. Pp. xii, 400. D.M. 19.80.

THE constant progress of liturgical studies involves the frequent revision of manuals on forms of worship, and where such revision is not carried out, the work quickly becomes dated. This is not the case with the present volume. The original book of Ludwig Eisenhofer, *Grundriss der Katholischen Liturgik*, which first appeared in 1924, has now reached its sixth edition, having in the process twice changed its name under the editorship of Joseph Lechner, first to *Grundriss der Liturgik des Römischen Ritus*, and in the present edition to the above shorter and more convenient title. So great has been the advance in the three years since the previous edition of 1950 that the book has now 38 additional pages. These are partly accounted for by a new and valuable section on liturgical music which includes two closely-printed pages of bibliographical references and an excellent short history of the development of church music. But considerable revisions have been effected at many points, and the very comprehensive bibliographies of which there is one for each section, have been brought up to date and form a most valuable index to liturgical literature. While naturally the writers referred to are predominantly of the Roman communion, the works of many non-Roman authors are included.

After an introduction, the book is divided into two parts. The first, dealing with liturgy in general, examines the forms of the Catholic liturgy, then the Church in its architecture and furnishings, vestments, and so on, and thirdly the Christian Year. The second part discusses first the Mass, its history and rationale, then the seven Sacraments and the Sacramentals, and lastly the Breviary Offices. Indexes of persons and of subjects are set out with accuracy and fulness.

This is one of the most convenient of the many handbooks on the Roman Rite. While not so detailed and not so much concerned with doctrinal and mystical interpretations as some other manuals, it contains an immense amount of learned information in very compact form. The work which is intended both for seminary students and for research workers, is already well-known and appreciated, and the new material in this edition will add much to its value and usefulness.

JOHN A. LAMB

Das Heilige Vaterunser. By KARL BECKER and MARIA PETER. Freiburg, Verlag Herder, 1951. Pp. 329. D.M. 17.60.

THE Lord's Prayer, so constant and so widespread in use both in private prayer and in public worship, has ever been the subject of reverent study and interpretation. Among the many works which have sought to express the heights and depths of the Prayer, this present one must take an important place. It is divided into five parts. The introduction discusses the history of the text and of its interpretation, tracing the latter from the earliest Christian times to the present day. The second, a short section, explains the Prayer in relation to the life and prayer of our Lord, starting from the thesis that we must miss its deepest significance unless the connexion is present to the mind. The third part shows the place the Prayer has taken in the liturgies of the Church, in Baptismal forms, in the Mass, in the Daily Offices, and in other rites. The fourth section explains the value of the Prayer in the personal, family and social life of the Christian. The last, which takes up about two-thirds of the book, is an exposition of the Prayer, petition by petition.

One very useful feature is the large number of quotations from writers of all ages of the Church, from Amalar, Ambrose and Augustine, from J. A. Bengel, P. de Bérulle and W. Bousset, from Calvin, Canisius and Cassian, from E. Lohmeyer, Martin Luther and W. Lüthi, from Paracelsus, Pascal and Peguy, to mention but a few. An index of these writers covers twelve pages, giving brief notes on the persons and their quoted works. An index of subjects completes the book.

There is no doubt that any who desire to study the manifold significance of the Lord's Prayer, should see this work. It is of the greatest value both to those who wish to use the Prayer in their personal devotions with the deepest understanding, and to those whose vocation it is to proclaim the Faith and to expound the Scriptures. There is nothing here of narrow Roman doctrine. The whole is conceived on a deeply devotional and spiritual level, and the reader is brought to realise how near Christians are to one another in the deep matters of the soul.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Liturgy of the Church of South India: An Introduction and Commentary on 'The Service of the Lord's Supper'. By T. S. GARRETT. Oxford University Press (Geoffrey Cumberledge). 3s. 6d.

THIS little book offers more to its readers than the limited scope indicated by the title might suggest. The fact is, as we all know, that liturgy has ceased to be the narrow interest of a few specialist scholars, and has marched straight into the life of the Church, to claim the attention and concern of both the ordinary parish priest and the theologian. A short time ago, the framing of a liturgy for use by a newly constituted church might have seemed a comparatively simple business—either the invention of a quite new form of Service for the Holy Communion, or the assembly of prayers and ritual actions which have accredited themselves by long or ancient usage. The Church of South India Synod Liturgy Committee, charged with the compilation of a liturgy for use in their church, had a task much more complex than this. The acts and the prayers and also the order in which they ought to follow one another raised profound theological issues. The standards to be applied in coming to decisions on such matters were not aesthetic or ecclesiastical in character, but genuinely theological.

Accordingly the Introduction, which composes the first part of the book under review, is not less than a commentary on the meaning of the Holy Communion. In it are outlined the principles which govern the determination and compilation of the elements which constitute the liturgy, of which a detailed account is given in the second part. Thus the book is a record of theology in action and directly affecting what ordinary members of the Church of South India will do when they wait in worship upon God, offering to Him their reasonable service and expecting from Him the covenanted blessings which He bestows.

Renewed insight has recently been gained into the originally corporative character of the Holy Communion, and attempts have been made to restore this aspect to present celebrations, so that all

those partaking may not be merely present but perform their appropriate office and part. The author claims that a right recognition of 'the place of the congregation in eucharistic worship may be claimed as an essential element in the most ancient Indian Christian tradition'; and the new Liturgy preserves this aspect. The people make response in the prayer which forms 'the central moment of the service', saying: 'Thy death, O Lord, we commemorate', and again: 'We give thanks to thee, O Lord our God', in words taken from the sacrificial memorial of the Syrian Holy *Qurbana*. The kiss of peace is restored, in a form deriving from the use of the Syrian Churches; it is given by the celebrant to the deacon and the other ministers, who in turn pass it to the congregation. The Intercessions are proposed in the form of a Litany, and the duty of leading the people in this prayer is alloted to one of those who assist the celebrant. Further the attempt is made to implement the wish and judgment of the Reformers, not only to integrate the part of the worshippers into the action of the Eucharist, but 'to restore the Eucharist to its primitive and rightful place as the main act of worship on a Sunday whenever it is possible to celebrate it'.

But the Eucharist is not only a communion but also a commemoration. This principle is recognised by the compilers of the new Liturgy, and the 'thought of commemoration is a constantly recurring theme'. Expression is given to it in at least two ways which may be mentioned. First there is included among the acts of the liturgy a 'reading of St. Paul's account of the institution of the Eucharist (1 Cor. 11.23-29) as a warrant for the sacramental act which we are about to make'; and this, standing free from incorporation in the Prayer of Consecration where its significance tends to be obscured, becomes a manifestly commemorative act. Second, the note of commemoration is again clearly evident in the recommendation that the Basilican posture be adopted for celebrations.

A further question which has been the occasion of animated discussion concerns the meaning rightly to be ascribed to the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist. The issues here involved are briefly but admirably expressed. On the one hand, 'to offer ourselves apart from the self-offering of Christ savours of Pelagianism'; on the other hand, to offer Christ (the *offerimus Hostiam puram* of the Roman missal) is to imperil or betray the vital evangelical truth of the entire sufficiency of the once for all sacrifice at Calvary. The Introduction appeals at this point to affirmations of modern scholarship concerning the meaning of sacrifice in Old Testament times, and suggests that, if full weight is given to the fact that sacrifice is not so much the death of a victim as the liberation of a life, the divergence between protagonists taking different sides on this issue may be

reduced. The principle to which the compilers come in the matter is: 'we may say that this was an act which took place once and for all and can never be repeated; but the appropriation of it by the worshipping Church is nevertheless part of the sacrificial act and may be repeated many times.' The principle is a statement of the view holding that the Eucharist is neither repetition of sacrifice nor mere representation of sacrifice, but a re-presentation. It is this view of the matter that is expressed in the Church of Scotland Book of Common Order by use of the phrase 'pleading His eternal sacrifice', which is admirably conceived. In the Liturgy under consideration, expression of the view held at this point takes another form. A choice had to be made concerning the position to be occupied by the prayer offering 'our sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving'. In the Book of Common Prayer, it comes 'only after the Communion, when the congregation have been united with the crucified and risen Christ through reception of the consecrated bread and wine'. In the 1928 Revised Book, this Prayer of Oblation is transferred to a place before Communion, thus imperilling the truth, which the position Cranmer allots it conserves, that 'man can only dedicate himself to God in reliance on him who prayed: "For their sakes I sanctify myself".' The compilers of this new Liturgy have felt bound to adhere to Cranmer's insight at this point, and 'the self-offering of the people takes place after the Communion'.

Again there is the vexed question of the 'real presence'. The issues underlying this question are clearly outlined in the section entitled 'The Mystery of Christ's Presence'. Even when the place of Christ's sacramental presence in apposition to His presence everywhere has been secured, there is still a difference of opinion whether the emphasis ought to be laid on the 'objective reality of the Christ's presence in the sacrament' or on the 'importance of the faith of the recipient'. Here again an admirably eirenical statement manages to take some of the sting out of the controversy: 'One might go so far as to say that there is not much difference between an adherent of the doctrine of the real presence who refuses to localise that presence in the elements of bread and wine, and a "receptionist" who recognises that a real gift is given and received in the Eucharist which is not dependent upon the devotional response of the recipient. In fact the two doctrines might be described as two contrasting, yet complementary, aspects of the fundamental truth which underlies the sacrament.' Again this principle thus broadly laid down receives its appropriate expression and at the same time what many have considered a lacuna in the Anglican office is made good, by restoration of the Epiclesis: the Holy Spirit is invoked to sanctify 'both us and God's own gifts of bread and wine'.

Another direction in which new insight concerning the Holy Communion has been obtained is its eschatological reference. Here too the compilers show themselves well aware of what is at stake. How many people who hear the words in the celebration think of the *Sursum corda* as containing an allusion to the 'Lift up your heads' of Luke 21.28? The eschatological reference of the Communion is made more explicit in the new Liturgy: the *beatus qui venit* is altered, to incorporate not only the 'hath come' but also the 'is to come'; a response is added that comes from the Syrian liturgies: 'Thy second coming we await; have mercy upon us'; and an echo of Maranatha is heard in the second Offertory prayer which contains the petition: 'Be present, be present, O Jesus.'

This commentary on the new Liturgy confirms the impression left on the reader of the office itself that we have here a really living liturgy, deeply conscious of its own importance as the vehicle by which offering is made and divine gifts received. There are several notable features that will be novel at least to most Western Christians. Some of these have already been mentioned; the others include the Litany form that is used for the Intercessions and the use of the spoon for the delivery of the elements to communicants. Several elements are permissive, either in the position they occupy (as in the case of the Agnus Dei), or in their inclusion or exclusion (as in the case of the Ten Commandments and the Trisagion). At other points alternatives are offered: Scripture readings may be responsive; our Lord's summary of the Law may be used instead of the Ten Commandments; for Proper Prefaces those of the Book of Common Prayer or of the Book of Common Order may be employed. It is not made quite clear whether these permissions are provisional until the mind of the Church comes to be made up, or whether they are expected to be permanent features of the rite.

Even more important than these permissive rubrics is the provision made for extempore prayer, and for its use in place of certain of the set prayers. 'Conceived' prayer may take the place of the Litany of Intercession; and even the Collects may be used in 'extempore paraphrases' which are said to be less formal and more natural.

Communions which are not accustomed to the use of a complete and detailed set liturgy cannot but be deeply interested in this compilation as the latest fruit of living liturgical interest. Communicants of Church of Scotland, for example, will find themselves very much at home at many points: in the words of the Confession and of the Preface to the Great or Consecration Prayer (which are borrowed from the Communion offices in the Book of Common Order), in the place accorded to the reading of the warrant, and to

the Fraction, in the use of the Epiclesis, and in the recommended Little Entrance (that is of the Holy Bible) and Great Entrance (the bringing in of the elements near the beginning of the Liturgy 'of the Upper Room'). They would entirely agree with the unambiguously important place accorded to the Word read and preached, alongside of the Sacrament. They would, one fancies, be eager to welcome the flexibility which the Liturgy imparts to the office, the lack of rigidity and the absence of fear of innovation—and one cannot help wondering whether they would all be willing to answer with as ready an acceptance an invitation to think of their own liturgy in similarly flexible terms.

The existence of the C.S.I. in the midst of Christendom is a challenge to all Christian Churches. It is greatly to be hoped that this little book will be as widely read and studied as it deserves. It cannot help to be an influence for good in the sphere of ecumenical relations.

The only minor blemishes which the present writer noted were a rather over-simplified account of the way in which the Lord's Supper separated into Eucharist and Agape on p. 15; an account in surely very shaky psychological terms of the relation of the Last Supper with the rite of the Passover on p. 22; a typographical wrong fount in 'devotional' on p. 36; and an error in the word Epistle on p. 69, note 2; together with a curiously and rather arbitrarily incomplete index.

J. K. S. Reid

English and Scottish Psalm and Hymn Tunes. c. 1543-1677. By Maurice Frost. Pp. 532. London: S.P.C.K. and Oxford University Press. £5 5s.

It is now almost twenty-five years since Sir R. R. Terry spoke of 'the pronounced reaction in favour of the virile rhythms and strong harmonies of the old Psalm Tunes'. The hymn-books published in the last generation have drawn much from that source, but it can be said that the tunes are not yet as well-known as they deserve to be and many are still neglected. Terry would have rejoiced in the publication of this splendid volume by Maurice Frost. His help and encouragement are indeed acknowledged, but the completed volume would in every way have delighted him, and perhaps not least because this book should be a great force in making the tunes both better known and more widely used.

The volume is indeed a very considerable achievement. In its format and typography it reaches the high standard associated with its publishers, and it is comfortable both to hand and to eye. Its purpose is to provide a collection of the psalm and hymn tunes

which appeared in books published between circa 1543 and 1677.

The first part deals with the Old Version Psalters and the tunes associated with them, the Scottish Common Tunes, and the new tunes of Ravenscroft 1621. First comes a bibliography of the Psalters with complete descriptions of the contents and with comparative notes, this list being in itself of great value. The tunes themselves follow, and are given in the original form, except that in some cases the clef is changed and that most of the harmonisations are given in short score. At the end of each tune is a list of the books in which it appears. In certain cases, the original form of the tune, as given for example in Zahn, is printed for comparison. It should be specially noted that the tunes peculiar to the Scottish Psalters from 1564 to 1635 are all to be found here.

The second part contains tunes associated with ten versions other than Sternhold and Hopkins, including Coverdale's *Goostly Psalmes*, Matthew Parker's Psalter, and Wither's *The Hymns and Songs of the Church*, while the Appendix gives tunes from three other collections. Each book is described fully, and tunes not already given, are to be found in this section.

It will be clear from this brief outline that this book will be essential for all students of the Psalmody of Scotland and of England. It is the fruit of many years of labour on the part of the author to whom great honour is due, and it is not likely to be superseded for a very long time. It is however not only a tool for the student. The choirmaster will find here much adaptable material, which can add to the interest and the accomplishment of his singers. The revisers of psalters and hymn-books will, it is to be hoped, be inspired to add to future editions more of these fine tunes than ever before. Even those who may have little technical equipment but are interested musically or devotionally in the praise of the Church, will find much enjoyment in a perusal of these pages. All will be grateful for the devoted labours of the author, and will rejoice to learn that, as readers of the Hymn Society Bulletin know, he is continuing his work with undiminished scholarly enthusiasm.

JOHN A. LAMB

Companion to Congregational Praise. With notes on the music by Erik Routley. K. L. Parry (Editor). London: Independent Press Ltd., 1953. Pp. 580. 30s.

WHEN *Congregational Praise* was issued in 1951 (reviewed in *S.J.T.* in December 1952), a Companion was promised, and many have been waiting for its appearance with confidence and high expectation. Its actual publication will be a source of the greatest satisfaction, not only to those who use *Congregational Praise*, but to all

hymn-lovers. The editor has provided the notes on hymns and authors, and Dr Routley has prepared those on tunes and composers. While acknowledging the real debt due to the *Handbook to the Church Hymnary* and to *Songs of Praise Discussed* and other similar works, the editors have done much original research and have produced a handsome, useful and authoritative book. There is an excellent 'General Introduction' on the history of hymns; an excursus entitled 'Congregational Praise: Some Back Numbers', an interesting history of the hymn-books of the Congregational Church; and a wise 'Note on Children's Hymns'. In the body of the Companion, there are eight special articles on 'Names of Hymn-Tunes', 'French Church Melodies', 'Bach Chorales', 'Gathering Notes', 'Hymns and the Classics' (really on Hymn-tunes and the classics), 'Welsh Hymn-Tunes', 'Metrical Psalms', and 'Music of the Chants'. A very useful feature is a chronological list of sources cited in the musical notes, which constitutes a bibliography of the most important psalm and hymn books from 1524 to 1951. This Companion can be heartily recommended to all who have any interest in hymnody and in its relation to the worship of the Church.

JOHN A. LAMB

Introduction to the Qur'an. By RICHARD BELL. The Edinburgh University Press, 1953. 18s.

THE Edinburgh University Press are to be congratulated on adding this scholarly and beautifully produced volume to their steadily growing list of learned publications. The appearance of Richard Bell's *Introduction* so soon after his lamented death is particularly appropriate, and may be considered to be a token of esteem and affection from the University which he served with such high distinction. It is a matter for regret that Dr Bell was not spared to see this volume through the press. It was one to which he devoted much thought in the closing years of his life.

Undoubtedly this book will take an honoured place in the already formidable list of volumes which have come from the pens of western scholars who have wrestled with the problems which Muhammad and the Qur'an have set the world. It is many years ago now since Richard Bell won for himself a place among the internationally famous Semitic scholars, and this posthumous volume can only enhance his already established reputation.

The *Introduction to the Qur'an* will be warmly welcomed for a variety of reasons. First of all, this book is, in a very real sense, part of the man himself. Here his humility, devotion to truth, and immense erudition are apparent on every page; and those of us who knew him personally will realise how much of his spirit he has

put into his last book. Again, the book is the fruit of a lifetime's devotion to Qur'anic studies. Here we are given considered judgments based upon years of diligent research and patient reflection. Not that Dr Bell would claim to have said the last word at any point! But his book is a real contribution to knowledge, and will be welcomed by Semitic scholars everywhere.

Generally speaking, books on Islamics are eschewed by the layman in this country because of the presence of technicalities. Let the uninitiated be assured that, except for a few pages, they will never find themselves out of touch with the author of this *Introduction*. Here and there acquaintance with Arabic grammar and other linguistic intricacies are assumed, but, those apart, the non-expert will find this an eminently readable and absorbing book, and one that might well stimulate to a lasting interest in the Qur'an and the Islamic world.

It is now eighteen years since Richard Bell gave us his *Translation of the Qur'an*, and the appearance of that work gave rise to a good deal of misunderstanding, due to Dr Bell's seemingly arbitrary analysis of the surahs of the Qur'an. Indeed, in the preface to the present volume he says: 'The views of Muhammad and of the Qur'an on which my analysis of the surahs was based have not always been understood.' His *Introduction*, therefore, will be welcomed everywhere because in it he sets out the principles which guided him in his critical rearrangement of the surahs. It was a pity that this *Introduction* did not accompany his *Translation*; a wish that he expresses in the preface.

It is Dr Bell's conviction that the unit of composition in the Qur'an is not the surah but the short passage; i.e. he considers that the surahs were compiled from short pieces, and that, therefore, the date of the short passages, not of the surahs, is the primary question when endeavouring to determine the chronological sequence of the contents of the Qur'an. One of the great merits of Richard Bell's *Translation* is his attempt to unravel the bits and pieces from which the surahs had been compiled; but exigencies of space made it impossible to explain the principles that guided him in this important but formidable task. This lacuna is now made good in his *Introduction*, hence one of the chief values of this posthumous volume.

Professor Blachère of Paris, in his scholarly *Introduction to the Qur'an*, is exceedingly cautious in his approach to the work done in this particular field and warns against over confidence in the critical methods adopted, and suggests that some of the conclusions seem to be founded on hypotheses more ingenuous than substantial. The wisdom of Professor Blachère's plea will commend itself, not only to workers in the field of Qur'anic studies, but also to those who are

conversant with what has been done in the field of OT textual criticism, and with the work of R. Bultmann and M. Dibelius in the field of Formgeschichte in the Gospels. But the readers of Dr Bell's *Introduction* will quickly realise that he was fully alive to the dangers of subjective criticism, and therefore endeavoured to work according to objective principles.

Whereas the chronological order of the surahs adopted by Noeldeke seems to have been determined by an over-emphasis on style, a criterion that was particularly open to the dangers of subjectivity, Dr Bell has been guided by (1) Linguistic and grammatical features; (2) Historical events; (3) Clearly defined stages in Muhammad's religious, political and social development. It is clear that whatever guiding principles are adopted in determining the length and date of each short passage the danger of subjectivity is inevitably present, but it will be recognised that Dr Bell's work on the Qur'an was based upon sound objective principles; and it will be interesting to have the results of a re-appraisement of his arrangement and chronological order of the surahs in the light of the principles he has set forth in his *Introduction.*

As was only to be expected, Dr Bell lays it down as an axiom that the Qur'an must take precedence over Tradition. It is his conviction that the form and content of the Qur'an are authentic, and that its present form is largely the same as it was in the Prophet's time. Dr Bell's *Introduction* also contains illuminating discussions on the Signs, the punishment stories, Qur'anic eschatology, the legislation of the Qur'an, and other kindred topics. The whole makes an illuminating book that is now essential to an intelligent understanding of the Qur'an.

J. G. S. S. Thomson

Index to Religious Periodical Literature

(We are very pleased to call the attention of our readers to the following important work issued by the American Theological Library Association)

Index to Religious Periodical Literature, an Author and Subject Index to Periodical Literature, 1949-1952, Including an Author Index to Book Reviews. Prepared by Libraries of the American Theological Library Association and Compiled and Edited by J. Stillson Judah with the Assistance of Leslie Joan Ziegler. American Theological Library Association, 1953. (Distributed by The American Library Association, 50 East Huron Street, Chicago 11, Illinois.) ix, 220 pp. $5.00 paper, $6.00 cloth.

An index by author and subject, with cross references, to thirty-one

scholarly periodicals not included in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, or the *International Index to Periodicals*, in the fields of Bible, Theology, Church History, and related disciplines, covering the years 1949-1952, together with an index to book reviews appearing in these periodicals. The resources indexed may be suggested by the following: 83 entries found under Dead Sea Scrolls, 41 under Church and State, 27 under Lord's Supper, 15 under Karl Barth, 27 under Reinhold Niebuhr, 55 under Communism, 32 under the World Council of Churches, and 15 under Missions (plus 19 cross references to related topics). The *Index* locates critical reviews for approximately 2,000 books, *viz.*, nine titles by Oscar Cullmann are covered by 21 reviews, and seven titles by H. H. Rowley are covered by 30 reviews, etc. It is expected that succeeding volumes of the *Index* will be issued in the future.

The periodicals reviewed are:

Anglican Theological Review
Baptist Quarterly
Biblica
Biblical Archaeologist
Catholic Biblical Quarterly
Christianity and Crisis
Church Quarterly Review
Congregational Quarterly
Crozer Quarterly
Interpretation
Jewish Quarterly Review
Journal of Bible and Religion
Journal of Cuneiform Studies
Journal of Near East Studies
Journal of Pastoral Care
Journal of Religious Thought
Journal of Theological Studies
Lutheran Quarterly
Modern Churchman
Muslim World
Palestine Exploration Quarterly
Review and Expositor
Revue Biblique
Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuse
Scottish Journal of Theology
Social Action
Studia Theologica
Syria
Theologische Rundschau
Theology Today
Vetus Testamentum

RAYMOND P. MORRIS, *Librarian*
Yale University Divinity School

Printed in Great Britain by ROBERT CUNNINGHAM AND SONS LTD., Alva

BULTMANN'S ESTIMATE OF JESUS

by The Rev. Professor ALLAN BARR

The name of Rudolph Bultmann has recently become specially associated with the proposal to demythologise the New Testament and reinterpret it in terms of a Christian existentialism. The discussion of this proposal will be further stimulated by the recent publication in English of *Kerygma and Myth*, which contains Bultmann's original essay on the subject and a selection of the contributions made by German scholars in the ensuing controversy. It appears to the present writer that insufficient attention has been given in discussion to the connexion between Bultmann's opinions on the historical Jesus and the proposal now so prominently before us. It may be that in Bultmann's teaching there is an underlying interplay between his criticism of the history and his hermeneutic proposal; such that on the one hand his estimate of the historical Jesus is influenced if not controlled by his general philosophical and theological assumptions, while on the other hand his radical conclusions regarding the history have tended to lead him to his extreme position as an interpreter.

There is general recognition of Bultmann's learning, ability and insight as a New Testament scholar. He has recently been elected President of the international Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas, an indication of the honour in which he is held by many who do not share all his views but recognise the outstanding value of the contributions he has made to many branches of New Testament study. Particularly he has done much by his pioneer work in the application of the *formgeschichtlich* method and in his New Testament theology to analyse and as it were to disentangle in our New Testament and early Christian sources the distinctive motifs contributed by the earliest Palestinian Christian circle, by the Hellenistic Jewish and Gentile Christian communities before Paul, by Paul himself and by post-Pauline Christians, and also by movements in the non-Christian Gentile world—gnosticism, the mystery

religions and so on, to which some of his critics think he has ascribed an exaggerated influence. In conclusions founded upon such close analysis there are certain to be many points at which other scholars will express disagreement with Bultmann. But it is in the application of his principles and methods to the Gospels that the results are most challenging and disquieting.

His estimate of the historical Jesus portrayed in the Gospels can be gathered chiefly from his *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition* (1921, 1931), his *Jesus*, 1926 (Eng. Transl. *Jesus and the Word*) and his *Theology of the New Testament I*, recently published in an English translation. The lapse of some thirty years appears to have brought no substantial deviation from the conclusions expressed in the earlier books.

Bultmann has more than once been described as the twentieth century Strauss, on the ground of his historical scepticism. The comparison is indeed illuminating and useful. D. F. Strauss was probably the first to bring out into the clear light of day the true character and importance of the eschatological teaching of Jesus, which Bultmann now with even more far-reaching consequences puts at the centre of his interpretation. Strauss, again, startled his contemporaries by applying the category of myth to a great part of the Gospel records; Bultmann, with some change in the connotation of the term, does the same today. But there are differences. In Strauss' time even source-criticism of the Gospels had only made a beginning. The Gospel narratives were taken more or less as they stand, and the debate on their historicity was acute. Were the miracles supernatural, or were they to be explained away on a rationalistic basis? Strauss offered a third way in his mythological explanation. Bultmann comes to the scene when both identification of sources and form-criticism have helped to distinguish between the earlier and the later strata of the Gospel material, and have made the mythological explanation in some cases more reasonable, in view of the time and place of their origin; and actually much less of the Gospel narratives is counted worthy of acceptance in the study of the historical Jesus, by Bultmann than by his predecessor. But there is a still more striking difference. Strauss, under the influence of the prevailing Hegelianism, extracted, as it were, from the Gospels nothing more than the God-man *idea*. That was what the life of Jesus

bequeathed to the Church and to the world. But Bultmann's work is characterised by evangelical ardour. He desires to commend the message of the New Testament to modern men in such a way as to bring about a radical change in their relation to God and in their practical life. Strauss, though he is described by Schweitzer as the 'most absolutely sincere' of theologians, had a rough passage among his contemporaries. Today the motives at least of Bultmann's reinterpretation are cordially appreciated. It is surely an indication of the great change that a few generations have brought to the theological scene that a more radical critic than Strauss is held in such honour and his work so valued.

How far does Bultmann's historical scepticism go? The statement in his book *Jesus* has often been quoted: 'I do indeed think that we can now know nothing concerning the life and personality of Jesus, since the early Christian sources show no interest in either, are moreover fragmentary and often legendary; and other sources about Jesus do not exist.' To the same effect, from his *Die Erforschung der synoptischen Evangelien* (1930): 'One claim has to be renounced. The character of Jesus, the image of his personality, is no longer recognisable.' This is not written in a mood of despair; Bultmann himself is really indifferent about the personal qualities of Jesus and the biographical details of His ministry. But the application of Bultmann's critical methods has led him to the conclusion that not only is the narrative framework of the Synoptic Gospels an artificial construction, but the constituent narrative elements—the various stories about Jesus—are for the most part legendary or mythical, the product of the faith of the Church. Such a conclusion, of course, may well be disputed, and that on Bultmann's own ground. For there is not only an *a priori* probability of genuine reminiscences of Jesus' life having been preserved until the composition of the Gospels, but there is considerable evidence on form-historical principles themselves (take the opening verses of Luke's Gospel as a single example) of a definite interest, on the part of the Evangelists and their sources, in the personal testimony of the original eyewitnesses. Bultmann's conclusions regarding the narrative are indeed radical. He leaves us definitely with the Crucifixion under Pontius Pilate, probably with the Baptism at the hands of John, possibly with

the Entry into Jerusalem (as a prophet, not as Messiah) and some other details, and that is all.

This may well be called 'scepticism'. But it is rather characteristic of those who gain a reputation as sceptics that they speak with much assurance where they have definite opinions to express. Bultmann's exposition of the Teaching of Jesus has a note of downrightness, almost of finality. The brevity of his *Jesus* compared with the ponderous volumes in which others have presented the Life and Teaching of Jesus is apt to give a wrong impression of inadequate treatment. The survey is indeed condensed, but it is comprehensive. He devotes about one page to the question of the life and personal qualities of Jesus, then turns to a close examination of the Teaching, and sets out his conclusions with a minimum of argument. So also in his *Theology of the New Testament*, the opening chapter on the message of Jesus occupies only 30 pages of the 350 of the first volume (the English edition); the charge of disproportionate treatment is more to the point there, but a good deal is packed into those 30 pages.

What then is the substance of the Teaching? Bultmann accepts as authentic a great part of the words of Jesus recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, but in every case, of course, after the sayings have been pruned or shorn of accretions which had their origin in the Palestinian or Hellenistic Jewish Christian communities or in the Gentile Church. In the resultant teaching Jesus' words are primarily those of an eschatological prophet. He announces the imminence of the Kingdom of God, that transcendent, catastrophic event which demands of every hearer of the message a decisive yes or no.

In interpreting Jesus' message, Bultmann rejects most of the definitions or descriptions of the Kingdom which Christians at one time or another have come to accept. It has nothing to do with the cultivation of the human spirit, nothing to do with mysticism, nothing to do with ideals for human society, or with the foundation of a 'Church' within it. Jesus does not think of it in world-wide, universal terms; though not political in character, it is for the Jewish people, and there is no thought of a mission to the Gentiles. It is indeed beyond description, supernatural; essentially an act, the act of deliverance, from the viewpoint of men essentially an event, the salvation-event,

entirely the work of God; still in the future, but dawning, and even now determining the present. And so, this is the last hour.[1]

In so far as the transcendent event *is* described, Jesus thinks and speaks in the language of contemporary Jewish apocalyptic, significantly stripped of its fanciful and speculative elaborations. His message is Messianic, but He never claims to be the present or the destined Messiah, and there is no reinterpretation of the traditional Messianic concept. He speaks of the Son of Man as the agent of God in the Final Judgment, but always speaks of the Son of Man as other than Himself. For this reason Bultmann places no stress on the distinction between these titles: Messiah, Son of Man; it does not essentially affect the message of the Kingdom's coming, and it has nothing to do with Jesus' consciousness of Himself. The authentic sayings of Jesus, he asserts, contain no prophecy of His coming passion, no reference to the Suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah. The account of the confession of Peter at Caesarea Philippi and the sayings attached to it, like the Transfiguration scene which is closely associated with it, are myth, the reflection of the Easter-faith of later times. 'Jesus did not speak of his death and resurrection and their redemptive significance'; of the words spoken at the Last Supper only those are retained as authentic which embody the eschatological hope.[2]

Such an exposition would amaze any ordinary Christian, and it may even be irritating to many of our present readers. For there are weighty objections to it, even on severely critical grounds, and few British scholars would agree with its major affirmations and negations. The term 'Son of Man', for example, as is well known, is always placed by the Evangelists in the mouth of Jesus Himself, and in only a few cases can be understood as referring to another than Himself; and it is the boldest of criticism to assign to the early Church the widespread extension of a title which, as far as our evidence goes, it did not use itself. Again, Bultmann assumes the derivation of this title from the apocalyptic writers, and gives no consideration to the view that Jesus may have taken it directly from the visions of Daniel or even used it in a sense connected with its original meaning: 'man'. And the scene at Caesarea Philippi,

[1] *Jesus and the Word*, pp. 27 ff.
[2] *Jesus and the Word*, pp. 9, 39, 213; *Theol. N.T.* (Eng. Transl.), pp. 9, 29 ff.

the prophecies of the Passion, and the accounts of the Last Supper are not so easily separated from the life of the historical Jesus. What for instance (to mention only one or two points) is mythical about the place Caesarea Philippi? And did not Paul receive his account of the Supper 'from the Lord' in the same way as he had delivered it to the Corinthians?

Bultmann at any rate assigns to the inventive faith of the later Christian community most of the Gospel narrative and all the elements of Jesus' teaching which claim for Him more than the function of an eschatological prophet, calling for decision in face of the certainty of the imminent inbreaking of God's Kingdom. That such eschatological teaching, with its accompanying call for immediate decision, is of the highest importance for a true portrait of the historical Jesus, is now generally recognised. But Bultmann places it in a central position, not only in the teaching of Jesus and in the Kerygma of the early Church, but in the authentic Gospel of all times, and particularly of our own, and subordinates to it the other elements of Jesus' teaching and of the faith of the Church in such a way as to provoke questioning and dispute.

Ever since the eschatological teaching of Jesus, with its form dominated by the contemporary apocalyptic, has been given its due place in the study of the Synoptic Gospels, two questions have perplexed and divided interpreters. One is the significance of the fact that Jesus pointed to impending cosmic events —the end of the present age, the Parousia, the Final Judgment —which did not come in his time nor since; the fact, as it is sometimes bluntly put, that Jesus was deluded in his expectations. The other question is the relation of Jesus' eschatology to His ethical teaching. Some have interpreted His ethic as an interim provision for the brief interval before the End. Others, such as Schweitzer, while insisting on the historicity of the apocalyptic teaching, in effect reject it as derived from outworn forms of thought of a distant age and from Jesus' own limitations, and see instead the enduring influence of Jesus in His moral and spiritual supremacy. 'A mighty force', as Schweitzer says, 'streams forth from him and flows through our time also.' Bultmann, on the other hand, manages to bring the ethic into conformity with the eschatology, and to give enduring significance even to Jesus' prophecies of an immediate End.

And the key to this unification is Bultmann's existentialism.

God for Jewish thought in general, and for Jesus Himself, is known in His *acts*. He is sovereign power, whose *will* is decisive for history and for the individual life. Man's relation to God is also determined by *will*—by repeated acts of decisive *obedience*. The salvation-event—for the Christian of all times—is that by which he passes (in the language of existentialism) from an improper understanding of himself to a true self-understanding. The Christian morality consists of an obedience to God's will, resulting from such a true understanding of one's self, repeated over and over again in the concrete situations of daily life. Such obedience is decisive; it gives to every act an eschatological character. We live at any moment in an 'eschatological now'. Jesus' eschatology is thus united to His ethic of obedience.

In such an exposition of essential Christianity, Bultmann's critics have accused him of being unduly influenced by modern existentialist philosophy, particularly that of Heidegger, also of Marburg. Bultmann certainly seeks to give a distinctively Christian turn to his teaching; the decisive life-change comes not from man's own resources, but through an act of God's grace. But it is alleged that the effect of Bultmann's teaching, for all its emphasis on the will of God, is to centre attention on the condition of man, and thus to create a form of Humanism. Karl Barth and others make the simple retort to Bultmann that what he teaches is not what the New Testament says.[1] There have been philosophies before, we are reminded; attempts have been made to accommodate the Gospel to them, and the New Testament message has survived most of them. The argument that Bultmann's Christianity is not New Testament Christianity will appear obvious to many, though it will not close the question for the modern non-Christian to whom Bultmann wishes to commend the Gospel.

The departure from New Testament conceptions is specially striking when we consider what Bultmann has to say about the Death and Resurrection of Jesus. Following the Pauline teaching on dying and rising with Christ, Bultmann sees in the Death and Resurrection of Christ the pattern, as it were, of the

[1] See Barth's *Rudolph Bultmann: Ein Versuch, ihn zu verstehen*, in which he deals with Bultmann with the utmost politeness, and almost tenderness, as with an erring brother, but succeeds in making clear how far he is from agreeing with some of Bultmann's positions.

existential change of the believer from his old life to the true self-understanding, but apparently sees in them little or nothing more. The Death on the Cross is historical (on the initiative of the Roman authorities, not the Jews, according to Bultmann) but serves only as the 'beginning, name and title' (Barth) of the Death which figures in the essential Christian message as Bultmann conceives it. With the elimination of all trace of Messianic consciousness on Jesus' part, and the rejection of ideas of Atonement as myth, one begins to wonder whether John the Baptist might not equally well have taken the part. Indeed it is not necessary to think of death by violence, and the death of any man might have served as type of the Christian's break-away from the old self. Hence there is force in the contention that Bultmann's treatment of the Death of Jesus is in the result docetic; the death which occurs at Calvary is not the real Death of the Christian message. Orthodox Christology is set aside. Barth indeed complains that there is no Christology in Bultmann's system; it is 'absorbed in soteriology'. For our present purpose we note how the one event regarded as historically certain is given a significance which lies outside itself.

Bultmann links the Resurrection so closely with the Death that they appear but two aspects or phases of the same event. He is very non-committal, however, regarding any historical basis of the Resurrection-appearances recorded in the Gospels. The dawning of the Easter-faith in the disciples is the real historical event. This separates it from the history of Jesus, and in spite of Bultmann's efforts to associate them, from His Death. Whatever difficulties the Gospel narratives of the Appearances present—and we are all aware of them—these records and notably their stress on the material manifestations are at the very least testimony to the *objectivity* of the event. This objectivity Bultmann does not succeed in conveying. As Barth says, instead of Christ being raised 'for us', He is raised 'in us'.[1] The final impression one gets is that, for the salvation-event, the choice of Jesus' death rather than the death of another, and the rise of a Resurrection faith in his followers have no explanation except in the inscrutable will of God.

I feel that in Bultmann's exposition both of the central mes-

[1] *Rudolph Bultmann: Ein Versuch, ihn zu verstehen.*

sage of Jesus and of his ethic there is a degree of abstraction that calls for criticism.

The emphasis on decision is fully justified, but decision in abstraction may be dangerous or worthless. We all know, for example, how a conversion-decision may be merely of psychological significance, and fruitless for want of understanding of the act, and we have had more than enough in our time of men who induced masses of their fellows and almost whole nations to decisive self-committal to worthless causes. What one misses in Bultmann's exposition of Jesus' teaching is an adequate recognition of the element of *Revelation* which underlies both the eschatology and the ethic. He indeed says that Jesus does not make known 'a new conception of God, or revelations of the nature of God'.[1]

The opening sentence of *The Theology of the New Testament* is: 'The message of Jesus is a presupposition for the theology of the New Testament, rather than a part of that theology itself.' It is not till he reaches p. 187 that he finds in Paul 'the founder of Christian theology'. One understands what Bultmann means; he regards Paul as the first clear systematic Christian thinker. But there is reflected here, what appears at many points, an undue subordination of Jesus' teaching regarding God's providence and mercy in the ordinary course of the present age. Bultmann casts doubt on the authenticity of such passages in the Sermon on the Mount as the injunction not to be anxious about material needs, to behold the birds of the heaven, to consider the lilies of the field, with its assurance that the heavenly Father knows we have need of all such things (Matt. 6.25 ff). Jesus, according to Bultmann, does not speak objectively of the attributes of God. 'He says *incidentally* (Luke 6.36, Mark 10.18) that God is merciful and kind; but in this He expresses only man's experience of God in His own life, He speaks only of God's dealing with man.'[2] Bultmann is so averse to anything that savours of Gnostic illumination or salvation through knowledge; so averse to making the Christian religion one of personal communion or mysticism; and he is so intent upon establishing the uniqueness of Christianity, producing parallels from the Old Testament, the Rabbis, the Stoics, to nearly every saying of Jesus of the kind I have in mind; that he

[1] *Jesus and the Word*, p. 152. [2] ibid., pp. 151, 161 f.

leaves himself and us with nothing but the abstract demand for decision for the Kingdom and the demand for ethical obedience that accompanies it.

An example of his aversion to the idea of personal communion can be seen (outside the Gospels) in his treatment of the characteristic Pauline phrase 'in Christ'. '"In Christ",' says Bultmann, 'far from being a formula for mystic union is primarily an *ecclesiological* formula. It means the state of having been articulated into the "body of Christ" by baptism. . . .' And 'since the Church is the *eschatological* Congregation, the formula "in Christ" has not only ecclesiological but at the same time eschatological meaning.' He goes so far as to state that 'Paul understands *faith* primarily as obedience'.[1] And an example may be given of Bultmann's treatment of Jesus' teaching on the nature or attributes or qualities of God (conceptions, according to him, quite foreign to Jesus' thinking or at the most matters on which Jesus had nothing new to say). 'God is the merciful God of forgiveness.' Who would quarrel with that statement from Bultmann? But see it in its context! It is part of the sentence: 'But the demanding God of judgment is also the merciful God of forgiveness,' and it follows a passage which quotes such sayings as: 'Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul! Rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell!' (Matt. 10.28).[2] The effect is to subordinate Jesus' teaching on the mercy and love of God, wherever it is found, to the apocalyptic. God is primarily Judge. Is this not mythologising, in Bultmann's own sense of 'myth'? Is it not forensic mythology? And imposing mythology where it is absent? Is not Bultmann here (to coin another term) hypermythologising?

The abstraction which I feel in the exposition of Jesus '*ethic* lies in the exclusive emphasis on *obedience*. God is the sovereign power who lays His demands upon man. Man, as God Himself, is conceived primarily in terms of will. Now it is true that the primal sin is represented as disobedience in the Adam and Eve story in Genesis; but behind that, surely, is a background of prophetic teaching on the nature of God and His righteous demands. Did not Moloch and Baal equally demand obedience? Did not the revelation of Jahweh's justice and mercy make all

[1] *Theol. N.T.*, pp. 311, 314. [2] ibid., p. 24.

the difference to the quality of obedience? It is also true that in the New Testament Epistles the term 'obedience' sometimes occurs as an equivalent of 'righteousness' or some other term with a richer ethical content. It is further true that Bultmann himself is fully intimate with both the Old and the New Testament ethical teaching. His discussion of Jesus' relation to Jewish legalism and his appreciation of Jesus' practical direction seem to me penetrating and illuminating, though Jesus' own personal qualities are removed from discussion. But when it comes to Bultmann's *formal* exposition of the matter, what do we have? God the Sovereign Power demands, man's part is to obey.

There is a demand (*Forderung*) for *trust*; a claim, a demand, for *love* (comparatively infrequent, says Bultmann, and not new). These are matters of will, not of sentiment or emotion. 'In reality,' he says, 'the love which is based on emotions of sympathy, on affection, is self-love; for it is a love of preference, of choice, and the standard of the preference and the choice is the self.' 'The command is, you must love; the will is called to action . . , love is understood as an attitude of the will.' 'Jesus knows only one attitude toward God—obedience.' There is no mystical or sacramental approach, only obedience.[1]

The exclusive emphasis on obedience lays Bultmann open to a charge of legalism. But he is at great pains to protect himself from this. What is demanded is not conformity to any law, not even the highest principles of the Sermon on the Mount. God demands '*radical*' obedience, a complete renunciation of personal claims, an obedience which is 'only possible where a man understands the demand and affirms it from within himself'. Strictly speaking Jesus teaches 'no ethics'. In every concrete case man must himself decide his concrete duty. Every moment of action is an 'eschatological now'.[2]

It is easy to see how such interpretation enables Bultmann to unify the eschatological and the ethical teaching of Jesus. Radical obedience is the condition for participation in the Kingdom.[3] Yet one cannot feel satisfied with obedience, conceived in abstraction as I think Bultmann conceives it, as the

[1] *Jesus and the Word*, pp. 48, 110 f, 118, 135. *Theol. N.T.*, pp. 18, 23.
[2] *Jesus and the Word*, pp. 77, 108. *Theol. N.T.*, pp. 12, 34.
[3] *Jesus and the Word*, p. 122.

basis of Christian morality. One is reminded of Kant's imperative. But if that is criticised as formal, it has at least its source in 'reason'. Bultmann is fully versed in the Biblical doctrine of God, but in his systematic study of Jesus' ethic, he tends to represent God exclusively as sovereign will. Is there not something in Job's protestations, his claim that God should justify Himself, even though in the end he has to lay his hand upon his mouth, and keep silence before the Almighty? Does not Paul, when his argument seems to be leading to the conclusion that there may be unrighteousness with God, reject the thought with the emphatic 'God forbid' (*μὴ γένοιτο*, Rom. 3.4, 6; 9.14)? Is not this reduction of Jesus' ethic to bare obedience to a Sovereign Power another case of Bultmann's hypermythologising—the enclosure of the rich personal God-man relationship of the Gospel teaching within the confines of a political or social myth?

As we have already seen, Bultmann, in discussion of the historical Jesus, dismisses most of the narrative of the Synoptic Gospels as either legendary or mythical in character. Without this elimination he would be confronted with the personality of Jesus and His personal claims. It is not proposed to examine here in detail any of the episodes of the Gospels so relegated to the unhistorical. Bultmann's views have been disputed and positive arguments set forth regarding these events and sayings by various writers, notably by Professor William Manson in his *Jesus, the Messiah*. But some general consideration of Bultmann's conception of myth and his demythologising proposals as they affect the Gospels is relevant to our subject.

It is important to notice how wide is the definition which Bultmann gives to myth. It is 'a mode of thinking in which the divine appears as human and the other-worldly as this-worldly'.[1] Thus myth as Bultmann defines it not only includes the clothing of religious ideas in narrative or quasi-historical form—and we are all familiar with this sense of myth in the ancient classical mythology and elsewhere—but also includes a variety of *concepts* which express spiritual ideas in material or earthly terms. The definition is far too wide and leads to confusion regarding

[1] More fully defined in *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 10, as 'the use of imagery to express the other-worldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this side'.

Bultmann's proposal to demythologise. The idea that God is King, for example, comes under the definition. So, indeed, does the Fatherhood of God.[1] Here we see the weakness—and the danger—of the proposal if it means a general demythologising. Ultimately if pushed to extremes it means the abolition of all figurative speech. Not only our Bible, not only our hymns, not only much of our noblest art and literature, but even our prepositions must be demythologised, and such words as 'in', 'to', 'from', 'about', 'through', 'over', which have a spatial derivation, must be eliminated from discourse regarding the divine and other-worldly. This is impossible, and it would be a parody of Bultmann's proposals to suggest that this is his intention. He indeed insists that the mythology is not to be eliminated, but interpreted. Yet we are led to the ironical situation that all the process of interpretation which Bultmann describes as 'demythologising' must simply be remythologising, if Bultmann's wide definition is accepted. And there is the considerable danger that the modern man, for whom the Biblical mythology is obvious, may not recognise that its modern substitute is mythological too. We are led also, I think, to see a feature of all Bultmann's work which many will regard as a weakness. He seems to be moved rather by a philosophical aim at a single unifying principle, than by the artist's, the poet's and indeed the common man's desire to find truth in the variety and particularity of experience. The imaginative, the metaphorical, the allusive, hardly get their place in his system.

Bultmann's concern is with certain myths, as he regards them, which embody outworn ideas disproved by science, and which, he thinks, prevent men of our modern scientific and technical age from receiving the word of the Gospel. Such are the 'three-decker' conception of the universe, the belief in angels, Satan and the demons, the virgin birth, the expiatory death of Christ, the Resurrection, the Ascension. These, with others, Bultmann proposes, should be reinterpreted in terms which the modern man will recognise to be relevant to his own life—in as far as Bultmann himself attempts to do so, in terms of the existential eschatology which we have been considering. On this proposal I would make several comments.

[1] Discussed in this connexion by F. K. Schumann in *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 190. The definition is disputed by J. Schniewind on pp. 47 ff.

Firstly, demythologising is nothing new. I cannot conceive of any sensible teacher or preacher dealing with the Ascension, for instance, who would confine himself to a bare exposition of the event (or myth) in terms of spatial elevation. The expositions of our preachers would not all please Bultmann, but I am sure the effort is commonly made to pass from the human to the divine, from the material to the spiritual, in such a way that the Biblical narratives are seen to be relevant to the thinking and the living of the modern man.

Secondly, the distinction between myth and history, is not to be too sharply drawn. Our historians seem to be still in disagreement about the nature and aims of their discipline, but they are agreed upon one thing, that a mere record of facts as such does not constitute historical writing. The factual basis of some of Bultmann's so-called 'myths' many of us will feel to be stronger than Bultmann admits. But even assuming that Bultmann is justified in seeing myth or an element of myth everywhere in the narratives and concepts found in the Gospels, these may yet have an importance in their own right in the historical as in other fields. They may require explanation, and interpretation; but it would be a mistake to think that by reinterpretation we had exhausted them or disposed of them. If one may make a distinction between *factual* history, which aims at an objective, balanced, survey of events, and *essential* history, which, even while apparently taking liberties with the primary facts, the *ipsissima verba*, and so on, seeks to reach and present the *heart* of the historical process, myth may have its place in such essential history, as also, one may add, has the account of the ministry of Jesus which we find in the Fourth Gospel.

Thirdly, I am doubtful whether outworn mythology is such an offence to modern man as Bultmann seems to think. Our less instructed fellows still find in popular romance references to bad blood and blue blood, soft hearts and broken hearts, which are about as unscientific as anything could be, and yet seem to ring a bell (there's more of it!) clearly enough in their minds. On a serious level, the mythology of Christmastide seems to create little offence; it indeed provides many people with their most vital contact with Christian tradition. As for our scientifically-conditioned intellectuals, it is surprising how much mythology they will swallow without protest. To take

an outstanding example, they have not yet rejected Shakespeare, whose plays are full of it. True, in some cases one may treat it as incidental. In *The Tempest* one may regard Ariel and his fellow-spirits as creations of fancy, and rather look for the relevance to life in the meditations of Prospero or, if one is so disposed, in the antics of Stephano, the drunken butler, Trinculo, the jester, and the monster Caliban. In *Macbeth* the witches and their prophecies might be supposed to be dramatic projections of Macbeth's own ambitious mind (though Banquo also is there to hear them). But in *Hamlet*, it seems clear, the whole play hangs upon mythology, not to say superstition. The ghost of the murdered king is no mere projection of Hamlet's suspicions. He is visible to that model of steady reliability, Horatio. But more; the ghost emerges from the 'deck' immediately below—there are *four* decks in this universe—to tell not only of his murder, but of his purgatorial sufferings (for he has been 'cut off even in the blossom of his sin, unhousel'd, unanointed, ananel'd') and thus to provide in no small measure the spur which incites Hamlet to revenge, with all the consequences which determine the course of the play. Yet who is prepared to question the relevance of *Hamlet* to his own existence or to the plight of humanity?

No, we must not exaggerate the need for demythologising the Gospels. Yet when all qualifications have been made, I think Bultmann is doing us a service in pressing for a deeper understanding of the needs of men in our scientific and technical civilisation, and for a fuller explanation to them of the forms and substance of the Biblical message. Especially I am sure that the Church is not doing enough or not doing it effectively enough to carry our young people over from the unreflective receptiveness of childhood through adolescence to the certainty of a faith which, instead of being offended by the archaism of some Biblical images and concepts, finds in them interest and help towards true living. But of course this effort need not be tied to Bultmann's destructive criticism and his philosophical presuppositions.

Something indeed may be done along these lines to commend the Gospel to modern men. And in the interests of truth even Bultmann's extreme criticism and his existential viewpoint should not be dismissed by us out of a mere conservative aver-

sion, but should receive the sifting of careful thought and discussion. Nor should we underestimate the zeal, the ability and the wide influence of Bultmann, and the attractiveness for some minds of a system which seems to bypass the historical uncertainties of the Gospels and also the difficulties of the traditional Atonement theories. So much we may admit. But if Bultmann thinks that he can win the allegiance of men of this generation, or of any other in our prospect, with his attenuated portrait of the historical Jesus, in which he leaves us with nothing but a pair of eyes peering intently and expectantly into the beyond, accompanied by a voice calling for decision for that which presses in from behind the veil—the rest in darkest shadow, I can only re-echo the oft-repeated comment of Karl Barth, 'I do not understand', *das kann ich nicht verstehen.*

THE HOLY SPIRIT IN GREEK PATRISTIC THOUGHT

by The Rev. Professor JOHN McINTYRE

(A paper read to the Society for the Study of Theology, 1954)

The subject of this paper abounds in historical problems of an extremely intricate nature—some of which arise through the theologically close association of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; but others of which are rooted in a number of more particular controversies in which the Greek Fathers were involved concerning the Holy Spirit. Among the latter are to be found such questions as the precise identification of the persons against whom many of the Greek writings were directed, for example, who the 'Tropici' were, with whom Athanasius deals in the *Letters to Serapion*, whether 'Pneumatomachi' was a generic term used to describe a variety of different heretics, or a proper name referring to an identifiable group existing in one particular place, whether Macedonius was a Macedonian, and so on. Included in the intricate historical problems raised in our period, there is that of accounting for the revival towards the middle of the fourth century of an interest in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit—whether it was due to the developing influence of asceticism, or simply a reaction to a latter-day Arianism working itself out belatedly in heresy concerning the Holy Spirit, or more subtly, whether it was due to a necessity felt by the Church to give substance to the Person and Work of the Holy Spirit, now that the doctrine of the Trinity had replaced the doctrine of the Logos as her central and dominant doctrine.

Absorbing as the historical problems connected with the Greek Patristic writings are, an examination of the theological content of these works raises so many topics of consummate importance for contemporary theological inquiry, that I am proposing for the purpose of this paper a temporary or partial divorce of the theological from the historical problems. For not only is the Greek literature the *locus classicus* for the Church's

doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and therefore necessarily subject to review if in our day we are going to meet the criticisms of men so divergent in outlook and denomination as Bishop Westcott and Nicolai Berdyaev, that the gravest defect in modern theology is the Church's lack of a developed doctrine of the Holy Spirit; but also, there are to be encountered in this period the questions, urgent for us, of the relation of Scripture to doctrine, and of liturgy to faith; of the extent to which metaphysical terms and principles may legitimately be employed in dogmatic definition, and, above all, of the seriousness with which Revelation is regarded when the Church, accepting her constantly renewed dogmatic responsibility, endeavours to interpret the Faith afresh to herself. Naturally, these questions do not occur in this general form in the Greek Fathers; nor are they answered in the specific manner which we would employ were we to set about answering them; but their problems were sufficiently akin to ours, and their answers sufficiently penetrating to justify an examination of the theological issues of the period in relative isolation from the historical complexity in which they were originally formulated.

Further to define the field of discussion, I propose to select certain principles which several of the Greek Fathers employed in their examination of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and which seem to me to be determinant of their formulation of that doctrine, and to discuss certain problems that arise out of these principles. The only methodological alternative to such a procedure is the catalogue technique so expertly executed by H. B. Swete, which does full justice to the unique contributions of *each* of the Greek Fathers to the varied pattern of Patristic theology. Such a catalogue would recognise the thoroughly Biblical treatment of the doctrine by Cyril of Jerusalem, with all its pre-controversial clarity; the single-mindedness of Athanasius who by his very reiteration of certain propositions secured the general lines of the future development of the doctrine; the originality of Basil in defining the role of the Holy Spirit in the sanctification of the Christian and of his assimilation to God, and in assigning to the Holy Spirit the function of perfecting the Trinity, the dangerous logic employed by Gregory of Nazianzus to demonstrate the community of essence of Father, Son and Holy Spirit; Gregory of Nyssa's mastery of dogmatic

construction; and the calculated definitiveness of John of Damascus. In turning, therefore, to the discussion of these principles, we shall be understood to take for granted rather than to neglect the distinctive contribution which each had to make to the subject; and, in any case, the quotation of the statements of each will save us from the dangers of premature generalisation.

To begin with, we may distinguish three principles—the first, logical or deductive; the second, epistemological or conceptual; and the third, ontological or correlative—which are employed by the Greek Fathers when they deal with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

I

(1) The first, the logical or deductive, principle is that identity of *ousia* (of Persons within the Godhead) is to be derived from unity of *energeia*, the implication being that since the Holy Spirit is indivisibly united with the Father and the Son in the Divine Activity, His own Divine Nature is thereby guaranteed. With regard to this first principle, four questions may be asked:

(1.1) What is the nature of the Divine *Activity* or *Operation*, whose unity is the basis of the inference? (1.2) What is the nature of the *unity* of this Divine Activity or Operation? (1.3) What is involved in the inference from unity of operation to identity of essence? (1.4) What is the validity of this inference as a means of establishing the Deity of the Holy Spirit?

(1.1) To the first question a number of answers may be given, which are not so much contradictory of each other as mutually complementary.

(1.1.1) Athanasius, in his refutation of the Tropici, as is well-known, endeavoured generally to establish the closest relation between the Spirit and the Son, so that the Divine Operation, the unity of which he tended to use mostly as the basis of his argumentation, was the self-manifestation of God in Jesus Christ. 'What is spoken from God is said through Christ in the Spirit' (*ad Ser.* 1.14). The Holy Spirit is involved in the physical birth of Jesus Christ (Id. 19). But since the self-manifestation of God in Jesus Christ has as its end-term self-manifestation to actual believing persons, it is not surprising that the Divine Operation of sanctification should also appear in Athanasius' argument. 'When the Spirit is in anyone, it

means that the Word is in Him bestowing the Spirit' (Id. 31). 'There is one sanctification which is derived from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit' (Id. 20). Two points concerning this last quotation are worthy of notice: First, we find the Father named as the source from which the Divine Activity is derived, so that the Holy Spirit is associated not solely with the Son, but is given a place within the total economy of grace —a position plainly stated at *ad Ser.* 1.30 in reference to baptism, 'For grace (in baptism) is given from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit.' And secondly, there occurs in this quotation the formula which Athanasius uses so frequently, '*from* the Father *through* the Son *in* the Holy Spirit.' In Divine creation, also, the Holy Spirit is given a place, this time through His close association with the Word. 'The Father creates all things through the Word in the Holy Spirit' . . . 'things created through the Word have their vital strength out of the Spirit from the Word' (*ad Ser.* III.5). In Athanasius, then, there is no separation of any particular operation of God as the basis of his argument concerning the Holy Spirit; wherever God acts, in creation, in Incarnation, in sanctification, there is present the Holy Spirit.

(1.1.2) In Basil, slightly different emphases are made, but the same general position is held, the differences being found in the following respects: First, Basil has more to say than Athanasius concerning the ethical as distinct from the metaphysical character of sanctification. 'Through the Holy Spirit comes our restoration to paradise, our ascension to the Kingdom of God, our return to adoption as sons, our liberty to call God Father, our being made partakers of Christ, our being brought into a state of all fulness of blessing both in this world and the world to come' (*de Spir. Sancto* 36). But even so, sanctification is not a work achieved by the Holy Spirit apart altogether from the Father and the Son, for Basil at once hastens to correct any misapprehension in this direction with the words, 'The Holy Spirit is inseparable and wholly incapable of being parted from the Father and the Son . . . in every operation' (Id. 37). Secondly, Basil defines more precisely than did Athanasius the nature of God's creative Activity; on the one hand, by distinguishing the original cause (the Father), the creative cause (the Son) and the perfecting cause (the Holy Spirit); and,

on the other hand, by seeing in this joint creativity the pattern of their fellowship together (Id. 38). Thirdly, Basil conceived of the work of the Spirit, in its cosmic reference, in terms that were both ethical and metaphysical. In c. 22, in his lengthy description of the attributes of the Holy Spirit, he speaks of Him as 'an intelligent essence, in power infinite, in magnitude unlimited, generous in good gifts, to whom all things turn needing sanctification, after whom all things reach that live in virtue, perfecting all other things omnipresent.' If there was in Athanasius what was more than a tendency to reduce the ethical to the metaphysical, there is in Basil almost the reverse tendency to equate the metaphysical with the ethical. But both in Athanasius and in Basil, there is no rigorous division of Divine *energeiai*. They both think of creation, redemption and sanctification as a single work, and they both think—though Basil the more explicitly—of the completion and perfection of this work as most closely the concern of the Holy Spirit.

(1.2) In speaking of creation, redemption and sanctification as 'a single work', we have moved to our second question: what is the nature of the *unity* of the Divine Operation? Here certain initial facts are clear: (1.2.1) First of all, this unity is derivative from the prior unity of the Divine Nature. Athanasius states the case succinctly, and his assertion is never questioned by any of his successors in the Greek tradition: 'The Holy and Blessed Triad is indivisible and one in itself' (*ad Ser.* 1.14). In this respect, I should like, with considerable diffidence to call in question Shapland's account of this principle in Athanasius' thought in his excellent commentary on 'The Letters of St. Athanasius'. Reflecting on *ad Ser.* 1.19, he says that the argument is from unity of *energeia* to unity of *ousia*; whereas, in fact, the unity of the *ousia* (that is, of the Divine Essence) is the highest premise of Athanasius' thought, and the argument is from unity of *energeia* to identity of *ousia*, identity of *ousia*, that is, of Spirit with Father and Son, as Son has identity of *ousia* with the Father. The progression is unity of *ousia*—unity of *energeia*—identity of *ousia*. This primacy for thought of unity of the Divine *ousia* holds for Basil, whose contentions for the intra-availability of the prepositions 'of', 'through' and 'in' for all three Persons of the Godhead rest on the ultimacy of the unity of the Divine *ousia*. So, too, Gregory of Nazianzus, for all his

dangerous logic of universals, has a very firm conviction of this same unity; and, in fact, it is this conviction which almost involves him in trouble with orthodoxy. On these grounds, I should, therefore, be partly in agreement and partly at variance with S. L. Prestige (*God in Patristic Thought*, p. 243) when he holds that the Cappadocians accepted objective triplicity as the basis of their thought, and that identity of Divine *ousia* was for them second in importance. Identity of *ousia* was for them second-in-order, perhaps, rather than in importance, for this identity was the conclusion and goal of their argumentation, particularly in regard to the Holy Spirit; whereas, the basis of their thought was the unity of the Divine *ousia*, the triplicity coming in for consideration in their discussion of the unity of the *energeia*. Prestige seems to me to over-simplify the complex nature of their argumentation.

(1.2.2) The unity of the Divine Operation is derivative; but it is also, and this is its second characteristic, not undifferentiated. Athanasius, as we have seen, used the formula, 'from the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit'; while Basil states the case more fully when he says, 'God works the differences of operations, and the Lord the diversities of administrations, but all the while the Holy Spirit is present of His own free will dispensing distribution of gifts . . . '; whereas Gregory of Nyssa (*On the Holy Spirit: Against the Followers of Macedonius*) works out the same scheme for the interpretation of Baptism, speaking of 'this life-giving grace after starting from that source, the Father, as from a spring pouring forth abundant life, through the only-begotten who is the true life, by the operation of the Holy Spirit.' The problem of describing the unity of the Divine Operation, therefore, becomes the problem of defining the nature of the differentiation to which the Greek Fathers witness in such similar terms. It is not satisfactory to say that the triplicity can be defined as three activities of God, for not only would such a suggestion ignore the commonly held view that wherever God acts, Father Son and Holy Spirit are present; but it would also violate one of their metaphysical-theological principles that the triplicity is not accident, for that is what activity is—the very point which Gregory of Nazianzus makes with regard to the Holy Spirit (*Fifth Theological Oration*, c. vi). Besides, such a suggestion does not do justice to their sense of

the unitariness of the Divine Operation which pervades from creation right through to the Last Judgment, in which, as Basil holds (*de S.S.* 39), the Holy Spirit, as well as the Father and the Son, also has a part. Nor is it adequate to say that the triplicity is represented by a threefold scheme to which the Divine Operation conforms every time it takes place— though sometimes the Greek Fathers, by their straining of Biblical exegesis to uncover the Spirit wherever the Son acts, and both wherever the Old Testament speaks of God, almost seem to hold such a view at times. It is not adequate to say so, because, when the complete evidence is passed in review, it becomes clear, for example, that the Word is associated with the self-manifestation of God which takes place in the Incarnation in a different way from that in which the Holy Spirit is related to it—you might say, more intimately associated—and that the same is true of the Holy Spirit in relation to sanctification. What cannot be demonstrated from the Greek Fathers is that the Father has that kind of relation to creation which the Son has to the Incarnation, and the Holy Spirit to sanctification. In fact, I find Greek Patristic theology weakest in its doctrine of God the Father, far weaker than it is in its soteriology, which the critics have condemned so severely for its confusion of metaphysics and ethics.

Perhaps the best way of describing the threefold differentiation within the unity of the Divine *energeia*—provided we are allowed to make the necessary qualifications—is to say that within this unity of Divine Operation certain functions are fulfilled by each of the Persons specifically. Some at least, if not all of the necessary qualifications would be: First, that in fulfilling His particular function, each of the Persons is 'assisted' throughout by the other two; Secondly, that the nature of this 'assistance' requires further definition, which we shall attempt later in discussing the epistemological and ontological principles; Thirdly, that the fulfilling of this function is not to be regarded as a definition of the 'Person', otherwise we should have laid ourselves open to the criticism made by Gregory of Nazianzus that we regard a Person as an accident of God.

(1.3) What is involved in the inference from unity of Operation to identity of essence? Since in the Greek Patristic writings under consideration, the assumption is always made that their

opponents accept the Deity of the Son, and naturally, of course, of the Father, we shall concentrate in our answer to this question upon the inference to the identity of essence of the Holy Spirit with Father and Son. (Note: It is not until 1.27 of the *ad Ser.* that Athanasius uses the word *homoousios*, and he uses it only once again, in III. He never calls the Holy Spirit *Theos*. Basil avoids the use of the word *homoousios*, but endeavours to prove that the Holy Spirit is *homotimos* with the Father and the Son.)

It seems to me that the following propositions form the structure of the argument from the unity of Operation to identity of essence of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son:

(1.3.1) Within the economy of the Divine *energeia*, whether we look at the *energeia* in specific instances of God's activity, or at its comprehensive totality from creation through to the Last Judgment, there are certain functions which fall outwith what we would call the 'work' of the Father and the Son—a position to which most of the heretics against whom the Greek Fathers were writing would agree.

(1.3.2) On the basis of (i) a great variety of Biblical texts; (ii) and particularly the baptismal formula, which for these Fathers was not simply a formula, but the basis upon which the new created life of the redeemed Christian rested; (iii) the nature of Revelation itself; and (iv) the inner character of sanctification: these functions have been traditionally assigned to the Holy Spirit.

(1.3.3) The functions are such—and this is the centre of several of the controversies in which the Greek Fathers were involved—that they cannot be fulfilled by anyone less than God. Or—to put it in another way—this is the kind of thing which only God can do. So Gregory of Nyssa (*On the Holy Spirit*, etc.) speaks for the whole tradition when he says: 'To profane the Holy Spirit is to profane the Trinity as a whole.' This statement we can see to be no exaggeration when we remember how frequently the Holy Spirit had been conceived of as bringing to completion all that God had done in the Person of the Father and that of the Word: to reject the Holy Spirit is to negate the whole process in which God had been working. It is, therefore, not a sophistical or a polemical device on Athanasius' part when he endeavours, against the Tropici, to establish

identity of essence of Spirit with Son—as if, thereby, he could, by demonstrating that $C=B$, and since $B=A$, conclude that $C=B=A$; on the contrary, he feels, and he says so, that to deny the Holy Spirit is to stultify your belief in the work of the Father and the Son.

(1.3.4) So the final step of the argument is the statement of the conclusion—identity of essence of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son.

(1.4) What, then, of the validity of the inference? To my mind, the argument so far as it goes—and its limits will be mentioned later—has a great deal to commend it.

(1.4.1) For example, at its main turning-points, it appeals not to metaphysical principles or to logical abstractions but to the concrete life of the regenerated Christian and to liturgical practice, to the sanctification which the Christian daily receives from God and to the baptism in which his new life began and in which he shares when others are baptised. It draws out the fullest implications of the situations in which the Christian finds himself, situations which constitute the completion of God's mighty working throughout all ages; and it says, in effect, that 'if so-and-so is true of you now, then this-and-that must be true also, for this-and-that made so-and-so possible.' It is, in other words, a kind of Transcendental Deduction.

(1.4.2) Further, it is an argument which takes Revelation seriously, treating it not simply as a series of propositions or even as a series of 'mighty acts of God', but as the self-disclosure of a Person (in the non-technical sense) Whose work is not completed until He has 'brought home' the significance of His mighty acts to individual sinful people, and re-created them unto faith. It presents the God Who works from above downwards, as working from beneath upwards, the God Who created and redeemed, making sure that the destiny of His creatures will not come to naught and that the redemption will not have been in vain. In short, it is a theology of the Trinity in general, and of the Holy Spirit in particular, which is rooted and grounded in grace. The centrality of grace comes out clearly, if incidentally, for example, in Oration xli of Gregory of Nazianzus 'On Pentecost': 'I am persuaded that you are to some extent partakers of Him (that is, the Holy Spirit) and kindred souls. You are dissatisfied with syllables and stumble at

words' (c.xii). 'Pray God to give you the Holy Spirit' (c.xiii).

(1.4.3) The result is that in this kind of setting even those concepts, such as the unity of God, which might have a vaguely ethereal, metaphysical and even distinctly Platonist or Neo-Platonist abstractness and irrelevance, acquire a new richness of content. If this is how the unity of God is to be understood, if this is the kind of conclusion which that unity yields—a complexity of operation for the redemption and the sanctification of ordinary men and women in their ordinary way of life—then we have travelled a long way from the Form that is 'beyond being and knowing' and from the One that can be spoken of only negatively.

(1.4.4) For the present it must be observed that this argument, taken by itself—and the Greek Fathers have at least two other principles for dealing with the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son—does not establish anything beyond identity of essence of Spirit with Father and Son. It says nothing, for example, about procession or breathing. But it is no criticism of it to say that it is simply an economic view of the Trinity, for it does not pretend to be anything beyond a discussion of the nature and implications of the Divine *energeia*. It does not claim that it is only in such *energeia* that the Persons exist, or that the distinction between the Persons is purely economic. When such allowance has been made, however, and granted that this principle is given first place by the most outstanding of the Greek Fathers in the treatment of the Holy Spirit; the problem still remains of how advance is made from the discussion which we have just stated, from the examination of the *opera ad extra Trinitatis* to the characterisation of the *opera ad intra Trinitatis*. The problem is not unique to the Greek Fathers: it faces all who are not satisfied with an economic theory of the Trinity, and perhaps even those who are; but the problem occurs in the Greek Fathers in a form that is stimulating for us, just because the basis of their theology of the Trinity and the Holy Spirit is one of grace. If the problem is not unique to the Greek Fathers it has to be raised in regard to them with considerable seriousness, simply because of their Greek tradition, which Gregory of Nyssa states ('On the Holy Trinity and on the Godhead of the Holy Spirit', included in *Letters of Basil*, 189, 'To Eustathius'): 'By what we know we

can form conjectures about things above us.' The Platonist first meets the Forms in their indistinct and incomplete particularisation in the world of sense, and by their presence there is stimulated to seek them in the world beyond sense; and something of that same procession seems to linger in Gregory's words as he suggests that we strive to know the inner life of God 'by arguing from particular evidence' in the form of Divine operations. How that progression is to be made this first principle and the arguments based upon it do not indicate.

II

(2) The second principle, which I have called epistemological or conceptual, which recurs in several of the Greek Fathers, is that knowledge of any one of the Persons within the Trinity is at the same time knowledge of the other two; and the use made of the principle in relation to the Holy Spirit is that of showing that if we conceive of the Father and the Son, we must also affirm the Holy Spirit. The principle is stated with considerable similarity by different writers, thus. Athanasius, *ad Ser.* 1.14, 'When mention is made of the Father there is included also His Word and the Spirit Who is in the Word. If the Son is named, the Father is in the Son and the Spirit not outside of the Word.' Basil, however, gives us the classic statement of it in Ep. xxxviii; though for him the principle works, as it were, in both directions, from Father through Son to Spirit and from Spirit through Son to Father. 'He who has conceived the Father and conceived of Him apart by Himself has at the same time mentally accepted the Son also: who lays hold of the Son does not mentally dismember the Spirit from the Son, but in due sequence forms within himself the faith that is a blending of the three. . . . Just as he who grasps one end of a chain pulls along with it the other end also to himself, so he who draws the Holy Spirit draws both Father and Son along with it. So if he lays hold of the Son, he draws Father and Spirit, and so likewise if he holds the Father, he draws Son and Spirit.' One other quotation: 'When you have grasped the notion of the Son, have you not admitted therein that of the Holy Spirit also?' (Gregory of Nyssa, 'On the Holy Spirit, etc.').

It may be that, as one swallow does not make a summer, so

a few quotations do not make a principle; yet it does appear to me that this theme is sufficiently fundamental to Greek Patristic thought to merit fuller examination. For not only does it further illustrate the way in which the Greek Fathers pictured life in the Spirit against the background of the total Divine life, but also it constitutes a step beyond the first principle in an endeavour to speak of infra-Trinitarian relationships, and particularly of the Spirit to the other two.

(Note: In speaking of Persons in regard to the Greek Fathers generally, I am not overlooking the fact that Athanasius abandoned the word *hypostasis* in his later writings; I only use it in speaking of him, because while he abandoned the term, he obviously would not abandon the thing which the term denoted.)

Let us look, then, more closely at what this second principle means.

(2.1) To begin with, there are two things that it does not mean. On the one hand, it does not mean that the concept of Fatherhood logically implies that Sonship, for not only does such a suggestion argue a theological shallowness which is unfair to the Greek Fathers, but it also fails to explain why the notion of Spirit should, in Basil's phrase, be 'drawn after' that of Son and of Father. On the other hand, we must rule out the explanation that in apprehending the Spirit, say, the believer apprehends Him both as Person and as Person subsisting in the Godhead—apprehends, that is, both the Person and the *ousia* which He shares with the other two Persons. The implication would on this view be drawn that to apprehend the *ousia* properly, he must, implicitly at least, be aware of these other two Persons. This explanation I would be inclined to reject, because the implication indicated does appear to me to follow. Besides, it does not quite convey the true sense of the principle.

(2.2) What is really intended by it can best perhaps be apprehended with the assistance of Basil's comment on Hebrews 1.3, given in Ep. xxxviii. 'The Lord is the brightness of His glory and the figure (character) of His Person.' The text constitutes an obvious difficulty for the view which Basil has been propounding earlier in his letter, that in the matter of the tokens which distinguish them from each other, the Persons

have nothing in common with each other, whereas, 'in such attributes as those of being infinite, incomprehensible, uncreated, uncircumscribed by space, there is a continuous and uninterrupted community of nature' as between the Persons. How can the Son be the figure of the Father's Person, which has distinguishing marks different from those of the Person of the Son? Basil's reply I find a little misleading, though the final issue is clear. He begins by saying that it was not the Apostle's intention 'to distinguish the Persons but to establish the true Sonship, the indivisibility and intimacy of relationship of Son and Father.' The latter, the positive, part of this intention is corroborated in what Basil later says; but the former, the negative part leads the reader to expect that the fundamental distinctions between the Persons are to be disregarded, and that Basil's exegesis will be that the Lord is the *character* of the Godhead. In the sequel, however, Basil's argument assumes these very strict distinctions, and introduces us to a very profound description of the relations that hold between the Son and the Father. Without there occurring any transference of the distinguishing tokens or any intermingling of them, nevertheless 'he who looks upon the "figure" of the only-Begotten, becomes at the same time keenly aware of the *hypostasis* of the Father.' The analogy of a source of light and the light which it sheds is the relevant one: a person who apprehends the light shed apprehends at the same time its source, so that a single act of apprehension takes in the whole situation and the relations holding between its constituent elements. He concludes by saying that he who grasps the form of the Son images the figure of the Father's Person, seeing the latter through the former.

Basil here takes us into one of the inmost mysteries of Revelation, and one which has been much neglected in the history of theology, not entirely I believe, for reasons of piety. When, today, we speak of Christ as the Revelation of God, we tend to think of Him as revealing the attributes of Godhead, the *ousia*, to be more precise; and even when we say that He reveals the Father, we emphasise the aspects of Fatherhood which are to be included in the *ousia* and not those which pertain specifically to the Person of the Father. The question which I raise, and I can but raise it in a paper which is on a different if allied theme,

is: If we so explicitly state as we do that it is the Second Person of the Trinity Who is incarnate, must we not be more precise in our description of how the Revelation that there takes place is related to the First Person of the Godhead as well as to the *ousia* of the Godhead?

(2.3) It is in terms similar to those used by Basil in the exegesis of Hebrews 1.3, that this second principle is to be understood when it is applied to the understanding of the Holy Spirit's relation to the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit, Whose function it is to complete the work of Revelation and Redemption originating with the Father and executed through the Son, does not do so by pointing us beyond Himself to Someone who lies outside Him. He unveils the glory of the only-Begotten *within* Himself. In knowing Him—with all that such knowledge involves—we come to know the Son and to be redeemed by the Son; and in knowing the Son we know the glory of the Father. That is the force of Basil's description of the Holy Spirit as 'the place of them that are sanctified' (*de S.S.* 63); for 'the way of true knowledge lies from one Spirit through one Son to one Father' (Id. 47). But it is no less the intention of Athanasius when he says (*ad Ser.*), 'When we are enlightened by the Spirit, it is the Son who in Him enlightens us. . . . Receiving the Spirit of wisdom, we receive the Christ and are made wise by Him. When we are quickened by the Spirit, Christ Himself is said to live in us.' If you like, here is the sanctification situation of which the doctrine of the *emperichoresis* is the projection. Anyway, it is clear that for the Greek Fathers intra-Trinitarian relationships are understood and described in terms of the sanctified life to which the whole Divine economy of salvation has been 'brought home' in the Holy Spirit; and the sanctified life is itself understood and described, not in terms of 'experience' or even of some kind of subjective faith, but in terms of the inmost relationships that hold within the Trinity.

III

(3) Our third principle we called ontological or correlative. It is the frequently recurring statement that the Spirit is to the Son as the Son is to the Father.

(3.1) When we look at this principle closely we find that it

covers a variety of situations, which we may enumerate as follows:

(3.1.1) In Athanasius, in addition to the simple statement of the principle at 1.21 of the *ad Ser.*, it is said that the Spirit is proper to the Son as the Son is proper to the essence of the Father (1.25); that the Spirit is the image of the Son as the Son is the image of the Father (1.26); that the Spirit is one with the Son as the Son is one with the Father (1.31); and we may include the previously mentioned text that the Spirit is in the Son as the Son is in the Father (1.14). (3.1.2) In Basil, we read that 'the relation of the Spirit to the Son is the same as that of the Son to the Father' (*de S.S.* 43), and he adds what is seldom found in Athanasius, 'If the Spirit is co-ordinate with the Son and the Son with the Father, it is obvious that the Spirit is also co-ordinate with the Father' (Ibid.).

(3.1.3) Gregory of Nyssa gives the principle a slightly different form when he asks: 'With what shall the Father be glorified but with the true glory of the Son, and with what shall the Son be glorified but with the majesty of the Spirit?' Then he goes on, as if to root this particular doctrine in the worshipping life of the Christians, 'Faith completes the circle and glorifies the Son by means of the Spirit and the Father by means of the Son.' That which happens within the Divine life of God is, by faith, reproduced in the heart of the Christian who worships God.

(3.2) To elucidate the nature and validity of this principle, let us endeavour to answer the following questions: (3.2.1) Is it compatible with the first two principles enumerated above? (3.2.2) Is it compatible or not with other views of the Greek Fathers other than those subsumed under these principles? (3.2.3) What is the range of the principle?

(3.2.1) It would certainly seem that there is *prima facie* considerable incompatibility between this principle and the first, that identity of *ousia* is to be inferred from unity of operation. For the burden of the argument by which that principle was maintained was that within the Divine unity of *energeia* there is a definite division of function, and that this unity is constituted by this very variety. If we recall that it is the uniqueness of the Persons as Persons, and not in virtue of their communityness in the Divine *ousia*, which makes differentiation possible

within the unity of Divine *energeia*, then we are obliged to deny that the relations holding between Spirit and Son and between Son and Father are of a kind which can be compared or correlated. That is, the uniqueness of the distinguishing properties of the Persons makes the comparison of relations suggested in this third principle a logical impossibility. Or the matter may be put alternatively in this way: in terms of the first principle, there is but one single set of relations, involving Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and it is a false abstraction to think of either the relation of the Spirit to the Son or that of Son to Father outside of that single set of relations which constitutes the Divine *ousia* in *energeia*. The same conclusion is borne out if we consider the second principle. The Spirit unveils the Son within Himself to the sanctified sinner; and the Son unveils the Father within Himself, all in one unity of self-manifestation, each relation within which is unique and precluded from comparison with the other. That is, the Spirit fulfils a function in relation to the human soul in sanctification which He could not fulfil were His relation to the Son the same as that which the Son bears to the Father. It seems important to me to consider such detailed implications of this third principle, not only in view of the problem of the *Filio-que* which is yet to be discussed, but also because it is possible to neglect the detailed implications and to say that there is no incompatibility between the third principle, on the one hand and the second and first on the other. To support the latter view, we could presumably quote the conclusion of the argument deduced from the first principle—that there is identity of essence of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son—and point out that this third principle means no more than that: the Spirit is *homoousios* with the Son as the Son is *homoousios* with the Father. Apart from the fact that at this stage of our discussion this is an oversimplified solution of the problem, I find it impossible to leave the matter there, for the third principle would appear to conflict with other views held by the Greek Fathers. So the second question has to be answered.

(3.2.2) There is, I should say, definite incompatibility between the principle that the Spirit is to the Son as the Son is to the Father and the general intention of the frequent arguments to show that the Father is a grandfather, and that the Spirit is

not the brother of the Son. For these arguments, and they run through several of the Greek Fathers, are designed to show that the relation between the Spirit and the Son is other than that between the Son and the Father. Basil makes the difference explicit when he says at *de S.S.* 46 that the Spirit proceeds out of God not by generation but by the breath of His mouth. It is noteworthy, too, that Basil brings out the difference between the relation of the Spirit to the Son and that of the Son to the Father in a less obvious way, by using the middle voice for the latter relation: 'The Father reflects Himself in the Son as in a mirror'; and the active voice for the former: 'The Spirit reveals the Son', making the truth concerning the Son to shine within Himself.

(3.2.3) Concerning what I have called the 'range' of the principle, the following comments may be briefly made: First, the principle proved of great value as a tactical weapon against those who admitted the Deity of the Son, so that its range was, initially at least, *ad homines*. If it could be shown that in virtue of certain functions that He fulfils, within the Divine plan of self-manifestation and redemption of the world, the Holy Spirit stands in a certain relation to the Son; and if on closer examination it can be shown that this relation is the same as that in which the Son stands to the Father; then the Deity of the Holy Spirit is effectively established. So, we might continue, the design of the principle is purely apologetic; and if, in fact, it achieves its immediate end, then it is unwise to press against it inconsistencies which it creates with the rest of Greek Patristic doctrine. In this way we might resolve the difficulties raised by our answers to the first two questions by separating the first two from the third principle. Secondly, it is possible to say that the Greek Fathers were not in the slightest confusion about the facts that several different relations hold between Father and Son and between Son and Spirit, and that of these identity of essence was only one. Most of these other relations obtained on what we might call the intra-Trinitarian level, but in discussing the economy of salvation and revelation, it was necessary for them first of all to make clear the relation of identity of essence as between the three Persons. Once that was established the others would follow. Accordingly, we may hold that the third principle is an alternative statement of this identity, and

it is emphasised by the Greek Fathers, not only because of its apologetic value, but also because of its dogmatic importance. The Spirit has to be held to be identical in essence with the Son, otherwise the Divine economy fails, as it were, at its climax. This third principle, therefore, affirms the ground not only of the success of revelation and redemption, but also and supremely, of the possibility of both revelation and redemption. Moreover, it constitutes the basis of the other two principles: its ontological affirmation conditions the affirmations of the deductive and epistemological principles.

(3.3) The upshot of this discussion of the validity of the third principle is as follows:

(3.3.1) We could maintain the validity of the principle, in spite of the inconsistencies that can be shown to exist between it and the other two principles; but we would do so at a price, which is twofold: first, of associating it with the self-manifestation of the Trinity, and with the Divine purpose of salvation for mankind, for it is within the setting of God's gracious creation, redemption, sanctification and last judgment of men, that it invariably occurs in the Patristic writings; and secondly, of regarding it as an alternative statement of the identity of essence which holds between the Persons of the Trinity.

(3.3.2) But we must maintain also that the principle has validity for the ontological as well as the economic Trinity; for the identity of essence established in the *energeia* is the expression of the identity which existed before all time and endures into eternity. Applied to the ontological Trinity, the principle creates no difficulty, so long as it is taken simply as equivalent to the statement of identity of essence. When, however, it is used in the form, 'The Spirit bears the same relation to the Son as the Son does to the Father', then the exponents of the 'grandfather' position have considerable justification for the criticisms they make. The facts that they make them at all, and that they go on making, indicate the presence of a problem which the Greek Fathers never quite solved: namely, how within the Trinity itself it can be affirmed that 'the Spirit is to the Son as the Son is to the Father', and that there are other relations which that principle does not cover. The full discussion of that problem, however, takes us to the question of the *Filio-que*, and to that matter we now turn.

IV

FILIO-QUE

(4) If the general contention argued above be correct, namely, that these three principles enumerated constitute the controlling factors in Greek Patristic thought concerning the Holy Spirit, then the question of the *Filio-que* must be discussed in terms of these principles, and not of isolated texts that occur here and there, or yet of what the Greek Fathers might have said had they followed the logic of their views farther than they were willing to, and so on. It is well-known that the Antiochenes, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret, were outspoken in their rejection of the Double Procession and of the view that the Spirit received His existence through the Son; but it is all too often assumed, for example, by Shapland in regard to Athanasius, by Prestige in regard to the Cappadocians, and to a certain extent Benoit Pruche in regard to Basil, that most of the Greek Fathers hold a less unambiguous position, because they inherited the Origenist subordinationist tradition. The position which seems most in agreement both with the spirit and with the letter of the Greek Patristic theology of the writers with whom we have been most concerned here, is that the idea of the procession of the Spirit through the Son, and *a fortiori* of the double procession implied by the phrase *Filio-que* is foreign to their view of the Holy Spirit; and the reasons which appear to validate this position are as follows:

(4.1) While their conception of the Trinity is not simply an economic one—their affirmation of the third principle is safeguard against that—nevertheless they devote most of their attention, particularly in discussing the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Trinity, to the understanding of the Divine *energeia*, to God's mighty acts of grace in relation to the created order. The Deity of the Holy Spirit is established because He plays a part in the Divine economy of salvation and redemption which God alone can play and because He brings that whole economy to bear upon individual persons and fulfils in them that which God had designed before the foundation of the world. Accordingly, their treatment of the intra-Trinitarian relationships is sketchy and does not go beyond the assertions: first, that the Holy Spirit is by nature (that is, from eternity) identical in

essence with the Father and the Son; secondly, that the relation in which He stands to the Father is not that of Sonship (Basil specifying this relation by saying that the Holy Spirit is the Breath of God, *de S.S.* 46); thirdly, that He is produced *after* the Son, being therefore third in order in the Trinity; fourthly, that He has the Father as His cause or origin. The affirmation of the *Filio-que*, or even of the idea that the Spirit receives His Divine existence through the Son would introduce a subtlety in to their thought concerning intra-Trinitarian relationships, which is alien to it. They affirmed concerning the *opera ad intra Trinitatis* all that seemed to them to be sufficient for their immediate apologetic and dogmatic purposes, all that seemed necessary to complete the Divine context of the immediate gracious situation in which the Christian found himself, when he saw the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ through the Spirit, and received His salvation.

(4.2) The Greek Patristic *ordo cogitandi* also militates against the suggestions in question. Time and time again, the Greek Fathers begin with the Holy Spirit and think back through the Son to the Father. The Holy Spirit is God with us here and now; within His enlightening us we find the Son, and within the Son the glory of the Father. Even Athanasius, who is less explicit on this point than Basil, at *ad Ser.* 30, argues a close connexion between one faith, one baptism and one God—the integrity of the baptism implying the integrity of the faith, and this in turn implying the 'inner consistency' (Shapland's phrase) of the Divine life expressed in the Sacrament. Basil, as was quoted in another connexion, says that the way of knowledge lies from One Spirit through One Son to One Father (47); while the third principle 'the Spirit is to the Son as the Son is to the Father' follows the same order. Even that text in Basil (45) which is sometimes used to establish his affinity with something like the *Filio-que* position, namely, 'We speak of the Holy Spirit singly, conjoined as He is to the Father through the one Son', observes this same order, of beginning with the Spirit and thinking backwards to the Father and the Son. In any case, on the one hand, this text is concerned primarily with the unity of the Holy Spirit and is not a carefully considered statement about the relation of the Spirit to the Father through the Son; and on the other, it is inaccurate any way to deduce the idea of

'procession' from that of 'conjunction'. Now the Greek Fathers know the difference between *ordo cogitandi* and *ordo essendi*, yet they in fact give little consideration to the latter beyond what is immediately implied by the former.

(4.3) Two minor explanations may be offered to account for the dearth of intra-Trinitarian description in the Greek Fathers, particularly with regard to the Holy Spirit. The first is the lack of Biblical evidence for such a phrase as the *Filio-que*, or for the view that the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, a lack which is emphasised by the frequent Biblical statements about the relation of the Son to the Father. Their opponents in the controversies on the Holy Spirit argued from Scripture, and the replies were in many cases exegesis of Scripture or the development of the immediate implications of such exegesis. They had to make their points bluntly and directly, in the closest relation to Scripture and without undue refinement. The other minor explanation is that, because their opponents held views which implied the inferiority of the Spirit to the Son (for example, the Tropici said that the Holy Spirit was a creature of the Son, and the opponents of the Cappodocians said that the Holy Spirit was to be 'numbered under' the Father and the Son), the Greek Fathers were naturally suspicious of any phrase which gave countenance to such implications. The double procession was no novelty to Athanasius (cf. Eusebius, 'Spirit is originated by the Son'; while Marcellus sets procession of the Spirit from the Son alongside procession from the Father); and if in *c. Ar.* III.3-6 he can argue that because the Son is *in* the Father, therefore His *from* the Father, and if in *ad Ser.* I.14 he says the Spirit is in the Son as the Son is in the Father, it seems strange that he does not go on to say that therefore the Spirit is from the Son also. His unwillingness to do so, I am suggesting, is due, in part at least, to the exigencies of the situation in which he is involved. So, too, Basil in the sub-numeration controversy has to establish the right of the Holy Spirit to be *homotimos* with the Father and the Son, and he will be likely to avoid any phraseology which compromises his full assertion of that right.

(4.4) It might be said that two considerations should have induced the Greek Fathers to affirm, if not the *Filio-que*, at least some position akin to it which takes account of the Spirit's pro-

ceeding through the Son. The first is their repeated emphasis upon the Son's mission of the Spirit, which if it is carried to its logical conclusion implies the procession of the Spirit from or even through the Son. Here two possible replies are apposite. First, we can only suggest that the Greek Fathers should have made this further logical inference so long as we forget, on the one hand, the immediate purpose of their writings as declared by themselves, and on the other hand, the temper and interest of their writings which lay in the exposition and examination of the Divine *energeia*. Secondly, the question of the relation of the *opera ad extra Trinitatis* to the *opera ad intra Trinitatis* is not to be solved simply by a point-to-point correlation of activities on two levels, so that we conclude from a mission in time a procession in eternity. Before we criticise the Greek Fathers for not making such an inference, we should first ask whether that inference is necessarily valid. The examination of that inference is not our present purpose, but it is one which ought to be conducted whenever the wider question of the theology of the Trinity is raised.

The second consideration which, it is argued, might have induced the Greek Fathers to affirm some form of the *Filio-que* is that the postulation of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son or from the Father through the Son, is necessary in order to guarantee that the illumination and sanctification which come in the Spirit are rooted and grounded in the self-manifestation and redemption accomplished by God in Jesus Christ. In other words, the procession of the Spirit from the Father through the Son is the ontological ground for the assurance that the Holy Spirit really introduces us to that revelation of God which is Revelation and not to some theophany which has nothing to do with the self-revealing and redeeming God Who was in His fulness present in Jesus Christ. My conclusion is that the Greek Fathers did not find it necessary to state that guarantee or to find that assurance in the way suggested, because they already had them in other forms—in the three principles stated above and in the inferences drawn from them; in their emphases upon the way to the Father lying from the Spirit through the Son, on the function of the Spirit to fulfil the Divine plan originated with the Father and executed by the Son, but chiefly perhaps on the notion that the Spirit completes

the Trinity, so that God can not be God except the Spirit be conjoined with Father and Son, nor the Spirit, Spirit, unless He be found eternally and in time co-present with them. The *Filio-que* may be a tidier way of expressing these facts, but it is hard to agree that it expresses any facts other than these.

DOING OVER A LITURGY

by The Rev. Professor J. R. MacPHAIL

The readers of this Journal have been told how the Church of South India's Order for the Lord's Supper first took shape ('The Making of a Liturgy', by the Rev. L. W. Brown, *SJT*, 4.1, March 1951). The Order has been studied in many countries; and indeed, of the English edition, more copies have been sold outside India than inside it! Some readers may like to know how it has worn. I report a full discussion of it in detail: the work was interesting to me, just because we were not handling large ideas with open minds; we had to consider details, and to decide one way or another.

The Liturgy was drawn up for use at the meetings of the Synod (the 'General Assembly' of our Church, meeting every two years) and of other bodies in which members with different backgrounds come together for work and worship. We wanted to be able to partake of the Lord's Supper in such a way as to have no feeling that some of the members were hosts, and the others guests or visitors. When the Liturgy was first used, in January 1950, it was liked so much that the Synod at once authorised it 'for optional and experimental use on special occasions'; it was to be reconsidered at the next meeting of Synod. But as January 1952 approached, it was felt that the Liturgy was not yet well enough known, especially in the Indian languages, and the experimental edition was given another two years. In January 1954, after some revision, it was 'approved for general use wherever it is desired'.

From the beginning, the Synod Liturgy Committee had elicited and collected comments of all kinds. The Convener, the Rev. Leslie Brown, left India in September 1952 in order to become Bishop of Uganda; and before he went he made a draft revision, trying with his unfailing sympathy and patience to understand the feelings and the beliefs of people of every sort, and to bring 'every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ'. His draft in turn brought in many more comments.

A digest of these, prepared for the use of the Committee, filled twelve closely-typed foolscap pages. At last the Committee met, for three very full days, at Bangalore, in September 1953. Most of the members had just spent five days on a lectionary, which had been circulating in various drafts for nearly two years. The full Committee had to consider the lectionary and some other matters; but practically all its time was spent on the Liturgy. The Committee consisted of three bishops, five professors (four from theological colleges, one from an Arts college), and one layman (a B.D., who is Co-Director of the Christian Institute for Social Studies at Bangalore).

The recommendations that emerged, all of them unanimous, came as a surprise to the members themselves. Most of us expected, I think, that we should produce a new Liturgy, and many of us had axes of our own to grind. We thought that something would happen when the Liturgy was scrutinised in committee. Oddly enough, this had not happened before. The original Liturgy took shape as a few friends found themselves at the same hill-station in the hot weather, or met occasionally all over South India; the work was done mainly by correspondence, and the draft was approved during a few hours of a one-day meeting. But as we settled to our task, with a lot of home-work behind us, we came to be more and more convinced that the pattern or structure of our Liturgy had weathered well; time and again, after we had exhaustively considered some big change this way or that, we found that 'our end was our beginning', and we were well content to make a few verbal emendations.

I

At one point only we recommended a rearrangement of the parts. In the experimental edition, after an opening hymn, the Collect for Purity, and an act of praise such as the *Gloria in Excelsis*, St. Paul's account of the Last Supper is read; this is the Presbyterian way, and the Presbyterian word 'Warrant' has come to be used widely for it, though it does not appear in the Liturgy. After it, as in the English Prayer Book, the Ten Commandments or our Lord's summary of the Law and the Prophets may be read, with responses. Then, if there has been no special preparatory service, a set Exhortation, or the Angli-

can form 'Ye that do truly', may be read. The Exhortation was taken from the Liturgy used in the Church founded by the Basel Mission in Malabar. We shortened it a good deal, but many people find it heavy. I think that 'Ye that do truly' is generally preferred.

The original Introduction says:

> It is expected that this Service [the Communion Service] will normally be preceded by a solemn Service of Preparation, held beforehand (a good example of tautology!), at which all those who intend to communicate may be put in mind of the greatness of this gift of our Saviour and of their own need of penitence and living faith as they come to receive Him. Such a service will ordinarily include the preaching of God's Word, an exhortation to examination of conscience, confession of sin, and prayer for God's grace; it may be held in houses in different parts of the parish when distance makes it difficult for all the people to gather in the church.

It should be explained that Indian Christians do not as a rule show the rooted hostility to frequent Communions which is known in some countries; but in most rural parts at least the Christians are spread out so thin, and the ordained ministers are so few, that it is exceptional to have celebrations more than once a month, and quite common to have them only twice or thrice a year, at irregular intervals.

The expectation of the Committee has not been fulfilled; the separate service is almost unknown. Where celebrations are frequent or regular, the preparatory elements are generally felt to overburden the action of the Liturgy, so as to weaken more or less the effect of the whole. Especially perhaps because it is directed that throughout these acts the people should stand! On the other hand, where celebrations are rare or irregular, the people do not mind a long service; they may even like it, and in some churches they stretch out the Communion Service to include baptisms and confirmations. And it is widely felt that a Communion Service ought to be thorough-going and heart-searching. One of our correspondents, urging that the Preparatory Service must not be confined to self-examination, it must bring the people face to face with God's Word and its calling to faith, went on to say:

> *Do* have this element in somewhere, preferably still, I think, in the Liturgy itself. It's a Reformed emphasis purely (the writer would be described by most Reformed Christians as an Anglo-Catholic)—and it has

a place in a full-orbed act of worship. I know the Liturgy is much neater without, and slicker.

If, as Pascal says, it is equally dangerous for man to know God without realising his own misery apart from God, or to know his misery without knowing the Redeemer who can cure him of it, then there ought to be time for meditation, self-examination, and penitence, before the Lord's Supper is celebrated; and in some ways this can be done better in company than alone. There ought to be a 'fencing of the Table'.

Bishop Lash of Bombay, writing in the *N.C.C. Review* about a little hand-book to our Liturgy by T. S. Garrett of Tirunelveli, referred to *The Indian Liturgy*, an order drawn up by members of an Anglican *ashram* or religious community in Poona, in which the Prayer Book Communion Service is blended with the Holy Qurbana, the Liturgy of St. James as used in the Syrian Church of South India. In the first edition, he said, provision was made for a service of preparation to be held say half an hour before the Communion Service was to begin, in the same place; the worshippers, after the spoken service was over, sitting on in the silence, waiting. 'I can remember now', he wrote, 'the meaningfulness of the quiet after it while the ministers made ready in the Vestry for their entrance to hymn or psalm.' It seemed to us that all our requirements might be met in this way: adequate time for the worshippers to prepare themselves together, with spoken prayer and exhortation and in silence; and yet the Communion Service, once it started, direct and pointed.

Another thing that weighed with me, much to my own surprise, is that I have come to feel that the Warrant ought not to be read at the beginning of the Communion Service. After years of the life and worship of our united Church, I value my Presbyterian heritage in a new way and more deeply; but here I am willing to abandon it. The Words of Institution, it now seems to me, tell their story better if they are heard for the first time in the Eucharistic Prayer.

One difficulty we did not overcome was the difficulty of finding a name for the separate or special service. 'Preparatory' was barred, because from the beginning we have used the name the Preparation for the opening acts of the Communion Service itself, the collect, the *Gloria in Excelsis*, the confession

and absolution. So we are reduced to starting off our Order of Service with an awkward mouthful: 'A Service that may be used before the Celebration of the Lord's Supper.'

The Warrant is not printed, partly to save space and partly on the principle that when a passage of Scripture is read, it ought to be read out of a copy of the whole Bible. The Ten Commandments are printed in the Revised Version, but pared down as in the Prayer Book of 1928; the Summary is also from the Prayer Book, in spite of our rule that if the Bible is quoted at all, it should be quoted exactly and in the Revised Version. In the *Gloria in Excelsis* and the *Agnus Dei* we have 'sin' for 'sins'. But we are not rigidly consistent, and in the *Sanctus* we keep 'Heaven and earth'. The Commandments and the Summary went in with some misgivings. We duly considered a recommendation from Scotland that the 'Ten Tabus of Mount Sinai' must not be so honoured; if ethical exhortation was wanted, we might go so far as to have the choir sing the Beatitudes, since this is allowed in the Byzantine Liturgy. The Exhortation is also printed, after some further pruning. The rubric says that the special service may include these acts, or some of them, along with the praise of God, the confession of sin, and the reading and preaching of God's Word.

The question of space was in our minds throughout. The first edition happened to fall, with some regrettable crowding here and there, into sixteen pages, and a unit of sixteen pages can be printed economically. If we were to add even a little, the cost would shoot up, and many of our congregations would be unable to pay.

The matter for the special service, in small type, takes up two of our precious sixteen pages, and are printed immediately below the title. The title must be printed on page 1, for our cheap congregational edition has no cover and no introduction. The title itself cost us some trouble. It began as: 'The Service of the Lord's Supper or The Holy Eucharist.' An English liturgiologist told us that this suggests 'preparing for or waiting at the great banquet, not the partaking of it'; and he objected to Eucharist as 'a clever man's word'. But we thought that the clever man could explain that it underlies both 'He blessed' and 'He gave thanks', which is worth explaining; and anyhow the objection does not apply when an Indian language is used.

We decided that where we were not convinced that there must be a change, we would keep the familiar form. Many discussions during the three days were to end the same way. Our title now reads: 'The Lord's Supper or The Holy Eucharist: an Order approved by the Synod, January 1954, for general use wherever it is desired.'

II

The Service opens with a hymn or psalm as the 'ministers' enter. Where possible, some of the ministers should be laymen, and the laymen should take part in the reading of Scripture. 'Deacons' are included. This word is generally used in the Church of South India in the Anglican sense of a presbyter on probation, but this is one of the points at which we feel that perhaps we all have something yet to learn. One of the ministers is to carry in both hands the Bible from which the lessons are to be read. It was a distinguished English Congregationalist who suggested to me, while I was on furlough, that we should add 'in both hands', and I can remember his eyes dancing as he spoke. The Introduction explains that we are trying to keep an echo of the 'Little Entrance' of the Eastern liturgies, in which the Gospel is brought in with incense and with special candles. In the Eastern rite there are many touches symbolising the whole history of God and man, the cosmic drama; the Little Entrance corresponds to the coming of the Word, and the Great Entrance, the bringing-in of the bread and wine, represents the crucifixion.

The opening rubrics also say that the presbyter throughout the service should stand behind the Table, facing the people. An English expert warned us that this 'basilican posture', so enthusiastically re-discovered not long ago by Roman and Anglican catholics, was perhaps not universally practised in the early centuries. But it seems to us a good thing, all the same; we want to have a table, not a shelf on the wall.

During the opening acts, all stand: it is the only attitude for prayer in the Gospels. We take the Gregorian Collect for Purity from the Prayer Book, omitting the half-private saying of the Lord's Prayer. The *Gloria in Excelsis* follows in its proper place, though weaker brethren may if they choose have it after the Communion. There are alternatives: a simple form of the

Trisagion, or a fine litany culled from the Song of the Elders in the Revelation, or any hymn of praise. Then, if there has been no separate service, the Warrant, the Commandments or Summary, or the Exhortation may be used, any or all of them. But since these are not always used, we add a bridge from praise to confession.

> Brethren, we have come together to hear God's most holy Word, and to receive the body and blood of the Lord. Let us, therefore, kneel and examine ourselves in silence, seeking God's grace that we may draw near to him with repentance and faith.

All kneel, and keep a short silence together; then the presbyter says the Invitation to Confession. After 'his holy ways' this is altered: 'make your humble confession to Almighty God, that you may be reconciled anew to him through our Lord Jesus Christ.' To many, the alteration will seem almost sacrilege; and we were warned that people might be misled into supposing that reconciliation with God is brought about by our confession alone: it comes with God's pardon, and in our Liturgy that is declared later on. Nobody would argue that our new conclusion has any style or distinction: the member who suggested it, a scholarly and devout Anglican, argued simply that if we drop the drawing near and the comfort of the sacrament, we must add something for the sake of balance. We were adding a counterpoise. Our reason for the alteration was severely practical. We were not working in a vacuum: we were trying to fashion a service that could be used with profit in our Church. I have already said that there are not enough presbyters. We were anxious that when an unordained man must conduct the Sunday morning service, the worship should be as full as possible, including the reading and preaching of God's Word, the confession of sin and the declaration that God forgives, intercession, and the offering and presenting ourselves for his service and worship. Such a reason will be appreciated, I know, in Scotland. So we wish that, even when there can be no Communion Service, the Liturgy should be followed as far as the intercession, and then completed with a hymn, a prayer in which the praise of God as Creator and as Redeemer is included, and the solemn dedication of the people's offerings as a token that we are offering ourselves. Now, those who conduct public

worship among us, in the absence of a presbyter, are often not well educated. If the Order is to be used in this way, it must be with the minimum of adaptation. In its present form the Order may be used with one small omission, the omission of the words 'and to receive the body and blood of our Lord' in the call to self-examination. And after much deliberation we thought it worth while to pay the necessary price. Cranmer showed no hesitation about altering familiar forms in order to meet practical needs. In our new Church I think we try deliberately to work in the spirit of some recent Pope, who said: 'We venerate tradition so much that we make new traditions as fast as we can.'

The Confession we print is copied and adapted, with permission, from the Scottish *Book of Common Order* (the Alternative Order). The changes emphasise the forgiveness of one's neighbour, and make the prayer suitable even when there is no celebration. Instead of this confession, verses from Psalm 51 may be said or sung; one of the confessions in the Book of Common Prayer may be used; or the presbyter may pray extempore.

After the Confession the presbyter repeats the texts used at this point in the Prayer Book, but in the Revised Version. We call them 'gracious', because the word 'comfortable' has changed in meaning since 1549 (so perhaps has 'gracious', but not so much); and we call them together 'the Word of God', so as not to commit ourselves on questions of Higher Criticism. The absolution or prayer for forgiveness from the Prayer Book follows. Here again the importance of forgiving others is brought out: 'all who forgive their brethren and with hearty repentance and true faith turn to him.' The Christians in India are few, and Hindus and Muslims are many, and sometimes militant: it is obvious that the Church in India must be missionary, or must perish: and if it is to be missionary, the members must forgive one another. After the prayer, the people say: 'Amen. Thanks be to God.' The prayer may also be used as in the Methodist *Book of Offices*, with 'us' and 'our' for 'you' and 'your'. When so used, it is to be said before the Gracious Word of God.

One correspondent, an English Congregationalist, told us he wished we could find some form which is really an absolution; we shared his wish, and his impotence to fulfil it. In some Lutheran Churches the people come forward in batches and

say their confession together, in a form that comes down direct from Dr Martin himself; the pastor then solemnly declares from the altar that there is forgiveness for the penitent but not for others, and then lays his hands on the heads of those kneeling at the rail, one by one, and speaks to each; and sometimes at least what he says is, 'In the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, I forgive thee thy sins.' One hears of this almost with envy. But we did not think the form could be transplanted.

So ends Part I of the Service, the Preparation.

III

Part II, the Ministry of the Word of God, begins with the traditional salutation. We are told that this is simply the old Roman way of saying 'Good morning', and ought to be used only when the minister appears before the people for the first time. But in practice it effectively marks the beginning of a new part of the Service. The Collect of the Day and the reading of Scripture follow. We have made it a rule from the beginning that there should be three lessons. The Old Testament apart from the Psalms should always be read, and so should the Gospels; and yet the rest of the New Testament (the 'Epistles') should not be omitted. The traditional system of pericopes, the 'Epistles and Gospels' of the Prayer Book, failed us here, for the Old Testament is practically excluded. Besides, the system grew up piecemeal, and betrays its origin. These miscellaneous scraps, read out from Prayer Book or Missal, would not by themselves suggest to anybody that the Bible is the standard by which people and Church must live or die. There is a fine table in *The Indian Liturgy*, and we recommended that temporarily; but a practical difficulty soon discovered itself. Anglicans and some Methodists are much attached to their custom of standing for the reading of the Gospel at Holy Communion. When this was proposed for the Church of South India, a Continental Reformed theologian objected vehemently to this making of distinctions within the Word of God. The only way out was to stand for all the lessons. But this made it difficult to follow *The Indian Liturgy*, for the lessons there are of heroic length. The Committee has now drawn up a draft table of collects and lessons, based largely on the traditional system, in which the portions are short. At the same time we have only recommended stand-

ing for all three lessons, and have recognised the practice of standing for the Gospel only. The theologian I mentioned retired a year or two ago!

A hymn or psalm may be sung after the first lesson—a 'gradual'.

There was no question, by the way, but that there should be a plan for the lessons. We have tried to make our plan so as to show that the Bible is the standard and guide in all things, not just an anthology to be dipped into at random. Each sequence of passages has a short title, so as to show its place in God's plan for mankind.

The sermon follows the lessons, and the people sit, for the only time. It was an Anglican who was most positive that there must always be a sermon, even if it is only a brief exposition of the lessons for the day. Christian worship is complete only when the Word of God is read, spoken, and acted.

The people respond to the Word of God, as read and as spoken, by rising and saying or singing that they put their trust in God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Nicene Creed is recommended, but the Apostles' Creed may be used instead. For many congregations, it would be unthinkable to say the Apostles' Creed at a Communion Service; and a Scottish correspondent wanted to rule it out on the ground that it has no claim to be catholic, being purely Western. Again, it was a question of pastoral necessity. The illiterate villager learns the Apostles' Creed when he is being instructed for baptism, and it becomes for him in truth, in the old term, a 'symbol'; it is the flag under which he fights, often at great risk. No other creed could mean so much to him.

Announcements may be made after the creed; if visitors are present, it may be said that communicant members of any Church with which our Church has relations of fellowship are welcome to partake. A hymn may be sung; and the people's gifts may now be collected. The experimental Service was not clear enough on this point, and there seems to be confusion sometimes: it is the kind of thing people may overlook when they are drawing up a new service, for everyone is so much accustomed to one way of doing things that he does not talk about it. We now recommend, as before, that the money or gifts in kind should be received at the doors by persons appointed for it

as the people enter; but where this is not the custom, the people may not notice the box or plate. The best alternative seems to be to collect during the offertory hymn; whether or not hymns are sung at all the suitable places (there are five altogether), the offertory hymn should not be omitted. But some people go out before the offertory, children, non-communicants, the excommunicate (the Church of South India tries to make church-discipline real); and it may not be easy for the man with the bag to get to the door first. A third course is to have a hymn and collection after the creed, and to keep the money in some suitable place until the offertory. We did not disdain to spend a lot of time on this point, simple as it seems. The offerings of the people are a necessary part of the Communion Service, and the collection must be made, not only efficiently, but also in such a way as to bring out the symbolism of it.

Lessons, sermon, and creed, make one unit. And this seems to be the best place for the intercessions. Two litanies are printed: a longer one, which is in effect the prayer for the Church Militant from the Prayer Book, with additions, broken up, as used in *The Ceylon Liturgy* (Anglican); and a shorter one, admirably compact, which comes from the Liturgy of St. James through *The Scottish Prayer Book* ('Shorter Litany II'): it was used at the inauguration of the Church of South India on 27th September 1947. Both the litanies have been considerably revised, after four years' use. In the draft revision one clause ran: 'For ourselves and all who call upon the name of Christ, that we may be unto him a kingdom, a priesthood, and a chosen people, let us pray to the Lord.' A bishop from a southern diocese objected: '(1) We have prayed for the Church already; (2) we *are* a kingdom now; (3) it won't go into Tamil.' We have also paid heed to a Scottish correspondent who advised us: 'On careful scrutiny, the number of all's might safely be reduced.' If a litany is used, the 'deacon' leads, but the presbyter says the collect at the end: the familiar 1549 offertory collect, 'Almighty God, the fountain of all wisdom,' or the beautiful second Good Friday collect. 'Or the presbyter may offer intercession in his own words for the Church and the world.'

And the second Part of the service ends with a short benediction. In this and in the 'peace benediction' at the end, the presbyter may say 'us' for 'you'.

IV

The third Part, the Breaking of the Bread, opens with offertory sentences, all standing: the presbyter, who is in sole charge from here, says Ps. 133.1 and 1 Cor. 10.17, and the people respond in the words of Ps. 27.6. The Psalms are quoted for once in the Prayer Book version. The Peace may now be given. The manner recommended (it is surprising how many manners there are!) is described in the Introduction: 'The giver places his right palm against the right palm of the receiver, and each closes his left hand over the other's right hand.' The presbyter gives the Peace to the other ministers, and each of them gives it to some one in the congregation, so that it may be passed throughout, from front to back or along the rows. We recommend that each person, as he gives the Peace, should say in a low voice, 'The peace of God be with you.'

Then, during the offertory hymn, the collection may be taken, if it has not been taken already, and at any rate the money is brought to the Table, while others at the same time bring in the communion vessels with the bread and wine. Lay people, including women, should do this, and they stand before the Table during the offertory prayer. Some of us wanted the Peace to be given before the offertory, and this order would probably work more smoothly; but we decided that we must follow the order laid down, 'First be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift.' The Introduction recalls St. Augustine's teaching that 'the sacrifice we offer is our unity in Christ'.

In the experimental edition the offertory prayer read:

> Holy Father, who through the blood of thy dear Son hast consecrated for us a new and living way to thy throne of grace, we humbly beseech thee to take and use these gifts for thy glory. All that is in the heaven and earth is thine, and of thine own do we give to thee. Mercifully accept us as with all these gifts we dedicate ourselves, unworthy as we are, to thy service, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

The first clause comes from the traditional Prayer of the Veil, based on Heb. 10.19-25; the rest is the usual form in which the people offer themselves to God's worship and service. A Scottish correspondent rebuked us for 'the glaring non-sequitur' between God's dedicating for us a new and living way to his

throne, and his taking and using our gifts. I think we have improved the prayer now:

> Holy Father, who through the blood of thy dear Son hast consecrated for us a new and living way to thy throne of grace, we come to thee through him, unworthy as we are, and we humbly beseech thee to accept and use us and these our gifts for thy glory. All that is in heaven and earth is thine, and of thine own do we give to thee.

This prayer is said standing. The offertory-bearers now return to their places, and all kneel for the beautiful prayer for Christ's presence, said together:

> Be present, be present, O Jesus, thou good High Priest, as thou wast in the midst of thy disciples, and make thyself known to us in the breaking of the bread, who livest and reignest with the Father and the Holy Spirit, one God, world without end.

The first sentence comes from the Mozarabic rite, the second from *The Teaching of the Twelve*.

The presbyter now stands, and so remains till just before the communion. This is one of the places where we were clogged by traditions and associations foreign to India. On the one hand, it is a good thing, in a new church, to have the directions as clear and simple as possible. On the other hand, Anglicans like the celebrant to stand, in keeping with the images of priest, sacrifice, and altar, but Methodists generally like their minister to kneel, so as to identify himself with the congregation. And meanwhile we have introduced this recommendation, new to both of them, that the presbyter should be 'behind' the Table, so that if he kneels it may be difficult for him to be heard and seen by the people, or to 'take' the elements during the eucharistic prayer. We have tried to be practical and sensible, and we hope that there may not be too many people who want to interpret everything in terms of ancient battles.

After the Salutation and the *Sursum Corda*, the address in the Preface now reads 'O Lord, Holy Father, Almighty and Everlasting God', which we were assured is the true patristic order, and Cranmer's, the usual order being late Latin and corrupt; and after 'didst make man in thine own image' we now have: 'and when he had fallen into sin didst redeem him to be the first fruits of a new creation.' We have also provided Proper Prefaces adapted (with permission) from the *Book of Common*

Order, except for two, Pentecost and All Saints' Day, which are from the Prayer Book as proposed in 1928. The people join at 'Therefore' instead of at the Sanctus, according to the Methodist custom. We resisted the temptation, which came from Scotland, to add seraphim and cherubim to the rest of the company of heaven, since the Sanctus was first uttered by seraphs.

One of our longest discussions was over the *Benedictus qui venit*. In the experimental edition this was given, with the rubric 'There may be added here', after the Sanctus, to be said by all together, in the Eastern form, 'Blessed be he that hath come and is to come in the name of the Lord, Hosanna in the highest.' Once again we could not hear clearly for echoes. To some people the phrase is associated with doctrines of Christ's presence which they cannot accept. And the liturgiologists gave us some work to do. We were told on the one hand that the Protestant Episcopal Church in America places the *Benedictus qui venit* immediately before the communion, because it appears there in the *Apostolic Constitutions*; and it was suggested that we should combine it with Rev. 1.4, 'he which is and which was and which is to come.' On the other hand we were warned that the *Apostolic Constitutions* are now generally recognised to be unreliable, and that every other ancient liturgy has the *Benedictus qui venit* after the Sanctus, except the Egyptian, which omits it (see Srawley). To us in India, in 1954, it may not matter what Hippolytus did or did not do. But we were attracted by the new proposal on its own merits. In the end, however, we came down, on the whole, on the side of the *status quo*. Even in four years a form of prayer may become difficult to change.

The next discussion arose over the response of the people which appears just after the Words of Institution: 'Thy death, O Lord, we commemorate, thy resurrection we confess, and thy second coming we await. Have mercy on us.' Perhaps it is worth while to record that for me the great moments of this Liturgy have come to be the prayer for Christ's presence and this response. It comes from the Liturgy of St. James. 'Have mercy on us', in such a setting, is very much in the style of the Eastern liturgies; and perhaps even Westerners who have lived for some time in the East are conditioned in some subtle way to sympathise. But the Scottish correspondent with the nose for non-sequiturs found one here, and said that 'Glory be to thee,

O Christ,' would be more in keeping. After some deliberation we accepted the proposal.

The next paragraph is the *anamnesis*: 'having in remembrance the precious death and passion, and glorious resurrection and ascension, of thy Son our Lord.' We were asked to add 'and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost'; while one correspondent (in Australia) wanted us to take in the example of Christ's life on earth, His continued intercession in heaven, and His kingly rule. One of our own bishops came down heavily here, saying it was not our purpose at this point to recapitulate the creed; the one thing to remember here is the death of Jesus: he wanted to cut out even the resurrection and ascension; while another bishop said that those who thought thus were 'Westernisers and pedants'! The paragraph remains as it was. And no one suggested any change in the *epiclesis*.

After the *epiclesis* the presbyter may kneel again, while all together say the Lord's Prayer. A Scottish correspondent was eager that we should have, at least as an alternative, 'debts' for 'trespasses', the Authorised Version and surely the right one, surely also the richer idea. I got the impression that people accustomed from infancy to 'trespasses' cannot really consider any change. The reason given was that in our Indian languages the word for debts would suggest 'moneylender' and nothing else. 'Trespasses' stands. A rubric at the end says that the Lord's Prayer and the *Gloria in Excelsis* may be used, as in the Prayer Book service, after the communion.

The presbyter kneels now, if not already kneeling for the Lord's Prayer, and after a silence all say the Prayer of Humble Access together, in the version already in use, 'that our sinful bodies and souls may be made clean by his most precious Body and Blood.' A Scottish correspondent stood up strongly for the original: 'I think', he wrote, 'there must be few who will not regret the tampering with this ancient English prayer associated with the first movement towards the Reform in England.' But we stick to our adaptation.

The presbyter rises, and breaks the bread. He may keep silence as he does so; or he may repeat 1 Cor. 10.16*b*, or a word from the Eastern liturgies, *hagia hagiois*, which we translate 'The things of God for the people of God'. Some people see no meaning in the alternative, but one of our members told us of

an almost illiterate Kanarese evangelist who could hardly get over his wonder and joy at the words.

There are no directions here about the administration: the simple statement that local customs are to be followed has been removed to the Introduction. There, however, it is recommended that where the people come forward to the altar-rail they should come in batches, with the help of stewards, and that each batch after communicating should wait together till they are dismissed together with a blessing. This is the Methodist way, much to be preferred to the Anglican way of arriving and departing one by one. I have seen it adopted in an ex-Anglican church, even when the Prayer Book service is followed. It is also recommended that a spoon be used, the wine being poured into the communicant's open mouth—the custom of the Syrian Churches. If it is to be used with confidence, a little practice is needed. The words of administration recommended are: 'The body of our Lord Jesus Christ, the bread of life'; 'the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, the true vine.' Alternatives are given in the Introduction: those in the Prayer Book, those in the *Book of Common Order*, or words from 1 Cor. 10.16. Apart from this, it is said only that the *Agnus Dei* may be said or sung, and that there may be a hymn while the people communicate.

There was much discussion over the post-communion. Some correspondents were eager that there should be, immediately after the communion, a corporate act of thanksgiving, such as the singing of parts of Psalm 103; but we were not convinced that the service ought not to end quietly, and besides it was reported that in some Tamil and Telugu churches the Thanksgiving Collects were set to Indian music for congregational singing. The collects, the first of them made up from Eph. 1.6; John 6.53-56; Rom. 12.1 f, the second a combination of the Thanksgiving Collects in the Prayer Book, are as before, the second a little rearranged. Either collect is followed by the response:

> Amen. Blessing, and glory, and wisdom and thanksgiving, and honour, and power, and might, be unto our God for ever and ever. Amen.

And the presbyter gives the 'peace benediction'. A final hymn, such as Psalm 103, may be sung while the ministers go out. The rubric says they are to take with them the Bible, the collection,

and the communion vessels, and adds: 'Any bread or wine set apart in the service which remains over shall be carried out to the vestry, and may there be reverently consumed.' It was at this point only that there was something like real controversy when the Order was first drawn up, and it was vigorously reopened by one correspondent at the revision. There are some who think that such a recommendation seems to imply a superstitious veneration for the elements that have been set apart or consecrated. Most members of the Church, I think, refuse to 'follow an antique drum', and find themselves free to deal with the question on the level of common-sense and good manners.

Until our Committee met in September 1953, as I have said, our Liturgy had never been examined word by word continuously by any group of members of our Church. I think we were all surprised and pleased to find how well it stood up to such scrutiny. Some of us may make reservations at particular points, and I myself will continue to hold that the right translation for *ōpheilēmata* is 'debts'. But the Liturgy is a very solid thing, simple enough for most people to follow, comprehensive enough to surprise, rebuke, and comfort, at every new experience of it. It is very much of a piece: it is not any particular thing said or done by the celebrant, but all that is done by all, that makes it effective. It arises out of a sense of mission and unity, and seems likely under God to strengthen that sense.

THE REFORMATION OF WORSHIP

1. The Dislocation of Worship in the Modern World

(The first of three lectures delivered at Toronto under the Old St. Andrew's Memorial Lectureship, 1954; the others will follow in subsequent issues)

by The Rev. D. H. C. READ

There is probably no activity of man at once so congenial to his instincts and baffling to his intelligence as the worship of God. Worship may be described as congenial to man's instincts since it exists, and has existed, in some form or other in every human society, and is a recognisable impulse in even the most secularised product of a modern sceptical world. It may be described as baffling to his intelligence since it escapes the definitions of our scientific culture, and is, in fact, so unaccountable on any merely rational view of human nature that rationalism has handed the problem over to the psychologist to explain in terms of repressions, mother-fixations, infantile-regressions and the like. This modern rejection of worship with the surface of the mind, coupled with the persistence of the instinct in powerful and often perverted forms is worth examining in the light of the enduring summons of the Christian Church to the worship of Almighty God.

'Let us worship God.' When a minister uses these words, as he does twice a Sunday in my own church, what is about to happen? That is the fundamental question. The familiarity of the words should not blind us to the astonishing nature of this announcement in a modern industrialised society, conditioned to an understanding of the hard facts of the physical world, and a scientific, or pseudo-scientific approach to the problems of human existence. 'Let us worship God.' If these words are more than interesting data for the social anthropologist, what do they convey to those who hear them?

The devout among the congregation will recognise a familiar summons to join in prayer and praise to God in response to a fresh hearing of His Word. The casual attender will understand

that the signal, the signature-tune, of the Church has been given for the usual mixture of singing, prayer, and sermon that he has been led to expect. But the hypothetical modern heathen dropping in for the first time will be completely bewildered as to what can possibly be implied. Here is a group of ordinary people drawn from all walks of life. They have clearly not come to join a discussion and pass a resolution, or the opening words would have been: 'Let us consider what action should be taken to prevent an atomic war', or something of that kind. They have not come to watch a spectacle, or the minister would have said: 'Let us watch this pageant of God's dealings with men.' They have not come to listen to an address, or the opening words would have been: 'Let me talk to you about the love of God', or some other topic. They have not come to a social occasion of talk and song, or the introduction would perhaps have been: 'Let us remember that the more we are together the happier we shall be.' It is more than possible that one or other of these introductions would on occasion be more appropriate to what was going on in the minds of those present, but the declared intention of the Church is to do that which may include all these elements but is, in essence, wholly other. What is it?

'Let us worship God.' First, we must note that the congregation is being asked to do something. That is our first clue to the meaning of public worship. It implies active participation. Perhaps some congregations today are not as helpful as they might be to our hypothetical inquirer at this point. So far from looking like an eager body of men and women straining at the leash, keyed for action, they resemble more a cinema audience waiting comfortably for something to happen. But 'Let us worship God' is a summons to corporate action. Whatever worship may be it is not an invitation to 'Stop, look, and listen.' The action may not be physical (although the movements of standing, sitting, kneeling, singing, are not without significance) but it certainly involves the mind, the emotions, and the will. If these remain passive worship cannot begin: the invitation to worship God is refused. It should not be beyond the wit of modern man to understand that action can be of this nature, for it is not peculiar to the Christian Church. I think of the difference between, shall we say, a placid and well-fed audience listening to a flow of after-dinner oratory, and a rally of Nazi

youth such as I saw in Germany in the thirties. The one suggests almost entire passivity (if not somnolence), whereas the other, although physically almost as motionless, gave the impression of the most dynamic activity.

If then worship is an activity of this special kind to what is it directed? When we give the obvious answer: to God, then our difficulties really begin. For this makes it plain that worship can be a significant activity of rational men and women only if they have some prior knowledge of the One to whom it is to be directed. 'For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.' This is not only advice given to the seeker of faith: it is a declaration of the indispensable condition for the understanding of worship. And this is precisely what makes worship opaque to the understanding of so many of our contemporaries. They cannot see through it to the God who gives it meaning. We cannot engage in a corporate activity of mind, emotion, and will directed towards God if we have nothing more in our minds than what Dr Julian Huxley has described as a 'God-shaped blank'.

This is, incidentally, one of the factors in the displacement of worship in the modern world. For the churches, realising perhaps sub-consciously that belief in the true object of worship has waned, have tended to deflect their activity to the service of man, offering him the attractions of spiritual power, peace of mind, or aesthetic enjoyment. It is supposed that people can be induced to worship if only it is made sufficiently appealing, without apparently the prior question being asked as to whether they believe in God. But worship depends from first to last on the reality of the Divine Spirit in whom we live, and move, and have our being. And the activity it represents is nothing less than the opening of the entire personality to Him. This, again, is a possibility on condition that God not only exists but has made possible communication with mankind—in other words that He is a rewarder of them that seek Him.

Here is a further difficulty for the man or woman of today. There are few who would deny outright that there is any God to be found, but there are thousands who question the necessity of any deliberate and corporate seeking, such as is implied in corporate worship. Is God not everywhere and always, and therefore the permanent background of my life? Why must

He be sought? And is the idea of corporate worship not a mere relic of the days when men imagined that God could be localised in some holy place? Is the very idea of worship not totally unnecessary since I cannot escape God who is the very condition of my existence? The rejection of public worship by so many of our contemporaries is based on some such reasoning as this, where it is based on any reasoning at all. We have to reckon today with a considerable number of semi-believers—men and women who would not question the existence of a deity, but who assume that since God is there all the time, as a kind of super guardian-angel, entirely responsible for everything, including their relationship to Him, set worship is neither relevant nor necessary. They would regard the Christian's church-going as something like trying to ring up the Laws of Nature on the telephone.

This popular method of eliminating the public worship of God is based on more than one misunderstanding of the human situation. If the argument simply is that since God is there all the time we can dispense with any set times or forms for acknowledging His presence, it is easy to point out that many things that form part of the accepted and valued background of our lives need nevertheless to be from time to time brought to the forefront of our minds. A man may protest that he loves his wife continually but that will not mean that he will dispense with certain regular ceremonies by which that love is expressed and even increased. The giving of a birthday present does not imply that for 364 other days of the year the beloved is forgotten: it is a regular and tangible expression of that which is already there. So public worship is not an otiose and unnecessary thing because God is, in fact, the basis and background of our whole existence. We know that just because of this omnipresence we are liable to forget His existence, so that, quite apart from any theological considerations, there is a very good psychological reason for setting apart times for concentration upon God.

But there is a very much more serious mistake involved in this assumption that public worship is unnecessary. This is the curious underlying belief that mankind is, in fact, in some kind of vague, continuous, and generally satisfactory relationship to God. It is odd how this assumption is made so often and so

easily by those who have themselves in practice ceased to recognise God as an important and influential factor in their daily decisions. If it were true that all mankind is continually in an unbroken relationship with its Creator-God then surely we should be living in a very different kind of world. For if there is any doctrine that commands the ready assent of the semi-believer it is that God is good, and that we ought to love our neighbours as ourselves. But a glance at the world we know offers no immediate confirmation of either of these beliefs. It is not obvious that the God behind the spectacle of Nature or the deeds of men is good in the accepted sense of the word; and it is clearly not true that men always and everywhere are loving their neighbours. We have only to look around us to convince ourselves that an automatic and satisfactory relationship between a good God and His human children does not exist. If it exists at all it is only sporadically and for a time. Thus to disregard the necessity for public worship on the grounds that man is, in any case and at all times, in communion with God, betrays a total lack of a realistic appreciation of the human situation. This situation has, of course, been analysed by theologians, by philosophers, by sociologists, by economists, and others in a hundred different ways, but one common factor emerges from all these analyses—that there is something seriously amiss with the human race. This disharmony which is expressed horizontally (to use the fashionable geometrical vocabulary) in broken relationships among men, is surely also symptomatic of a disturbance of the vertical relationship with the Divine.

We stumble here on a remarkable paradox in man's understanding of God. For it would appear that the further we are in fact away from Him, the more optimistic view we tend to take of the relationship. St. Peter, in the very presence of Christ, cries: 'Depart from me for I am a sinful man. O Lord' —a cry which is echoed in the experience of the saints who confess that the nearer they come to God the more profound is their sense of sin; while the natural tendency of our hearts when we are really very far from God—seldom, if ever, praying, and totally unconcerned with His will for our lives—is to assume that God is just round the corner, awaiting our convenience. If we are to accept the testimony of the saint, or even if we are

merely to accept the evidence of our own heart and eyes, we must recognise that all is not well with our relationship to God. Therefore worship may begin to appear in yet another light—as an opportunity to recreate a lost harmony, to set us on the path where we can truly give thanks and praise. There is a necessity for man to come to God in worship not simply to give expression to a love that is always there, but to ask pardon for a love that ought to be there but is not. One of the things that is implied when we say: 'Let us worship God' is that God has in fact made it possible for us to return to this harmony with Him for which we were designed. This, of course, is why one of the first things that happens in our public worship, or ought to happen, is a confession of sin and some form of declared absolution. The worshipper realises that, much though he would like to give thanks and praise to God, before he can freely do so something must happen. He has to be reminded of the need for pardon—more than that, he has actually to *be* pardoned, set in a new relationship to God which is indicated by the announcement of forgiveness. Then he may utter his praises and prayers and listen to the Word.

Supposing it is agreed that it is necessary to express the love which we ought to have all the time for God on special occasions, and agreed further that we need this worship because this relationship does not in fact continuously and harmoniously exist, but needs to be continually restored, might it not then be asked: May this not happen, and ought this not to happen, in the private of a man's own soul? Should the relationship not be restored, and the communion and adoration made, through the prayer and devotion of the individual in which he comes consciously to remember his God and also to receive the necessary forgiveness? Why *public* worship?

This is probably a familiar question to you all. Is it necessary for me to come to public worship in order to be a Christian? I can commune with my God much better on the hills, etc. etc. Many a man claims that he finds the only real worship in the quiet of his own soul, and not only finds it unnecessary to come to public worship, but finds it disturbing, because the presence of others interrupts the free nature of his communion with God. The form in which prayers are put for him is unhelpful; the hymns he is required to sing are mere irritants; he may dislike

the shape of the church, the voice of the minister, the robes of the choir—all these things he considers a disturbance. True worship is that which sets him alone before his God and restores a relationship of love and trust between them.

This attitude, which appears so reasonable to modern man, arises out of a way of thinking about human nature that is quite peculiar to a limited section of history and geography—the individualism that can be dated from the Renaissance and reached its greatest influence in the Europe and America of the nineteenth century. The atomised conception of the lone individual, capable of existing in isolation from his fellows, who can be considered in abstraction from the society of which he is a part, is now being recognised as a curious aberration in the history of self-consciousness. In all other periods of history, and in other cultures, man is seen continually in relation to society —the family, the tribe, the nation; and the political, psychological, philosophical, and theological trends of today are all in favour of setting him once more within this context. We recognise that the isolated individual personality standing in lone splendour to face the mysteries of the world and God is an abstraction, a mythological figure created by the desire to exalt the discoverer and inheritor of vast new powers, and perhaps also to justify at other times a ruthless economic expansion. The individual personality—on which we rightly set such value —is of course itself the product of continual contact with our fellows, whatever may be the essence of the soul, and cannot be understood in isolation from human society.

It is thus only by an artificial process of abstraction that a man can imagine himself making a lone act of worship in which the only factors are himself and God. Even the hypothetical hermit on the desert island carried with him a load of inherited custom and belief. It is reported that King James the Sixth once caused a baby to be deposited on the Bass Rock in the Firth of Forth with only a deaf-and-dumb nurse in attendance. His object was to prove a current theory that the natural and instinctive original language of the human race was Hebrew. Needless to say the poor child grew up speaking no language at all. Yet we still meet men and women who speak of their own private religion as if it bore no relation to any current ideas in the Church or society. It does not usually take long to dis-

cover that this private religion consists normally of scraps of diluted Christianity mingled with stray mystical and philosophical ideas gleaned from a hundred human traditions. The man who goes forth to worship, as he says, amid the beauties of Nature, may indeed from time to time find more reality there than at public worship, but he should remember that he carries with him to the hills two thousand years of the traditions of the Church.

But there is a still more important element in public worship unnoticed by the modern individualist. We have considered the question of the restoration of the broken relationship, and seen how its vertical and horizontal aspects cannot be ignored. Neither can they ultimately be separated. To seek restoration and forgiveness from God in isolation from our fellows is to enter a spiritual cul-de-sac. Our Lord did not teach men to pray: 'My Father, forgive me my sins', but '*Our* Father, forgive us our sins, as *we forgive them that sin against us*.' The Genesis story of the Fall of Man consists not only of man's first disobedience in the garden but also of the slaying of Abel. And the sin that affects simultaneously our standing with God and our fellows is also forgiven only in the same double context. This surely means that the aspect of worship that is concerned with our recreation in Christ is unreal unless it means our association with our fellows. While this can take place genuinely in private prayer by the exercise of humility and imagination, it finds its true embodiment in the fellowship of public worship. For part of the very sin that needs forgiveness—we might even say the root of it—is our attempt to cut ourselves off from our fellows and make our own selves the centre of our universe. It may be fanciful to suppose that the average worshipper in our churches is conscious that the reconciliation with God which he is seeking is directly connected with his relationship to the people in the pews around him, but their presence is in fact a reminder that, as the New Testament bluntly puts it: 'If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar.' The word of reconciliation is spoken within the fellowship of reconciliation, and apart from the living worship of the Church the Gospel of the grace of God in Christ will be distorted in its meaning and perverted in its application. (This is why some forms of highly individualistic evangelism, which ignore the

worship of the Church, lead to a form of religiosity in which a loudly-professed love of God is accompanied by a cold and hard attitude to mankind and a total lack of social conscience.)

'Let us worship God.' So far, in trying to elicit the meaning of these words spoken in modern society, we have constructed a picture of a communal act in which men and women directed their energies of mind, feeling, and will towards the God who created them, in response to a disclosure of His love toward them. If such a God exists—a God who is not only the creative power in control of the entire universe, the ground and meaning of human life, but also a living Spirit of love who seeks through Jesus Christ His Son a family of sons and daughters to live in harmony with Him and one another both here and now and on into an infinite vista of new discovery of love and communion —if such a God exists, then surely His worship is the central and pivotal act of our human lives. This is where in an increasingly confused and baffling world we find ourselves as we truly are. When the prodigal son had gone through the attractions of the far country and found himself in the utter loneliness that is the paradoxical end of all attempts to grasp the fulness of life for oneself, he 'came to himself', and the discovery of his real self was coincident with the resolution: 'I will arise and go to my Father.' Public worship is when we arise and go to the Father, and that is when we truly find ourselves. Far from being, as is commonly supposed, an optional activity of those who take to religion as others take to golf or philately, worship is the one central, natural (at the deepest level) activity of man from which all his other activities take their meaning. It is not a sectional activity, but that of all mankind: it is not a peripheral activity, but one that engages man at the centre of his being: and it is not an isolated activity, for what we do at worship should shed its light upon the whole range of our life and interests, personal and communal. 'Man's chief end' in fact, 'is to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever.' If these words are true—and no rival definition of human purpose, we should remember, has a fraction of the intellectual and moral grandeur of this one—then worship is the one supreme obligation and privilege open to mankind, and ultimate significance can be attached to our other activities only as they are related to this.

It is worth noting that when we try to conceive of a life beyond this one we know, the only activity that presents itself to the imagination without falsity or fantasy is that of the infinitely varied worship of the Eternal God.

You will have noticed that in attempting to set out something of the meaning of Christian worship I have already been compelled to enter into a kind of dialogue with modern man. In so doing we must avoid the impression that we can make a rigid separation between the minority of faithful worshippers who are conscious of what they are doing and the average majority for whom these things are meaningless. It is, of course, true that there is a wide gap between those who are devout and understanding worshippers and those who seldom give it a thought, but the situation is a much more complicated one than this. We are all, inside and outside the Church, subject to the pressures of our age, and the queries that are raised about worship are probably as prevalent within the ranks of those who have some connexion with the Church as outside. None of us is exempt from the influence of the secular society within which we live and from those currents of opinion and habits of life that are inimical to the spirit of worship.

We must also in our thinking on this subject guard against the ecclesiastical nostalgia that continually makes sad contrast between the present and an idealised past. We are often led to suppose that there was a time when Christians flocked to worship with zeal and regularity—whether it was Victorian Britain, the days of Luther and Calvin, the all-embracing Christendom of the Middle Ages, or New Testament apostolic times. The slightest historical investigation of these, or any other period of Church history, will reveal that professing Christians have always in practice fallen far short of the ideals of worship set before them by saint and scholar. It is therefore not accidental that the title of these lectures is the *reformation*, and not the *restoration* of worship, for our aim must be continually to reform our habits and practices of worship in the light of the Scriptural revelation and of the current human situation, and not to return to some imagined purity of worship in the past.

What, then, are the salient features of the modern displacement of worship? First, that it is a displacement rather than an

abandonment. It might have seemed possible fifty years ago to speak of Western man having abandoned worship and having determined henceforth to live and to organise society on purely rational and naturalistic principles. For at that period the secular, self-sufficient man, who had thrown off the shackles of superstition and transcendent authority and was now 'master of his fate and Captain of his soul' had reached the climax of his apparent power. There is no need to emphasise the subsequent disillusionment through which we have lived, still less to attempt to make Christian capital out of the tragedy of humanism, but we are entitled to draw some conclusions from the strange and unexpected turmoils of the twentieth century. It is surely now much clearer than fifty years ago that society cannot be ordered on the assumption that man is a rational, self-sufficient creature, but that we have to take into account, in practice as well as theory, that dimension of human existence that escapes the understanding of the secular humanist. The modern novelist, the dramatist, the artist, and the existential philosopher are all in their different ways aware of this dimension, while the secular idealist and the social planner is often still wedded to the idea of man as an understandable and manageable unit of life, entirely capable of rational self-determination. The sensitive thinkers of today are all aware that the dimension of human existence that cannot be rationally encompassed and controlled is precisely that which is most significant. What we are confronted with now is not the abandonment of worship on the grounds of man's self-sufficiency but efforts to direct a tendency to worship towards rival and often contradictory ends.

At the deepest level of his existence man realises that he is a dependent being and seeks to give himself to that beyond himself to which he ascribes worth—hence 'worthship' or 'worship'. The range of his potential understanding of the universe around him is unlimited but there is no rational means by which he can thus understand himself. Meaning for human life has to come from without. This is the basis of divine worship; and it is the Christian belief that man can reach his true stature only by offering himself entirely to the God who has created and redeemed him, and can achieve the liberty for which he strives only in the divine service which is perfect freedom. Sin is the

refusal of this acceptance of God's claim, and it can take the form not only of self-assertion and the expression of the autonomous human will, but also of the deflection of worship to other ends. It has been said some years ago that the prohibition of polytheism should be altered for modern man to read: 'Thou shalt have at least one God'; but surely now it is apparent that the first commandment is most relevant in the present situation: 'Thou shalt have no other gods before me.' For, in fact, 'other gods' rather than 'no God' is the characteristic of our generation. Worship is not abandoned: it is given in increasing measure to forces, powers, ideas, even personalities of our time. Little did our grandparents in the Church imagine that by the second half of the twentieth century we should be reckoning not so much with atheism as with diabolism. But it is surely every day more apparent that history is being written in our time not by the forces of secular humanism, and certainly not by a Christianity that has rubbed out its supernatural dimension to conform with the humanist pattern, but by the worshippers—the men and women of faith, whether that faith be in Marxism, in the neo-fascist gods that lurk behind anti-Communism, or in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

How are we meeting this situation? For we must remember that the majority, at any rate in the Western democracies and the younger nations of Africa and the East, have not yet made up their minds. Millions are scarcely conscious that a demand is being made on their allegiance. Yet we have a striking example before our eyes in the recent history of Germany when an entire nation, a nation that had been in the forefront of the crusade for freedom in the name of rationalism and secular progress, succumbed overnight to the worship of false gods: an entire nation—with the exception of those who consciously and deliberately gave their allegiance and their worship to Jesus Christ. A revival of worship among Christians depends to a large extent on how seriously we understand the threat and the opportunity of the present crisis. What is at stake is something infinitely bigger than the statistics of church-attendance: it is the course of history in an era when science has put in our hands instruments of unimaginable power for the swaying of mankind.

It is in this setting that we should try to consider the more

detailed and practical problems of the public worship of the Church. For no one can deny that within Christian communities there has also been a displacement of worship. We are tempted to tinker with the superficial symptoms—asking ourselves how we can meet this or that local need, or exposing the shallow excuses people give for not coming to church—without facing the root problem of 'the chief end of man'. Do we, or do we not, believe that worship of God is our first and central duty—simply because God is God and we are His children? This is the question that has to be faced, quite apart from the consideration of how best we can express this worship. Would we not all have to confess how in some measure we have been infected by the contemporary habit of considering worship as a secondary and optional activity, to be compared with music, dancing, or golf? Only when we are thoroughly convinced that we are dealing with the ultimate in human life—an ultimate about which a life-or-death battle is now taking place—can we begin to consider the question of the reformation of worship in the Church of today.

The lack of a radical understanding of the nature of worship has led to serious deflections from its true purpose within our modern Church life. The nature of these is perhaps best indicated by the comments and criticisms that are frequently heard which assume that the purpose of worship is to provide some psychological or spiritual satisfaction for the individual. 'I don't get anything out of it' is one of the commonest criticisms of public worship today. It may well be that ministers and others should receive such criticisms humbly and ask themselves if in fact their accustomed mode of worship is not out of touch with the lives of ordinary men and women; but in essence this question reveals a misunderstanding of the nature of Christian worship. It has become almost axiomatic that worship should be a means to an end—and that end the inducing in the individual worshipper of a feeling of inner peace and security. Go to Church because 'man's chief end is to glorify God' has been replaced by: Go to Church because you'll feel better. However true it may be that communal worship will tend to foster a fuller, richer life, and that it is designed to build up the life of the believing community, it ought never to be forgotten that the true worship of Almighty God is an end in

itself—the only ultimate and irreplacable end of human existence.

If worship in our churches today is sometimes made subservient to the satisfaction of specific human needs, so that in extreme cases it almost ceases to have any supernatural reference at all, there is also apparent another kind of deflection from its true end which consists in isolating it from the life of the community. If worship can be secularised so that it becomes chiefly a man-ward rather than a God-ward activity, it can also be spiritualised and thus removed from its relation to our everyday life. This occurs when in the attempt to guard against secularisation we insulate our services from all that reminds us of the material world in which we live. This may be done in two quite different ways: either by the excessive cultivation of ritual and atmosphere as remote as possible from twentieth-century life, or by the attempt to dispense with any material aids of symbols whatever. In either case worship is being isolated, removed into a so-called 'spiritual' realm, where an attempt is made, consciously or unconsciously, to forget the world in which we live. But this is not to glorify God: it is to subtract from Him the material surroundings in which He has set us, and to encourage a false dichotomy between our devotions and our everyday affairs. To worship the God who was incarnate in Jesus Christ is not to escape to a spiritual world. It was in *this* world that He was incarnate, and the worship of the Church which is His Body, must be a worship in the flesh and blood of our material life—which is exactly what is suggested by the supreme moment of Christian worship, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

'Let us worship God.' This is the summons to the highest activity of man, in which he opens his whole being to Almighty God in the fellowship of the Church. He then seeks no lesser end but this: to adore and enter into communion with his Maker and Saviour. And he brings with him to this worship nothing less than the entire context of his material life. Only thus can worship be the central act from which all else takes meaning. Is this too high an ideal to set before us? We all know how far short we fall as individuals and as congregations from the full meaning of Christian worship. But if we are determined that our worship shall be ordered, formed and

reformed, so as best today to minister to this end, it is well that we should begin by reminding ourselves of what it is meant to be and to do. Only by keeping these objects in mind can we deal seriously and usefully with the practical problems of our common worship in the modern world.

THE MULTITUDE IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

by The Rev. BERNHARD CITRON

The great German scholar Martin Dibelius is said to have expressed his admiration for the Scottish Church during a visit to Scotland some years ago by declaring: 'You have not yet lost the masses.' The attitude of the masses towards the Church largely depends on the attitude of the Church towards the masses. This applies to the modern Church as much as it applied to the Church in which the Gospel was first proclaimed. Martin Dibelius himself stated in his work on Form-criticism (*Die Formengeschichte des Evangeliums*, 1933, pp. 50, 54, 64) that in the Gospels the multitude forms an impersonal choir whose main function it is to express amazement and admiration.

If this had been the only function of the multitude in the Church of the New Testament, the power which the Gospel exercised not only upon some chosen individuals but upon the masses, would remain unexplained. The Synoptic tradition regarding the multitude is divided. In the First and Second Gospel the multitude has a character of its own. There is on the whole far more agreement between Matthew and Mark as far as the multitude is concerned, than there is between Matthew and Luke. But undoubtedly Matthew is more sympathetic towards the multitude than any of the other Evangelists. Luke's attitude towards the masses is entirely different. His treatment of social problems is individualistic; he draws a picture of Jesus which lets the Master appear as the friend of everyone who is poor, needy, sick and oppressed. St. Luke's pen-portrait of Jesus is therefore often considered as the Social Gospel *par excellence*. On the other hand Luke shows a marked distance from the masses.

The Third Gospel was the favourite of an age in which personal religion and individual charity played the most prominent part in Christian Faith and Practice. Our age with its renewed emphasis on corporate religion and community welfare has

also restored the balance between the two forms of Christian social action as represented by Matthew and Luke.

1. Terminology

Three words occur in the Synoptic Gospels which in English have been rendered multitude, people, crowd or throng.

(*a*) *Plethos*

This is a general term for anything that appears in large numbers. It can be used of a multitude of the heavenly host (Luke 2.13), of a multitude of fish (Luke 5.6) or of a multitude of people (Luke 1.10, 19.37, 23.1). *Plethos* is found eight times in Luke and twice in Mark. The absence of this rather colourless and impersonal word from Matthew is characteristic. In the light of the following study it will become obvious that to Matthew people are more than just numbers.

(*b*) *Laos*

In the Septuagint this word is used in the sense of nation, especially the nation of Israel. Matthew whose way of thinking is Hebraic, uses the word *laos* still in this sense. Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* (article on *laos*) mentions only four exceptions from this rule. In the following four instances Matthew is supposed to have used the word *laos* in a general sense, as a synonym for *ochlos*, the anonymous crowd. But a close examination of these passages shows that in three instances out of four Matthew did not mean to identify *laos* with *ochlos*. In the first instance (Matt. 4.23), the Evangelist distinguishes between the Jewish *laos* among whom Jesus first exercised His ministry of teaching, preaching and healing and the mixed *ochloi* who followed Him after His fame spread throughout Syria (vv. 24 f). The antithesis between *laos* and *ochlos* is therefore fully intended. In the second instance (Matt. 26.5), Matthew quotes from Mark (Mark 14.2). He simply allowed the word of the received text to stand in his record. In the third instance (Matt. 27.25), the cry of the people is recorded: 'His blood be upon us and on our children.' The *Wörterbuch* suggests that the *laos* which utters that cry, is identical with the *ochlos* in verse 24. However, Matthew would not have changed the noun merely for the sake of style (as Luke

might have done), but he meant *laos*, when he used this word. The reference is to Deut. 19.10 where it is enjoined 'that innocent blood be not shed in thy land, which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance, and so blood be upon thee.' According to Deuteronomy the shedding of innocent blood would be a stain upon Israel, i.e. the whole *laos*. The people who accepted the responsibility for the blood of Jesus and thus transgressed against the prohibition in the Book of Deuteronomy, acted not merely as a cruel mob, but as the *laos* of Israel which had turned from the law and had consciously committed a hideous sin.

The fourth instance mentioned in the *Wörterbuch* is Matt. 27.64. In this case the word *laos* is really a synonym for *ochlos*, but the reason for this is of a very peculiar kind. It should be noted that the event takes place after the death of Jesus, after the veil in the temple is rent and after all distinctions between the *laos* of Israel and the *ochlos* of every race and nation have ceased. At that time the *ochlos* is really transformed into the new *laos*, God's own people.

We can therefore conclude that Luke uses the word *laos* frequently and indiscriminately, sometimes in the sense in which it is used in the Septuagint, as the nation of Israel, and sometimes in a general sense as crowd (*ochlos*). In Matthew's Gospel Israel still remains *the laos* till all distinctions between the people of the Old and of the New Covenant have disappeared.

(*c*) *Ochlos*

The word most commonly used is *ochlos*. It occurs forty-nine times in Matthew, forty-one times in Mark, but only thirty-eight times in Luke. The third Evangelist is conscious of the derogatory meaning of the word in classical Greek where it denotes 'the mob'. His aloofness from the *ochlos* can be traced throughout the Gospel. Mark is on the whole unprejudiced. There can be said of his Gospel what has been said of the Gospels in general, that 'the *ochlos* appears usually as the anonymous background for the works of Jesus' (*Theologisches Wörterbuch*, article on *ochlos*). Matthew on the other hand is inclined to be friendly towards the multitude. As a Christian Jew he uses the word *ochlos* without any derogatory association. *Ochlos* has been adopted as a foreign word by Hebrew writers, simply meaning a large number of people. (In a Midrash to the Book of Deuter-

onomy it is stated 'Jacob went to Egypt not in a great multitude' (*b'ochlosin har 'bath*), see Adolf Schlatter, *Der Evangelist Matthäus*, 1948, and Matt. 4.25.)

Moreover the Christian-Jewish community in which and for which the Gospel according to St. Matthew is written was a city congregation (see G. D. Kilpatrick, *The Origins of the Gospel according to St. Matthew*, 1946, p. 124 f). The members of that Church belonged largely to the city *ochlos* and the mission of the Church was directed towards the same class of people. A city missionary living and working among city folk can never remain aloof from the common man. He will avoid saying anything that could offend ordinary people, and he will present his message not only to individuals but to the masses. In Matthew's folk-book of the Life, Death and Resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ the *ochlos* therefore plays a more important, a more personal and a more sympathetic part than in any of the other Gospels.

2. Character of the Multitude

(*a*) *Pushing and demented crowds*

Members of city congregations are used to crowds. They are neither amazed nor unduly disturbed by the presence of large numbers of people. This explains the complete absence from Matthew's Gospel of the pressing, jostling, moving throng which causes so much disturbance in the other Synoptic records, especially in Luke. Matthew tells us of a man who was sick of the palsy and who was healed when his friends brought him to Jesus (Matt. 9.1 f). Mark and Luke however describe the traffic jam in front of the house in which Jesus sat (Mark 2.3 f and Luke 5.18 ff), so that the four friends were forced to uncover the roof and to let the stretcher with the sick person down. After the healing of the palsied man the *ochlos* glorified God (Matt. 9.8). Mark and Luke avoid the word *ochlos* in this connexion but use *pantes* (Mark 2.12) and *hapantes* (Luke 5.26).

In the incident of the visit of Jesus' mother and brothers, Luke alone blames the crowd for not letting the visitors through (Luke 8.19), while in Mark's Gospel the people even intercede for the family of the Master (Mark 3.32).

In the passage of the woman with the issue of blood, Luke lets the disciples say (Luke 8.45): 'Master the multitude throng

thee and press thee,' while no such complaint is forthcoming in Matthew's Gospel (Matt. 9.22). All three Evangelists mention that Jesus taught from a ship (Matt. 13.1 ff; Mark 4.1 ff; Luke 5.1 ff). Only Luke shows anxiety because the multitude 'sat on him'. In Matthew the withdrawal from the multitude always takes the form of an orderly dismissal. Luke's aversion towards crowds is particularly marked when hyperbolically he speaks of 'an innumerable multitude of people insomuch that they trode one upon another' (Luke 12.1). There is no parallel to this passage in either Matthew or Mark. The warning against the leven of the Pharisees and Sadducees which Luke records on that occasion is in Matthew and Mark addressed to the disciples (Matt. 16.6; Mark 8.15). The picture drawn by Luke of the *ochlos* that lined the road through Jericho was that of an amorphous crowd which blocked the view for small-sized Zacchaeus (Luke 19.3). Matthew describes what happened when Jesus left the town. Two blind men tried to draw His attention. They are rebuked by the *ochlos* which in this case takes over the part of a body guard, usually played by the disciples (Matt. 20.31).

In Luke's eyes the *ochlos* becomes the very symbol of madness. Those vexed with unclean spirits are *ochloumenoi hypo pneumatōn akathartōn* (Luke 6.18). The use of the verb *ochleo* as indicating the work of evil demons because they crowd out the mind of those who have fallen under their spell, is characteristic for Luke. It is used in the same sense in Acts 5.16. Thus the whole *ochlos* that sought to touch Jesus (Luke 6.19) is the demon-possessed crowd, whose outward appearance reflects an inward state of mind.

(*b*) *Hostile or friendly multitude*

The crowds are in Luke's record not only embarrassing but very often hostile. Matthew suggests that the multitude is normally sympathetic but might be led astray by Jewish demagogues. Matthew alone mentions that Herod is afraid to kill John the Baptist out of fear for the *ochlos* (Matt. 14.5). Both Matthew and Luke noticed that after the healing of a dumb man the *ochloi* marvelled (Matt. 9.33; Luke 11.14). But only Matthew emphasises their genuine admiration for Jesus. 'It was never so seen in Israel.' The slanderous allegation 'he

casteth out devils through Beelzebub, the prince of the devils' is by Luke placed in the mouth of the multitude (Luke 11.15), while Matthew ascribes this remark to the Pharisees (Matt. 9.34).

The different treatment of the multitude in the three records of Jesus' entry into Jerusalem is most characteristic. Mark does not mention the *ochloi* at all, but speaks of 'many' who spread their garments in the way (Mark 11.8). Luke does not even suggest the presence of a friendly multitude. Jesus is hailed by the *plethos* of the disciples (Luke 19.37). On the other hand the Pharisees who object to the disciples' enthusiasm stand 'among the multitude'.

Matthew, however, gives the disciples a prominent place in the Palm Sunday events. The *ochlos* spreads garments in the way, hails Jesus with shouts of Hosannah and acclaims Him as the prophet of Nazareth (Matt. 21.8-11).

The three Synoptists agree that the chief priests and scribes were reluctant to act openly against Jesus out of fear of the people (Matt. 26.5; Mark 14.2; Luke 22.2). But Matthew and Mark alone speak of the possibility of an uproar.

The 'great multitude' which took part in the arrest of Jesus was not an *ochlos* in the usual sense of the word, but a strong detachment of the temple guard. In the morning, however, real crowds gathered outside Pilate's judgment hall. The governor's verdict: 'I find in him no fault at all' is according to Luke strongly resented. It made them (i.e. priests *and* people) 'the more fierce' (Luke 23.5). According to Matthew and Mark the popular clamour for Jesus' death was not spontaneous, but was the result of strong agitation on behalf of the Jewish leaders (Matt. 27.20; Mark 15.11).

A change of popular opinion after the death of Jesus is noticed by both Matthew and Luke. In the Gospel according to Luke the only noticeable change is remorse: 'they smote their breasts' (Luke 23.48), while in Matthew's Gospel the people are marked out as potential believers in the Resurrection. (For the use of *laos* as synonym of *ochlos* in Matt. 27.61 see 3(*c*) in this article.)

(*c*) *The quest for healing and instruction*

During His Gallilean ministry Jesus was always followed by

the *ochloi*. The three Synoptists agree on this general observation (Matt. 4.25; Mark 3.7; Luke 6.17). However Luke, whose only sympathy is for the *Gallilean ochlos*, seems to indicate that the initiative comes from the multitude, while Matthew and Mark also record that Jesus Himself summoned the multitude.

The primary motive for the approach of the multitude was the desire to be healed. Luke has given us the touching picture of the multitude that waited for Jesus' return from the land of the Gadarenes and received Him gladly (Luke 8.40). He now lets them come very close, so close that they even throng Him (v. 42). After having healed the woman with the issue of blood and having raised Jairus' daughter, Jesus sent out His disciples to heal and to preach (Luke 9.1-6). No one would have been more anxious to receive Jesus than Herod the Tetrarch: but the slayer of a prophet cannot see Jesus (vv. 7-9). The *ochloi*, however, which still followed Jesus and which had received Him first, are now received by Him (v. 11). The verb *apodechomai* (to receive gladly) means to give access to one's heart. The *ochloi* gave Jesus access to their hearts and He gave them access to His. This seems to be the order in Luke's Gospel. But while permitting the multitude in His presence, Jesus does not only heal the sick, but He declares the Kingdom of God to them.

Though the desire to be instructed comes second to the request for healing, Luke discovers such a request on the part of the *ochlos* quite early in the ministry of Jesus. 'And it came to pass that as the people pressed upon Him, *to hear the word of God*, he stood by the lake of Gennesaret' (Luke 5.1). Nowhere in the two other records is the wish of the people to hear the Word of God as clearly expressed as here. That approach of the Gallilean *ochlos* in Luke's Gospel is the most positive side of the relationship between Jesus and the multitude to be found in the Third Gospel.

3. The Attitude of Jesus towards the Multitude

(*a*) *Jesus summons the multitude*

In the First and Second Gospel Jesus does not teach by popular request but He Himself summons the multitude for

instruction. 'And when he had called all the people unto him, he said unto them, Hearken unto me every one of you and understand' (Mark 7.14 cf. Mark 8.34; Matt. 15.10).

Jesus' concern for the instruction of the multitude in St. Matthew's Gospel becomes evident in a comparison between the introduction to the Sermon on the Mount and that of the Sermon in the Plain.

And *seeing the multitudes*, he went up into a mountain: and when he was set, his disciples came unto him: and he opened his mouth, and *taught them, saying* . . .	And he *lifted up his eyes upon the disciples and said* . . .
(Matt. 5.1-2)	(Luke 6.20)

The 'seeing of the multitude' forms the sequence to the 'seeing' of Peter and Andrew, James and John at the Lake of Gallilee (Matt. 4.18 ff). Martin Buber has pointed out (*Moses*, 1952, p. 35) that the decisive step in the life of Moses was the going out to his brethren and *seeing* them (Exod. 2.11). In the ministry of Jesus the seeing of the first Gallilean disciples precedes their call. Does the seeing of the multitude therefore imply that they are also prospective disciples? The brief epilogue to the Sermon on the Mount seems to support this theory. 'When he was come down from the mountain great multitudes followed him' (Matt. 8.1). The same holds true of the multitudes what has been said of the chosen disciples: He saw—and they followed.

Though the Sermon on the Mount is not directly addressed to the multitude it is spoken with an eye on the multitude, while the Sermon in the Plain is preached with His eyes fixed on the disciples alone (Luke 6.20). Though it is affirmed by Luke that afterwards the people were able to hear Him (Luke 7.1), this Evangelist says nothing about the impression which the discourses made upon the people (cp. Matt. 7.28), nor about their following Him (cp. Matt. 8.1. See Plummer, *St. Luke*, 1896, *ad loc.*).

(*b*) *Hard sayings toned down*

The apostle after whom the First Gospel is named, was chosen at the close of a meeting with the *ochlos* (Matt. 9.8 f). 'The Evangelist gives us an insight not only in his own character but in that of his Church' (Schlatter, *op. cit.*, p. x). The con-

version of the *ochlos* was the primary missionary object of that Church. The same consideration with which the actual disciples are treated, is also accorded to the future converts, the *ochloi*. Unfavourable references founded elsewhere are omitted. In Luke 3.7 John the Baptist addresses the multitude as 'generation of vipers' while in Matt. 3.7 this hard saying is applied to Pharisees and Sadducees only. In Luke 11.29 Jesus calls the whole multitude 'an evil generation', while in Matt. 12.39 only the Scribes and Pharisees are addressed in this way. In Luke 12.56 the *ochloi* are hypocrites, in Matt. 16.3 the Pharisees and Sadducees alone are the hypocrites. These three instances are taken from the common source of the First and the Third Gospel whose original text is not available. It is therefore impossible to decide whether Matthew intentionally shielded the *ochlos* or Luke exposed it. But it is evident that the Church in which and for which Matthew's Gospel was written, believed that Jesus avoided any harsh judgment upon the multitude.

(*c*) *Compassion on the multitude*

The different viewpoint of the three Synoptists is very clearly seen in their presentation of Jesus' compassion for others. Luke presents Jesus as having compassion for individuals. He has compassion for the widow of Nain who mourns over the death of her only son (Luke 7.11). The compassion of the Good Samaritan for the victim of highway robbery is the Christian example of neighbourly love (Luke 10.33) and the compassion of the father for his prodigal son (Luke 15.20) is the supreme example of the forgiveness of God for the repentant sinner.

The term 'compassion on the multitude' however belongs exclusively to the Mark-Matthew tradition. Mark records the fact that on two occasions (both connected with the Feeding of Multitudes) Jesus showed compassion on the *ochlos*. Following His holy impulse He met the situation. Moved with compassion because the multitudes were like sheep without a shepherd, He began to teach them many things (Mark 6.34). Later when the disciples mention that the people have nothing to eat, Jesus simply says 'Give ye them to eat' (v. 37). The expression 'compassion for the multitude' is not repeated during the Feeding of the Five Thousand. But on the occasion when four thousand people had gathered around Him, Jesus says of Himself: 'I

have compassion on the multitude' (Mark 8.2). He then feeds them by miraculously increasing the available provisions (v. 6).

In St. Matthew's Gospel the words 'compassion on the multitude' occur three times. The three instances are grouped in such a way that they reveal the full scope of the ministry of Christ and of His Church to the common people.

The first occasion is a preaching and healing mission in Gallilee. 'But when he saw the multitude, he was moved with compassion on them, because they fainted and were scattered abroad as sheep having no shepherd' (Matt. 9.36). Christ realises that His own work of teaching and healing must continue. The *ochlos* cannot help itself. In response to its utter helplessness and need of spiritual leadership He appoints twelve shepherds (10.1). Thus the Church, holy, catholic and apostolic, is born out of Christ's compassion for the *ochloi*. They are the sheep without a shepherd (9.36) and the lost sheep of Israel (10.6). The pastors of the Church are charged with the completion of the Lord's own work by preaching the Kingdom of Heaven (10.7) and by healing the sick (10.8). At the same time the masses to whom the apostles are sent, whether rich or poor, are responsible for fulfilling their social obligations towards the Church and towards the poor saints, 'for the workman is worthy of his hire' (10.10).

But lest anyone imagined that the work of mercy is now entirely left to the leaders and to the members of the Church, Jesus Himself shows His continued compassion for the multitude. The Evangelist takes us to a desert place. 'And Jesus went forth, and saw a great multitude, and was moved with compassion and he healed their sick' (14.14). The healing ministry of Jesus is here motivated by His compassion not only for individual sufferers but for the whole *ochlos*. Disease is a national and social evil which Jesus conquers by His own acts of healing as well as by the healing ministry of the Apostles.

The Feeding of the Five Thousand which follows contains two important elements regarding the relationship between Christ, the Church and the *ochlos*. The Church has not the power to feed the hungry while the people cannot provide for themselves and for others when they are taken from their usual place of habitation. Therefore the disciples must turn to their Master for help. The narrative makes it clear that

the Church must still pray: 'Give us this day our daily bread.'

However, our Lord's personal concern for the material as well as the spiritual and physical well-being of the multitude continues. The Feeding of the Four Thousand is the third occasion on which Jesus' compassion for the multitude is revealed. Again large crowds follow Him. This time, they have come into the hill country near the Sea of Gallilee. 'Then Jesus called His disciples unto Him and said, I have compassion on the multitude, because they continue now with me three days and have nothing to eat' (15.32). In its outward form the passage is an exact parallel to that in Mark's Gospel. But grouped together with the two other incidents in Matthew's text, the full extent of Jesus' compassion for the multitude becomes evident. He feeds them, He heals them and He appoints a Church for them, where this threefold ministry continues.

4. The Individual and the Multitude

Two directions of Christian Service are given to us in Evangelical tradition: concern for the spiritual, physical and material need of the individual, and concern for the spiritual, physical and material need of the masses. The very fact that one of the Evangelists emphasises our Lord's compassion for the individual and the other His compassion for the multitude, shows us that the Gospel contains both elements. It is true that at certain periods in Christian history the personal character of Christian Faith and Service was more in evidence than their corporate nature. Today the reaction against this purely individualistic aspect of religion can be seen in the whole Christian world. However, the Church would fail in her mission if she fell from one extreme into the other. Thanks be to God for the riches of Christ's redeeming love who has compassion for the individual as well as for the multitude.

BOOK REVIEWS

Introduction to the Old Testament. By Aage Bentzen. Vol. I: The Theology of the Old Testament, the Text of the Old Testament, The Forms of Old Testament Literature; Vol. II: The Books of the Old Testament—with a supplément. Second Edition. G. E. C. Gad, Publisher, Copenhagen, mcmlii. Vol. I, pp. 1-268; Vol. II, pp. 1-300 + 1-32. 80s.

This work was published in Danish in 1941. In this new edition in English certain minor changes have been made in order to bring the work abreast of current discussion, and, also with this latter purpose in view, some additions appear in an appendix at the end of Vol. II. Dr Bentzen's work is comprehensive for, besides taking account of the law, prophets and hagiographers, it provides introductions to the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. It likewise merits praise for being comprehensive by bringing to the English reader, though acquainted with the work of other European writers in the field of OT study, the important contributions of Scandinavian scholars.

In his preface the author acknowledges his special indebtedness to Professor Kahle's book *The Cairo Geniza* (1947) and in Vol. I Kahle's researches are appreciated in the section upon 'The Canon of Alexandria'. What we must understand by the term Alexandrian Canon is here given a certain satisfying precision. According to Kahle the word *Septuagint* originally attached only to *the Law* in Greek. This, the Law, was canon. The other books that were added, whether prophetic, historical, apocryphal or pseudepigraphal, had for the Egyptian Jews no canonical authority. The 'Septuagint' in the wider sense in which we now understand the word is a creation of the Church which needed a canonical Greek translation. For the Alexandrian Jew the Law was the real canonical scripture. 'The canon of the larger LXX is the canon of the Church, not of the Greek synagogue.' The fixing of the Palestinian Canon for the Semitic-speaking Jews took place at the synod of Jamnia *c.* A.D. 100. The formation of the Church Canon of the Greek OT was completed possibly a century later.

Another interesting view-point is to be noted under the title 'The Forms of Literature', where we are invited to a reconsideration of the subject of oral tradition and literature. Professor Bentzen states that while he cannot accept the position of giving sole importance to oral

tradition as does the Uppsala school, yet nevertheless the transmission of the contents of the OT has been *principally* oral. This oral tradition is found not only in the pre-literary stage of history but also in the literary period. Thus Bentzen arrives at the conclusion that we must think of most of the OT literature as receiving its present form not until the fourth century B.C.

Attention should also be drawn to the study of the forms of Hebrew poetry in Vol. I, where the writer examines these fragments of literature which have been described as workers songs, taunt songs, drinking songs, wedding songs, mourning songs, etc. In examining these various forms of OT poesy, Dr Bentzen is of the opinion that far too readily such poems have been deemed to be 'profane' and that while *a priori* 'profane' literature may be present in the OT the line between profane and religious poetry is elusive. A category which has been originally 'religions' or 'cultic' may appear in later times in a secularised context of time. He admits that the drinking songs (for the motifs of which cf. Isa. 22.13, 56.12; Eccles. 10.19; Cant. 5.1; Wisd. 2.1-9) are poems where it is difficult to find a religious sentiment, but he asserts that even the most sensuous songs of The Song of Songs may belong to wedding ceremonies which were as religious as any Protestant wedding ritual. Secular royal songs, he is persuaded, are not to be found in the OT. Psalm 45, very generally held to be a secular poem, is described by our author as 'a wedding-benediction spoken by a prophet to the divine king'.

In Vol. II the particular books of the OT are the subject of treatment. In reviewing the recent criticism of scholars on the Book of Ezekiel Professor Bentzen judges that the view of Hölscher on the literary character of Ezekiel has proved to be the view which has had most influence even upon his critics. Hölscher limits the prophet's own work to the few rhythmical sections of the book, together with part of the visions, and part of the narratives in chs. 4-6. Most of his critics accept in principle this standpoint and hold that in its present form the Book of Ezekiel is not an authentic work of the prophet. Bentzen's own view is that in the Book of Ezekiel we have a complex of poetic words of the prophet which have been transmitted orally and at length fixed in writing, but that besides these there are sermonic prose parts which are probably based on words of the prophet but which have been transformed under the influence of disciples. This complex of poetry and prose became the Book of Ezekiel, edited some time before 516. The question whether Ezekiel prophesied in Judea also receives some discussion with the remark that though the supposition of a Palestinian period cannot be dismissed yet it cannot be proved. On the Book of Hosea the author

very much inclines to the interpretation of H. S. Nyberg which has much similarity with that presented by Pfeiffer. According to Nyberg, Gomer in the prophecy of Hosea was not a prostitute but a foreign woman from Moab. On the other hand the woman mentioned in ch. 3 is a second wife who is a real prostitute. The first marriage of Hosea symbolises Israel's breach with the national God *El eljon* in Jerusalem: the second marriage illustrates the breach with Jahweh. The representation of Gomer as a foreign woman combines suitably, in Bentzen's view, with the idea of Jahweh spending himself on a people to which he had originally no obligation. This view of the religious background and contents of Hosea is certainly most interesting though the attempt to resolve the difficulties in the text of Hosea by supposing that in it there is a reference to two different women will hardly commend itself. Professor Bentzen has confined himself much too exclusively to Nyberg's view and we are left to regret that this view is brought into no comparison with others which have emerged in the history of the criticism of Hosea. For a much more credible solution of the questions, textual and otherwise, connected with Hosea 1 and 3 is represented in J. M. Powis Smith's *The Prophets and Their Times.*

Thirty-four pages are devoted to the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha and these are very welcome but the space alloted to each book is too small to allow of satisfactory treatment. All the more useful therefore are the references to the translations and to important literature where fuller introductions can be found. But we find no reference to the *First Book of Maccabees* (1950) and *The Letter of Aristeas* (1951) in the new 'Jewish Apocryphal Literature' series published for the Dropsie College (Harper and Brothers, New York) which have the Greek Texts, translations and excellent introductions. The date of the original of the 'Testaments of the Twelve' is placed in the first century B.C. without any indication that it is also otherwise dated, perhaps more correctly, by Eduard Meyer who places it *c.* 200 B.C.

In the Additions to Vols. I and II in the appendix we have a short but valuable account of the discussions and literature that have arisen from the finding of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Also Hölscher's latest work on Pentateuchal problems is worthily commented upon with praise.

O. S. RANKIN

Studies in Old Testament Prophecy. Edited by H. H. ROWLEY. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1950. Pp. 200. 16s.

THIS tribute to Professor T. H. Robinson from the Society for Old Testament Study contains papers by scholars of international repute

from Europe and America. The theme is Old Testament prophecy and to illuminate this every branch of Old Testament research is employed from philology and semantics with G. R. Driver and A. R. Johnson to the interpretation of passages and books with W. F. Albright and N. H. Snaith—the latter in a presentation of Deutero-Isaiah as a nationalist prophet of Israel. Eminent names such as Eissfeldt, North, Rowley, Porteous, Pedersen and the late A. Lods give some idea of the quality of the scholarship and the variety of views.

The clear impression resulting from a study of these papers is that all is not quiet on the prophetic front. Fresh material is being gathered, new discoveries made, reinterpretations and reconstructions being attempted and old positions reviewed, but the end of the debate is not yet in sight. Every branch of Old Testament study makes its contribution to this discussion of the meaning and place in history of the Hebrew prophets.

In a paper entitled 'The Basis of the Ethical Teaching of the Old Testament Prophets' N. W. Porteous states the issue clearly. Expressing the implications of some recent research on the prophets in the light of parallel phenomena in the Ancient East outside Israel, he writes: 'The warning is out once more that we are on very dangerous ground if we claim anything like uniqueness for the Hebrew prophets' (p. 144).

Much of the fresh interpretation is the work of Scandinavian scholars from Mowinckel to Haldar, though British scholars working on parallel lines have done much to establish the theory of a cultic pattern common to the Ancient East of which the faith of Israel is merely one example. Porteous touches on this subject in a discussion of A. Haldar's book, *Associations of Cult Prophets among the Ancient Semites* but while admitting that the association of prophets and priests at sacred places was much closer than formerly supposed and that there is a surface resemblance between Old Testament priests and prophets and their contemporaries in neighbouring countries, he is not prepared to accept all the conclusions drawn from this. The suggestion, for example, made by Haldar and others that it was by the study of the entrails of slain beasts that the prophets attained to their moral and religious insights he finds on examination to be supported by vague and insufficient evidence and rash conjecture (p. 146).

In this connexion the meaning of the word Torah which is bound up with the teaching of the prophets is considered in view of the theory that Torah is derived from the Accadian word Tertu which sometimes means not only law or message but also liver. The suggestion is that prophetic oracles were a branch of hepatoscopy. But

the evidence for this is too forced and far-fetched to unseat the usual etymology deriving Torah from the Hebrew verb to point out or show, meaning direction or instruction. This attempt to merge Israelite prophet, priest and worship in the cultic pattern of the Ancient East recalls the attempt to interpret early Christianity as one of the Hellenic mystery religions, and can only be done by minimising the importance of distinctive features and notions of Old Testament religion.

One of the positive gains resulting from these studies however, is, as Porteous points out, to bring out the close association of priest and prophet as regards teaching, for the Torah which both taught was concerned both with moral and ritual instruction. One of the bases of the prophets' ethical teaching is thus seen to be the tradition of their own people to which they were debtors. With regard to this debt to the body of tradition in Israel there is an interesting paper in this collection on the 'Yahwistic Tradition in the Eighth Century Hebrew Prophets' by G. Henton Davies, substantiating in detail for them the point that Porteous makes that they were not innovators, preachers of some new idea, but inheritors of a rich and living tradition, of a known will and work of God. C. R. North's paper on 'The "Former" Things and the "New Things" in Deutero-Isaiah' is also illuminating in this connexion. It was time to be reminded that the prophets are not the sole mouthpiece of God, but that the People of God as a whole in all the vicissitudes, institutions and events of its history is the vehicle of the divine revelation, and that one aspect or part is not to be exalted at the expense of the other. While the prophets were in some degree unique in the vigour and earnestness with which they interpreted the tradition, it may well be that their special position consists in their calling to proclaim the 'strange work' of God in judgment and mercy, the dealing of God with His People in ways not envisaged in the tradition but revealed to His servants the prophets. This experience, as Porteous sees (p. 152), set them apart in a new and deeper commitment to God. This is an important element in the ethical teaching of the prophets, but it leads beyond the realm of ethics to eschatology, the ultimate basis not only of prophetic ethical teaching but of the whole of Israel's life being, as Porteous says, the movement of Israel's history 'towards a culmination determined by the Will of God' (p. 156).

On the historical plane, however, it must further be noted that the prophets were indebted also to the wisdom of other ancient peoples of the East outside Israel. Porteous calls attention to the notion of a moral law binding on all nations as we see it in Amos, and also the prophets' 'sense that there is an order in nature which

is worthy of imitation by man' (p. 155 cf. Isa. 1.3; Jer. 8.7). There are also traces in the prophets of the conception of a victory of Yahweh over chaos as the source of the idea of a cosmic order. Another basic element in the ethical teaching of the prophets is the influence of the extra-Biblical wisdom literature transmitted by the sages and it is reasonable to suppose that this influenced the social aspects of prophetic teaching. As Paul in his time was a debtor both to Greeks and Barbarians, so the prophets before him learned from a wide world. Such considerations keep before us the universalist, human note characteristic of the Old Testament and show that it had a real foundation.

Although it is possible thus to trace on the plane of history these sources of prophetic teaching in the tradition, in their own experience and in the culture of the Ancient World, there is as Porteous says no simple answer to the question. But the more varied and widespread the sources from which they borrow, the more remarkable appears the power residing in them to absorb and transmute it all and to bring it into the service of the God of Israel, the power—should we say?—of the Holy Spirit.

The studies in this book suggest that the new hypotheses and insights will have to be tested by detailed application in the interpretation of individual prophetic writings, a work which cannot fail to enrich and deepen our understanding of their message. This book as an example of such work is one which no one can read without learning much that is new and gaining an increased respect for the patient, detailed and devoted study that is bestowed on and required for the proper understanding of the Bible.

J. C. Campbell

Psalmen en Cultus. By Nic. H. Ridderbos. J. H. Kok N. V. Kampen, 1950. 40 pages.

It is unfortunate that this inaugural lecture by a Dutch Old Testament scholar is available only in the Dutch language, as it contains a thorough and judicial consideration of the relation of the Psalms to the Hebrew cult. The author takes an independent line between the negative point of view of Eerdmans who believed that the Psalms had been written independently of the cult, though they had later been used in connexion with it, and that of Mowinckel, who advocated in thorough-going fashion a cultic origin of the Psalms. Mowinckel and other Scandinavian scholars begin with the so-called *Gattungsforschung* of Gunkel, though they have gone on to positions which he would not have accepted. Dr Ridderbos is prepared to recognise the value of Gunkel's work—as is done for example by Professor T. H. Robinson in his most useful little text-

book *Poetry and Poets of the Old Testament* (Duckworth, 1947), the most authoritative recent book on its subject published in this country, and by other British scholars who regard Gunkel's analysis of the types of psalms as epoch-making—but he considers that Eerdmans's criticism of Gunkel and Mowinckel is valuable as a warning that we should not claim more knowledge than we really possess of the character of the Israelite cult. In particular Eerdmans would have us show a due caution with respect to the extravagances of certain recent theories. One of Dr Ridderbos's most interesting observations is that the lack of concreteness in many of the Psalms does definitely suggest a cultic origin. The whole lecture is characterised by a sober and honest study of the evidence.

NORMAN W. PORTEOUS

The Acts of the Apostles: the Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary. By F. F. BRUCE. The Tyndale Press London. Pp. 490. 25s. net.

Praedicatio verbi divini est verbum divinum. This aphorism of Bullinger is the key to the apostolic age. The proclamation of the living Christ was in fact the living Christ in action. The heralds of the Cross and the Resurrection announced the mighty events in which God had confronted the human race; and in that very moment and by that same act God was confronting men again. When Paul before Felix 'reasoned of judgment', God was there and then judging the man by Christ. That is to say, preaching is much more than declaring a Gospel; it belongs itself to *Heilsgeschichte* as an integral part of God's continuous saving activity; as P. T. Forsyth put it, 'it is the Gospel prolonging and declaring itself'. In short, the acts of the apostles were quite literally the acts of Jesus Christ, and the genesis of the Church belongs essentially to the sphere of Christology.

Hence the inexhaustible significance of St. Luke's second volume. There is always need for a fresh exploration of its hidden treasure. The great five volume work on the Acts, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, impressive and epoch-making as it is, has by no means closed the field or made further study redundant. There is ample room for such a work as has now come from the pen of Mr F. F. Bruce, Head of the Department of Biblical History and Literature in the University of Sheffield. Here is a Commentary which by its intrinsic merit is assured of a very cordial welcome. It is on the whole conservative in tone, but of course this is not necessarily a matter for deprecation; indeed, the dogmatic denial of Luke's value as a historian has in some recent writers reached a point demanding correction and rebuke; and if Mr Bruce's book helps to counterbalance some of the more extreme expressions of that tendency, it will have done real service.

This Commentary is a very workmanlike production, and the notes—critical and exegetical, linguistic and grammatical—are a model of the kind of material with which a good Commentary ought to provide students and expositors. In a valuable Introduction Mr Bruce discusses the main problems which the Book of Acts poses for modern interpreters. While recognising that it would be precarious to attempt to fix exactly the date of composition, he favours the view which would place it as early as A.D. 60-62. Not all students of Acts will be prepared to follow him here; but even those who differ from him must admit the force and cumulative effect of his arguments. The writer of Acts is not to be disparaged as a historian: his accuracy can be vindicated at many points where it has been called in question. Moreover, 'we need not quarrel with Luke because his choice of what to include and what to omit does not coincide with what ours would be. It need not be considered *de rigueur* in an academic study of a book of Scripture to ignore the factor of divine inspiration; and we may well believe that Luke's selection was an "inspired" selection, and one that admirably served his purpose.' Nor can we dismiss the speeches in Acts as free compositions on a Thucydidean pattern. Luke's main narrative is clothed in excellent Greek, sometimes almost classical in style; but the speeches—this is very markedly true of the earlier ones—reflect a less cultured language, or are translations from an original Aramaic. Even the minor speeches —such as those of Gamaliel, Tertullus, and the town-clerk of Ephesus—ring true to character, and we need not forthwith attribute this simply to the dramatic instinct of the writer. In this connexion Mr Bruce argues from Luke the evangelist to Luke the ecclesiastical historian: if his fidelity to his sources in Vol. I can be tested and controlled, as it can by reference to the other Synoptists, why should we hasten to disallow a similar fidelity in Vol. II? He concludes that 'the speeches in Acts are not Luke's invention, but summaries giving at least the gist of what was really said on the various occasions, and therefore valuable and independent sources for the life and thought of the primitive Church.'

There is an excellent discussion of the much debated question: Is the Paul of Acts really the Paul of the Epistles? It was here that Tübingen launched its attack; and still today it is at this point that the assault on the historicity of Acts becomes fiercest. Mr Bruce sets Acts and the Epistles side by side, and shows how they throw light upon each other. Difficulties undoubtedly there are—is not the relationship of Paul's visits to Jerusalem as recounted in Acts and in Galatians respectively a standard question much beloved of Divinity examining boards?—but the difficulties are not insuperable. Incidentally, Mr Bruce places Galatians before the Apostolic

Council, and identifies the Jerusalem visits of Gal. 2 and Acts 11.

Synoptic source-criticism has reached a point where its major results may be regarded as fairly assured, but the same cannot be said of Acts. Here much remains in the region of conjecture. Did the 'many' narrators, to whom Luke refers in the prologue to his first volume, relate also traditions of the Palestinian Church upon which he may have drawn in his second? Did the lost ending of Mark (supposing there ever was a 'lost ending') carry the story beyond the Resurrection to the years that followed, and was Luke debtor to Mark here just as he was in his earlier book? How much of the Greek Acts reveals the presence of an underlying Aramaic sourse? C. C. Torrey would maintain that the first fifteen chapters are simply a translation of one Aramaic document. Mr Bruce, who has investigated the question of Aramaisms with considerable care, would certainly not go all the way with Torrey, but he postulates an Aramaic source or sources for the sections dealing with the beginnings of the Jerusalem Church and the early ministry of Peter. He refuses, however, to follow Harnack in regarding pairs of similar narratives in the early chapters—two sermons by Peter, two arrests and defences, two enumerations of converts, two accounts of Christian 'communism'—as simply 'doublets' arising from duplicate sources ('Jerusalem A' and 'Jerusalem B'), and prefers to find here one straightforward consecutive account of events as they occurred. In addition to material deriving from Jerusalem, an Antiochene source is also fairly evident. But very much of Luke's information would be acquired orally, from Paul, Barnabas, Philip and his household, and many others: and behind the 'we-sections' lies the first-hand account of Luke's own travel-diary. On the negative side, Luke shows surprisingly little acquaintance with the Pauline Epistles: certainly Acts antedated the *corpus Paulinum*. And the theory that Luke must have known the *Antiquities* of Josephus can be shown on examination of the crucial passages to rest on evidence much too flimsy to be convincing.

The Greek text printed in the Commentary is the β text of Westcott and Hort. The elaborate investigation carried out by J. H. Ropes in Vol. III of *The Beginnings of Christianity* has convinced Mr Bruce that, while the δ text has many important readings, it is nevertheless secondary. This does not necessarily mean, however, that β represents the basic text: a Caesarean text related both to β and to δ may be the original. In this connexion, the references in the Commentary to the readings of the Chester Beatty papyrus P^{45} are noteworthy.

It may appear churlish and ungrateful, where Mr Bruce has given us so much, to wish that he had given more. But to the present

reviewer it seems that the value of the book would have been still further enhanced by a fuller treatment of the basic theological issues which Acts raises. Thus it could be desired that a section of the Introduction had been devoted to the Christology of the primitive community; the doctrine of the Church demands further exposition; and the significance of Baptism in the first Christian age should be more thoroughly explored. If Mr Bruce could see his way to fill up this *lacuna* in a second edition—for a second edition is sure to be called for in due course—he would put his readers still further in his debt.

JAMES S. STEWART

Grundtvig, an Introduction. By P. G. LINDHARDT. S.P.C.K., 1951. Pp. 141. 21s.

OF Denmark's great men none is less known to the English-speaking world than Grundtvig. Every visitor to Copenhagen does indeed pay a visit to the great church which has recently been built in his honour in one of the suburbs, but they are attracted thither by the rumour of its architectural impressiveness and uniqueness rather than by any interest in its patron saint. If they know anything else about him, it is likely to concern his founding of the Danish Folk High Schools; but that, though a striking enough story, reveals only one of the many facets of this truly remarkable and original personality. Those who would know something of the other facets—of Grundtvig's churchmanship, of his theological outlook, of his ritual reforms, of his astonishing activity in hymn-writing, of his pioneer researches into Scandinavian mythology—cannot do better than provide themselves with Professor Lindhardt's book, which was written in English for their especial benefit. Here in brief compass they will find most of what they would wish to know, as well as many interesting side-lights. They will learn, for instance, that in the year of the Scottish Disruption Grundtvig paid a visit to Dr Thomas Chalmers in Edinburgh and that, 'though he liked him very much', he could not reach agreement with him concerning the correct form of the church. They will learn also how Grundtvig attended a service in St. Paul's cathedral, but found the service very 'dry' and the church only 'an embalmed corpse of the beauty of the Lord's house', and the sermon so far from tolerable as to drive him to the Methodists across the way.

JOHN BAILLIE

Psychology, Religion and Healing. By LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD. Hodder and Stoughton Ltd. Pp. 544. 25s.

THIS book owes its origin to a conversation during the first world war. In the desert, north of Baghdad, an R.A.M.C. doctor and two

army chaplains sat talking late into the night. The doctor told the two padres of his own practice of prayer and mental suggestion on behalf of his patients, and his story deeply impressed them. One of these two chaplains, and the doctor himself, were later killed. The survivor was Leslie Weatherhead, who has since given so much study to this great subject, and here lays before the public the reflections of half a lifetime on psychology, religion and healing.

The book has thus a tremendously wide range, and there is an undoubted impressiveness about it. At the end one has just such a sense of exhilaration, and perhaps also of exhaustion, as would be felt by a man completing a tour of the world in a Comet air-liner, below whose eyes countries and oceans have been unrolled one after another in bird's-eye view.

Starting with pre-Christian healing, we are carried down the ages, through the New Testament miracles; we catch a glimpse of healing in the early Church. We are presented with the problem of demon possession, the story of Lourdes, an account of Christian Science, and the systems of Jung, Freud, Adler and MacDougall. At the end we face with the author the problems and hopes raised by the confluence, after many centuries of separation, of the movements which seek to cure the body and the mind. The sketch of Lourdes, which Dr Weatherhead and his son have visited along with a pilgrimage, is most fascinating, and the account of Christian Science, with its strange founder, its muddled thinking, its often admirable practitioners and its real insights and achievements, is trenchant, and yet essentially fair.

In this review we can only touch on one or two of the theological matters handled by the book. One valuable part of the study is the chapter in which Christ's healing miracles are discussed, one by one. The author's view-point is one of belief in Our Lord's divinity, and he holds that there is unquestionable evidence that Christ performed wonders in healing beyond the powers of other men. Even though He promised His followers that they would do works like His—and they did do so, to some extent—yet they showed, fairly soon, certain signs of degeneration in the gift. They did not make the same careful investigation of the cases presented to them; their method of healing grew stereotyped, and an ever more predominating appeal was made to the faith of the person to be healed, on whom the onus would therefore fall, if the attempt to heal was not successful.

Though Christ's healings are thus in a class by themselves, Dr Weatherhead rightly holds that it is of interest to ask what methods and mechanisms known to our psychological science He may have used. The subject is interesting, but inevitably speculative. In most cases we do not know exactly what the diseases were which were healed.

At one point a question may be raised. Dr Weatherhead says that when it is stated that Jesus healed many (Mark 1.34), the implication is that some were not healed. On the contrary, we never hear of His turning away anyone who came to Him on the grounds that God did not wish their healing. Admittedly the argument from silence is poor, but it could probably never be stronger than it is here.

The author often points out how profound our ignorance still is in the matter of spiritual healing. He suggests that if a man had come to Christ with a thorn in his foot, He would not have confined himself to laying His hands on the patient, but would have taken the thorn out, or got a doctor to do so. Nobody, not even Mrs Eddy, prays about decayed teeth; people go to the dentist. 'It is illogical for him [such a patient] to complain of his unanswered prayers if an illness is in the same category, did we only know it, and calls for the skilled physician as the most relevant way of treating the illness.' Prayer, Dr Weatherhead continues, certainly has a value in cases of this kind, but not a curative value.

The question we would ask here is: 'Of what kind are these cases?' It used to be said that spiritual healing might be of use in hysterical disorders, or in functional illness, but not in cases of organic disease. Is the distinction here made by Dr Weatherhead this old distinction under a new guise? It can hardly be so, for he himself is eager to admit that there do seem clearly to have been cases of tubercle or cancer where the organs have been hopelessly injured, and yet recovery has come in answer to prayer. We would agree with him that if a man has lost a leg, prayer that he may grow another seems to be a waste of time. But apart from an extreme case like this, it seems to be no longer possible to draw a line between functional and organic disease, or to say, for example, that in a certain case an inoperable cancer is at work, and therefore that the patient is beyond the help of prayer. Sometimes it would appear as if Dr Weatherhead himself would like to draw the line between diseases that originate in the psyche and others that originate in the body. In both types, it is admitted, the whole man is often injured and involved, but only where the disease has originated in the psyche, is prayer likely to have curative effect. This hardly seems more satisfactory than any of the earlier answers. The problem remains very obscure, and Dr Weatherhead gives the wise advice: 'Where in doubt, pray'!

He has a very good paragraph about the ineffectiveness of most of our church intercessions. 'If the patient is known, is loved, is named; if those who pray really care; if they clearly understand what they are doing and why; if a word-picture is painted which

helps them imaginatively to enter the sick-room and see the patient and enter into his needs . . . then I am certain prayer is more potent than one sentence of a long prayer, which frequently runs: 'Lord, bless all those who are sick, and make them better." '

There are possibilities here of lapse from good taste into the sensational and grotesque, but surely a balance can be struck between such exaggerations and the vague generalities of many of our church intercessions. The fact that ministers feel uncomfortable in making specific intercessions for sick people by name, is surely a sign that the living sympathy and fellowship which appear to be so strong a spiritual force behind intercession, are missing in the congregation which is at prayer.

We may grant that such individual concrete prayer is more likely to be effective than vague generalities. But if Dr Weatherhead wishes us to study more scientifically than this the laws of the efficacy of intercession, it is hard to see how we could do this in any other way than by following the advice given in Bertrand Russell's jibe, and praying for one ward in a sanatorium, and not praying for another, where the patients are equally ill. Then we could prove the efficacy of our prayers by the larger number of persons cured in the ward for which we intercede!

Dr Weatherhead has something very wise to say about the relation of faith to cure. Failure to obtain cure by prayer or submitting to the laying on of hands does not necessarily mean a failure in faith. Often a sufferer with great faith comes away uncured, while another with little or none is cured. It would be intolerably cruel to burden someone thus disappointed with the extra weight of the thought that faith had been lacking. The main aim of all spiritual healing is to be at peace with God, whether healing of body is added or not. Those who are cured are often cured because of their suggestibility, not because of their faith. Faith healers are only too apt to praise persons they have cured for faith, and to censure their failures for the lack of it. Where there are so many unknown factors at work, this is gratuitously unkind. The reason may be one of many, perhaps lack of spiritual power on the part of the healer, or on the part of the Church itself.

Having said this, one must point out that Christ praised people who were healed, for their faith. He did not say to the woman with the issue of blood: 'Thy suggestibility hath healed thee, go in peace.' He definitely praised here for her action in touching His garment which must have cost her something, and was the product of faith, not suggestibility, which is either ours or not ours, which is therefore in no way praiseworthy. But Christ could be sure that if healing did not result, the fault was not in Him, and there was in Him a spiritual

insight that is not in even the finest of His followers. So that He had a right to praise where none of His followers has.

Dr Weatherhead is most sensible in his advocacy of the full use of all medical, psychological and spiritual means that God has put in our power for the healing of disease. But he does point out that much of what passes for spiritual healing is not really the spiritual healing which Christ promised to the Church. For this power to be restored to the Church, a far deeper and finer fellowship must exist than today within the Body of Christ. And while Dr Weatherhead rightly emphasises the need for such unity on Christ in the local congregation of believers, may it not be that our continuing divisions throughout the wider Church, which are so contrary to Christ's will, are one of the greatest obstacles to His cause, not only in other concerns, but here also, in the matter of spiritual healing?

DAVID CAIRNS

The Psychology of Religion. By L. W. GRENSTED. 'Home University Library.' Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. Pp. 181. 6s.

THE difficulty which faces Dr Grensted in this small book is one of compression. Time and again he is forced to leave a suggestive train of thought with the plea that this subject cannot be dealt with further in a work of this size, and he is compelled for the same reason to forego the narration of experiences, which, as he says, make James's *Varieties* such fascinating reading. Dr Grensted's writing is both condensed and authoritative, and occasionally illumined by a flash of the humour with which he so often delights his hearers in lecture and conference.

There is the further difficulty of defining both psychology and religion, since the latter covers so vast a field of phenomena, and the former is still a battlefield between groups so hostile to each other as the behaviourists and the analytical psychologists. In the event, Dr Grensted discusses most interestingly several of the themes treated of in handbooks on the subject: conversion and individual religion, the growth and development of religion in the child and the race, the ideals and dangers of corporate religion.

For theologians one of the points of great interest in this field is precisely the place where psychology breaks off, and where the question of the truth of religious belief is raised. This theme naturally interests Dr Grensted, as a theologian, and he has handled it in his Bampton Lectures. Here he is careful to point out that 'actually the material for the psychologist lies not in the existence of God, but in the forms under which we approach and apprehend Him. Faith and practice come properly within the scope of psycho-

logical analysis . . . God does not.' Yet, as he admits, 'The transition from psychology to metaphysics is not always easy to recognise, and each student of the subject must draw his own conclusions in his own way.' The last chapter on 'Reality' does raise this question as far as it can be raised within the bounds of a psychological work. In this chapter Dr Grensted makes the interesting observation that the thought of Jung and Freud has made less plausible William James's 'over-belief' in a 'More' lying beyond the subliminal self, which could play the part of God.

This book is a valuable, yet tantalising introduction, and it makes one long to see how the author could use his great knowledge in painting on a wider canvas.

Throughout the text there are frequent references to important works, and there is a most valuable bibliography.

DAVID CAIRNS

The Protestant Era. By PAUL TILLICH. Translated by J. L. Adams; with an Introduction by R. H. Daubney. Nisbet. 21s.

THIS is, without doubt, an unusually difficult book to review. The difficulty does not, however, spring merely from Professor Tillich's complicated thought nor from the frequently obscure and awkward style, but from the whole character of the book, containing as it does sections on widely different themes and from widely different periods of the author's life and experience. In subjects we range from 'Philosophy and Fate' to 'The Formative Power of Protestantism', from 'The Transmoral Conscience' to 'Marxism and Christian Socialism'. The temporal range is as wide: the first chapter is Dr Tillich's inaugural lecture as Professor of Philosophy at Frankfurt in 1929; the second is an address given to the American Theological Society in 1939; the fourth comes from 1946. The title does not adequately represent the contents of the book, and we cannot find any one ground theme running through from beginning to end. Quite plainly, to cover the whole material, one would need a long essay on the development of Professor Tillich's thought.

Since this is out of the question, let us take that part of the book that lies nearest to the title's apparent intention, and see what Professor Tillich has to say about Protestantism. He goes right to the heart of the matter to discover the essence of Protestantism. Its distinctive element, he says, 'is the radical proclamation of the human border-situation and the protest against all attempts, through religious expedients, to evade it, even though this evasion be accomplished with the aid of all the richness and depth and breadth of mystical and sacramental piety' (p. 193).

The human 'border-situation' or 'boundary-situation' Dr Tillich

conceives of as man's existence being threatened by not-being. Not-being should not be equated with death, which is, being only physical, not an ultimate threat to man's being. It is rather man's use (or rather abuse) of his freedom to deny his vital existence, to fail 'to realise the true and to actualise the good' (p. 195). When this happens, as it always and inevitably does, man is in danger from not-being and the human border-situation is set up. But the choice is not resolved by making it; rather, it always presses upon man, always making his life into this border-land.

It is possible, however, to attempt to escape from this dangerous position into one of security, and man, especially the religious man, will continually attempt to do this very thing. But it is our salvation that we shall continue to live within the border-situation, and that we shall do so consciously. 'Absolute seriousness can be attributed only to the man who scorns this possibility of escape, who views his whole existence from the point of view of the border-situation, and who knows, therefore, that his existence can at no time and in no way be made secure, neither through his submerging himself in the vital life-process, through intellectual or spiritual activity, through sacraments, through mysticism and ascetism, through right belief or strenuous piety, nor through anything that belongs to the mundane substance of religion' (p. 196).

Professor Tillich wishes this to be understood as a re-statement of the classical doctrine of justification by faith alone. We should be grateful for the emphasis and power with which he insists that this doctrine is the distinctive element in Protestantism, and for the way in which he destroys all ways of escape from man's essential dilemma (and we may notice in passing that here he is reminiscent of the earlier Barth, and of Kierkegaard, with his 'pinch of spice'—even though Kierkegaard interpreted the protest differently).

But two questions must be raised:

First, there is always a danger present when ideas are translated out of symbolical language into metaphysical, even though, as in this instance, the metaphysical also has its symbols. By so doing, the philosopher cuts himself loose, not only from the concrete, but from the normative influence of the concrete. In pursuing his thought, he will then be guided only by his principles and aims. It may very well be that his thought will lose itself in sterility or in a pseudo-philosophy, perhaps a theosophy. From the first, Dr Tillich is saved by his intellectual and imaginative power; from the second he is not always safe—at least in the present book. For example, how indeterminate he becomes when he searches after new terms, and finds such expressions as 'belief-full realism'; 'In every Protestant form the attitude of a belief-full realism must be expressed'

(p. 216). And is his programme for Protestant theology, whose task is not 'to develop further the traditional problems of Christology and soteriology but rather to describe the New Being, which is manifest in Jesus Christ in relation to nature and history' (p. 217), likely to prove more fruitful, more intelligible and more relevant to the modern situation than, say, Heinrich Vogel's grappling with traditional problems in his *Christologie*?

Secondly, it is not unnecessary to ask who the modern man is for whom Professor Tillich would make theology intelligible in this way—and this is a question which is relevant, not only to this book, but to the most of modern theologians. Very few of those of us who work in parishes ever meet this creature 'modern man'. It is highly significant that, while we hear a lot about him on the Third Programme we do not encounter him on the Light, where the only modern man catered for by those real experts on the subject laughs at jokes that were old when the New Testament was written, grieves over those sorrows of life that his grandfather, with less restraint, cried over, and is excited by the same sort of adventures that thrilled the first hearers of the Odyssey. He is the man to whom most of us preach, and he can understand (even though he may not believe) what we mean when we speak in images, Bible images, old fashioned images, even forensic images. He understands what a judge is and what a father is, and he can imagine the relief and incredulity of the guilty man on hearing the judge say 'Not guilty!'; but he cannot understand pure ideas, being is a mystery to him, not-being an impossible enigma. We would suggest that modern man would be better served if theologians did not recreate him after their own intellectual and subtle images, or imagined that he is a being created by the technological age, but merely took him as he is.

T. H. L. Parker

Christian Faith and Communist Faith. Edited by D. M. Mackinnon. Macmillan. 21s.

This 'series of studies by members of the Anglican Communion' raises two preliminary questions. First, is it too late in the day to consider, here in the West, the converting power of the Marxian idea? Secondly, have Anglicans as such anything to say upon this kind of subject? Before I read this book I should have been inclined to reply 'too late' to the first question, and 'no' to the second, but now I am less sure. I should have said that Marxism as an idea reached the peak of its power here at the time of the Spanish civil war, when it did indeed seem that the death-rattle of capitalism, in its last struggle with the proletarian revolution, was sounding according to plan. Since then the Soviet power has risen to heights unscaled

before, and as always power has brought new adherents to the official doctrine, but for the young men who set off in high hopes for Spain the dialectical god has almost always failed. Here and there in this book contributors who lived through the struggles of the thirties fall back into their language, as when Mr Crombie writes at the very beginning of his excellent essay: 'It can hardly be denied by anybody in the Christian tradition that the ideals of Socialism are valid in a way in which the ideals of Fascism are not.' But on the whole they succeed remarkably in discussing the situation as it is and revealing in it a new and unsuspected depth.

In some very important sense, the strength of Marxism is still philosophical. It is certainly not economic. The absurdities of Marxian economics are exposed by Mr Munby with lucidity and ease. The philosophy of Marx persists because it is the only modern myth that provides a rounded interpretation, challenging decision, of the whole human predicament in our time. It does provide criteria for the choice of a line of action where all other philosophies, including Christianity, lead to a maze of indecision. Moreover the dialectical interpretation of history enables us to attribute a particular and definable character to the more or less mechanical process, in which so many of us who are not Marxists implicitly believe ourselves to be involved. What Mr Crombie calls 'social clockwork' is very like a basic presupposition of our civilisation. Only the Marxist can explain how the clock works. Therefore the present decline in conversions to Communism may be accidental and transient, a result of full employment in Great Britain and a very particular historical situation in Germany. If economic depression forced us to crisis and decision we might go to school with the Russians more willingly than the Germans. The strength of English empiricism lies, in part at least, in the Englishman's capacity to postpone decision.

This is a book by Anglicans, who are all empirically minded by continental and Scottish standards. Five of them are professors or lecturers in philosophy, one a lecturer in economics. Two others are priests with philosophical interests, and two Biblical theologians. Dr Arnold Toynbee's essay on the Christian understanding of history stands a little apart from the rest. It contains some most interesting mature reflections on his own life's work, but many who are in sympathy with the rest of the book will still question the sufficiency of his distinctions between the higher and the lower religions, and the importance which he so evidently attaches to the enlarged time-scale of our modern perspective on the historical process. I for one am puzzled by his conclusion that the alarms of the modern scientist at the prospect of mankind's self-destruction 'strikes a more Chris-

tian note than the Apocalypse', apparently because they reveal the wages of sin as death and leave no room for mercy. Dr John Robinson's essay on the Christian hope diverges from the rest in another direction, since he belligerently condemns concern with the destiny of the individual soul as a Hellenising aberration from the faith of the New Testament. This faith is expounded by Christopher Evans in a finely balanced essay, well directed to some of the points that arise in controversy with those who seek to combine Communism and Christianity. Both these Biblical essays would be in place in an ecumenical symposium. The philosophers are more distinctively Anglican. The book might be more unified if it were a discussion between them.

Professor Hodges shows that Marxism is primarily a social philosophy, Mr Munby and Professor Mackinnon that it has failed to incorporate many advances in economic science, and that in its later development it has become subject to some serious strains. The Rev. R. V. Larmour considers truth and truthfulness in it; Mr Foster and Mr Crombie come to grips with the differences between Marxism and Christianity. Mr Crombie, in a most discerning essay, denies the possibility of a philosophy of history in the sense that is common to Hegel, Marx, and Toynbee, and criticises Marxist ethics. Father Martin Jarrett-Kerr considers human personality, Professor Hughes 'how far a Christian conception of social justice can command the assent and support of non-Christians without sacrifice of conscience on either side.' Lastly Professor Mackinnon in two final essays takes us back to theology at a deeper level than his theological contributors. In his thought the resurrection of Christ, and the possibility of communicating the significance of His resurrection to men, is the critical issue. Only so can another hope be offered in place of the hopes for a transformation in human nature that Communism, with all its ruthlessness and cruelty, still offers to alienated souls. In this Professor Mackinnon is fundamentally in harmony with Dr Robinson, but while the latter is content with an exegesis of the New Testament in which the eschatology, for so many centuries misunderstood, recovers its lost predominance, Professor Mackinnon agonises over the apparent impossibility of making the resurrection intelligible. Significantly he finds more light in Barth than in contemporary Roman Catholic or Anglican theology, for his problem is fundamentally one of dogmatics in the continental sense. His concern is evidence of a faith that societies have lived, and can live again, in hope of the resurrection of the flesh, despite Dr Robinson's sombre view of the Church's long misunderstanding of the significance of the end.

It is important that the most searching essays in this book come

from philosophers with a passionate concern for the health of philosophy in their own universities and nations. A Christian philosopher who holds the *philosophia perennis* under ecclesiastical direction must in some measure contract out of the discussion of a public philosophy for his nation. Another who believes that the idea of a Christian nation is an unfortunate aberration in Christianity may see more advantage than danger in the absence of a public philosophy of life on any level but the material one. But a Christian philosopher in communion with the Church of England cannot be indifferent to the theological direction of his own vocational task.

GEORGE EVERY

Congregationalism: A Restatement. By DANIEL JENKINS. Faber and Faber. Pp. 152. 10s. 6d. net.

THE Ecumenical movement, says Mr Jenkins, 'can be most generally defined as a movement for the renewal and reintegration of the divided parts of Christ's Church on earth in the light of a fresh vision of the Church as a single reality given by Christ as part of His Gospel.' Having received that vision in no ordinary degree he sets himself to explain Congregationalism to other churches and to help his fellow-Congregationalists to look at themselves in a new light. The result is a brilliant book offering a truly realistic estimate of the place of Congregationalism in history and in the world today. After describing its oecology—in the English-speaking countries among people of a particular type who live in particular neighbourhoods within these countries—he seeks its essence in three watchwords, Faith, Freedom and Fellowship. But Freedom is founded in faith in the Lordship of Christ, and is operative within a fellowship gathered into 'Church order'. Chapters follow on Congregationalist worship and Church life, on the relation of Congregationalists to culture in the broad sense and to secular society, especially to the political parties, and, finally, on the prospect for Congregationalism in an age of popular education and social levelling.

The later non-theological chapters are interesting but naturally more tentative. The earlier ones are rich in penetrating insight. Nothing could be better than his insistence on the importance of the particular congregation. 'To be a Christian means to enter into communion with one's fellow Christians, not . . . to belong to the Church in general but to a particular congregation,' where fellowship is most immediate, most difficult and most costly, 'an exercise of great humility'. Very profound is his handling of the problem of Faith and Freedom especially as it affects a Church ostensibly creedless but nevertheless participating in the World Council of Churches.

He does not deny the inroads of modernism, but shows that that was not the original intention or the permanent necessary result of the rejection of 'subordinate standards' of belief. Special interest must attach to his treatment of the ministry where, guided by early Independent theologians, he shows how the Congregationalist 'learned minister', i.e. 'learned in the Scriptures and in the ways of God with His people and in the wisdom of the Church throughout the ages', was intended to and in fact may keep the door open to genuine ecumenicity in a Congregational Church. He makes at least an incidental plea for recognition of the possibility that the local congregation is now in some sense the nation, and urges the strengthening of the wider organisation of the Congregational body.

This book is in no sense a 'rationalisation' of Mr Jenkins' denominational loyalty, which is unquestioned, but a just and wise appraisal of the strength and weakness of Congregational order. It is invaluable for a true understanding of what Congregationalism properly was and is; and it is also an example which representatives of other ecclesiastical traditions might well follow in these days, in viewing their denominations problematically in the light of the ecumenical vision.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper in Early Methodism. By JOHN C. BOWMER. Pp. 244. Dacre Press, 25s.

MR BOWMER has done the Church a fine service by this compact, adequate, well-balanced, and well-documented study. The Lord's Supper occupied a central and powerful place in the devotional life of Methodism during the long period of Wesley's life. This fact has been well-known to students of liturgy and the sacraments, but has perhaps not been generally recognised, for ninteenth-century Methodist historians have not by any means done it justice, many having sought indeed to conceal rather than to expose the truth. It is only in recent works, e.g. those by Dr J. E. Rattenbury, that this matter has received its due. For, as Mr Bowmer writes, 'the revival of religion, begun and controlled by John and Charles Wesley, was a sacramental as well as an evangelical revival, and of which, in some respects, the nineteenth-century Oxford Movement was a sequel'; and to support this he marshalls a scholarly array of facts which cannot be denied.

John Wesley from the age of eight years throughout his life received communion frequently. He himself preferred the phrase 'constant communion' to 'frequent communion', and that more accurately describes his practice. For, in an age when celebrations of Holy Communion were generally infrequent, he made the massive

apostolic witness of receiving on an average of once in every four or five days. And 'constant communion' was not only his own unswerving practice; he urged it also upon his followers, and everywhere he went his influence on the sacramental devotion of the Societies he founded was immense and significant.

Mr Bowmer presents us first with a brief accurate account of sacramental practice during the eighteenth century in the Church of England; and it is seen that while weekly celebrations were not unknown in London and some larger centres (eleven churches in London), they were rare in the provinces. Outside London the general rule appears to have been quarterly celebrations, slightly more frequently in some parishes and less frequently in others, with monthly celebrations in a few places. It may therefore be remarked with what impact Wesley's teaching fell upon his century when his followers began in great numbers to besiege the churches demanding more frequent communion.

Mr Bowmer examines Wesley's early training, the teaching and influence of his parents, the Holy Club at Oxford, his studies of the writings of the non-jurors and the early Fathers, out of which arose his desire to see restored the primitive eucharistic fellowship in its fulness among Christian people, together with careful discipline. We follow Wesley to Georgia, a broadening and deepening experience for him if somewhat drastic in its application, and observe the Moravian influences at work upon him both there and in London, through which his heart was 'strangely warmed' and his ardour transformed into an enduring and unquenchable passion. Thereafter, Mr Bowmer traces Wesley's personal practice in detail, the administration of the Lord's Supper in the early Methodist Societies, the Service itself, and admission thereto. He deals also illuminatingly with the problem of ordinations confronting Wesley, arising out of the refusal of many parish priests to give communion to the Methodist multitudes and on their part out of a natural and strong desire to receive the sacraments at the hands of their own preachers. Wesley withstood the demand with great determination, and yielded only when it could no longer be forgone, and in the belief that 'bishops and presbyters are the same order and consequently I have the right to ordain', believing also that by such action the Apostolic Succession was maintained. His practice, however, differed from that in the historic Presbyterian Churches; and it appears doubtful also whether his followers after his death acted as carefully in this matter as he himself had done. Mr Bowmer continues with a lucid exposition—which might indeed have been enlarged—of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper in Early Methodism, including the aspect of sacrifice which appears so frequently and emphatically in Wesley's

teaching and hymns. Methodism was a revival marked by a rich and full eucharistic theology—it was in nothing superficial—and the sacramental hymns of Wesley are deeply theological, comparable in this to the great tracts and sequences of the Western Church.

An interesting chapter on the Lord's Supper in Scottish Methodism is included, exposing the difficulties which beset Wesley, who disliked the Scottish mode of celebration, and his converts, who detested the Anglican liturgy. It was all very difficult, and there were other complications. In the end he had to agree most reluctantly to the Scottish use by Scottish Methodists. In Scotland, he met with much opposition by clergy and secession ministers alike, and the Methodist community here was never large. But this must not lead us to underestimate his influence in Scotland or to suppose that he was coldly received by all alike. He made several close and firm friends among the Scottish clergy; he was received at the General Assembly; and he even on one occasion as Henry Moore relates, 'laid aside his last portion of bigotry and partook of that holy ordinance', the Lord's Supper, in a Scots parish church. However, he found the Scottish services dull and dry in comparison with the English.

This book is important, not only for its merit in itself—and of that there is no doubt—but also because of its ecumenical witness. It is noteworthy that the Church in its great ages has always been recalled by its leaders to the importance of frequent communion, not always with success. And as the practice of modern Methodism is on the whole a sad commentary upon Wesley's teaching in this respect, so also is modern Scottish practice upon the teaching of Calvin who taught that 'once a week at the very least the Lord's Supper is to be celebrated in the Christian congregation'. The witness of the Apostles must be honourably faced in this matter, and the witness of great leaders and reformers who have come after them. It may be that the ecumenical movement, gathering increasing momentum, will play a decisive part in recalling the Church to an apostolic eagerness to receive 'constantly' the holy gift its Founder has given.

WILLIAM D. MAXWELL

Jésus Transfiguré. By HARALD RIESENFELD. Munksgaard, Copenhagen. 1947. 12 Swedish crowns.

'LET us make three tabernacles.' These words, spoken on the Mount of Transfiguration, have suggested to most students some reference to the Jewish Feast of Tabernacles. This book carries the connexion much further. According to the important school of interpretation to which this writer belongs, a school especially active in Scandinavia,

the Feast of Tabernacles as we find it in post-exilic times is a product of the disintegration and 'democratisation' of the old autumnal feast of the enthronement, a feast which was central to Israelite religion and which even after its disintegration still supplied the leading motifs of eschatology and messianic thought. The first part of this book examines these motifs, such as the glory, the sacred robe, the divine cloud, the *sukka* or booth and the holy mountain. The second part shows how these elements are present in the transfiguration story. The transfiguration is thus in essence an enthronement.

The contribution of this school of interpretation is still not nearly well enough known in Great Britain except among specialists, and it is perhaps worth while to notice some of its characteristics as we find them exemplified in Riesenfeld's book. Firstly we may notice the importance of the cult. The ideas and motifs of the Bible are seen not to be the product of some exchange of ideas, but to be derived from a rich and central tradition of worship. This the reviewer believes to be in essence true. The older schools of interpretation often spoke of the development and influence of ideas but could give no convincing account of how this transmission of thought took place. Riesenfeld makes plain how the cult provided a centre for the different manifestations of Israelite faith.

Secondly one would note how, in contrast with earlier criticism, little account is taken of influences from without Israel. The whole complex of messianic and eschatological thought is explained from within the experience of Israel, and the foreign influences are regarded as peripheral. The book has a synthetic approach which is very welcome. Rather than analyse the messianic ideas into different sources, periods and influences, Riesenfeld tries to grasp the totality of the messianic faith.

For this reason the book will seem unconvincing to those who insist on the more traditional methods of approach. Those who believe our first step must be to date our sources and separate them according to the influences visible in them will be surprised to find Ugaritic texts and late material from the Midrashim coming alike as grist to Riesenfeld's mill. And those who are unconvinced will be able to show some reason for their scepticism, for in several places Riesenfeld, like some others of the same school, shows a lack of care in the treatment of evidence and a distressing tendency to leap to conclusions. On p. 31, for example, while demonstrating that joy is the central trait of the Feast of Tabernacles, he mentions how David danced before the ark during the Israelite autumn feast. Now there is no statement whatever in the Bible that the dancing before the ark took place at the autumn festival, and on p. 47 Riesenfeld admits that this is only 'probable'. It is in fact fairly probable, and if one

agrees with Riesenfeld's general theory it is very probable; but one should not use one's probable conclusions as evidence to argue from. In the same way there are places in the book where one's feeling is rather of astonishment at the ingenuity used than of conviction that the case is proved. But it is mainly in the details that these imaginative excesses appear, and the reviewer feels that the broad lines of Riesenfeld's treatment, both of the elements derived from the cult and of their reapplication in the transfiguration, are correct.

Lastly, this treatment should be suggestive for those studying the Christian witness of the Old Testament. We have here a study of Israelite religion in messianic terms, not in the sense of prediction of the future, nor by any reading back of Christian theology into the pages of the Old Testament, but in an understanding that the central cultic reality in Israel was in fact messianic and in its disintegration left fragments of messianic thought which could be, and as in the transfiguration were, reintegrated in a new messianism, which was yet still the old.

JAMES BARR

The Times, Life and Thought of Patrick Forbes, Bishop of Aberdeen, 1618-1635. By W. G. SINCLAIR SNOW. S.P.C.K. 20s.

IT is surprising that Patrick Forbes has had to wait so long for a modern biographer. He is hardly less interesting than Leighton, and he lived at a time when the relations between Episcopacy and Presbytery were not so embittered as they afterwards became, and when an accommodation was perhaps still practical. Indeed he was himself a living example of accommodation. Dr Snow describes him as 'the Episcopalian who was also a Presbyterian', and has found it a labour of love to study a man who 'has much to offer towards the cause of unity . . . in particular between the old Episcopalian Church in Scotland and the Presbyterian Church which became the established church of the land after the Revolution of 1688.'

Patrick Forbes, heir of the Laird of Corse, Aberdeenshire, was cousin of Andrew Melville, studied under him in Glasgow and St. Andrews, and shared his exile for the Presbyterian cause in 1603. For a time he retired to his ancestral estate to meditate on the sad state of religion around him. Only after much hesitation did he accept ordination by the Bishop of Aberdeen as minister of Keith, moved principally by a sense of the lack of ministers in that part of the country, offering an opportunity to Romanist propaganda of which he was a strenuous opponent. In 1618 he accepted the Bishopric of Aberdeen from James VI, becoming alike by birth and learning, wisdom and character the ornament of his order in the First

Episcopal period. Always loyal to the Throne, he accepted the Episcopal system which King James had succeeded in introducing, not as something necessary to the Church's being, but as something likely to promote peace in the Church and to prove effective in the church's work. Likewise he supported James's liturgical proposals as things indifferent in themselves but likely to be religiously helpful, but had little sympathy with the attempt of Charles I and his doctrinaire advisors to hurry matters, to their own ruin. He did not however feel himself to be in a position to offer opposition to his royal master.

As Bishop of Aberdeen he developed a fruitful activity which deserves to be remembered with gratitude. Always concerned for the provision of an adequately trained parochial ministry, he reorganised King's College and made his influence felt also in Marischal College. In the Diocese he worked harmoniously with and through the existing Church Courts, the Synod and the Presbyteries, and sought to win malcontents by conciliatory methods. He succeeded in gathering round him a group of learned irenically-minded men like himself, 'the Aberdeen Doctors', who defended his ideal of a moderate episcopacy and resisted the National Covenant and its supporters. Perhaps his influence may still be traced in the fact that Episcopacy is stronger in Aberdeenshire today than in any other part of Scotland.

Whatever we may think of the system Forbes accepted—not for itself but for the higher end of the religious good of Scotland—he is himself worthy of all admiration; and he has been fortunate in his biographer. Dr Snow has contrived to give a convincing account of the religious leader wrestling with the difficulties of a time of controversy and increasing bitterness; and he has succeeded in the hazardous task of unravelling the tangled policies of the rival parties in a narrative at once clear, reliable and completely impartial.

JOHN H. S. BURLEIGH

Principalities and Powers. By E. GORDON RUPP. Epworth Press. 7s. 6d.

WHATEVER else we may say about Mr Rupp, he is an arresting writer. This is due largely to his vivid and original style. We may find it entertaining or irritating, but it is certainly not dull. Yet that is not all, for Mr Rupp is in touch with exciting ideas for which his style is perhaps a not unsuitable weapon. He looks out over the past and present, and instead of the smooth development postulated by a former age, he sees an almost apocalyptic content. The book, which is the published version of some broadcast talks, presents us

with what is in the strict sense a Christian view of history. Past, present and future are all set against the New Testament and the Christian Gospel. The resultant picture is a sombre and challenging one. But it is also a confident one. And the confidence is not that of 'liberal' reservations, but of a faith which sees the life of the resurrection as already present, and Christ seated at the right hand of God. There is, of course, no academic discussion of the themes presented. In that sense the book does not give us anything new. But as a tract for the times it could hardly be more relevant or effective.

G. W. Bromiley

Johann Sebastian Bach as a Biblical Interpreter. By William H. Scheide. Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1952. Pp. 40. 75c.

The art of Bach was a unique meeting place of consummate musical skill and of profound Christian faith. The Cantor of the Thomaskirche in Leipzig was a preacher who used his music in the proclamation of the Gospel, and every note of music which came from his pen was offered to the glory of God. In the newest of the Princeton Pamphlet series a Christian layman-musician has explored briefly the ways in which Bach used the Bible, and how his Biblical music is the indispensable key to the understanding of this most Christian of artists.

Scheide finds the meaning of Bach's greatness in the sense of *purposiveness* with which he filled his music, and he explores some of the ways in which this sense of purpose was directed to the presentation of Biblical texts. From the 200 Cantatas which Bach wrote for the Lutheran liturgy and from the Passions and other vocal works, but also from the organ works which portray Biblical pictures, Scheide has selected examples to show the unusual depth of understanding which Bach brought to the interpretation of passages from the Psalms, the Prophets, and the New Testament. But he does not make sufficiently clear the close relation which these works bore to the liturgical setting for which they were mostly written. Just as the Passions were musical settings of the actual Biblical narrative with added commentary in the form of choruses and arias, the Cantatas were also related by Biblical reference or by the use of chorale-stanzas to the message of the liturgical Gospel for the Sunday or festival on which they were sung. The Cantata was, indeed, a musical sermon; and where Bach supplied the music the organ-loft was no less worthy a preacher than the pulpit.

The Biblical references in Bach's works are so many (and they appear in allusion or in paraphrase more often than in direct quotation) that any attempt to show their extent requires very careful

definition. Scheide has tried to exercise such definition, but the 118 'principal settings' of Bible texts which he lists in an appendix provide only about two-thirds of the direct quotations from Luther's version of the Bible which are to be found in Bach's texts. Nevertheless Scheide shows us enough of Bach's Biblical exposition to explain why Nathan Söderblom could speak of his music as a 'fifth Evangelist' and why Werner Richter can hold that Bach has been the only man who has ever *fully* succeeded in interpreting Luther's theology to men of a later generation.

ROLAND F. SCHLUETER

St. Teresa of Jesus, and other Essays and Addresses. By E. ALLISON PEERS. Faber & Faber. 25s. net.

THE perennial charm of St. Teresa is proved by the books that continue to be written about her and her works after four centuries. Professor Allison Peers has accentuated the saint's magnetic qualities by giving us more of that detailed personal information we dearly love, and by showing us the surroundings in which she lived and moved. To see the saint as her contemporaries saw her, we must go first, not to her mystical treatises nor even to her autobiography—however revealing the latter may be—but rather to her *Foundations* and (to a less extent) to her Letters—and that is what Professor Peers has done. His third long and scholarly essay on 'St. Teresa's Style' is obviously intended for the reader who can enjoy her works in the original Spanish.

To read of Teresa's monumental labours as the foundress of the Discalced Carmelites is to be reminded that mystics of that calibre may yet be people of strong natural sagacity. In addition, Teresa was blest with a keen sense of humour which never failed her even when travelling over sixteenth-century Spanish roads in her quaint mule-drawn carriage, or when facing the unbending opposition of the authorities to her new order. Her courage and devotion to duty, as well as her practical ability can be judged from the fact that she founded seventeen convents for the Discalced within twenty years. Dominating she may have been (how could her strong character fail to dominate?) but always lovable and sympathetic and far removed from the conventional idea of sainthood.

The Letters too reflect the active side of the saint's life, but they are chiefly useful, as the author points out, for the huge portrait gallery they provide of Teresa's contemporaries and indirectly—of herself—so fearless where her Order was concerned (did she not beard King Philip himself?) so tactful, so courteous, so humorous, so deeply and unfeignedly spiritual.

The three lectures on Spanish Mysticism which follow, deal suc-

cessively with 'The Historical Problem of Spanish Mysticism', 'The Mysticism of Luis de Leon', and 'The Mystical Poetry of the Golden Age'. The problem is how to give a reason for the disappearance of great mystical literature in Spain after the astonishing outburst of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is one of those enigmas to which there is probably no solution. The writer can only suggest that the external conditions (Renaissance and Reconquest, Reformation and Counter-Reformation) happily coincided with the emergence of outstanding literary and religious genius, as in the Carmelites, St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross. In his detailed examination of the works of Luis de Leon, Professor Peers is perhaps too arbitrary and even mechanical in his judgment, for mysticism is almost impossible to define with any precision. He concludes however that Luis de Leon, though too much of the Spanish Horace to be deeply religious in the ascetic sense, has at least one mystical poem to his credit, 'Alma region luciente'. Of minor poets of the Golden Age the author demonstrates that Lope de Vega, Baltasar del Alcazar, and Valdivielso are at least touched by the mystical spirit.

More interesting to the general reader is the lecture entitled 'New Light on St. John of the Cross', a study of books produced to mark the quatercentenary of St. John in 1942, which suffered temporary oblivion owing to the war. The New Light is shed particularly on John's imprisonment in Toledo. Here is sober fact in contrast to the hagiographer's miraculous tales of the prisoner's escape. Did not the friar possess a file, and know how to use it? Of greater literary importance is the discovery of a secular pastoral poem on the basis of which John composed a touching pastoral, 'a lo divino', revealing himself as a master literary craftsman.

Included in this rich and varied volume of Essays and Addresses are three lectures on Cervantes, which tell of Cervantes' respect for the English and England's reciprocal love and admiration for the author of Don Quixote; and of Cervantes' Criticism on the Continent outside Spain, showing how to this day Spain's greatest writer is variously interpreted and variously misunderstood.

In his last essay, 'A Man of God', Professor Peers pays a moving tribute to Dom Edmund Gurdon one time prior of the Carthusian monastery of Miraflores—an Englishman who found his spiritual home in Spain, and whose saintly, detached life left a deep impression.

Only a Hispanist of the magnitude of Professor Peers could have produced this book. It is a mine of information on Spanish literature and a further revelation—by one competent to give it—of the greatness of the Spanish mystics.

C. R. Walker

The Life of Mary (Das Marienleben). By Rainer Maria Rilke. With English Translation by N. K. Cruickshank. Oliver and Boyd. 6s.

This cycle of poems dealing with incidents in the life of Mary makes no attempt to treat Mary historically but only as a symbol of human perfection who herself reaches a higher stage of being (represented by the angels) and whose life enriches other human lives. The activity of this purer being is here 'singen', and the cycle opens with the angels' song and ends commanding men to kneel and sing.

For Rilke life and death and all being are one. Spirit created matter by the condensation of spiritual force, whose waves connect the higher with the lower stages of being. Man, who has a share in both these worlds, realises his unique destiny by taking up the transient 'visible' objects around him and by transforming them into the 'invisible' vibrations of his nature whereby they 'introduce new vibration-numbers into the vibration-spheres of the universe', and so become eternal. This, the mysterious poetical process called 'singing' or 'praise' on these poems, involves the fullest acceptance and affirmation of everything, however repulsive, in the created world. Man increases his own share in the 'invisible' higher being by performing this task, which is urgent because the machine age is destroying rapidly the store of 'lively, experienced things that share our lives', things which alone can be transformed thus, and man has become a displaced person living in the *Leidstadt* (cf. *Waste Land*), a condition of provisional aimless existence, God being dead and the traditional world-picture shattered by the scientific outlook.

Written just before his masterpieces were begun this cycle illustrates in germ form much of Rilke's attempt to solve modern man's problem in its own terms without either turning aside and imposing some non-integrated metaphysic or abandoning the spiritual side of man which he instinctively perceives. Mary symbolises man's attempt to escape from the transience of this world and gain absolute eternal significance. We cannot accept Rilke's solution, however, because he resolutely refuses to admit the break in the universe caused by sin and also confuses aesthetic contemplation with worship. Poetry becomes a substitute for religion.

Rilke makes great use of subtle variation of rhythm and pace and the translator, faced with an especially hard task, has succeeded in large measure in re-expressing these in English. Invariably faithful as to the meaning, he rarely has recourse to unnatural expression for the sake of metre or rhyme.

A. T. Mackay

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